Migration and Interculturality in Great Britain, Germany, and Spain
Case Studies in the World of Labour

- Project Report -

Financed by Volkswagen Foundation and Anglo-German Foundation

Translated by Lisa Grow, Carolyn Moore, Erika von Rautenfeld, and Agnieska Zimowska

Göttingen – Barcelona – Keele, February 2003
Contents

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter I: Western Europe – Its Transformation into a Region of Immigration ........................................ 4

  1. “Migration” and “Migration Policy”: A Limitation and Delimitation of Vague Terms ........................................ 7
     1.1 Migration – a Multifaceted Phenomenon ......................................................................................... 7
     1.2 Migration Policy – a Wide-Ranging Field ...................................................................................... 13

  2. Migration and Migration Policy in West European States: The Process of Alignment .................................. 17
     2.1 Case Study “Great Britain” .............................................................................................................. 21
     2.2 Case Study “Germany” .................................................................................................................. 28
     2.3 Case Study „Spain” .......................................................................................................................... 34

  3. Migration and Asylum Policy in the European Integration Process: The Long Road to Amsterdam ............. 44

  4. Conclusion: The Transformation into a Region of Immigration – and even a Move Toward More Open Societies? ......................................................................................... 50

Chapter II: Multiculturalism or Interculturalism? The Social and Political Situation in Britain, Germany and Spain ........................................................................................................................................ 53

  1. Social and Political Constructions: Classifications, Attributes and Self-Assessments ............................... 55
     1.1 Social Constructions between Everyday Perceptions, Political and Scientific Discourses ........................................ 55
     1.2 Multiculturality versus Interculturality: Confusion over Terminology in Political and Scientific Debate .................. 63

  2. The legal, Political and Social Position of Immigrants in the Case Study countries ..................................... 66

  3. Political Debates and Conflicts at the Millennium: Impressions from Britain, German, and Spain ............... 79
     3.1 The Political Atmosphere .................................................................................................................. 79
     3.2 Xenophobic Resentments as Reflected in Comparisons of Attitudes in the Different Countries .................. 84
     3.3 September 11th 2001 – an Aside ........................................................................................................ 86

  4. Summary: Internally Open Societies? ........................................................................................................... 88

Chapter III: Company Case Studies: Structure of the Empirical Investigation ................................................. 92

  1. Initial Questions, Conceptual Structure and Aim of the Case Studies .......................................................... 93

  2. Methodological Approach ........................................................................................................................... 99

  3. Companies Being Studied: Making Contact, Denials and Access .............................................................. 105
     3.1 Survey Company “Michel Motors” ..................................................................................................... 107
     3.2 Survey Company “AutoCat” ............................................................................................................. 110
     3.3 Survey Company “Textil S.A.” .......................................................................................................... 112
     3.4 Survey Company “Special Motor Plant” ............................................................................................ 114
4. The Interviewees: The Composition of the Samples ................................................. 116
5. Presentation of the Results and the Process of Evaluation................................. 123

Chapter IV: Personal Situation of the Industrial Workers................................. 126
1. The structural Side of Personal Circumstances................................................. 126
   1.1 Education – Profession – Income: the Social Status of the Interviewees ...... 128
   1.2 Social Inequalities
       Do They Follow Patterns Based on Gender or Migration?......................... 134
2. The “Subjective” Side of Personal Circumstances ......................................... 147
   2.1 Social Orientations, Fears and Self-Evaluation......................................... 147
   2.2 Experiences of Discrimination Made by Respondents
       with a Background of Migration in the German case study...................... 159
3. Taking Stock: Personal Circumstances as Reflected in Structural Inequalities,
   Experience of Discrimination and the Feeling of Privilege.......................... 161

Chapter V: Interculturalism and Social Images:
   Between Individualism and a Sense of Community................................. 164
1. The Interculturalism of the German, Spanish and British Interviewees .............. 165
2. The Four Types of Attitude towards Immigration and Interculturality ............. 173
   2.1 Type 1: “The Receptive”........................................................................... 174
   2.2 Type 2: “The Tolerant Sceptics”................................................................. 180
   2.3 Type 3: “The Intolerant Individualists”..................................................... 184
   2.4 Type 4: “Rigid and Intolerant Individualists”........................................... 187
   2.5 Attitude Potential and Types of Attitude amongst Interviewees
       with a Background of Migration................................................................. 191
3. Conceptions of Interculturalism and Political Participation............................ 194
   3.1 A Comparison of the Conceptions of Interculturalism
       in the Attitude Types – a Provisional Assessment..................................... 194
   3.2 Interculturalism Conceptions and Political Participation........................ 199
4. Immigration and Interculturality as Reflected in Group Discussions............... 203
   4.1 Between Liberality and Restriction: Conceptions
       on the Regulation of Future Migration...................................................... 203
   4.2 The “Multicultural Society”: A Functioning Reality or a Failed Model?...... 211
   4.3 Inside the company: About "good colleagues", "glass ceilings",
       and the difficulty of making complaints.................................................. 220
   4.4 Outside the Company: About “Good Friends”, “Cultural Differences”,
       and Reciprocal “Isolation”........................................................................ 232
   4.5 Who and how are "the others"?
       The construction of groups, attributes, and lines of difference...................... 237
   4.6 Under the Magnifying Glass:
       Group Dynamics, Sensitive Issues, and Specific Aspects.......................... 246
5. Conclusions: Interculturality - the "Other" Social Relationship............................. 249

Chapter VI: The Long Way to an Open Society –
   a Summary of the Most Important Results................................................. 254

Annex
Bibliography
Introduction

Migration is an issue that comes up again and again in political disputes in Western European immigration countries and is often the subject of controversy. It is defined as a problem against which society should defend itself. However, migration – according to one conclusion from sociological investigations – may have become a phenomenon which can no longer be guided and controlled effectively by national states. Migration, like goods, services and capital, is subject to the globalisation process. Another complicating factor is that international law regulates – in the meantime even more so than national legislation – who is to be allowed to enter a national territory.

Interculturality is, in turn, a topic which is brought into a connection with resentments and conflicts. Cultural differences and cultural distances between immigrant minorities and the majority societies are emphasised and also defined as a problem. The lack of incorporation of individual migrant groups into society, xenophobia and violent clashes seem to support the ideas of cultural distance and the problematic character of intercultural migration societies.

Migration and interculturality are topics subject to the ups and downs of scientific and public discussion and interest. At the turn of the millennium, they have once again become the object of special attention: after a decade-long and sometimes controversial negotiation process, the European Union member states raised, in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 migration and asylum politics to the status of an area of common policy. Thus nation-states should give up responsibility regarding this field of politics and transfer competency to the European level. What this kind of common migration and asylum politics will actually look like is still to be determined, with the year 2004 as a deadline.

The wide reaching effects of these issues now becoming an area of common European policy and of this transfer of power does not play a central role in the public discourses in the affected countries. These changes do, however, flow indirectly into the discourses. For example, the immigration countries undertook efforts at the end of the last century to deal with migration and asylum politics on a national level. The new legislation includes standardisation that takes into account the anticipated content of the planned EU common policy, some of which has already been discussed and specified by the European Commission, the groups of Ministers of Justice and Ministers of the Interior as well as the heads of government at EU summit conferences. The connection between new national legislation and the European integration process is generally not, however, communicated in public debates. Neither is it a topic of debate in the social sciences or, more precisely, in political science. What are the decisive motives that have prompted some EU member states to reform and, in some cases, newly formulate their laws regarding migration and asylum politics, particularly in light of the fact that there will be decisions on the EU-level in 2004 that will have effects on the legislation of the individual countries? Furthermore, it is striking that citizenship laws have been changed recently in many countries. The tendency is toward the principle of "ius sanguinis" in the cases in which "ius soli" was in place. A closer consideration of this political development is needed, as it can be interpreted as a kind of counter movement to the goals of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Are member states using this new legislation as an attempt to retain national competency in an area in which it is feared that national sovereignty is endangered? The question here is whether a common European policy in the field of migration and asylum politics – as was the intention in the Treaty of Amsterdam – will be established at all or if member states are not more likely to simply synchronise their individual actions in this field.

Migration and asylum politics is, in fact, a field of politics in which national sovereignty is particularly at issue. This is because what stands to be decided is who has the power of disposal over national territory and its borders and who decides on the membership in a nation-state via citizenship. Migration and flight are already seen as a threat to national sovereignty;
a shift in political competency onto the international level must surely then be seen as danger all the more. It is important at this point to consider whether migration and flight themselves are what should be considered alarming and whether a common policy in the field of migration and asylum represents a danger or if is not instead the strongly Westphalian understanding of the nation and the state that makes them into a problem. This aspect unfortunately cannot be discussed in adequate length in this study. However, it does play an important role and is present as an implicit theme throughout the investigation.

The concrete starting point for the analysis is the definition of migration and interculturality as a problem. This definition is, in the last instance, impossible to separate from the understanding of nation, state and citizenship.

Our focus lies on Western Europe and the European integration process. We have developed possible explanations for the definition of migration and interculturality as a problem from theoretical, hermeneutic and empirical directions, concentrating on a tricountry comparison and case study. The countries chosen for the study are Great Britain, Germany and Spain, each of which represents a main type of migration country in the European Union: (1) Great Britain as a post-colonial migration country, (2) Germany as country that recruited foreign workers in the 1950s to 1970s and (3) Spain as a county with a strong internal migration in the 1950s to 1970s and as a new southern European migration country. A further selection criterion was the different position of each country in the process of European integration. Each of the three countries exhibits specific features in its migration history, migration system and political development, but the criteria named above are the ones that characterise them all decidedly as migration countries. It was of particular interest in the choice of case countries that they are different in terms of the development of migration, migration systems and migration politics. Even if a structural and political adjustment towards similarity in Western European migration countries, including the new destination countries, can be detected since about the mid-1970s, the divergences have not be overcome completely and these affect current migration politics. The goal here is to investigate whether these differences also lead to different understandings of migration and interculturality or if commonalties can be found that displace possible divergences.

We have taken a close look at the history of migration and at migration politics after World War II in each of the three countries, tracing the controversial negotiation process that led to the Treaty of Amsterdam. The focus here is on the political dealings with and the political understanding of migration and flight. Further, we have paid attention to the manner in which society deals with migration and interculturality, examining it according to several perspectives. Most important are the questions of (1) social and political constructions that are related to immigration and interculturality. Which ascriptions are relevant in every day life? How and when are immigrants assigned to specific groups and ascribed particular characteristics? What role does the concept of culture play? Which constructions become powerful in the context of xenophobia and anti-foreigner resentments? In the end at issue is the construction of the “Other” in opposition to the construction of the “Self”. This is an important point in (2) the discussion of citizenship in the three countries and how immigrants and descendant generations are incorporated into and/or excluded from society as well as how migration control and social selection are carried out with the instrument of citizenship. Last but not least, we collected (3) impressions from the public discourse and social conflicts in order to capture the tenor of opinions about migration and interculturality. These are supplemented by the results of the Eurobarometer opinion polls.

All this was important to make the political and social background of the empirical case studies clear. The case study was carried out with employees in three car manufacturing plants and one clothing manufacturing plant in Great Britain, Germany and Spain. With one exception the make-up of the plant workforce was interculturally structured. We wanted to know whether the social constructions that we analysed on the societal level could be found in
the interviewees’ attitudes and patterns of argumentation. Other issues were the understanding of interculturalism as a social condition and the question of whether the interviewees differentiated between the everyday experience at work and the assessment of interculturality on a societal level. In order to investigate to what degree the interviewees understood interculturality as social condition of a specific kind, we gathered data on their attitudes on other social conditions – like gender relations – and compared them. We were further interested in analysing the concepts of interculturality we could find in the beliefs expressed and in connecting these to the interviewees’ life prospects, social interests and general ideas about society. Our goal was to find explanations for the development of both open as well as intolerant or xenophobic ideas about interculturality and interculturalism.

Altogether 923 industrial employees of various national backgrounds took part in a standardised written survey that gathered quantitative information about their views. 54 of these persons took part in group discussions, in which the participants’ patterns of argumentation regarding immigration and interculturality were the focus. The arrangement of the empirical part of the study was based on the experience and the methodological procedure of a study carried out in a German car manufacturing plant between 1996 and 1998. It served as a pre-study for the this comparative analysis (cf. U. Birstl/ S. Ottens/ K. Sturhan 1999).

This comparative study grew out of a joint project between scientists at the Center for European and North American Studies (ZENS) at the Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, the Department of Sociology at the University Autònoma de Barcelona, the Institute for German Studies of the University of Birmingham and Keele University and carried out in close co-operation with trade unions and employee interest representation.

This study was financed by the German Volkswagen Foundation and the British Anglo-German-Foundation (AGF). Die AGF financed a subproject of the entire study that was carried out under the title of “Preventing racial discrimination at the workplace: Examining the problem of employee interest representation of migrant workers in Germany and ethnic minority groups in Britain in selected car manufacturing plants”. This subproject was methodologically integrated into the larger study.
Chapter I: Western Europe –
Its Transformation into a Region of Immigration

Until the end of the Second World War, Western Europe with the exception of Switzerland and France was primarily a region of emigration. Beginning in the post-war period, Western European countries gradually developed into countries of immigration. This transformation took place even in the traditional countries of emigration such as Italy and Spain during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Only Portugal and Greece still have a negative migration balance, that is, a higher rate of emigration than immigration. Ireland, another traditional country of emigration, increasingly has become a desirable destination for migrants since the turn of the millennium.

To a large degree, this transformation was filled with tensions and conflicts. To this day, migration remains a topic constantly subject to political scandalisation even though immigration has been necessary and therefore desired. It is striking that although individual countries have differently structured migration systems, their policies of immigration and asylum are quite similar. One likely reason may be that many Western European states do not identify themselves as countries of immigration, and thus this primacy is then reflected in their policy. In the past, this has been true for post-colonial immigrant-receiving countries such as Great Britain as well as for the leading country of sought out for migration and asylum in Western Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany, which after long tortuous debate, in 1998 finally recognised itself as a country of immigration.

Since about the mid-Eighties, the development of individual Western European nations into countries of immigration can be observed together with the transformation of Western Europe as a whole into a consolidated region of immigration. This consolidation is visible along four lines of development: (1) The migration systems of the countries of immigration are all undergoing a process of convergence. In the past, the migration system of each individual country had its own specific characteristics based on the historical relationship between the country of origin and the country of destination, such as colonial and post-colonial ties or the expulsion and flight from fascism and war. Meanwhile from the 1950s until the 1970s, some countries, such as France, the Netherlands and Germany, actively recruited foreign labour from specifically selected countries. These labour recruitment programs were intended to be temporary and address the needs of the labour market, however it has had long-term consequences. Altogether, this has shaped the migration situation in the individual countries somewhat differently. At the latest since the mid-Eighties, it has become clear that the historical context is increasingly losing its significance, and instead, migration systems are undergoing structural changes with a central focus on the migrant-sending countries. In other words, places in which intercontinental immigration has dominated – for instance, in France, the Netherlands, or Great Britain – there a shift to an internal European migration. And in places where this was prevalent in the past, now experience increased intercontinental migration, for example in the Scandinavian countries or in Germany. In the course of this development, older migration networks between the migrant-sending countries and the migrant-receiving countries are breaking apart and being replaced by new migration chains and networks (2) As early as the mid-Seventies, it can be observed that individual countries began to move closer towards developing a migration policy. The impetus for this shift emerged in the migrant labour recruiting countries after termination of the recruitment programs between 1972 and 1974 during the period of the so-called Oil Crisis and the ensuing economic recession which was accompanied by massive unemployment. From here on, immigration policy was directed toward sealing-off national borders leading then to a situation in which Western European states sometimes acted contrary to each other’s interests. As a result, a spiral of increasingly restrictive immigration policies was set in motion for which the region of Western Europe
Chapter I: Western Europe

gained the title, “Fortress Europe.” One consequence of this political direction led to nearly all countries outside of the OECD to become subjected to a visa requirement. Additionally, first the Western European countries followed in particular by the neighbouring Eastern European states in connection with their role as transit countries, were required by compulsory bilateral and multilateral “Re-admission Agreements” to intercept all potential migrants travelling without a valid visa in their country or, after they had crossed the border, to accept these people back. The Eastern European countries then correspondingly reacted in a by signing comparable agreements with their other eastern neighbours. In this manner, a broad belt was created around the region of the present-day European Union, making it extremely difficult for migrants to enter into the region (3) On account of this policy, the Western European countries of immigration only had two “gates of entry,” either via family reunion, a right guaranteed by international law, or via the right to asylum. Not until the Nineties did these countries reopen a narrow gate of entry to foreign labour migration. Yet at the same tim, the right to asylum was restricted by the so-called “third-state regulation.” (4) Probably the most decisive line of development during this process of consolidation was that all of the changes mentioned above were no longer embedded in the individual nation-states, but rather, they became part of the European integration process. This cam to a provisional culmination with the “Amsterdam Contract,” which was signed by all fifteen European Union member states in 1997 and put into effect in 1999. Under this contract, migration and asylum policy became a fully “shared interest” and thus an obligation of the entire European Community. As a result, individual nation-states are to be absolved of responsibility in decisive areas in this field of policy - according to the conception of the European Commission - and they are to be placed instead under the jurisdiction of the European Union. By the year 2004, we shall see just how this policy will look in detail, how much authority will be shifted to the communal level, and how willingly individual states will acquiesce their authority. Before then, according to this agreement, a joint and legally binding migration and refugee policy must be formulated and accepted through a consensus procedure by all EU member states. So far, the path to Amsterdam was difficult and ridden with conflict (see Section 3).

As a consequence, the migration systems of immigrant-receiving countries are, on the one hand, slowly but steadily becoming more structurally similar even as this process of convergence is bolstered and guided by policies of the individual states. On the other hand, some areas in the field of migration and refugee policy of the individual nation-states are being subordinated to a co-ordinated, supranational policy that may become a joint European Union policy in the future. The signs seem to point toward the consolidation of Western Europe into a region of immigration.

However, it is not yet clear whether this development also implies that Western Europe consequently will present itself as a region of open societies. The storm clouds can be interpreted in various ways. Currently, we see controversial and heated debates over immigration and asylum taking place within the separate countries. Public discussions oscillate between scandalising the phenomenon of migration, on the one side, and calls to approve increasing levels of immigration again and for a greater national investment to incorporate immigrants on the other. These discussions are often accompanied by solidarity campaigns, but by resentment, xenophobia and racism as well. Therefore, one can describe the situation within the individual societies as being quite tense.

Hence, this is the political and social background of this report based on three case studies on migration and the accompanying construction of the “Other” and the “Self” in Great Britain, Germany and Spain. These three countries – and this will become clearer in the following sections – are well suited for this study since they represent the three main types of countries of immigration with respect to circumstances related to their historical past in Western Europe as well as within the European Union. Together they represent (1) a country characterised by post-colonial immigration (Great Britain), (2) a country having a foreign labour recruitment
programme from the 1950s until the 1970s (Germany), and (3) a former country of emigration which recently became a country of immigration also having significant internal migration in the past (Spain). In addition, the migration structures of these countries illustrate characteristic features. The structure in Great Britain, for example, is relatively heterogeneous and primarily marked by intercontinental immigration, a characteristic of countries having post-colonial immigration. In Germany, on the other hand, the structure is less heterogeneous. There is a dominant group of immigrants, as is usually the case for countries which recruit labour from specific countries. In this case, the dominate group is Turks. In absolute terms and proportionally, however, the Aussiedlerinnen and Aussiedler (ethnic Germans coming back to Germany after their ancestors have emigrated two to seven hundred years earlier) from Eastern Europe, who according to Article 116 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz (GG)), “ethnically belong to the German people,” constitute the largest group. Only since the beginning of the 1990s, have they been reclassified in political discourse as a migration group. This type of “ethnic migration” is, moreover, unique to the immigration circumstances in Germany. Overall, most immigration to Germany is from other European countries. Spain, on the other hand, has a mixed structure. This means that immigration to this country is both intercontinental, such as from North Africa and Latin America, and intra-continental, coming from Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, this structure can be described as “semi-heterogeneous” and is comparable to Italy, which has also recently become a country of immigration.

While Spain with its present migration structure already represents an immigrant-receiving country that is mainly characterised by inter- and intra-continental migration, the first signs of this type of mixed structure are only beginning to appear in the other two countries. For Great Britain, this means that there is an increasing proportion of immigration from other European countries, especially from Eastern and Southeastern Europe. While Germany has a rising share of intercontinental, or more specifically, Asian immigration. In other words, the processes of convergence and shift in the migration systems of these three countries summarised above can be easily mapped out.

As will be shown in the following analyses, these three countries also represent the differing positions of the EU-member states in the European integration process, and thus the process of consolidating Western Europe into a region of immigration as well. Great Britain along with Ireland and Denmark represents the so-called “Euro-sceptics.” Although they certainly wield political influence within the EU, nonetheless, in agreements and treaties they are granted special status in numerous ways. Germany together with the Benelux-countries and France belongs to the so-called “European core.” These countries are considered to have the ability to exert immense influence on and ultimately even formulate EU policy. They are, moreover, the founding countries of the precursor to the EC/EU, the European Economic Community, which was established in 1957. An additional founding member was Italy, which however, is in a similar position as Spain in the European integration process. In 1986, Spain became a member of the EC in the wake of its southward expansion and neither belongs to the group of “Euro-sceptics” nor to the “European core.” Instead, Spain tends to find itself grouped together with other South European countries, but also with the Scandinavian countries, which are on the periphery of the power radius. Spain, nevertheless, pursues a pro-Europe foreign policy agenda and is attempting to increase its significance within the EU. This was especially evident during the Spanish EU-presidential term during the first half of 2002. In comparison to Italy, Spain had shown more continuity in its European policy and in its relationship to the EU.

The aspects mentioned above will be examined in greater detail in the following sections of this chapter and more intensely for these three countries. This will be conducted within the context of an empirical study focussing on the development of migration and policy in the three countries. The second chapter will cover the social, that is, the sociological context in which immigration into these countries takes place. Further, it will discuss the manner in
which this context is reflected in social constructions, attitudes, conflicts and patterns of inclusion and exclusion to which immigrants are subjected. Both chapters form the analytical framework for the empirical case studies, which focus primarily on the intercultural structure of the work environment in industrial factories, and in which they can be placed.

Additionally, both chapters are devoted to the central question of whether the political and social developments offer evidence to suggest that Great Britain, Germany and Spain are changing into externally and internally open societies. In Chapters IV and V we will examine whether or not the results from this part of the study can be found in the empirical results of the case studies.

1. “Migration” and “Migration Policy”: A Limitation and Delimitation of Vague Terms

What exactly does it mean for a society to be externally or internally open? And, what does this have to do with migration and migration policy?

According to Seifert, migration and how migration is dealt with indicates the degree of openness present in a society.

“Migration stands for the external openness or exclusivity of societies, whereas integration reflects the internal openness or exclusivity of a society. This rests on the assumption that there is a close connection between the external and internal dimension of openness and exclusivity” (own translation, W. Seifert 2000, 19-20).

Strictly speaking “migration” is not the central criterion for measuring the external and internal exclusivity or openness of a society. More important is how migration is dealt with in the political arena, namely the migration policy that creates a closed or open society. However, concrete definitions of migration and of migration policy have not been clearly clarified in either politics or in migration research.

1.1 Migration – a Multifaceted Phenomenon

Our study deals with three conceptual levels dealing with the phenomenon of “migration.” These include (1) the level of politics, (2) the level of sociology, and (3) the level of political science. Perceptions of migration vary greatly between these areas, particularly as a result of their different approaches to and interests in this phenomenon.

In the political context, the term migration generally refers to voluntary relocation. Here flight from political persecution, war or environmental catastrophes are set apart as so-called involuntary relocation (cf. B. Santel 1995, 22, 24). In contrast, the prevailing view in migration research is that this differentiation is conceptually not very useful and lacks clear divisions. This, for the most part, rests upon three assumptions: (1) Voluntary migration is usually equated with labour migration and therefore excludes, for instance, gender specific aspects of migration. As one can find familial motives along with the economic reasons that lead women to migrate from their country of origin. Such motives are present, for example, when a women follows her husband or future husband or when she wants to flee familial constraints (2) The use of the term “voluntary” always implies a certain amount of scope for decision-making and

---

1 The conclusions made in this Chapter are based in large part on a second study, “Migration and migration policy in the European integration process.” The focus of this earlier study is the assimilation and consolidation process inside the European Union as well as on the question of how supranational and nation-state politics are interconnected and how this differently affects the member states depending on their position in the integration process. In this study, Great Britain, Germany and Spain are also the central countries examined (cf. U. Birsl, 2003).

2 Here the terms relocation and migration are used synonymously.
actions as well as for alternative decisions and actions. Whether these are always present in decisions concerning economic migration is questionable. When the conditions in one’s country of origin are such that personal survival or the survival of one’s family are uncertain, then there is very little or no freedom of decision or action. Thus migration can be a consequence imposed by one’s living conditions. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary migration assumes an ability to demarcate political and economic conditions, a reality that seldom exists. Recent examples on the European continent illustrate the very flexibility of such distinctions. For instance, do we consider the “the citizens of Albania who left their homeland in 1996/97 hoping to find refuge in Italy to be ‘mere’ labour migrants seeking better working conditions and higher wages or to be refugees forced to migrate as a result of the hopeless conditions in their society?” (own translation, A. Treibel 1999, 20). A similar question can be raised with regard to migrants from Bosnia, Kosovo or the Kurdish region of Turkey. Are they fleeing because their lives are endangered by military conflict, or are they migrating because these conflicts have deprived them of a material basis necessary for survival?

A distinction between migration and flight or between voluntary and involuntary migration is futile from a social scientific perspective. Nevertheless, such distinctions will appear repeatedly in this study, since they play a central role in legal legislation and political measures on immigration as well as in attempts to regulate and control migration and incorporation policies.

While “migration” is the broader term for migratory movements, the term “immigration” denotes the entry and resettlement into a nation-state. However, at which point one can talk about immigration has not been uniformly demarcated in Western European countries. There only appears to be universal agreement that immigration denotes a complete change in one’s residence, at what moment this takes place, however, is interpreted differently. In general, entry into a country with the intention of staying for a fixed duration of time is considered immigration. Definitions of this “duration” vary from three months as, for example, in Belgium, Denmark or Spain, to six months as in the Netherlands, or to twelve months as in Portugal, Finland, Sweden or Great Britain. In addition, some countries require an officially authorised residency permit. Yet in the case of Germany, the most important criterion is to have a permanent and registered place of residence (cf. U. Birsl 2005, Appendix I). In the past, the United Nations has pleaded for the creation of a universal definition of immigration. Although the member states took note of this plea, it has not yet been put into action for the purpose of determining the criteria for entry into a nation-state and for recording statistical data. Since 1960, the UNO has simply defined immigration and relocation as a change of residence for a period of more than five years (cf. P. Han 2000, 7).

The time factor also plays a role in research directed at defining migration. However, here no periods of time have been set, rather, what counts is a long-term change of residency, essentially a change in the focal point of one’s everyday life. Along with the time dimension (1), Treibel also denotes additional dimensions of migration: (2) geographical distance and spatial mobility; (3) the causes, motives and aims of migration, in short, the push and pull factors; as well as (4) the scope of the migratory movement (cf. A. Treibel 1999, 20-21).

Geographical distance and spatial mobility (2), on the one hand, allude to migration over long distances, national borders, and continents, namely the geographical expansion of migratory movements. On the other hand, it refers to the spatial aspect, which includes the “out-migration” from a structurally weak economic area and the “in-migration” into area of industrial concentration. This type of spatial mobility may refer to migration within a country, that

---

3 The criteria “residency permit” and “permanent residence” generally exclude refugees from the process of gaining recognition. As they can only obtain a residency permit after their status is recognised. The same is true for the German case regarding the acquisition of a permanent place of residence since only “home owners,” “tenants,” or “sublease tenants” can register themselves. Refugees in Germany count among this group because they are housed in group lodgings.
is, internal migration, to migration into a transnational economic area, or to international migration in the geographical sense. In the final analysis, we are dealing with a change of residency that involves the crossing of political borders (cf. among others, P. Han 2000, 9). Like the time dimension, the spatial dimension cannot be quantified, as for example, by kilometre measurements and so forth.

While the time and geographical-spatial dimensions tend to be secondary dimensions of migration, the push and pull factor as well as the scope of a migratory movement are considered to be of central importance. However, the significance of push and pull factors (3) has been contested. Included here are the push factors in the country of origin, such as comparatively worse labour market conditions, lower wages, an unstable political situation or environmental catastrophes. Meanwhile, pull factors to the targeted country of destination are understood to be more favourable conditions for finding employment, the possibility of earning better wages, and a more stable political situation and environmental conditions. There is growing scepticism whether push and pull factors can offer sufficient explanations for migratory movements and their direction, namely their target.

Thus, according to Pries (cf. 1997, 15ff.) and Faist (cf. 1997, 63ff.), from push and pull factors it cannot be determined why only a few residents of certain countries, regions or localities migrate, while others living in the same conditions do not; and further, why certain countries are selected as destinations, even though another country offers equal or, in some cases, even better conditions. In their view, decisions to migrate and the destinations chosen can only be explained by the existence of transnational social spaces (Pries) and transnational migration networks (Faist). Together they have the capacity to set up social spaces over vast geographical distances and across state and continental borders and to create interactive networks of communication and information exchange. These networks, moreover, serve to make resources available for migration, such as financial means, contacts, and reception networks in the country of destination. For Faist, transnational social networks form the meso-level, that is, the link between individual decisions to migrate (the micro-level) and overarching political, economic, and cultural structures on an international scale (the macro-level). This has been absent in earlier studies of migration movements (cf. Th. Faist 1997, 73).

These migration networks in transnational social spaces, in effect, should be indispensable for migratory movements, regardless of whatever motives may exist. In contrast to what is often suggested in scientific reports, these networks are not new phenomena. They can be observed in a more concentrated form since the beginning of the nineteenth century, especially during the mass transatlantic migration from the European continent to North America. A precondition for this was a level of technological development that enabled transnational connections within these networks which could even cross the Atlantic. “The concentration of the networks was crucially promoted through an increasing density of transnational transportation, trade and banking ties after the end of the Napoleonic Wars.” (own translation, Bade 2000, 133) This infrastructure allowed for the provision of economic and social resources to the next group of immigrants.

All this, however, takes the presence of a previous group of pioneer migrants for granted, who had to manage without a network in a transnational social space. This pioneer migration is likewise attached to various prerequisites, in which push and pull factors play a central role

---

4 Pries and Faist focus on different research perspectives: While Pries emphasises the spatial relationship between country of origin and the country of destination, Faist is concerned with the systemic-theoretical question of why international migration takes place at all and what explanations there are for it, and further, under what conditions international migration could cease. Both authors emphasise, however, that their approaches can complement each other. According to Pries, “... the meso-level of social ties suggested by Faist can explain non-migration as well as the fundamental significance that the pluri-local, which support connection for interaction in transnational social spaces between the countries of origin and destination, have for positive migration decisions.” (L. Pries 1997, 36; cf. Th. Faist 1997, 81) In the following, we will employ this suggestion by looking at migration networks within a transnational social space.
(A) Pioneer migrants must have access to a relatively generous financial resources and social capital — for example, education, vocational qualifications and knowledge of a foreign language — in order to be able to migrate in the first place. Further, their knowledge of the country of destination must be quite extensive in order for them to be able to assess whether their education and qualifications will be useful in the new place and to evaluate whether job market conditions and wage potentials are favourable. (B) The society of origin must be at a stage of development in which those willing to migrate have the opportunity to accumulate the required financial resources and social capital. (C) The historical links between the country of origin and the potential receiving country determine to a great extent the destination targeted by pioneer migrants. In particular, colonial and/or post-colonial relationships reinforce the economic push and pull factors. In this case, knowledge over the destination country is already available or easy to obtain; the same is true for the language. Often pioneer migrants have spent time in the state of the former colonial power or have passed through a comparable educational system and even much more. If pioneer migration is initiated through labour recruitment programmes, then the resource expenditure for the migrants is not quite so high. In this case, the push and pull factors are clearly in the foreground and often gain greater significance through the support services offered in the recruiting country (e.g. jobs, assistance in acquiring housing, residency and/or work permits).

Only after this pioneer migration has gathered momentum and the immigrants have permanently settled will others follow from the same place of origin— usually members of the immediate or extended family. In this manner, a so-called chain migration can be established forming a migration network and thereby a transnational social space. Immigrants following afterwards do not need to have access to the same extent of financial means and vocational qualifications as do the pioneer migrants. This is also the reason that the first group of immigrants from a particular region is always composed of relatively highly qualified individuals, and thereafter, the migrants’ level of education and training is lower in chain migration. This “ground rule” holds true at least for migration to Western industrialised nations, since in order to migrate to these highly developed societies, a certain amount of financial and social capital is necessary. Therefore, migration out of poverty stricken regions into Western Europe, North America and Oceania can only take place regionally.

Despite the relativisation of the push and pull factors, they should not be underestimated, at least for pioneer migration. When compared with the other factors in the country of destination, they are, however, also at the forefront. A study commissioned by the European Commission showed that the conditions of entry and reception, for instance, could be either pull or deterrence factors - depending upon their political intention – and they were not important criteria in the process of selecting a country of destination. Compared with this, however, the wage differential to the region of origin and the applicability of educational and professional degrees in the targeted labour market were of central importance. If these pull factors can not be sufficiently found, then it might cause potential migrants to give up the decision to migrate or to consider a different destination, and this can also take place within an existing transnational migration network (cf. J. Schoorl et al. 2000, 88-89).

Altogether this means that migration causes, motives, and goals are dependent on both push and pull factors as well as the historical and political relations between the country of origin and the country of destination. Further this also rests on the possibility that migration networks develop in a transnational social space.

This also directly influences the scope of migration (4), the last of the dimensions discussed by Treibel for determining migration. From a sociological point of view, migration can

---

5 For this reason, in 1999 just about 17.2% of the nearly 13 million refugees and migrants worldwide were able to enter one of the fifteen EU member states. In contrast, 28% sought refuge outside their countries in African countries, more than 37% in the Asian regions and still almost 18% in the eastern and south-eastern part of Europe (cf. United Nations 2000, 35)
really only be spoken of if it takes on collective forms, becomes a social phenomena, and is carried by social relationships. This leads to two different consequences: (A) Migration first becomes visible as a sociological phenomenon once chain migration has begun. Pioneer migration as such often cannot be recognised if it only appears as individual migration in which the social context is still unclear (B) In such a way, a decision to migrate must linked to social relationships in order for it to be considered a valid sociological phenomenon. This means that the decision to migrate must be collectively reached and, as a result, shared in the country of origin. This takes place, for example through family or neighbourhood connections as well as in initiating further decisions to migrate because of these social relationships, for instance, within the context of a family strategy or a network. Thereby the scope of migration is measured by the question of whether migration and decisions to migrate occur within the context of collective social relations. At the same time, this means that even this dimension – in the sense of a determinable scale upon which migration might be measured – is just as difficult to quantify as the temporal and geographical-spatial dimension (cf. U. Birsl 2005).

These four dimensions represent the somewhat more sociological side for understanding migration. The manifestations of migration as defined by Fassmann and Münz constitute the other more political scientific side. According to both authors, six general categories can be distinguished from each other, however, they are not distinctly separate in respect to the causes, motives, and goals of migration. They do, nonetheless, play an important role in the migration policy of the migrant-receiving countries:

- labour migration followed by family reunification, for example under the so-called “guest-worker system” from the 1950s to the 1970s or in conjunction with the internal migration that took place earlier in Spain or Italy when migration from the south to the north was especially prominent; as well as through recent recruitment measures in the highly qualified segment of the labour market or the less qualified segment of the labour market, for instance in agriculture and tourism,
- colonial and post-colonial migration,
- ethnic migration, for example, in Germany the immigration of Aussiedlerinnen and Aussiedler from Eastern Europe or following the termination of the foreign labour recruitment program, the return migration between 1972 and 1974 of the recruited labour force back to southern European countries,
- flight from persecution or expulsion,
- elite migration, for instance within business conglomerates or the field of science,
- other migration, under which is included, for example, the migration of retired persons from the northern to the southern West European countries of Italy or Spain.

One problem with these distinctions results from the mixing together different aspects of the forms of migration. For example, post-colonial migration – similar to ethnic migration – above all is defined by the historical relationship and connections between the country of origin and the country of destination, even though this migration is primarily labour migration. In contrast, the category of labour migration focuses on the motives for migration. Under “elite migration” class-specific aspects are addressed, although this form is also oriented above all to the labour market. For flight and expulsion, again causes and motives are of central importance. Here, as previously discussed, the problem of a lack of distinction between flight and (labour) migration appears once again in the categorisation.

---

6 Insight on this is offered by Hillmann's study on women who immigrated alone to Italy, but whose decision to migrate, however, was tied to "family strategies. Therefore, their decision was socially integrated as well as commonly shared (cf. F. Hillmann 1997, 23, 26).

7 Fassmann and Münz identify only five forms of immigrants (which include both men and women). We have excluded the category "other migration" under which both authors had subsumed elite migration (cf. H. Fassmann and R. Münz 1996, 18)
In other words, the systematisation of migration is not unproblematic, yet politically it plays a significant role. Migration policy is oriented primarily towards these manifestations of migration and/or even establishes them firmly as such in the first place and then organises migrant groups hierarchically in determining the allocation of legal, social, and political opportunities and in gaining access to the host societies. The sociological dimensions of migration only seep rudimentarily into the policy, and then only to the degree in which individual manifestations are defined.

In Overview 1, migrant groups are organised into categories, and when possible, the forms of migration are assigned to each. Through the classification of migrant groups, both their different legal statuses as well as the hierarchy between the groups becomes clear, just as they are politically created.

### Overview 1: Classification of Migration Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration Group</th>
<th>Legal Status</th>
<th>Most Important Host Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Group I: Ethnic migrants** | Post-colonial migrants                                                       | a) According to Article 116, I of the Basic Law (GG) of the Federal Republic of Germany, expellees, (Late) Aussiedlerinnen/ (Late) Aussiedler (ethnic Germans migrating from Eastern Europe belong to the “German Volk.”)  

b) Returning migrants from the former of foreign labour recruitment countries.  
c) Subjects of former colonial administrations and officially recognised groups of the “motherland”. Granted the citizenship of former colonial power, either as inhabitants of the colonies or soon after their arrival. In the Netherlands and in Great Britain they also have the special status of “ethnic minorities.” |
|                          |                                                                            | a) Germany, b) Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, c) Great Britain, France, Benelux States, also Portugal, Spain. |
| **Group II: European Union citizens** | According to the “Treaty of the Creation of the European Community, they are defined as those possessing citizenship from an EU member state and enjoy unrestricted freedom of travel and settlement, unrestricted access to the educational system and labour market, the right to vote in municipal elections (and in several countries, e.g. Sweden, the Netherlands – also the right to vote at the national level after a set minimum period of residency. | All 15 EU member states. |
| **Group III: Labour migrants** | Legal status varies; many fall under Groups I and meanwhile also under Group II. Otherwise: residency status often depends on having a place of employment or on the duration of stay, subject to special legislation for foreigners and lower-level job availability; special regulations for Turks through the Treaty of Association between the EC and Turkey; equal status with Group I or II for non-EU citizens only possible through naturalisation, which is varies between the countries from open to restrictive (and in several countries, e.g. Sweden, the Netherlands – the right to vote at the national level is even granted after a set minimum period of residence. The new foreign labour recruitment targets highly qualified individuals, who are given more favourable and (longer-term) residency and work permits. The recruitment of lower-skilled labour falls under both categories. | Without ethnic and postcolonial migration: France, Germany, Benelux States, Austria, Sweden, Denmark; and in the new foreign labour recruitment also Great Britain |
| **Group IIIa: Temporary labourers** | Short-term residency and work permits restricted to certain fields of work and regional jurisdictions (usually in agriculture and mining). | Germany, Spain, France. |
| **Group IIIb: Contract Workers** | Bilateral labour contracts with non-EU countries, thereafter through work contracts with foreign companies, domestic enterprises can have labour send to serve their own needs. The contracts and terms of the sending company and country applies to the workers. | All 15 EU member states, especially Germany. |
| **Group IV: Asylum-seekers** | The individual right to asylum on account of political persecution. The definition of persecution differs, legal provisions; exception Germany: The basic right to asylum is guaranteed by Article 16 of the Basic Law (GG); often granted only limited social rights and reduced welfare benefits, status may be recalled. | All 15 EU member states, especially Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Belgium. |
Chapter I: Western Europe

1.2 Migration Policy – a Wide-Ranging Field

With a closer examination of the field of migration policy, one soon notices that, similar to the definition of migration, it is not clearly denoted either in the social sciences or in politics. Unstated definitions and emphases more or less prevail in discussions within the field of policy. The definitional scope in policy varies according to the subject matter and the social scientific discipline. Also, this scope differs in relation to the particular experiences and practices of the individual nation-states in their handling of migration. This not only affects on the emphases set in public politics, but also those in the social sciences. Perhaps the most salient difference in politics and research can be found between the countries which formerly mainly experienced emigration and now have recently become migrant-receiving countries and the traditional countries of immigration. For our study, we count all those countries which transformed themselves at the latest during the post-war period.

In the political arena of these traditional countries of immigration, migration policy usually exclusively refers to immigration policy, that is, the regulation of “voluntary” migration across national borders. The Immigration and Asylum Seekers Act of 1999/2000 in Great Britain and in the first Immigration Law (Zuwanderungsgesetz) of 2002 in Germany are indeed the first pieces of legislation to address “voluntary” as well as “involuntary” migration in a single legal code. In so doing, it somewhat has eased the strict separation between these two migration categories. Nevertheless, these laws only deal with the “gates of entry” into the societies, namely with immigration.

On the contrary, in the former of countries emigration nowadays countries of immigration, among which Spain belongs, their dealings with emigration in previous decades in part shape their current migration policy, and it also includes - at least ex post facto - internal migration. This is interesting insofar as the customary countries of immigration also had migration movements of this type. However, it has found no comparative response in the political arena. In Great Britain, a significant volume emigration continues even down to the present. Further internal migration was a vast phenomenon. This took place primarily in the late Fifties and the Sixties as labour migration from the traditional industrial regions in the North into the service oriented and booming sectors in the South. In the following decades, labourers from midlands also joined this southward migration after a widespread structural crisis struck the economy.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, internal migration – if we exclude the upheaval in the immediate post-World War II period – is a more recent phenomenon that emerged after the reunification of the two German states in 1990, and it primarily takes places from East to West Germany. Since the turn of the last century, this pattern of migration slightly levelled off, but still continues to hold (cf. N. Werz 2001). Beyond this, since around the mid-Nineties, we can observe an emigration from the structurally weaker economic area of the north to the structurally stronger south-western region, which is only partly compensated by the internal East-West migration. For the emigration regions of Great Britain and Germany, this seems to be “brain drain” since most of the emigrants come from the qualified and highly-qualified labour market segment. In contrast to Spain however, neither the internal migration within both countries nor the emigration from Great Britain are under discussion as aspects of migration.
policy. Thus, in our comparison of these countries, we are confronted with different limitations and emphases within the field of migration policy.

These differing limitations and emphases in public migration policy are also reflected in the social scientific discourses. Thus British and German migration research focuses almost exclusively on immigration and asylum together with the incorporation of these immigrants and refugees. In Spain, however, these discussions encompass immigration and asylum and the incorporation of such migrants as well as prior emigration and internal migration. Since the nineties though, an analysis of immigration and immigration policy also dominates in Spain.

Apart from this “typically national” differentiation within the social scientific field of policy analysis, similar to the category of “migration,” differences also exist between a more political scientific perspective and sociological one, even though migration research is really an interdisciplinary field of research *par excellence*. Political science concentrates, for the most part, on the political aspects of migration management and control in terms of access to a nation-state, namely, to its territory and to the applicability of the nation-state’s domestic, social, labour market, and economic policy, in sum, the political arena of a state. Sociology focuses predominantly at the point at which the political science leaves off by focussing on what happens after immigrants enter the political space of the nation-state. In other words, in the sociological context, with a view on migration policy, it is particularly interest in how immigrants are incorporated into the labour market and the welfare state. In short, to what extent groups of migrants are granted social rights, that is, the so-called social citizenship, and how this affects the living conditions of immigrants and of the host-society (cf. as representative K. Eder 1998; J. Halfmann and M. Bommes 1998). The political scientific and sociological perspectives implicitly complement one another and bring in quite a large intersection of political arena and/or the debate over citizenship. The subject of transnational social spaces and migration networks is clearly dominated by the sociological discourse, and as of yet, interdisciplinary connections to political science have not been realised. This is frustrating given that, on the one hand, transnational social spaces are usually politically initiated, as for example in the recruitment of foreign labour, and on the other, they have far reaching consequences in shaping migration policy. Then, these transnational social spaces are not oriented according to the territorial boundary-drawing of nation-states, but rather cut across them.

Despite overlap in the subjects of inquiry among the social science disciplines, there are seldom interdisciplinary exchanges over the research results. Instead migration research tends to be conducted separately from each other.

All this could be a possibly explain why the field of migration policy – as well as the definition of migration – has not yet worked out in the social sciences. According to the American political scientist Hollifield, another explanation may be that political scientists came relatively late to the field of migration research. He is particularly irritated that this has been the case in the USA:

“From the standpoint of intellectual history, it is interesting to ask [. . .] why political scientists and scholars of international relations were so late to focus on the topic of immigration, in comparison with sociologists or historians, for example? This is especially surprising in a country like the United States, where immigration has had an enormous impact on politics and government” (J. F. Hollifield 1999a, 21).

Western countries of immigration deal quite differently with these transnational social spaces. While the two North American countries, the USA and Canada, utilise them for migration policy, the West European countries of immigration more characteristically attempt to cap migration networks, for example, by trying to block family reunification in so far as this is permitted by international law (cf. here U. Birsl 2005)

Hollifield's contribution offers an extensive and critical insight into the political discourses on migration within international relations research.
However, even in Hollifield’s international comparative studies, which he carried out in part together with Cornelius and Martin, it does not become clearer as to what should be understood by the term migration policy. In these studies, the area of policy is condensed to the topic of migration control, and more specifically, to a discussion of control in terms of who may enter a nation-state’s territory and who may not. Especially in regard to this question, Hollifield et al. see the sovereignty of the nation-state being challenged and threatened since international law infringes on the national law. This means, for instance, that the internationally ratified right to family (family reunion) or the Geneva Refugee Convention determine who can enter into a country. In this context, national law has lost its power to regulate. Furthermore, migration may just be part of the general globalisation process over which nation-states – this usually refers to the OECD-countries – may have little or no political influence. Perhaps this is the reason why the instruments of migration policy of the countries of immigration are becoming more alike and why efforts in migration policy have increased while their efficiency simultaneously decreases (cf. ibid., 27 and 39; F. J. Hollifield 1999b; W. F. Cornelius, P. L. Martin, and J. F. Hollifield 1994).

While a closer examination of immigration and asylum policy in Western European countries strongly confirms the convergence hypothesis advanced by Hollifield, Cornelius, and Martin, at the same time, however, it is apparent that regulations in this policy field are in some way very contradictory. These contradictions cannot be explained primarily by the phenomenon of globalisation or by the impact of international law. They emerge largely because immigration is becoming relevant in other policy areas, such as in labour market and economic policy in addition to external security and foreign policy or in internal security policy. Distributed across these five policy areas are various regulations which include legal standardisation as well as resolutions, policy implementation regulations, or bilateral or multilateral agreements.

Even in the countries that have an immigration law, it is difficult to infer which regulatory system deals with all aspects of migration policy. Even all these regulations together still do not form an overall concept of immigration and asylum. In fact, they are much more likely to be driven by different motives and to serve — to emphasise it once again — different interests. Not only has this produced conflicting outcomes, but clashing interests as well. A result closely connected to public discourse on immigration and asylum and on incorporation policy. Characteristically these discourses often scandalise migration, for instance in election campaigning. Consequently, it amplifies xenophobic sentiments and, as observed by Hollifield, Cornelius, and Martin, provokes attitudes of aversion towards immigrants.

Emerging out of all this a strikingly paradoxical situation in which one policy area supports increased immigration, while another seeks to restrict it and meanwhile a public dispute breaks out over immigration and asylum. The alleged inefficiency of immigration controls can basically be traced back to this contradictory construction of policy and to these competing interests. Thus, it is first and foremost “home-made.”

Our three case studies for Great Britain, Spain and Germany will illustrate how such paradoxical situations are created at home as a result of conflicting interests and motives in migration policy and in political actions.

---

10 This approach has already been criticised many times, both in light of its causal analysis and with regard to the ability to empirically verify policy outcomes as well as the efficacy of policy in general and in the field of migration in particular (cf. as representative V. Guiraudon and G. Lahav 2000, 164; H. Dittgen 1999; O. Schmidtke 1999; and U. Birsl, 2003).

11 Consider, for example, the effects of the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington on internal security policy in Chapter II, Section 4.

12 García y Griego in his work on immigration policy in Canada also reaches the conclusion that endogenous factors are mainly responsible for problems in immigration control. He points to an additional factor not discussed here: the uncoordinated activities of administrative authorities, who deal with immigration, produce quite high frictional losses as part of their administrative work (cf. M. García y Griego 1994).
Phenomena such as the globalisation and the internationalisation of legal rights are not insignificant in their importance for exploring the possibilities for nation-states to manoeuvre in area of migration politics. However, to solely concentrate on these phenomena and to reduce migration policy simply to the control of national territory hinders a look into the diverse constitutional conditions and spheres of influence in this policy area, which can be observed in nation-states. Moreover, broadening the outlook to include the international relations system calls for a greater differentiation since the function and position of Western nation-states in these relationships ought to be crucial for determining what different repercussions their function and position have on the formulation of migration policy and its instruments. This not only refers to a potential loss of sovereignty for the nation-state in the course of developing and extending international ties. Rather, it is more about the political ambitions that arise in areas such as economic and foreign policy in order for a nation-state gain in importance and power in the supranational arena. Along these lines, the countries studied here will offer us further insight.

By now it should be evident that the area of migration policy is a complex political field. In Diagram 1 below, a model of this policy field is summarised with consideration given to the central aspects of migration policy, in particular the determining factors.

Diagram 1: Nation-State Migration Policy

The illustration above defines the core of migration policy insofar as it addresses the conventional concern with controlling access to the nation-state territory and, beyond the territorial principle, to the political arena. This core is then positioned in its interrelation to the motives, interests, and policy formulations of the five policy areas identified above: labour market, economic, internal security, external security, and foreign policy. The determinants of migration policy are enclosed by political and cultural factors. These include the public discourse on migration and asylum, political party debates, and the situation of the political atmosphere.
and attitudes. Finally, located in the outer square is the phenomenon of migration with its incorporation into the historical migration system that has developed over years in the countries of immigration. A migration system is shaped, for example, through earlier immigration during the colonial and post-colonial periods as is the case for Great Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands or, as in Germany, through the recruitment of workers and ethnic migration. While in other cases, such as in southern Europe, migration systems are still developing. But even here, historical relationships such as the long-ago colonial history of Spain play a role. These historical relations serve as the basis for the transnational social spaces and migration networks.

It is in the transformation of migration systems, according to our findings, that one must look for the reasons for this convergence and for the process of aligning migration policy among Western countries, in this case, Western Europe. It follows that in the migration systems of the traditional countries of immigration, historical relationships and/or their meaning have weakened considerably and, as a consequence, also the impact of past ties between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. This development has had a variety of consequences. The two most important for our study are: (1) Migration from the traditional migrant-sending countries is decreasing in scale and/or resettlement from other countries and continents of emigration is increasing. The result is a shift the migration structure of the countries targeted for migration, which is leading to more heterogeneity. Further, chain migration is partially coming to an end and transnational social spaces are vanishing or are extending across several target countries. The migration structures in the West European countries of immigration are becoming more alike (2) Simultaneously traditional ties in international or transnational relations between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving are decreasing. This is particularly observable for post-colonial ties as they are losing their significance in labour market and economic policy and even with regard to external and security (military) policy. Supranational relationships are in the process of being rearranged and in a similar manner among the countries compared, so that common positions in motives and interests are developing in the respective policy fields of West European countries.

The following section will examine in greater detail the process of alignment taking place at the level of migration systems and migration policy. It would, however, exceed the limits of this chapter to show all the fields and factors in Diagram 1 that have an influence on migration policy or to analyse all the regulatory areas of this policy area. For this reason, we will focus above all on the political instruments relating to the core of migration policy, namely access to the nation-state territory and the political arena. From here, we will discuss the identifiable and central factors useful for explaining the migration policy actions of national governments.

At the political level, this approach excludes one part of the phenomenon of migration from our study, namely emigration. Emigration only enters in when we address the topics of return migration and foreign labour recruitment policies intended to compensate for emigration.

Internal migration can, however, be a subject of discussion. In particular, this will be the case for Spain. On this occasion we are not dealing with a policy regulating territorial access to Spain, but rather with the question of incorporation into the political arena which changes as a consequence of migrating from one region to another.

2. Migration and Migration Policy in West European States: The Process of Alignment

Among the EU member states, France is the only country with a tradition of being an immigration country reaching back to the nineteenth century. The history of immigration into Western Europe is otherwise more recent. For the regional area of Belgium, Denmark, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden, transformation into countries of immigration only began after the Second World War. In contrast, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal remained countries of emigration for a while longer. Except for Ireland, the direction of this emigration out of the southern European states has changed. Until the beginning of the 1950s, emigration was primarily transatlantic to North America. It then shifted in the course of the labour recruitment programs in the direction of central and northern European countries giving rise to a predominately internal European migration.

Even the migrations balances of Great Britain remained largely negative from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. This meant that more people migrated out of than into Great Britain, and that for decades it has simultaneously been a country of immigration and emigration. Even today, Great Britain is known as a state having only a moderate level of immigration. A closer examination of this situation, however, reveals that Great Britain has been quite underrated as an country of immigration (see Section 2.1).

Luxembourg, where population growth is chiefly tied to migration, surpasses all immigration recordings. However, drawing comparisons between this small state and larger ones is problematic. The high immigration rates can be explained for the most part by the presence of EC institutions such as the European Investment Bank, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament headquarters — besides their headquarters in Strasbourg and Brussels — as well as its proportionately small population size of only about 430,000. In Belgium, where EC and EU institutions are also concentrated, foreign employees from other member countries do not skew immigration rates on the same scale.

Even Finland is an “exception country” in that, in the strict sense, it is neither a country of immigration nor of emigration. The migration balance is too small to be of relevance.

The actual scope of migration movements and the proportion of immigrants among the inhabitants cannot be understood on the basis of national statistics since these numbers are generated in a much too diverse method and certain groups are not included in the data. This has to do with the granting of special legal statuses, especially for groups participating in ethnic or post-colonial migration (see Overview 1). The population survey of the Statistical Office of the European Commission, in short EUROSTAT, however, offers a certain amount of useful information. It contains statistics on the “total migration balance” of all fifteen EU member states and indicates population growth and decline in comparison to the previous year while making adjustments to balance birth and mortality rates. Thus it is possible to get a sense of the volume of immigration and emigration independent of the migration groups. And of particular importance, the figures of the individual countries are relatively comparable with each other. Overview 2 was created on the basis of these statistics. It offers information over the total migration balance of the EU as well as the contribution of immigration and emigration to the population development in each of the individual nation states.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10,213.8</td>
<td>+11.30</td>
<td>379,255</td>
<td>+3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5,313.6</td>
<td>+15.67</td>
<td>210,734</td>
<td>+3.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany*</td>
<td>82,038.0</td>
<td>+12.25</td>
<td>7,747,839</td>
<td>+9.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10,533.0</td>
<td>+25.89</td>
<td>340,234</td>
<td>+3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>39,394.3</td>
<td>+28.81</td>
<td>-270,032</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>58,966.8</td>
<td>+28.46</td>
<td>3,781,981</td>
<td>+6.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3,744.7</td>
<td>+32.71</td>
<td>-197,644</td>
<td>-5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>57,612.6</td>
<td>+14.37</td>
<td>-235,866</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>429.2</td>
<td>+36.30</td>
<td>91,209</td>
<td>+21.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>15,760.2</td>
<td>+36.38</td>
<td>879,760</td>
<td>+5.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter I: Western Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>8,082.8</td>
<td>+14.41</td>
<td>583,346</td>
<td>+7.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>9,979.5</td>
<td>+12.26</td>
<td>-789,473</td>
<td>-7.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5,159.6</td>
<td>+16.05</td>
<td>26,235</td>
<td>+0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>8,854.3</td>
<td>+18.09</td>
<td>637,714</td>
<td>+7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>59,247.0</td>
<td>+12.66</td>
<td>820,449</td>
<td>+1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>375,329.4</td>
<td>+18.30</td>
<td>13,327,314</td>
<td>+3.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Note: Population estimates are based on the different methods in these countries (cf. separately, ibid., XX-XXI). In the German figures, the time period up to the unification with the GDR have been included. The migration balance was determined from the difference between the population size on 31 December and 1 January of each year and the difference between birth and mortality rates has been adjusted accordingly (cf. ibid.: 184). To compare the development of the migration balance in greater detail over five-year segments, see U. Birsl 2005, Appendix II.

Unfortunately the EUROSTAT figures only go back as far as 1960. Therefore, the post-war years with their upheavals, expulsions, repatriations, and the movement of refugees in continental Europe cannot been taken into consideration Especially for the Federal Republic of Germany, this era was the peak phase of immigration (see Section 2.2). In Great Britain, the highest phase of immigration also began shortly after the war, namely post-colonial migration, which then slowly began to wane following the passage of the 1962 Immigration Act and in the aftermath of the economic crisis (see Section 2.1).

What the overview does clearly show is that Germany has become the country with the most immigration in the EU. Austria, Sweden, France and the Netherlands follow by a wide margin. For the other countries having a positive migration balance, population growth through immigration tends to be low. In the case of Spain and Italy, the migration balance ranges around the zero mark. Unlike in Finland, this can be attributed to their transformation from an country of emigration to one of immigration, a trend that first became apparent between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Overall it can be said that Western Europe has developed into an immigration region in which large-scale emigration has notably decreased. Only Portugal can unequivocally still be classified as a country of emigration. Now even Greece and Ireland appear to have become destinations for migration movements since the turn of the millennium. While Ireland primarily experiences labour immigration, Greece has become a targeted destination for people fleeing war and crises in the southern East European countries.

Behind the numbers in Overview 2 lies a dilemma. By now it has reached almost all West European societies and has become politically aggravated: a negative demographic prognosis. This means that Germany, Italy, and Sweden are already recording negative numbers in the so-called category of “natural population growth.” Meanwhile even Spain, which together with Italy previously counted among the countries having a high birth rate, is now registering “zero-growth.” Only France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands still indicate a population increase; but here too, there is an unmistakably downwards trend. Increasingly restrictive migration policies implemented since around the mid-Seventies politically exacerbated this development. It is now no longer even possible to compensate for the looming population decline through immigration (cf. EUROSTAT 1999, 4f; also D. Thränhardt 1997, 139). And there is another phenomenon still relatively unnoticed in migration research, in which a frontier nearly has been created between the traditional and the newer countries of immigration: all of the larger, economically advanced countries of immigration, for which EUROSTAT figures are available, are registering an upward tendency in their emigration figures, even

---

13 Natural population growth is determined from the balance between the birth and mortality rates.
among their own citizens\textsuperscript{14}. This could be a reaction to the crisis-ridden development of the economy and the labour market since the 1980s, which evidently continues to have an effect. Yet in many of the countries affected, economic and labour market data show upward trends since the mid-1990s. An further explanation could lie in the internal European market, which may have stimulated increased mobility in the labour market. However, this is implausible for two reasons: (1) Studies show that transnational mobility between labour markets in the EU is not yet an identifiable phenomenon. According to a survey by Werner, on average less than two percent of all labourers come from one of the fifteen EU countries. The majority of foreign labour originates, as in the past, from outside of the EU. These proportions have been relatively constant over the past decade and a half. The “low level of regional mobility is even more surprising since it has always been a stated goal of the European Commission to dismantle remaining migration obstacles. Together with the creation of an internal market, […] the freedom of movement even for non-income earners such as students and pensioners was extended, the mutual recognition of professional certificates and diplomas was approved, and the transfer of acquired social benefits to another member state was regulated.” (own translation, H. Werner 2001, 12). (2) The phenomenon of an increasing exodus of European-born citizens is such that it has not affected countries in south-eastern Europe or Ireland, which were formerly places of emigration and experience immigration. This may be a consequence of diminishing differences in the level of prosperity and income within the EU between northern and central European countries on the one side, and southern European countries and Ireland on the other (cf. ibid., 14)\textsuperscript{15} The emigration of European-born citizens tends to move more in the direction of North America. At least, this can be shown for Great Britain. Here, it is probably not negative indicators in the British economy and labour market that drive emigration, but rather the quality of the job offers on the labour market and the low-rated wages and salaries in the highly qualified segment of the labour market. Already in 1996, Coleman expressed his misgivings in a report that this is a sign of a brain drain whereby “scientists and engineers are leaving Great Britain, because they can find better paying jobs abroad.” (own translation, D. Coleman 1996, 73).

The precarious demographic developments and the looming brain drain are reasons why the West European countries now are attempting to redirect their migration policy and are again undertaking measures to recruit foreign labour for domestic labour markets. Consequently at the EU-level, there is now an effort to create a common migration and refugee policy on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty that came into effect in 1999. The European Commission made its first recommendations concerning this issue in November 2000. They point — similar to the policy of most EU countries — to a shift in perspectives from a restrictive to a more open immigration policy. However, until now these recommendations are only an initial change in winds in this shift in attitude, and it remains to be seen if this change will translate into practice.

The development of a migration policy that emphasised the admission of immigrants until the 1970s, and later increasingly developed measures designed to seal-off the borders to immigration can be easily traced in our case studies of Great Britain and Germany. The example of Spain illustrates what it means for former migrant-sending countries to become the new countries of immigration in the 1990s with their own migration development and preferred migration policy to come up against the predominant structure and policy of other EC member states and to politically adapt.

\textsuperscript{14} These countries include Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. No data is available for France and Austria (cf. EUROSTAT 1999, 188-189 and EUROSTAT 2002, 79)

\textsuperscript{15} However, this applies to the average situation in the nation-states; regional disparities continue to exist as will be shown for the countries studied here.
2.1 Case Study “Great Britain”

Since a much earlier period, Great Britain has been among one of the Western European countries having the greatest amount of emigration. Only briefly from the 1950s until 1963 did the country have a positive migration balance; meaning more immigration than emigration. Throughout roughly the next two decades, comparatively more people moved out of the country than into it. Only since 1983 did its transformation to a country of immigration, and until today, the migration balance has remained positive and at the same time, emigration momentarily waned. As mentioned above, an increasing trend toward emigration has once again emerged since the middle of the Nineties.

In spite of its long tradition of emigration, after the Second World War the society developed into a “multi-racial Britain” as well (I.R.G. Spencer 1997). Its migration structure was marked by immigration from former colonies and was relatively heterogeneous. In addition, until now the extent of immigration has been underestimated, partly due to a lack of statistical recording of immigration (cf. D. Coleman 1996, 57ff). This, in turn, is rooted in the historical conception of the British Empire as a multi-national and decentralised global state having a common citizenship. This view of the British Empire was widely accepted until the 1930s, but then in the ensuing decades, it had to give way to more realistic conceptions in order to preserve British influence in those dominions striving for independence. As more and more colonies turned against British colonial power during the Second World War, the empire was forced to transform itself into the New Commonwealth of Independent Nations. Nevertheless, the basic conception of citizenship was retained in law (cf. ibid., 56). For decades this privileged immigrants from the former colonies, dominions and protectorates, who were not considered foreigners. Post-colonial immigration was, therefore, treated like ethnic migration for a long time (on Colonial History and Immigration cf. U. Birs1 2005; G. Therborn 2000, 52; F. Ansprenger 1998). The situation has changed over the course of time so that such preferential treatment now only applies to a drastically limited number of groups.

Indeed (post)colonial immigration after World War II was neither planned nor desired. On the contrary, such immigration interfered with the plans of the Labour government under Premier Attlee (1945 to 1955) who actually strove to temporarily recruit foreign labour from the ranks of the so-called “Displaced Persons” (DPs) and from European, especially East-European, countries.

The economic and labour market policy stipulations for labour immigration in Great Britain during the immediate post-war period differed from those existing in western continental Europe. The British economy had not been affected by the ravages wreaked by fascism and war in the same way as the other states. Instead, war production characterised the economy. As a consequence, the automobile, the chemical, and heavy industrial sectors particularly concentrated in the western midlands, were expanded during the war and saw further growth after 1945. Coal mining and large parts of the iron and steel industry, on the contrary, experienced technological regression. Although the Labour government started investment programs for these traditional long-standing industries in the northern Britain and attempted to

---

16 The only statistical records from which one can draw conclusions are (1) the “International Passenger Survey” (IPS), which offers estimates for travel entries and departures without registering them, and (2) census data form censuses conducted every ten years since 1841. This data, together with that from the “Labour Force Survey” (LFS), which has been recorded regularly since 1969, provide information over place of birth and citizenship. However, members of minority groups residing in a country after two and three generations are no longer traceable using the criteria of place of birth or citizenship, since they were born in Great Britain and usually possess British citizenship. As a result, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) has since 1981 requested information about ethnic affiliation using rough categorisations. Those surveyed must assign themselves into “ethnic groups.” Since the year 2000, the Office for National Statistic (ONS) has been working to register “ethnic groups” in a more methodical and differentiated manner.
support the sector through nationalisation measures, a lasting consolidation of these industrial cores proved impossible. This followed short phases of boom and crisis and of re-privatisation and re-nationalisation. As late as the 1960s, it became impossible to avoid the conclusion that steel industry was in decline. The death knell of the coal mining sector began sounding in the 1970s, and even more so in the 1980s, forced by the radical closing of mines by the conservative Tory Thatcher government (1979 to 1990) (cf. here A. Armengaud, S. Pollard, and G.L. de Brabander 1987, 37-38; A.E. Green 1998; I. Sturm-Martin, 2001, 65). On top of this, Britain’s structural economic and labour development was nearly forty years ahead of other west European countries. Already in 1911, the industrial sector reached its highest employment level making up fifty-two percent of the total British workforce (cf. G. Therborn 2000, 83) and the service industry began to bloom. This service sector established itself above all in the southern part of the British Isles and then expanded further after the Second World War.

In the immediate post-war era, Great Britain presented itself as an economically divided country with a marked and escalating southern/northern difference in living conditions and on the regional labour markets. Despite the expansion of the service sector and the quite favourable situation in the processing industries formerly engaged in war production, Great Britain experienced a phase of economical growth ten years earlier than the other West European state. However, it only lasted a short period from 1946 to 1950 and only included several branches. Following this brief period, an economic crisis peaked at the beginning of the sixties, which really first registered across Western Europe and globally at the beginning of the Seventies with the shock of so-called Oil Crisis. These dates simultaneously mark important stages in the history of immigration and immigration politics in Great Britain, which, no different than in other Western countries proceeded almost exclusively around the labour market.

Along these lines the political aspirations toward immigration of the Attlee government focussed on the recruitment of continental European workers, more specifically of so-called "voluntary European workers," who in 1947 to 1950 were still recruited in accordance with the stipulations of the Foreigner Act of 1905. By means of bilateral agreements with East European countries, with the USA as allied partners in the occupation zones in Germany, and with the assistance of refugee organisations, foreign workers found work in sanatoria, hospitals, in the cotton industry and in other more crisis-threatened branches of industry. For example, women from Baltic countries in the Displaced Persons camps or even prisoners of war from Germany, Austria and Italy were among these workers. Further, in accordance with a 1948 agreement with USA, 6,000 Sudeten German women were scheduled to work in the textile industry (cf. D. Coleman 1996, 53-54; I. Sturm-Martin 2001, 49ff.). Since immigration into Great Britain proceeded undocumented until 1962, that is until the first immigration law, the Commonwealth Immigration Act, reliable numbers do not exist over the extent of this single and short period of the worker recruitment by the British government. Estimations lie far apart and tend toward a range from 75,000 to 450,000 (cf. P. Egtved 2002, 59f.). These recruitment policies and numerous ideas over economically oriented immigration policies on the temporary admission workers in 1948 was counter checked and unleashed political confusion with the arrival of two freighters having a total of only six hundred prospective immigrants from the then still dependent Caribbean colony of Jamaica.

Although at that time smaller migration movements from colonies or former colonies direction Great Britain were already in motion, only these six hundred incoming Jamaicans drew public attention and rejection. These reactions resulted from the fact that other migration movements consisted mostly of white colonialists - administration officials, settlers or soldiers, who returned to the motherland in the course of decolonisation. On the other hand, the those willing to migrate from Jamaica were blacks, the so-called "African-Caribbeans." An committee of governmental specialists conjectured that general problems in accepting the immigration of non-white workers could occur within the populace. The government argued in turn that these problems could also be found among employers, and in addition that there
might not be a demand for African-Caribbeans on the labour market since their level of qualification might be too low. This was formulated by the government in a memorandum to the Caribbean colonial governments, and they further added that food and living accommodations were scarce in the mother country so that the acceptance of those willing to immigrate might not be possible (cf., I. Sturm-Martin 2001, 49ff.).

Despite all these putative hindrances, however, the colonial administration succeeded within the shortest amount of time in locating work for these six hundred migrants, and simultaneously, an economic need for these workers appeared (cf., ibid.). Moreover, the immigrating African-Caribbeans of the first hour were in no way low qualified:


In addition to those possessing handicraft skills in this first immigrant generation, there were also academics and members of the medical profession, and teachers. This was also valid for the subsequent pioneer migrants from the Asiatic region, in particular from the Indian subcontinent (cf. for this Chapter II, section 3).

The British government was divided. On the one side, internal political resistance developed – with the exception of several employers – even the unions positioned themselves against further immigration from the colonies because they feared wage-dumping. On the other side, the still existing colonial power could not afford greater conflicts with their colonies and former colonies since it might then have endangered the project of the New Commonwealth of Nations. Labour market problems in the colonies were immense and the Caribbean governors expected migration to serve as a pressure valve, while at the same time they sought to prevent a brain-drain. Therefore, they put pressure on and most of all demanded that the British metropole accept 5000 war veterans as labour migrants. However, the British government favoured the recruitment female workers from the Caribbean Islands, to work in the crisis-ridden textile industry in which poor working conditions and compensation typically made the employment of masculine workers seem impossible. While the colonial administration now concentrated on this "project," the Home Office and the Ministry of Labour continued to pursue the plan in accordance with agreements and bilateral contracts on European workers. In this manner, the 6000 Sudeten German women were then also brought to Great Britain to work in the textile industry (cf., I. Sturm-Martin 2001, 51ff.).

In the subsequent years, colonial and post-colonial immigration became more dynamic. For a long time in the administration, one could not agree on which ministry should be responsible regulating immigration: the Colonial Office, the Labour Ministry or the Home Office? The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Exchequer and the Transportation Department were temporarily involved as well as the then newly founded Commonwealth Relations Office which is now the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (cf., ibid., 83ff.). Similar to other countries of immigration, the Home Office is responsible for migration issues.

---

17 Translation: “The profile of the typical immigrant from the West Indies changed over the course of the period from 1948 to 1968. In the first phase – from 1948 to 1955 – generally these immigrants were skilled and unskilled labourers and their motivation was often part of an effort to improve their social status in their home country through a stay in Great Britain (...). In the second phase of this immigration – from 1955 to 1962 – the typical migrant was unskilled and usually came from rural and poverty-stricken areas”.

18 Such as in France or in the Netherlands, immigration of these “war veterans” to Great Britain was a tragic phenomenon. These were groups which had sided with their colonial masters during the wars of liberation in the colonies. Thus they could not remain in their countries of origin and likewise encountered the continuation of colonial racism in the colonial “motherlands.” British citizens of Indian origin especially experienced this in East Africa (cf. here, D. Thränhardt 1997, 143-144)
This muddle in matters of competency at the beginning of immigration history following the Second World War quite vividly illustrates how this rather ad hoc and unforeseen immigration affected many different interests.

This somewhat unhappy start in the history of a society characterised by immigration and the disastrous project to recruit female workers to work in the textile industry led to government abandon such recruitment in 1950 and entrust it to private enterprises, to the then still state run railroad society British Railways and to the National Health Service. From this time on, the governmental activities were limited to creating the general legal requirements for labour recruitment by the private enterprise. Consequently, the chapter in public recruitment policy came to an end when in actuality the recruitment of workers from other countries occurred up until the mid-Eighties. Also for immigrants coming from non-Commonwealth States, over the course of two decades, work visas were still issued independent of retaining an established place of work. Only through the Immigration Bill of 1971 were professions specified and selected for which work permits could be issued. Moreover, these were only conceded on a temporary basis (on the most important legal immigration arrangements, see Appendix II.A). In 1985, free entry for dentists and physicians was then also closed off. The total level of immigration via recruitment is likely to be relatively low. Since even under rather open legal situation prior to 1962 and the then already accelerated immigration from the (former) colonies undertaken by recruited non-white immigrants and immigrants from the Commonwealth did not even comprise ten percent (cf. Coleman 1996: 54, 70-71).

In this way, most immigrants came under the category of (post)colonial migration that was strictly speaking also labour migration, but it occurred within the context of the Commonwealth and not through recruitment. For the most part, these migrants found work in factories and in transportation enterprises. In contrast to other West European countries, these factory jobs were not in industrial production, but rather in unprofitable mills and foundries in northern England whose continued existence was already threatened. What is comparable to other countries is that most migrants were offered work in unskilled and semiskilled activities (cf., ibid.: 55).

In the meantime, post-colonial immigration to Great Britain approached its closing stages. As shown in Overview 3, the main immigration phase of most minority groups had already concluded.

**Overview 3: Main Phases of Immigration of the Greatest Minority Groups in Great Britain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority Groups</th>
<th>Main Immigration Phases</th>
<th>Percentages of the Members of Minority Groups Immigrating in these Phases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African-Caribbeans</td>
<td>1950-1970</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-Asians</td>
<td>1960-1980</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>1960-1980</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>1960-1980</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1960-1990</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ethnic minorities</td>
<td>1950-1980</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the case of the minority groups listed above, the immigration percentages recorded in the Labour Force Survey of 1990 had already strongly declined. Only in the case of the "Bangladeshi" and "Africans" did they continued to rise throughout the decade from 1981 to 1990.

Immigration also declined in a additional group, namely that of the Irish. Further, migration out of Ireland was rather characterised by a pendulum movement in which the direction was clearly determined by respective developments in the economy and on the labour market in Great Britain and Ireland. The Irish enjoyed a distinct position in the Kingdom which can be traced back through centuries of special relationships between both countries and the violent subjection of Ireland by the British Empire. Through the Act of Union of 1801, Ireland
Chapter I: Western Europe

was completely merged into the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland." Even though it could assert elements of self-administration around the end of the nineteenth century through the Home-Rule-Act, not until 1921 could Ireland impose its independence and state sovereignty from Great Britain. This came at the price of splitting off from Northern Ireland. Indeed the Home-Rule-Act no longer has validity, yet it still bears after-effects. Accordingly, immigrants from Ireland until now are not understood to be "aliens," and they enjoy full citizenship rights even if they do not possess British citizenship. Furthermore, different than immigrants from the Commonwealth, they are not designated as an ethnic minority group. For these reasons, the sheer size of Irish immigration is hardly ever statistically registered. One thing is clear, the Irish are the largest migration group, and under this consideration, the migration structure of Great Britain no longer appears as heterogeneous as is usually assumed (cf. U. Birsl 2005).

The extent of immigration - as frequently mentioned above – is difficult to register. According to an international comparative study by EUROSTAT on the models and trends of migration in Western Europe, based on the Labour Force Survey of 1994 for Great Britain on, 3.9 million people living in the British Isles were born abroad. If one puts this number in relation with that of the total population in the same year, it constitutes 6.7 percent (own calculations based on the EUROSTAT population statistics of 1999: 13). As a result, the situation in Great Britain looks very similar to that of the large countries of immigration such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden. Now even its divergence with France, which has 11 percent, diminishes. Moreover, the extent of immigration in Great Britain is likely to be even larger since the generations of the first hour of immigration are no longer empirically registered according to the place of birth. The amount of 6.7 percent is somewhat higher as has been commonly estimated in migration research in which 5.5 percent is usually indicated (cf. U. Birsl 2005).

If we take the databases of the LFS and the EUROSTAT study despite all the problems in the data surveys that serve as their basis, the migration structure in Great Britain can at least be approximately determined. In this case, the great migration groups of the Fifties and Sixties are no longer sufficiently represented. For instance, the proportion of African-Caribbeans from Jamaica and of African-Asians from Kenya must be estimated at a higher value than shown in Figure 2.

What can not be seen in Figure 2 is the shift in the migration structure toward more immigration from Europe. This is a development first began with increasing numbers of immigrants in the category of flight and asylum and a simultaneous decrease of post-colonial and Irish migration.

Similar to other Western European countries of immigration, flight and asylum were not important topics until the Eighties. Only around the end of the Eighties, the number of refugees suddenly increased, then temporarily again regressed and soon increased again in the mid-Nineties. By the end of the millennium, Great Britain was yet no longer a major target country for refugees and has only very recently slowly ascended in the ranking list of favoured countries of refuge.

---

19 More recent figures on birth place are not yet available. The LFS is being methodically reworked (cf. the "Technical Report" of the ONS by M. Hussain/ A. Jones 2000) and the results of the "Census of Population and Housing 2001" are not yet available. However, current data with another standard of comparison support the aforementioned proportions. According to the LFS for the winter quarter 2001/2002, the proportion of those belonging to "ethnic groups" in the population at an employable age (16 years and older) is 6.6% (cf. LFS 2002, 19 and own calculations)

20 According to the EUROSTAT study, no comparable figures exist for Germany.
Chapter I: Western Europe

Figure 2: The "Top 10" countries of birth of immigrants living in Great Britain. Figures from 1994, percentages rounded

In the year 2000, according to information from the UNHCR, Great Britain then took over the top rider function of Germany amongst the EU-member states. Specifically this means that 25.1 percent of all refugees who applied for asylum in one of the EU-countries did so in the British Isles. In absolute numbers, this made up more than 97,800 applications (cf. UNHCR current figures from 31 January 2001). The circumstances for the increasing numbers for the case of Great Britain also stemmed from crises, wars, and dictatorships in African and Asian countries as well as in Southeast Europe, above all in the former Yugoslavia and the CIS states. Additionally, Turkey dominates as a country of origin (cf. Coleman 1996, 74). This means that as a consequence of refugee movements in the Nineties increasingly immigration occurred from outside the Commonwealth with growing numbers coming from European countries. This then led to a shift in the migration structure to more continental immigration.

It is still questionable whether Great Britain actually became a more strongly favoured destination for refugees or if this situation resulted instead from the re-categorisation of politically-motivated migrants and more restrictive immigration policies. As it is striking in the case of intercontinental flight, the largest groups of asylum-seekers come from the Commonwealth countries, including the former colony of Pakistan, whose membership in the Commonwealth was suspended following the military putsch in 1999 (cf. United Nations 2000, 352ff.; Coleman 1996, 74). Here the likely assumption seems to be that by the reducing the "gates of entry" for migration, a shift from post-colonial and labour migration to the category "flight and asylum" took place.

Whereas in 1948 at the beginning of the immigration from the Commonwealth via the British Nationality Act, an unlimited freedom of entry and residency for migrants from colonial and post-colonial countries and beyond that the granting of equal rights - including full citizenship rights – for those belonging to the "United Kingdom and Colonies" and the "Commonwealth of Nations" were embodied in law, restrictive policies were already being implemented in 1962 with the first Commonwealth Relation Act. For the first time, a classification with a hierarchical system of rights and claims to state affiliation for British subjects from the then still dependent colonies and for the Commonwealth Citizens of the independent states

Source: Compiled from statistical data in EUROSTAT 2000, 59.
was implemented. In the various amendments to the immigration law through 1988, the rights and claims to citizenship were scaled down further and further; the criterion of *ius sanguinis* gained successive importance. Then in 1971, the members of the Commonwealth were declared "aliens," and at the beginning of the Eighties, citizenship status even for migrants from the still dependent regions such as Bermuda and Gibraltar was restricted. The Amendment of 1971 marked immigration policy until the turn of the twenty-first century. The period beginning in the Seventies can also be designated as a basic turning point in policy as can also be observed in the other countries of immigration of this time. Immigration had already shifted at this stage from standard labour migration to family reunification as a new form of labour migration and to the "gate of entry" through the asylum law. Above all, family reunification partially compensated for the regressive numbers in the area of labour migration so that it was also used to limit it. A subsequent consequence of these restrictive policies was an increase in the number of asylum-seekers at the end of the Eighties.

Thereafter the asylum law was also tightened up through the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act of 1993 in a manner similar to the other EU-countries. The central regulations included the determination of secure countries of origin according to the London Resolution of the EU ministers of immigration of 1992 (see Section 3) and an accelerated proceedings for refugees from these countries of origin, which was then followed by the rejection of their applications for asylum. This narrowing of the right to asylum by the conservative government under Major (1990 to 1994) released enormous protest and legal actions by human rights groups. As a consequence, some regulations could not be realised such as the implementation of DNA tests for clarifying the kinship relations of those seeking asylum, especially for unaccompanied refugee children. The recently compiled and most current Immigration and Asylum Act approved in 1999 and put in force in 2000, now includes all provisions of the Schengen group on the right to asylum even though Great Britain and Ireland do not belong to this group. It specifies the arrangements concerning secure third countries and countries of origin and additionally provides for the prohibition of employment as well as reduced social services for refugees for the duration of their asylum proceedings. In short, in this law are all of the restrictive measures found above all in Germany's refugee policy since 1993 that carry the reputation of policies to seal-off borders. As in Germany several years prior, conflicts and in part extremely resentment-ridden and violent disputes took place in the foreground. The debate over a new immigration and asylum law was borne out of a scandalising the topic "flight and refuge." (see Chapter II, Section 4). This was only one side. On the other side, for first time since the mid- Eighties the law allowed labour migration, however, only for the highly qualified labour market segment. Again, especially for immigrants from the Commonwealth were to be given access to privileges if they strove for a university degree in Great Britain and chose to remain in the country afterwards (see Appendix II.A as well as P. Egtved 2002, 69ff and the overview on legal arrangements for immigration in R. Bank/ R. Grote 2001).

According to Coleman, despite the current slackening in the area of labour migration, immigration policies can be conveyed in a simple formula:


\(^{21}\) Translation: ‘For more than twenty years, the Conservative Party (Tories) programmatic demands from 1974 have been in effect: ‘New immigration should be reduced to an unavoidable minimum. This minimum will be defined by the rights accorded to following family members and through for work permit procedures adjusted according to the labour needs of the British economy’.”
2.2 Case Study “Germany”

This could also be the formula for migration policies valid in Germany at that time and to a large degree is still valid today. However, Germany transformed into a country of immigration earlier than Great Britain.

First, from the nineteenth century up to the 1940s Germany belonged among the largest countries of emigration in Western Europe together with Great Britain, Ireland, and Italy. Only the Ruhr region already experienced a higher volume labour migration from Italy and the East European countries at the end of the nineteenth century. The transformation of Germany into a country of immigration did not take place prior to the rise of National Socialism and World War II. Since the 1990s, compared with the other West European countries, the Federal Republic can be characterised as the most important country of immigration. Up to the present, Germany’s migration structure is still comprised, for the most part, of groups originating from other parts of Europe, foremost from South, Southeast, and East European states. However, since the beginning of the Eighties, a slight shift towards immigration groups from the African and above all from the Asian continent can be observed. As a result, the migration structure all in all has become a little more heterogeneous.

Immigration history began directly at the conclusion of the Second World War with a mass migration released as a result of revolutions, expulsions, and repatriation as well through the reorganisation of the political and national territorial landscape in Europe as an effect of National Socialist domination and war. Three distinct groups were especially affected by: (1) At the end of war there were approximately 10.5 to 11.7 million "Displaced Persons" (DPs) in Europe - in most cases, they had been forced labourers - from twenty different countries outside of their own countries. Of these, alone 4.5 million remained in the Western, that is US-American, British, and French occupation zones in Germany. In spring, the Allies began large-scale repatriation measures which also included forced repatriation into Stalinist Soviet Union.

In West Germany, approximately 150,000 of these DPs who remained received the status of "homeless alien" which was established in 1949. Under this category mostly came the elderly and ill as well as those who were too weak to be able or willing to migrate (cf. here, W. Jacobmeyer 1992). (2) At the same time, a great population movement started in an east to west direction - above all into the four occupation zones in post-war Germany -, that was characterised by expulsion and flight. This mass expulsion was also a result of National Socialism. In the course of the so-called "NS-Volkstumspolitik," the so-called "Reichsdeutsche" and "Volksdeutsche" had been resettled into the East European territories occupied by the Wehrmacht (German Army) at that time. Around the end of the war, these people began to flee westward from the Soviet Army. The then attempted to settle, however, they were driven away again in accordance with the resolutions made by the Allied powers at the war conferences. Yet these resolutions did not only involve the groups that had moved into Eastern Europe through the National Socialist "Germanisierungspolitik." Equally affected were those groups that had wandered into regions of Poland, Romania, former Czechoslovakia, or the Volga. Large parts of this eastern settlement movement were rescinded through the redrawing of national borders and the policies of the Allies. Descendants of German immigrants who remained in the Soviet Union - e.g. in Kazakhstan - were displaced by force. The first census from 29 October 1946 registered over 9.6 million displaced Germans from Eastern Europe; among them 3.6 million stayed on in the Soviet occupation zone and almost six million remained in the Western zones. By the next census in 1950, the number again increased by more than two million in the Western zone, that is, in the Federal Republic,
so that sixteen percent of the population were refugees and DPs (cf. here, W. Benz 1992). In turn, the number in the Soviet occupation zone rose approximately from 500,000 to 4.1 million, comprising a population rate of twenty-two percent (cf., Datenreport 1999-2000, 27). (3) Shortly before and then particularly extreme after the division and the foundation of the two German states in 1949, a migration movement set in from the German Democratic Republic into the Federal Republic of Germany. These migrants were classified as "Republikflüchtige" (Refugees of the Republic) in East Germany and as "Uebersiedler" (Moving Over Settlers) in West Germany. Until the construction of the Berlin Wall, approximately 2.7 to 3.7 million people crossed the inner German Border from the East to the West. This migration movement as well as that of the DPs and/or the Aussiedlerinnen and Aussiedler from Eastern Europe was, for the most part if not altogether completely, stopped with the building of the Wall. Thereafter individual groups could only occasionally migrate over or resettle into the Federal Republic, and this was usually only possible if they could obtain a strong lobby in the West. Since the end of the Second World War up to the coming down of the Wall and the opening up of the so-called "Iron Curtain" between the East and the West in 1989/90, approximately fifteen million people had entered the Federal Republic via East-West migration, including the migration from East Germany. Taking into consideration the 1989 population level, this made up about one-fourth of the total German population (cf. here, K. Bade 1992; H. Fassmann/R. Münz 1996, 20ff.). This form of ethnic migration is - in comparison with all other Western countries of immigration – is specific to the migration structure of Germany. These migration movements were not politically understood as a form of immigration until the end of the Eighties. This changed only with the conclusion of the Block alignment and the introduction of relatively open borders between Eastern and Western Europe.

While this kind ethnic migration lasted throughout the post-war period, the Federal Republic of Germany - just as Great Britain had before and simultaneously with the Central European states began to recruit foreign workers in an attempt to establish the so-called "guest-worker system" along the lines of the rotation principle. The increasing need for cheap labour in the unskilled and skilled segments of the industrial labour market was the setting for this recruitment policy.

The need for unskilled and skilled labour only became evident in the course of the late Fifties. During the period of economic reconstruction following World War II and especially after the 1948 monetary reform, there was an initial demand for specialists. To a large degree this need was met by the refugees and displaced persons, among whom there were highly qualified persons. Simultaneously, the German occupation zones and the then young Federal Republic experienced a high level of emigration owing to the situation of unemployment and poverty after 1945 that was caused by fascism and war. Altogether until the beginning of the Eighties, it most likely amounted to approximately three to four million persons (cf. F.-W. Henning 1987, 450).

Unlike Great Britain, it was predominantly the industrial sector that at this time first began to expand and in 1970 achieved its highest level of employment at 48.5 percent of the total workforce (cf. G. Therborn 2000, 83). Also different than in Great Britain, the recruitment of foreign workers was concentrated in the factory production in the manufacturing industry, in the steel industry and in mining. These industrial cores were and continue to be in the western and southwestern regions as well as in the large urban centres of Hamburg in the North and West Berlin in the East. The economic structure was similar to that in Great Britain with a south-north, or more precisely, a southwest-north slope developing that did not yet divide the standard of living and regional labour markets to the same degree as in the British Isles (cf. F.W. Henning 1987, 453).

The expansion of the service sector first began prior to be noticeable at the beginning of the Seventies and was limited for a long time to public service. The background circumstances were the expansion of the welfare state that included the educational system under the
social-liberal government (1969 to 1982) through which the pattern of employment shifted noticeably and the number of woman employed rose. For foreign workers there were no employment perspectives here; instead at this time, the foreign labour recruitment came to an official halt.

But first, we will now discuss the recruitment of foreign workers, who as "guest workers" were to form a political buffer zone for the industrial labour market (cf. F.-W. Henning 1987, 460). Already in 1955, the first bilateral labour recruitment agreement between the Federal Republic and Italy was brought into being. However, it did not take on effect to the extent planned because the demand for workers was still being met through the continuous migration from East Germany. Only around the time of the erection of the Berlin Wall did the situation change. The federal government signed further bilateral agreements with Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968). Yet to a large extent the agreements with the North African countries were in vain since a system of labour migration had already been established in the meantime between them and the former colonial power of France. Also, labour recruitment from Portugal did not have the desired effect as the labour emigration into France had also already begun.

Until the official labour recruitment stop in 1973, the total number of foreigner labourers coming through this programme came close to the four million mark, of which more than 2.5 million had to pay social security. (cf. here, Seifert, 2000, 66-67).

After 1973, immigration to the Federal Republic structurally took a rather inconsistent course. The consequences of the labour recruitment and the recruitment stop shaped immigration so that by the mid-Eighties this phase can be described as a stage of migratory stagnation. The 1973 recruitment stop in the Federal Republic as in other West European countries was caused by the so-called oil price shock, economic crisis and an rising unemployment rate that reached the one million mark at that time. The recruitment stop had three consequences: (1) the "gate of entry" for labour migration was closed, and (2) the work visas and thus also residency visas were simultaneously withdrawn from foreign workers who had lost their place of work and compelling them to return to their countries of origin. Only those who retained employment or who were already in the retirement fund did not need to re-migrate (3) The recruitment stop of 1973 marks the moment in which the Federal Republic transformed into a country of immigration since the majority of foreign workers and their families now had to decide whether to re-migrate into their country of origin or to remain in the Federal Republic on a long-term basis. The reason for this was that migrants outside the European Community (EC) were prohibited to reenter if they had left the national territory.

This particularly hit immigrants from former Yugoslavia and Turkey hard. From the start Italy was a EC-member and Greece, Spain and Portugal joined in the course of the southern enlargement in 1981 and 1986 and even previously had the option to join. Hence, for example, could Spain still sign preference agreement with the EC in 1979 during the era of the Franco Regime. As a result, the re-entry prohibition did not, or only temporarily did not, apply to emigrants from these South European countries. Conversely, many of those affected by this legislation chose to permanently change their place of residency to the Federal Republic and have their relatives follow later on. Similar to Great Britain of the Seventies and Eighties, family unification dominated migration to the Federal Republic and compensated to a large extent for emigration out of the Federal Republic. The federal government tried to intervene in this long-term immigration development as of 1980 through a "return assistance law" and in co-operation with the other EC countries extended contract of association with the EC to Turkey that included a re-entry option. However, these measures came too late, namely when as the decision over the permanent residing place of many immigrants, especially those from Turkey, had already been made and therefore the 'point of no return' had already been crossed. The number of foreigners from EC states, on the other hand, sank, and over the course of the Eighties, there was a noticeable fluctuation or a pendulum swing between the
Chapter I: Western Europe

country of origin and the Federal Republic as the targeted country (cf. here, U. Birsl/ S. Otten/ K. Sturhan 1999, 48ff.). This can be traced back to the relative freedom of travel for EC citizens already existing at that time and that those migrating back and forth were not forced to permanently settle on and/or transfer their place of residence. Moreover, the North-South divide in wealth slowly diminished in Western Europe.

Altogether, the number of foreigners slightly increased despite the recruitment stop and introduction of measures for re-migration. Immediately prior to the German Unification in October 1990, a little more than 5.2 million stayed on in the western federal states constituting a population share of 8.2 percent (cf., Datenreport 1999, 2000, 45). At this time, Turks already made up the largest immigration group at 38 percent of all foreigners. However, from the beginning of the Nineties, this number continuously decreased and until arrived at only 28 percent in 1997. This is the result of a changes in the migration structure already underway in the 1980s. Upon closer examination of the migration balance, it becomes evident that the figures from the mid-Eighties to the end of the Nineties vastly exceeded those during the recruitment period (cf., EUROSTAT Population Assessment 1999: 184; U. Birsl 2005, Appendix II).

Since 1989/90, a new era of immigration began which had already been foreshadowed in the Eighties. This era is closely linked to two kinds of events occurring on the European continent and temporarily exceeded the quantitative level of immigration during the recruitment period: (1) with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and unification of the two Germanies in October 1990, the "Iron Curtain" between Eastern and Western Europe was also lifted. For the first time since 1961 this allowed migration from Eastern Europe into the West. This meant for Germany that from this point in time on, predominantly those possessing so-called "German ethnicity" according to Art. 116 GG, also called "Spätaussiedler" (later Aussiedler), immigrated. Since 1988, when the number suddenly went from a little less than 80,000 to more than 200,000 by 1997, a total of roughly over 2.4 million Spätaussiedler/innen immigrated to Germany.

Another migration group which is more politically relevant than quantitatively are Jews from Russia, who had been incorporated by the GDR government and in 1990 could now immigrate to Germany after the Unification as "Kontingentflüchtlinge" (contingent refugees). Until the end of 1999, this comprised a total of 120,500 people (cf. Bundesministerium des Innern 2001, 91; Datenreport 1999 2000, 27ff.; Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 1997, 227ff.).

(2) Since the Eighties, for the first time, conflicts on the European continent intensified in such a manner that civil wars in Croatia as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina erupted at the beginning of the Nineties and in the Kosovo at the end of the Nineties. These set flight movements in motion, which with the support of Germany led in the direction of Western Europe. A new status was created for these refugees, the "de-facto refugee." These refugees were to be admitted on the basis of humanitarian purposes during the armed conflicts, but not to be given a permanent status as legitimate asylum-seekers (cf. Overview 1 in Section 1.1 of this chapter). Such refugee policies formed the domestic political basis of legitimacy for the first deployment of the German armed forces in the history of the Federal Republic which took place within the framework of the UN-peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and the first involvement in a NATO military intervention in Kosovo. The new refugee status also became necessary in the Federal Republic in 1993 – thus almost simultaneously with the admittance of refugees from former Yugoslavia and the deployment of the German Armed Forces in Bosnia – since main argument used limit the basic right to asylum according to Article 16 GG was that the number of people seeking asylum was too high.

However, the short-term admittance of refugees from former Yugoslavia did not completely work out since many could not return on account of the destruction and continuation of conflicts in their hometowns. Repatriation and deportation measures, therefore, had to be repeatedly interrupted. As a result, many of these refugees stayed on for several years in the
Federal Republic and applied for asylum. They have become the largest group seeking asylum since the breakdown of the Yugoslavian state.

In addition to these events, the number of the Europeans seeking asylum, mostly from Turkey, rose over the first half of the Nineties. On the one hand, this came about as a result of the political and social situation of the Kurds in south-eastern Turkey, who usually are not granted the right to asylum in Germany. On the other hand, the family reunification migration of the first generation of recruited workers was drawing to a close. Certainly efforts were made to keep this "gate of entry" open through a "marriage market" between Germany and Turkey, however, this is only a narrow gateway. Consequently resettlement into the Federal Republic is usually only possible through right to asylum.

Moreover since the Eighties, migration increased from African and especially Asian countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Sri Lanka or Iraq, indeed also through the right to asylum. Once again this kind of migration expanded in the Nineties. However, on account of the aforementioned events taking place on the European continent, this flight movement did actually increase in absolute numbers but not proportionally. On 31 December 1999 a total of 1.24 million refugees lived in Germany (cf. Bundesministerium des Inneren 2001, 96).

Concerning the Federal Republic's, it can still be said that in contrast to the other large European countries of immigration, such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Great Britain, that its migration structure characterised by European immigration. However, the transformation towards a more intercontinental immigration can not be determined at present.

Focussing on the migration structure, in sum it can be said that since the end of World War II about sixteen million Aussiedlerinnen and Aussiedler have migrated and/or fled into the current territory of the Federal Republic, that is, both East and West Germany. The foreign population reached a total of nearly 7.4 million around the turn of the twenty-first century, of which 1.24 million are refugees. Thus the most immigrants and their families came as a result of the labour recruitment programme of the 1960s and 1970s, of whom the third generation already lives in the Federal Republic. As a whole, the foreign population constitutes almost nine percent of the total population. However, concerning their distribution, there is a drastic West to East divide insofar as only 3.3 percent of all foreigners live in the five new federal states, while 96.7 percent reside in the old federal states including Berlin. This means that the share of foreigners in the west is nearly 11 percent and only a little more than 1.7 percent in the east (cf., Bundesministerium des Inneren 2001, 17, own calculations). Moreover, the numbers of naturalised migrants especially rose among the Turks since the beginning of the Nineties. On account of their German citizenship, they are no longer registered in these figures. For this reason, the extent of immigration can no longer be calculated exactly.

Taking the countries if origin into consideration, the migration structure has changed slightly towards intercontinental immigration. This development slightly declined within Europe inasmuch as it was compensated on a higher level owing to refugee movements in the Nineties. Along these lines, the share of European immigration was still at 94 percent in 1970, still at 93 percent in 1980, sank to less than 80 percent in 1990, and since then has steady held this level (cf., U. Birsl/ S. Ottens/ K. Sturhan 1999, 51; Bundesministerium des Inneren 2001, 18, own calculations). Figure 3 shows the migration structure according to regions of origin around the turn of the twenty-first century.

When looking at migration politics in the Federal Republic, one can clearly observe a paradox in the different aspects of the most western European countries of immigration. The guiding principle behind German policies up through 1998/99 was the notion that the Federal Republic was not a country of immigration. This was different than Great Britain, for example, which at least admits to being a multi-ethnic society and makes an effort to shape it by means of anti discrimination laws. In contrast, immigration as a societal development was simply ignored in the Federal Republic, at least in the public discourse. This applied even to
the period of labour recruitment, since it was assumed that labour immigrants would enter the Federal Republic solely as "guest workers" and would leave the country when no longer economically needed.

**Figure 3: Migration Structure according to Region of Origin**
*Status: 31. December 1999, Percentages rounded*

![Migration Structure Diagram](image)

Source: Bundesministerium des Inneren 2001, 18 and own calculations.

In the 1970s and especially in the 1980s, new strategies were developed to prevent direct access to the national territory of the Federal Republic. Therefore specific states attempted to regulate through endorsements, that is visas for migrants. The advantage of such endorsements is that they usually have to be applied for at the German consulates in the country of the migrant’s origin. In this way, entire areas of entry controls into the Federal Republic were shifted abroad. In the meantime, almost all countries outside the OECD are subject to an obligation to hold a visa. Simultaneously the Federal Government agreed in the course of the breakdown of the Eastern Bloc and of the fall of the "Iron Curtain" to bilateral "agreements to take back returning nationals," in particular with their East European neighbours. These agreements obliged neighbouring countries to not let immigrants without a valid visa enter the Federal Republic. The implementation of these endorsements and bilateral agreements was also performed and co-ordinated by other West European countries within the framework of the so-called "Schengen-Group." (See Section 3).

Probably most controversial conflict carried out in the public on the subject of migration and asylum policies took place in 1992/93 over the issue of legislation greater restrictions to the basic right to asylum for victims of political persecution. Certainly this was not the most drastic cut-back in refugee politics as the right to asylum under Article 16 GG at that point had already been extensively undermined through the political and legal practices. However, this restrictive practice should attain constitutional standing and this then also in the area of civil rights. This cross-party compromise to change the right to asylum between the CDU/CSU, FDP and the SPD finally led to the procedure of so-called "secure third countries" as had been agreed upon by the members of the first Schengen group.

In spite of all these restrictions and the guiding principle that the Federal Republic “is not a country of immigration,” there had been nearly unbroken national policy authorising immigration. Nonetheless, only two "gates of entry" officially existed up to the turn of the twenty-first century: (1) via the basic right to asylum and (2) via family reunification (See here Appendix II.B).
Characteristic of migration and asylum policies of the 1990s in general was, on the one hand, ethnic migration, that is, the immigration of Late Aussiedlerinnen and Aussiedler which was subject to quotas and limited. Interestingly enough instruments were applied which are similar to those used in Great Britain during post-colonial immigration since the 1970s and 1980s. On the other hand, the basic right to asylum was limited, while labour immigration and the entry for refugees was approved. These last two forms of immigration, however, were decisively reduced in terms of legal and social protection. That is, labour immigrants who work seasonally or by means of a work contract in the Federal Republic, are only given a restricted residency visa and, even more importantly, extremely limited access to the labour market.

Since the end of the Nineties, a change in perspective or perhaps even a alteration in the policy paradigm seems to be underway, which is relatively consonant with policies of the European Union and the Treaty of Amsterdam. This possible paradigmatic alternation can be recognised foremost in three measures: (1) revisions in the citizenship laws that had been valid since 1913 and thus a drift away from ius sanguinis. Along with this is double citizenship, which up to now only applied to foreign children of whom a parent had already regularly lived eight years in the Federal Republic. By age twenty-three, these children must choose between the citizenship of their parents or the German one. This stipulation has been valid since 1 January 2000 (2) The introduction of the so-called "Green Card" allows for longer-term labour migration including social protection for highly qualified people in the IT sector. This policy can mean a return to a more comprehensive recruitment politics as already planned in the immigration and asylum law of 2002 (3) this first immigration law in the history of the Federal Republic sums up the central immigration and asylum regulations that had previously been incomprehensible in innumerable laws, regulations or administrative guidelines are now anchored in a single set of regulations. Basically, the law sets up three "gates of entry." That means that in addition to asylum and family reunification, market-oriented labour immigration, that is labour migration with more legal protection previously should be possible.23

2.3 Case Study „Spain“

In Spain around the turn of the twenty-first century, there was no change in the perspective concerning migration politics similar to Germany or Great Britain - at least not in the direction of more openness. However, an adjustment process can be seen in the policies of these three countries. Since 2000, the Spanish government has adopted increasingly stricter policies and brought its migration policy standards down to the same level as Germany. Along these lines in the Summer 2002, the Minister of the Interior, Mariano Rajoy, whose department is responsible for questions of immigration, announced the second reform of the foreigner law of February 2000. This reform put family reunion as well as undocumented immigration under stricter control which explicitly following regulations valid in Germany. All in all, the argument justifying the change in the foreigner law was that Spain might be required to adapt to the regulations of the other EU-member states (cf., taz, 6 June 2002, 11).

In comparison to Great Britain and Germany at least, Spanish immigration policies can be described a being somewhat more liberal. Since the first foreigner law of 1985/86, there have always been three "gates of entry": (1) limited labour migration, (2) family reunion, and (3) flight and asylum. Its regulations were relatively less restrictive once individuals seeking to immigrate had been able to establish a legally recognised route into the nation-state territory and the political sphere. Moreover, legalisation campaigns - "regularizaciones" - made it possible for at least some migrants who lacked valid documentation to attain an officially recog-

23 However, the immigration law became the bone of contention in the election campaign of 2002 (cf. here Chapter II, Section 4).
nised residency status, even if only temporarily. However, all this is not inconsistent with the regulations prevailing in the other EU-member states, the Schengen Agreement, and the Treaty of Amsterdam (See Section 3). Even so, for Spain these more favourable immigration regulations do not function clearly as an additional pull factor as mentioned in our comparative analysis above on the push and pull factors for international migration (nor for Italy as a further target country) (cf., J. Schoorl et al. 2000; Section 1.1). In addition, even Spanish policies are not only oriented toward regulation and control, but also toward limiting immigration. Thus comparatively speaking, Spanish immigration policies are only a little more liberal than those of Great Britain and Germany.

Reasons for the tightening the foreigner law have another basis than mentioned by the Minister of the Interior. On the one hand, the central government in Madrid and the Minister of the Interior in particular were under political pressure on the domestic front throughout the spring/summer of 2002. Conditions behind this were, above all, the increasing number of people fleeing largely from North African states across the Atlantic into the Canary Islands and over the Gulf of Gibraltar into Andalusia. The precarious situation of the refugees in the admittance camps, as for example in the closed airport of Fuerteventura or the protests by Moroccan immigrants who searched in vain for agriculture jobs in Huelva (Andalusia) and elsewhere, repeatedly made media headlines (cf. for example, El Pais, 6 March 2002, 26; 7 March 2002, 22). Consequently, the autonomous governments involved demanded more support from Madrid. On the other hand, with regard to foreign policy, pressure from EU-member states increased toward those countries whose territorial borders are concurrently external EU borders. Whereas Germany and Austria - as two of the countries affected - can displace responsibility for undocumented immigration by means of bilateral agreements that obligate their East European neighbours to take back returning nationals in their function as countries of origin and/or transit. This recourse, however, can only be taken with great difficulty or is impossible for the southern European countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain, simply on the basis of their geographic and geopolitical situation. Flight to these EU states - primarily to Italy and Spain - moves across the Adriatic Sea and the Atlantic. This migration movement originates largely from the Asian continent and the northern region of the African continent. According to the Schengen Agreement, the countries in which immigrants first set foot must take care of them. In this way, foreign policy pressures simultaneously become an internal political issue.

Predominantly these domestic and foreign policy reasons have led to changes in the foreigner law. It is decisive that the immigration of Sin Papeles is understood as a problem, or more precisely, by political definition certain immigration groups become Sin Papeles and thereby a problem. For example, this applies to the labour immigrants from Morocco, who were used in the 1990s as low-paid and qualified workers in agriculture or in the service sector. Since political priority has now been placed on employing seasonal workers from newly EU-joining East European countries such as Poland and Romania, who are expected to later return to their countries of origin, workers from Morocco neither get temporary residency and work permits nor do they find work. Even those who legally entered and remained in Spain, have become immigrants without valid papers in the course of this shift in political priority (cf. here El Pais from 4 March 2002, 20; 6 March 2002, 26; and also Chapter II, Section 4).

This example shows similarities with the basic migration policy model in Great Britain and Germany, inasmuch as those individuals who are willing to immigrate are classified into specific types of migration groups by way of political measures and can within the elapsed time of their stay be redefined, so that they are consequently then excluded from this category. In summary: In Great Britain, this affects post-colonial immigrants, who through the tightening of the immigration legislation, have become refugees. In Germany, the same applies to Turks who cannot claim a right to family reunification after the labour recruitment stop of 1973 and therefore must attempt to gain entrance as refugees.
All things considered, this means that Spain is following along the same path of migration policy as Great Britain and Germany. In short, domestic and foreign policy pressures and their correlated political way of dealing with migration groups has led to a negative trend in immigration policy, and therefore, to an adaptation of the politics developed in the traditional countries of immigration. However at the first sight, Spain appears to have begun a transition into a new country of immigration, yet with a very different sort of social premises and migration history.

Until the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, Spain is typically characterised as being first and foremost a country of emigration. The positive migration balance at the beginning of the Nineties turned out to be lower than in Italy, which also underwent similar changes from a traditional "exporter" of workers to a country of immigration around the same period. Aside from emigration into the American continent during its colonial history, which for Spain and Portugal began early and also ended relatively early in comparison to the other great colonial powers of Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands, the Spaniards did not begin to emigrate to North America prior to the second half of the nineteenth century. In this period, the mass exodus from the European continent into Canada and especially in the USA was already in full swing. From beginning the twentieth century, Spaniards for the first time emigrated in larger numbers in the same direction as the other European countries. Between 1900 and 1930 the officially number of was 144,000 people; however, it must be assumed that in reality a considerably greater number of people emigrated who were not registered by the Instituto Español de Emigración (cf., Colectivo Ioé, 1999). Nonetheless, this emigration process had already slowed down in the period following the First World War and, in part, turned around with the remigration of some of these emigrants. Reasons for this immigration pattern was the difficult economic situation in west European countries resulting from the First World War and the global depression. In spite of this situation, the Spanish Civil War (1936 to 1939) then forced at least 140,000 Spaniards into the foreign exile, some estimates even show approximately 300,000 refugees (cf. W. Bernecker 1987, 951). Along with this refugee movement abroad, this war also triggered a further flight movement from the urban into rural areas.

The Spanish Civil War had far-reaching effects: It claimed approximately 800,000 lives through fighting, famine, and executions, and the birth-rate declined (cf. ibid., 951). Therefore, the human sacrifice was grave, just as much as the material and economic losses even if they did not reach the same dimensions as in other continental European countries as a result of the destruction brought about through World War II. In this war, Spain remained just as neutral as it had in the First World War.

Social misery which proliferated more and more since the beginning of the Forties, however, cannot be explained alone by the Civil War. To be certain the gross national product in 1940 was set back to its level in 1914 and large parts of the industrial production factories and the transportation infrastructure had been destroyed, however, the autarchic politics, policies to seal-off national borders under Franco, further exacerbated the situation. It was not yet pos-

---

24 In 1492, intercontinental colonial history began. In this year, Christopher Columbus under the commission of the Spanish Habsburgs discovered the American continent. This led to the annihilation of the empires of the Aztecs and Inca. Furthermore, in 1521 the group of islands of the Malaysian archipelago and the Philippines was taken under Spanish possession. From 1492, when the Catholic Conquista Granada as last Moorish and Muslim City in Spain was destroyed, the coastal garrisons in Morocco and Algeria were erected and Tunis was conquered in 1535. However, the Ottoman empire again partially pushed back the Spaniards. In addition, parts of the Netherlands were controlled by Spain. By this time, Spain had not only become the greatest colonial power on the American continent, but also the hegemonic power on the European continent. However, in 1700 Spain lost power over some of its European areas as well as in its American colonies, with the exception of Cuba and Puerto Rico, between 1810 and 1824. These two countries together with the Philippines then were handed over to the USA as a consequence of the Spanish American War. Cuba became independent in 1902 and the Philippines in 1946. Even until today, the smallest island of the Greater Antilles, Puerto Rico, is still a commonwealth associated with the USA (cf. here U. Birsl 2005, in 2003: Appendix VII).
sible at that time for the population to escape this plight by means of migration since for ideological reasons state authorities suppressed it through restrictive passport policies. Out of the continuous pressures caused by social plight, this situation was finally loosened in 1946 (cf. ibid.; D. Nohlen/ A. Hildenbrand 1992, 25f.).

Autarchy and state interventionist policies between 1939 and 1959 can be seen in part as a consequence of the international isolation of Spain. Yet this is not the only cause; further it also resulted from the social and economic ideology of the Falangists who supported Franco. Their main objective was to pursue policies to develop a self-sufficient industrial economy that would be independent of imports. The main instrument of this policy was the Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) which supervised and promoted the key industry. In addition, the state directly controlled the investments in the industry and set agriculture prices, raw material allotment rates, and a low-wage level. All this led to an economic standstill until 1951 with its social consequences of poverty and hunger. Above all it affected the industrial proletariat, yet the rural population that had to work for the lowest wages on large agricultural estates was also hit hard. Therefore, it was the large landowners who profited most from the policies of the Franco regime. In contrast, industry was the economic sector that had to struggle with stagnation and delayed technological modernisation.

At the beginning of the fifties, the economical situation improved, if only on a short-term basis. It was the time period in which the United Nations ended the boycott against the Franco regime and Spain was allowed to become a member of the western military alliance of NATO. Thus the period of political isolation came to a close. The circumstances for the Western world’s change of sentiment towards Spain was the intensifying Cold War situation. The USA now conceded economical and military aid to the country and installed military bases on the Iberian peninsula; additionally, European countries offered loans (cf. ibid., 26).

Nevertheless, living conditions became critical in some regions, since the natural population growth visibly advanced again. Especially in the underdeveloped regions and provinces of Castilian-León, Castilian-La Mancha, Galicia, the Extremadura, and Andalusien population pressures mounted which found no equivalent in occupational opportunities. We must not forget the low earnings and the general prohibition of women’s employment imposed in 1938 and continued over the course of nearly three decades. In this manner, the men alone took on the function of feeding the family. Thus in the Fifties began a mass exodus out of these regions and provinces which became even stronger in the Sixties and continued until the beginning of the Seventies.

Increasingly these push factors were combined with the pull factors from the aspiring industrial centres of Catalonia, Madrid, Valencia, and the Basque Country as well as from west European countries recruiting workers from abroad. Hence Spanish workers emigrated most of all to Switzerland, Germany, and France; additionally, migration to the American continent occurred once more. To some extent, migration routes proceeded first over major Spanish industrial centres before moving abroad. The rural and lesser developed areas lost approximately five million people in the course of this mass exodus (cf. Colectivo Ioé 1999; D. Nohlen/ A. Hildenbrand 1992, 169).

This mass emigration did not inconvenience the Franco regime since it offered two advantages. On the one hand, emigration eased the Spanish labour market as well as the social situation. On the other, regional labour markets in the major population centres now could be supplied with cheap and unqualified workers from the rural areas. This became an especially important factor at the beginning of the Sixties as Spain went through an structural economic change and a period of economic boom at least regionally comparable to that experienced in

25 Only Argentina offered aid for economic recovery. The most difficult aspect of the isolation must have been the exclusion of Spain from the Marshall Plan for Western Europe.

26 For a comparison on the image of women and policies on directed toward them during the Franco regime including its subsequent development, see K.-W. Kreis 1998.
other West European states. This was the era in which autarchic politics came to an end and the technocrats of the Catholic elite Order, "Opus Dei," took over key governmental functions thereby securing economic hegemony. The starting point of this new liberal economic course favoured by the Opus Dei was the "Plan de Estabilización," the stability pact of 1959. On this basis, import restrictions were loosened, the general conditions for foreign capital and investments were improved on the whole, and the peseta was devalued and the freedom of foreign exchange was granted. The chemical industry, iron and steel production, machine production, and the consumer goods industry including the automobile industry profited foremost from these policies (D. Nohlen/ A. Hildenbrand 1992, 27).

Most internal migration, therefore, also went toward these industrial branches. However, in the target areas, the situation of the domestic migrants proved to be problematic. In the beginning, young men migrated as pioneer migrants and were later followed by their wives and other relatives. These pioneer migrants found work in these targeted areas which was usually under worse conditions and for lower wages than the local population. Further, this internal migration led to a rise in residential areas on the outskirts of the cities which were subsequently rapidly extended and condensed (cf. ibid., 171). Therefore, separate residential districts developed, in which domestic migrants, for the most part, found lodgings. Later, groups of immigration moved in. Today these housing units are marked by social problems, tensions, and conflict. Among these kind of housing units are the Maremagnum in and the Ca N'Anglada/Terrassa near Barcelona, the Banyoles in Girona, and the Malmea in Madrid. Xenophobic resentment and abuse is especially directed against new groups of migrants living in these buildings (cf., Imserso 1998; C. Solé 1995).

There is, therefore, an overall problem of incorporating domestic migrants in areas which are also strongly marked by traditional regionalism. The authoritarian centralism of the Franco regime served to encourage this regionalism since maintaining its political and cultural importance provided a form of a counter movement. The consequences for immigrants are most obvious in the linguistic differences that can be found in some areas and provinces; the variety of languages serves to culturally differentiate between groups within the country as well as in the processes of inclusion and exclusion. For migrants in the relevant regions - as for example in Catalonia, a region with a high level of immigration – language differences may restrict their access to the regional society and to the labour market (cf. here, D. Laitin/ C. Solé 1989).

For internal migrants, interregional boundaries can actually function almost like international boundaries.

Altogether this means that even if internal migration in Spain as well as in Great Britain and Germany was caused by an economic and social gap, nevertheless, there are still important differences. Economic and social disparities in Spain were and are to a certain degree to-

---

27 According to F. Ortega, the modernisation process put into action via liberal economic policies was not intended to have such wide-ranging social and cultural implications (cf. F Ortega in 1994, 55ff.).

28 See also Chapter II, Section 3 and Chapter III, Section 2 in this study.

29 According to Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, Castilian (Castellano) is the official national language. Additional languages include: Catalan (catalán and/or català), Galician (gallego and/or galego), and Basque (vascuense and/or euskera). In the last years of the Franco era, movements and initiatives developed in these regions to reinstate the regional language as the dominant local language. To a large extent this has been successful so that these languages shape the cultural life in these regions (on the variety of languages, see D. Nohlen/ A. Hildenbrand 1992, 174ff.). Moreover, regional governments have adopted these specific regional languages as their second official language. Such is the case for Catalonia after the Franco-Era; therefore, it is also the language used in for the empirical interview portion of our study: "Durante este mismo período el movimiento de 'normalización' o 'catalanización' alcanza su fase 'burocrática'. La educación en catalán es ahora una necesidad legal, y la capacidad de escribir en catalán es útil para conseguir puestos de trabajo en el gobierno de Cataluña." (D. Laitín/ C. Solé 1989, 13)

30 This is to be understood literally: The regional self-understanding in some regions corresponds quite well with a national one. In such regional self-conception, its territorial and political-space delineation must not necessarily be compatible with the nation-state and the national territory (cf., J. Fijalkowski 1997, 351f.; U. Birsl 2005)
day considerably more striking. Internal migration together with regionalism in Spain has more features in common with the trans-border, or more precisely the geopolitical border, crossing of labour migrants into Great Britain in the 1940s and Germany from the 1950s to the 1970s.

In this phase of the mass exodus, approximately two million people migrated abroad under labour recruitment programmes into other West European countries. However, the net emigration was only around 800,000 people since during this time and even prior to the official labour recruitment stop, many emigrants returned to Spain owing to an economic upturn in parts of Spain-(cf. here J. Rodríguez Osuna 1985)\textsuperscript{31}. Later, the democratization process was the main stimulus for remigration. After the end of the Franco era\textsuperscript{32} and especially with in Spain’s entry into the EC, the number of people holding Spanish citizenship who reside in other countries has significantly declined. After that, more of a pendular migration movement can be observed between Spain and the former migrant-receiving countries such as Germany (cf., U. BirsI/ S. OttenS/ K. Sturhan 1999, 52).

At that time, these migration movements and processes - internal migration, emigration, and remigration - offered multiple social and political advantages. They eased or assisted regional and sectoral labour markets through domestic migration and remigration. Migration abroad into other West European countries produced the side-effect that the emigrants transferred money to their relatives still living in Spain. This brought in foreign currency, a rise in consumption, and consequently, money flowed into the public funds which then could be used, for instance, for economic policy. However, similar to other south and southeast European countries of emigration, Spain now tried to control emigration. For this reason, in 1956 the Instituto Español de Emigración drew up guidelines by which to evaluate the long-term supply and demand of workers for the Spanish labour market. On this basis, the contingents for emigration were determined. Simultaneously, scenarios on the return of emigrated persons were created. Therefore, one tended to put stakes on a rotation cycle so that in regard to the issue of the "exportation" of workers, their "re-importation" was likewise intended. The political intentions of the Franco government were quite compatible with the recruitment politics of the migrant-receiving countries, which - as is commonly known – were also build on a rotation of the pool of foreign workers.

There were signs of another phenomenon before this decisive phase in Spanish migration history: the first pioneer migrants of the later stage immigration to Spain had arrived. The share of the foreign population in the total population actually constituted only 0.4% in 1975, and of this, the majority were European citizens such as retirees from Great Britain, Germany, and France - apart from some labour immigrants from Portugal. However, decisive for this later stage immigration are the immigrants from Latin American countries. Among them were refugees from Cuba, Argentina, and Chile as well as immigrants from Venezuela, who found accommodation on the Canary Islands. Immigrants from Asia only comprised a small portion of those immigrating at this time. However, as early as the 1970s, their numbers began to increase. The first pioneer migrants from north African countries, particularly from Morocco, were also significant to the structure contemporary migration in Spain (cf., Colectivo Ioé 1999). Around the middle of the Seventies began a distinct stage characterised by complex and rapid change which can be expressed by four central events (1) The end of the Franco era and the beginning of the so-called pre-arranged shift to civil democracy (2) Increased momentum in the transformation of the economic structure led Spain to quickly develop into a ser-

\textsuperscript{31} In this stage of economic activity, there was a labour demand that could not be met alone by shifting from rural, agricultural workers into the major industrial centres. Therefore, the domestic migration situation can be seen as initiating the loosening of the work prohibition for women in 1962.

\textsuperscript{32} Franco died in 1975, and thus began the period of the so-called transición, that is of the pre-arranged transition to civil democracy. On 31 October 1978, the two chambers of parliament, the Cortes Generales, - the parliament (Cámara de los Diputados) and the senate (Senado) legislated a new constitution.
vice-sector oriented society only as it had just become an industrialised country. The transformation of occupational and social structures that accompanied this change was unparalleled before the breakdown of state socialism and the planned economy in the Eastern European bloc (cf. for more detail, U. Birsl/St. French/C. Solé 1996). (3) Alongside these transformations, Spain was hit by the 1970s economic crisis that had wide-ranging effects on the labour market. Now it was even experienced by the once up-and coming large industrial centres, and migration movements changed their course accordingly. The Basque country and Catalonia were marked by emigration, while the Canary Islands, the Balearic Islands, and Andalusia were now subject to immigration. Meanwhile, Madrid and the autonomous region of Valencia remained areas targeted by migrants. In this situation, it is important to note that since this time, not only internal migration but also emigration only occurred on a small scale, which marked migration of the former phase. (4) This is the phase in which Spain changed from a country of emigration into a country of immigration (cf., Colectivo Ioé 1999).

This transformation into a country of immigration began moderately. During the Sixties, the number of the foreigners living in Spain increased from 65,000 to 148,000; in the Seventies, it rose even less so that the total increase was only to 200,000. From the beginning the Eighties, this process of immigration accelerated as well since there were already 275,000 immigrants in the country in 1985 (cf. A. Izquierdo Escribano 1992, 71). By the year 2000, the number of foreigners increased up to 938,783. As follows, the one-million-mark has not yet been reached (cf. http://www.elpais.es/temas/immigracion from 20.02.2001) - at least not in term of the number of registered immigrants. As already mentioned, undocumented immigration plays a specific role in Spain owing to its geographic and geopolitical position. The number of undocumented migrants living in Spain can scarcely be calculated despite the four regularizaciones taking place since the first set of foreigner laws legislated between 1985/86 and 2000. These legalisation campaigns - the most recent in 2000, - however, give us some idea on the magnitude of undocumented migration at present. In the course of these campaigns, a little more than 246,000 immigrants living undocumented in Spain applied for a regularisation of their status. Only 56% or 137,454 of these applications were granted. Accordingly, the official number of foreigners increased to around 17% from 810,329 over the aforementioned total number, (cf., ibid. and own calculations). All applicants together compose a rate of almost a third of those not included in the initial total immigration figure.

In the research, it is unclear how to estimate the scope of undocumented migration. Consequently, it is under discussion whether this third should be considered as a gauge since it remains a relatively constant number in the legalisation campaigns or if we must assume that only a fraction of the Sin Papeles submit applications during these campaigns. Reasons for this may be connected with the relatively low approval rate of these applications, or may lie in the fact that information over the procedure is lacking, or that through the application process, undocumented migrants are registered and as a result face greater risks if their application is denied - either forcing them to leave the country or only being granted temporary residence permits which then entail the threat of deportation. Thus in the literature, there emerges a gap between 30% and 70% that needs to be included in the official statistics (cf. on this, A. Izquierdo Escribano 1996, 280; J. Casey 1998; J. Schoorl et al. 2000, 35). If we choose the middle course and consider that the ratio of the Sin Papeles to the officially registered immigrants is about 50%, then increases in the total number of the immigrants reaches more than 1.4 million in 2000. At the same time, this means that immigration in Spain is quite underestimated since according to this calculation, the share of foreigners increases from 2.5 % to 3.6%; and prior to the legalisation campaign, it was even estimated at only 1.7%.

Even these figures only at best approximate the actual extent of immigration inasmuch as shown in Figure 4 below, which is based on the most important migration policy regulations

33 However, the industrial sector never dominated the employment structure. The highest level of employment in 1975 reached 38.5% for all employable persons (cf., G. Therborn 2000, 83)
summarised in Appendix II.C, naturalisation requirements are made easier for some migrant groups, for instance for individuals from former colonies, so that they are no longer fall under the category of immigrants in the statistics. Hence between 1960 and 1995, a total of 122,000 applications for Spanish citizenship were granted, however, most of these naturalisations took place after the Franco era (cf. Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración 1999). So when measuring the level of immigration, this number should be considered making the share of the immigrated population in Spain at around 4%.

Taken altogether this means that Spain cannot yet be included among the larger countries of immigration. However, the point in time in which Spain transformed into a country of immigration must be moved to a considerably earlier date than suggested by the immigration balance shown for last two and a half decades. Already it has been shown for Great Britain that relying only an immigration balance offers little insight for positioning a country as country of immigration. As in the British case - although for other reasons, - the volume of immigration in Spain is underestimated and as a result its importance as well.

An interesting aspect of migration in Spain is that it has a rather “semi-heterogeneous” structure and falls between Great Britain and Germany in its composition and proportionate to the origin of the immigrants in terms of world religions.

Figure 4: The Structure of Migration According to the Region of Origin, Status: 1998, percentages rounded

Source: Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración 1999 and own calculations.

European immigration is still almost entirely fed by other EU-countries, for the most part from Great Britain, Germany, Portugal, and France. Labour migration from Poland and Romania is not yet included in these figures from 1998. The recruitment of workers from these countries did not begin until the year 2002. So that a contingent of 6,700 seasonal workers were recruited to work on Andalusian plantations alone at the beginning of that year. More than 5,100 of this contingent were migrant workers from Poland and nearly 1000 were from Romania. As a result, Moroccans have been almost completely pushed out from this sector of the labour market (cf. El País, 4 March 2002, 20).

Assessments in the international research differ a little over the date of this transformation in Spain. While King and Rodríguez-Melguizo also point to the "migration turnaround" in the Seventies (cf., R. King/ I. Rodríguez-Melguizo 1999, 56), Cornelius argues that it did not occur before the first half of the Eighties (cf., W. A. Cornelius 1994, 331f.). However, to a large degree there is a consensus that this transformation set in before the end of the Eighties, hence before there was a positive migration balance.
The latter make up nearly 20% and so far compose the largest group of immigrants; at the same time, four out of five of all immigrants come from the African continent. In part, they come from the coastal cities of northern Morocco which had been occupied and colonised by Spain at the end of the Middle Ages. Additionally, immigration from Latin America and the Philippines can be assessed as a late post-colonial migration. Or to put it differently, more than a third of every person who immigrated to Spain came from her former colonies\textsuperscript{35}. Through a stronger political orientation towards Eastern Europe, the numerical proportion between post-colonial and independent immigration will shift from one-third to two-thirds in the near future.

In addition to this, since the beginning of the Nineties, an increasing number of those seeking asylum - similar to Germany - come above all from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan as well as from Poland and Rumania (cf. Colectivo Ioé 1999). Nonetheless, the level remains quite low comparatively. So far the "peak value" of asylum applicants in Spain was at 12,620 in 1993 (cf. UNHCR Statistics 1999).

Similar to Great Britain and Germany, immigration is spatially concentrated onto a few areas. In Spain, these are centres of industry, services, tourism, and agriculture. Eighty percent of all officially registered immigrants live in the three Mediterranean and autonomous regions of Catalonia, Valencia, and Andalusia, as well as in the Madrid area and on the two archipelagos of the Balearic and Canary Islands. Much clearer than in Great Britain and Germany, in the industrial areas, for instance around Barcelona and Madrid, new labour sectors for immigrants have emerged, especially for migrant women. In the first place, they do not find work in the industries or other branches of trade, but rather in private households. The demand in this sector has arose out of the increased employment of Spanish women (cf., Colectivo Ioé 1999). Similar developments can be found in Italy and even in the classical countries of immigration. However, these immigrant women are not perceived to the same degree since the public discourse concentrates on other topics of immigration.

Spain has at last become a target country of migration, however, without having a suitable migration policy. Yet in comparison to Germany and to a certain extent to Great Britain, Spain constructed an infrastructure for migration policy within an extremely short period of time despite its undertaking a comprehensive social and economical transition after the Franco era. The constitution of a migration policy transpired almost from its beginning under the foreign policy pressure from the European Community; and therefore, it was rather prematurely linked to the process of European Integration. This distinguishes Spain, as well as the other new West European countries of immigration, from the classical countries of immigration which were able to formulate an immigration policy along national interests as early as the 1970s.

Consequently, the first important migration policy decisions in Spain fell at a time in which the process of adaptation between the countries of immigration was already underway and the first multilateral agreements has been reached:

1. In 1978 Spain signed the Geneva Refugee Convention.
2. In the same year, the first democratic constitution after the Franco-Regime was passed.

Legislated in the section "Titulo I. De los derechos y deberes fundamentales," the civil liberties, standards of citizenship (a combination of the \textit{ius sanguinis} and \textit{ius soli} principles), individuals rights (the assurance of public freedoms, such as the freedom of religion, the prohibition of discrimination according to political conviction, religious affiliation, and belief) and limitations for foreigners (for example, the right to vote in municipal elections, but not in national elections, though allowing for exceptions to be set by the autonomous regional governments) as well as the right to asylum.

\textsuperscript{35} Own calculations based on figures from the Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración 1999.
3. In 1984, the asylum law, the "Ley reguladora del derecho de asilo y de la condición de refugiado, in short, the "Ley DE Asilo," was implemented. It awarded asylum based on the criteria set by the Geneva Refugee Convention, and further includes admission for humanitarian reasons. The latter stipulation was removed by an amendment in 1992. Reasons for this amendment was Spain’s admission to the Schengen group. Not only did the legal situation as a result become increasingly restrictive, but asylum law practices as well (cf., M. P. Garazo Ortiz 2001, 291).

4. The "Ley Orgánica sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España" - in short, the "Ley de Extranjería" or the "foreigner law" - was passed in 1985 and implemented in 1986. For the first time, a legal basis was established for foreigners. Their status with regard to residency and work permits had not been controlled until this time. Therefore, the first regularización was put into effect during this time in order to provide immigrants the possibility legalising their residency. The law was also necessary in the anticipation of the EC-membership and in the establishment of a legal status of citizens from the other EC countries. It remained valid until January 2000. At this time, a new law with the same name was passed, which accommodated the rather open migration policy since the beginning of the nineties that had been introduced under the PDSO-led government (1982-1996). It was considered, in comparison, to be a modern law that provided foreigners with basic legal protection. Moreover, it provided a unique regularisation of the residency status for all Sin Papeles seeking asylum. At that time, the deliberate recruitment of foreign labour at a larger volume was planned. However, in March of the same year, the conservative Partido Popular (PP) gained the absolute majority in new elections of the Spanish parliament. Even in their election campaign, the PP announced their plan to tighten the new foreigner law. The amended law came into force in January 2001. In this piece of legislation, approximately 80% of the initial set of laws were modified, however according to Carazo Ortiz, not all of the new rules consisted of substantial changes in the legal status. Two aspects of this new law are worth mentioning: a) Spain admitted to being a country of immigration, and b) undocumented immigration became an important issue that was to be dealt with restrictively (cf. ibid., 283). As mentioned earlier, for the time being this change in the law was not the last word in immigration policy. Migration had become a public topic open to increasing scandalising since the election campaign of 2000.

5. In 1986, through the enlargement to the south, Spain becomes a member of the European Union.

6. In 1991, Spain joined the Schengen group, which had consequences for its asylum law especially concerning the regularisation of the principle of safe third countries.

Despite the asylum and the foreigner laws, the legal structure of immigration policy became relatively unclear over the course of time. Even here, there were many modifications outside the legislative procedure that were put through, so that the regulations, guidelines for implementation, and so forth now somewhat overlap.

As already mentioned, the Home Office is responsible. However, the foreigner laws further stipulate that a migration council, the Consejo Superior des Política de Inmigración, composed of representatives from the government is responsible for developing and co-ordinating immigration policy. Furthermore, exists a forum made up of social and public interest groups, the Foro para la Integración Social de Inmigrantes, in which also migrants’ associations are also represented (cf. ibid., 286).

Altogether, Spain has migration policy instruments on hand enables it to more openly shape this policy field than is possible in other West European countries, such as Great Britain and Germany. This is manifested - despite all restrictions – by the regularizaciones as well as in the residence law, which to a certain degree allows for permeability across a short-term to a
longer-term or even to a permanent residency permit\textsuperscript{36}. Further, in the Spanish consulates, it is not only possible to apply for tourist visas, but also for a permiso de residencia temporal that at least guarantees legal immigration within a given amount of time. Therefore, the "gates of entry" are not yet as narrow as in other countries of immigration.

Even the citizenship law, in part, offers relatively favourable conditions. Naturalisation is only possible after ten years of regular residency, the civil code, the Código Civil, also grants some exceptions. For instance, it is already possible after a period of five years for individuals entitled to asylum and officially recognised refugees, for immigrants from former colonies – exception for those from the North African region, after two years for Sephardic Jews,\textsuperscript{37} and after a year for foreigners married to Spanish citizens to apply for naturalisation (cf. here ibid., 299f.). However, all in all Spanish migration policy is becoming increasingly restrictive. The settings of the European integration process should not only be examined; aspects of internal politics play an equally important role as shown by the discussion over the second reform of the Ley Extranjería. Nonetheless, the process of European integration does seem to have more influence on migration policy in Spain than it does in Great Britain and Germany.

3. Migration and Asylum Policy in the European Integration Process:
The Long Road to Amsterdam

Of the three countries in this study, Spain is doubtless the one most clearly caught up in the undertow of the European Integration process. This case most forcefully shows that national policies can no longer be evaluated without considering the more multi-levelled policies in the European Union. It also illustrates that it is increasingly difficult to differentiate just how the interests of foreign policy and domestic policy are interrelated. Nevertheless, the Spanish case - as a new country of immigration - is a special case insofar as the initial conditions for creating a unified migration and asylum policy in the EU differed from those encountered by the traditional Western European countries of immigration. In turn, as illustrated through our British and German case studies, the nation-state shaped developments in migration and migration policy for nearly the first three decades after World War II. In the course of this period, specific migration structures emerged. Essentially these structures can be distinguished according to their political and historical context. In the British case, it was formed by its colonial history, and in the German case through expulsion and flight as well as labour recruitment. Out of these circumstances, specific relationships developed between the migrant-sending countries and the migrant-receiving countries, within the transnational social spaces of migration networks, and in the typical migration structures as well. Under these circumstances, the political regulation of migration also differed. In spite of these different associations in migration policy, the labour market oriented push and pull factors are the most important common aspect of Great Britain and Germany.

Therefore, in the first three decades of both country’s immigration history, it can be said that migration policies in each case were uniquely designed, even if parallels can be found in the ways they politically dealt with postcolonial and ethnic immigration. Nevertheless, this situation began to transform at the beginning of the Seventies toward a more common migration policy. Both the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1971 in Great Britain and the labour recruitment stop of 1973 in Germany mark a turning point from a migration policy of admission to one aimed at closing off national borders. Regardless, immigration is at the same time

\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, some permeability is residency permits also exists in Great Britain and Germany. However, in comparison, the hurdles for arranging a permanent residency status are lower in Spain.

\textsuperscript{37} In the Middle Ages, different lines of thought in Judaism were formed which continue to exist today: Oriental Judaism originated in the regions of northern Africa and Arabia, the Ashkenazic Judaism in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Sephardic Judaism in Spain. At the end of the fifteenth century, the Sephardic Jews were expelled from Spain.
further made possible, but increasingly it is dealt with "under the table," that is, outside of the public discourse and with restricted rights for new groups of migrants.

In the Eighties, both countries began - though somewhat delayed – to successively adjust their migration policy and structures in the same direction. Certainly, distinctive characteristics of each country can still be found today, yet it can also be observed that both in the European immigration into Great Britain and the transcontinental immigration into Germany increasingly comes from the Asian region.

With regard to the historical-political context, this all leads to a noticeable decline in original interrelationships in the migration systems and to the formation of new relationships between the migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. All this takes place within structures that for both Great Britain and Germany do not differ nearly as much as they did in the Seventies.

In the case of Spain, two trends of development are of central importance: First, taking a regionally differentiated perspective, it is possible to notice that in comparison to the traditional countries of immigration, Spain has a similarly motivated and structured migration movement since the late fifties, which brought large-scale immigration to the regions that promoted it. For the regions targeted by migrants and the conditions to incorporate them there, the course of interregional migration movement shows similarities observable during the international migration movement of the same period into Great Britain and Germany. This interregional movement also came to an end during the first half of the Seventies, although, it was not slowed down by means of migration policies. Instead it resulted out of the transformation process that began at the end of the Franco era and with the economic crisis.

Second, pertaining to the entire country, this stage of migration represented a circulation of labour, an internal migration that had the character of a mass exodus in the direction of the southern regions and provinces. Therefore, it was an internal issue. Simultaneously, it was also the phase of large-scale emigration from Spain and of remigration, hence a rotating migration. The migration policies developed at that time were, in contrast to our other two cases, not an immigration policy, but rather a policy for emigration and remigration. This immigration, which sent out its lightning bolts in the Seventies, was still not a social phenomenon that had to be reacted to politically. In other words, regarding migration movements, processes, and structures, Great Britain, Germany, and parts of Spain show a relatively strong correlation until the mid-Seventies. However, since migration was contextualised differently, each country had its own specific policy counterpart.

While the process of adjusting migration policy began in the early Seventies in Great Britain and Germany, Spain first joined this process during the mid-Eighties as the first legal regulation of immigration came into being. This coincided with Spain’s membership into the European Community. EC-membership was of rather great importance to Spain since not only attaining economic relations with Western Europe was at stake, but also it needed support for its young democracy. Owing to these circumstances, Spain was in a privileged position compared Portugal, but less than Greece, thus that is with other two new EC-member countries of the Eighties. This position set apart Spain, even from Italy, as a further, new country of immigration in southern Europe. Therefore, pressures to adapt to EC stipulations were greater since they were also combined with internal political pressures to integrate Spain into the EC.

As Spain became a member of the EC in 1986, there were already massive tensions within the field of migration policy and the situation was unclear as well. Further the project “European Domestic Market” anticipated its realisation.

The scenario the Eighties can roughly be described as follows: Until the middle of 1985, migration policy was determined and controlled by the individual nation-states, still governmental regulations were already closely interrelated. These spiralled increasingly toward a tighter and more restrictive partitioning off of immigration policy. Germany forced the other
EU partner countries by means of its visa policy and bilateral return agreements (cf., Section 2.2) to follow suit with similar instruments so as not to become alternative countries targeted for migration by individuals who initially sought to immigrate to Germany. This can also be understood as a negative "domino effect" at a supranational level. In addition, the countries of immigration copied migration policy measures from each other since they expected that it would be more efficient in controlling migration. This was the case, for example, at the beginning of the Eighties when countries such as France, the Netherlands, and Germany sought to persuade the workers recruited from Turkey to remigrate with measures designed to assist their return. All in all, the situation was characterised by an "alternating hot and cold shower" dispensed both against and with each of the other partner countries. As a consequence, the migration policies of the individual national governments became more and more restrictive until the situation became progressively entrenched (cf. for greater detail, U. Birsl 2005).

All this developed into a tangible problem by the mid-Eighties since the mutual blockade in migration policy seriously endangered the project "European Domestic Market" which was now to be concretely undertaken. On the agenda was the implementation of the goals previously anchored in the founding contract of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. In order to realise this economic community much was at stake; not only did the conditions provide for the free movement of goods, services, and capital, but also for the free movement of the citizens of the EC member states. Therefore, the dissolution of the internal borders within the EC had already been stipulated in the contract of 1957. Here the status of so-called "third country affiliates" had not yet been mentioned since this immigration issue had not then been considered as virulent. The mode of immigration (e.g. visa restrictions) and the status of third country affiliates, however, became a bone of contention in the following three decades. This, among other things, delayed the establishment of an economic and monetary union over and over. The greatest resistance came from Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark, which balked against provisions for the freedom of travel and residency for citizens of the third country affiliates. They only wanted to grant these freedoms to EC-citizens and additionally wanted to still be able carry out identity checks at the nation-state borders. Moreover, for Great Britain the planned visa policies were a thorn in their side since their Commonwealth countries would also be affected by them which would cause their relationships with these countries to suffer (cf. ibid.; B. Santel 1995, 188).

The then twelve European Community members - Finland, Austria, and Sweden were not yet included - in 1986 decided to prepare the ground for a common internal market in the Treaty of Rome (Single European Act (SEA) of the EEC-Treaty). However, the opposition mentioned above did not lessen as a result. Even the Ministers of Internal Affairs and the Ministers of Justice of each of the EC-countries, who met in the same year as the group of the "ministers responsible for immigration and the fight against terrorism and drugs" and called for an ad-hoc committee to deal with immigration issues, were not able to change the situation. This group in turn developed subassemblies on the topics of "asylum," "visas," "communication transfer," "forged documentation," and "the external borders." The competency and space to manoeuvre of the ad-hoc group was limited. It could only formulate resolutions, recommendations, and conclusions that were not obligatory (cf., Ch. Klos 1999, 22f.). However, a revealing aspect of this ad-hoc committee is that it was integrated into a group of ministers who not only dealt with immigration but also with terrorism and the battle against drugs. Thus immigration was obviously understood to be an internal security issue.

All of this neither eased the existing conflicts, nor did it make the situation any clearer. This was not only foreseeable, but also the reason that the three Benelux countries, the Neth-
erlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, had already met with France and Germany a year earlier in 1985. Therefore, in this Luxembourgian Schengen, these countries endorsed a first supranational agreement ("Schengen I") outside of the EC-structure which - among other things – was to facilitate the dissolution of border controls and immigration from the third country affiliates. Its objective was force open the already complicated situation and to replace the national migration policies that the worked against each other’s interests with a co-ordinated action that would also to put pressure on the other EC-countries to adapt as well. Furthermore, it was also a matter of imposing their authority to establish fixed definitions for these issues. Up to now, these five countries still understand themselves to be the "Core of Europe," or denoted differently, as the "Motor of Europe."

Even this group needed a second try and had to meet in 1990 for again in Schengen to renew their agreement (Schengen II), in which the foundations were laid down for the economic and monetary union as well as for a common migration and asylum policy.

After 1990, little by little additional EC-countries joined the supranational agreement of the Schengen group: Italy in 1990, Spain and Portugal followed in 1991, Greece in 1992, Austria in 1995, and Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in 1996. As follows, Great Britain and Ireland are the only EU-countries that did not sign the agreement. The consequence then was that both states also did not sign the Treaty of Amsterdam since the Schengen agreement in 1999 was to be transferred under jurisdiction of the EU the same year the Treaty was to come into effect.

Whereas the intentions of the Treaty of Amsterdam can be interpreted as the consolidation of the field of immigration among Western European countries and as a move to a more open migration policy - at least when it is measured against the policies of the traditional countries of immigration, - the first signs of it at the beginning of the Nineties looked much different. This becomes clearer if we look once more at the individual stations along the road to Amsterdam taken by the EC to get to Schengen II:

**Maastricht Station:** The Treaty of Maastricht is the contract that provides for the foundation of the European Union. It was signed in 1992 and came into effect in November 1993 following its ratification by each of the nation-state parliaments of the twelve EC countries. The "House Europe," of which the roof is supported by three pillars, was designed by this contract. The first pillar contains the area of regulations which are transferred under the authority of the European Community. Everything that can be found in this area represents an obligatory shift of the nation-state’s authority onto the European level. At the same time, this area is supranational. External and security policies, which are co-ordinated through intergovernmental co-operation, are anchored in the second pillar. The same applies to the third pillar which covers the policy fields of justice and the interior. This contract was to launch the development of European Domestic Market insofar as it referred to the tasks of the community. Furthermore, the initial objective of the contract negotiations was to also assign migration and asylum policies under the jurisdiction of the European Community, that is, to the first column. At that time, this step was probably taken much too early. Only mandatory visa and a common set of visa regulations were declared to be under the jurisdiction of the Community. Even this move already signified the general trend toward more restrictive policies as, for instance, already practised in Germany. All other aspects of migration and asylum policy were designated as matters of intergovernmental co-operation through the Justice Departments and Home Offices, and in so doing they were located within the third pillar.

**London Station:** With regard to migration policy, since more extensive plans could not be made as was hoped for at Maastricht, the ministers of the interior met again in the same year as the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in their function as persons in charge of the division

---

39 The first agreement failed to begin with because of technical questions as well as those concerning data security regulations in the construction of a supranational information and data entry system.

40 At this time, Austria, Finland, and Sweden were new EU-members, joining in 1995.
on immigration. In their London resolution, the ministers were able to get things moving with their objective to further limit the rights in the area flight and asylum. The so-called "Third Country Arrangement" as conceived by the Schengen groups was incorporated. Under this arrangement, the criteria were clearly established that defined certain migration countries of origin and transit as "safe third countries." In accordance with the London resolution, a country is a "safe third country," if

- "für das Leben und die Freiheit des Asylbewerbers keine Bedrohung gemäß Art. 33 der Genfer Konvention bestehen,
- der Asylbewerber weder Folter, noch unmenschlicher oder erniedrigender Behandlung ausgesetzt ist,
- dem Asylbewerber bereits Schutz gewährt wurde oder er zumindest die Möglichkeit hatte, entsprechenden Schutz zu erhalten,

Even if the London Resolution was not obligatory, it had far-reaching consequences for the countries. The “third country arrangement” found admission into the laws of the nation-states. For our three cases, this meant that Spain began by amending the Ley de Asilo in 1992, a year later Great Britain incorporated the first arrangements on it into the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act of 1993, and in the same year, Germany changed Article 16 of its Basic Laws.

In the years subsequent to 1992, great number of additional resolutions, recommendations, and conclusions followed from the Council of "Justice and the Interior," which in this manner created a complicated regulatory system which could no longer transparent even to the experts involved in the committees and discussions.

Amsterdam Station: In 1997, strictly speaking there were two regulatory systems up for disposition in Amsterdam, placed collectively under title "Treaty of Amsterdam." On the one hand, there was the so-called "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union" (cf. Treaty of Amsterdam 1997a) and thus entailed a further development of the Treaty of Maastricht. On the other hand, there was the "Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community," the EEC-Treaty of 1957 (cf. Treaty of Amsterdam 1997b). This final part is the important one for our context, because of a formulation found in Article 14, Section 2: "Der Binnenmarkt umfaßt einen Raum ohne Binnengrenzen, in dem der freie Verkehr von Waren, Personen, Dienstleistungen und Kapital gemäß den Bestimmungen dieses Vertrags gewährleistet ist" (Ibid.) and in Article 61ff. is points to the goal of designing a common migration and asylum policy and to establish the rights of the third country affiliates as well as the responsibilities and minimum standards for individuals seeking asylum. All this ought to have been settled within the period of five years after the contract has been in effect, that is until 2004. During this period, the previous consensus ruling of the governmental representatives in the Council of Europe still applies. After this, elections will only take place according to the majority principle as determined by the Treaty of Nizza in 2001.

This sums up the current contractual basis established at the last station in Amsterdam. Even in the year in which the contract was put into force, the European Council met in Tam-
pere to determine several guidelines. The EC-commissioner for Justice and the Interior, A. Vitorino, summarises the results of this meeting as follows:

„The European Council (...) agreed: ‘The separate but closely related issues of asylum and migration call for the development of a common EU policy’ and set out the elements which it should include namely partnership with countries of origin, a common European asylum system, fair treatment of third country nationals and management of migration flows. In the framework, the European Council also stressed the need for rapid decisions on ‘the approximation of national legislations on the conditions for admission and residence of third country nationals based on the shared assessment of the economic and demographic developments within the Union as well as the situation in the country of origin’ (paragraph 20 of the Presidency conclusion). It did not, however, give any detailed indications as to how this policy should be developed and implemented” (A. Vitorino 2001, 3, emphases in the original).

Indeed it may be the major guidelines have been formulated here, however, this explanation hardly offers us anything specific or indications over how it will be organised. In this way, the European Council then attempts to make more specific guidelines while also trying to bring the member states more closer to an important fundamental principle that exceeds the declaration of Tampere: a common migration system for the region of the European Union, whose organisation is a community task. This principle has far-reaching implications as suggested in a “Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat und das Europäische Parlament über eine Migrationspolitik der Gemeinschaft” (Communication from the Commission of the Council and the European Parliament about Migration Policy of the Community 2000). According to this, a state can not only generally advertise for labour migration or that the third country affiliates should have equal access to residency permits as EU-citizens, but rather the Community is to determine the provisions for labour requirement as well as arrange relations with the migrant-sending countries.

From a purely structural and political perspective, these ideas do not appear to be unrealistic. Since, as we have seen for our three cases, the process of adjustment in migration structures as well as the political intentions and instruments are quite advanced. The same applies to the declining importance of the political-historical context in shaping relations between the migrant-receiving and migrant-sending countries. Here new and quite similar relationships are underway. One could also say that through the Treaty of Amsterdam, all that which was politically feasible resulted from what had already been successful structurally. Or in other words, the Treaty of Amsterdam was only possible in 1997 after the process of adjustment was far enough along. And yet, there are two main arguments against a unified migration system (1) As we have seen, typical characteristics still exist in the current migration systems of the countries studies here despite of all their similarities. Or as in the Spanish case, these characteristics simply emerge out of it. Post-colonial relations are put into play here to shape migration, while they have declined in importance in Great Britain. However, when one looks at the Commonwealth, they do not seem to have become irrelevant (2) A common migration system does not only mean a shift of this policy field from the nation-state to the European level, it also set into motion two constitutive keystones of state sovereignty. This pertains to the state’s authority to control state territory and - even more important - the nation-state’s power to regulate the sphere of policy. In the case of policy, it becomes a question of the belonging to a nation-state via citizenship, and therefore, of the mode through which non-citizens are granted access (cf. here U. Birsl 2005). Both of these arguments kept Great Britain so far from joining the Schengen agreement and/or the Treaty of Amsterdam. European scepticism is also nourished by this. Even for Germany, which played a central role in all of the stations along the way to Amsterdam, this European Council guideline would go too far. To be certain, the Immigration Law of 2002 is comprised of arrangements that have striking parallels with the single propositions made by the Council, however, authority remains firmly secure under the nation-state government.
Furthermore, all three countries initiated new immigration or foreigner laws at the same time – for the Federal Republic of Germany it was even the first immigration law in their history, - at a time when the Treaty of Amsterdam had already been put into force. Considered altogether, this would have been unnecessary if these decisions would have been based, or if such had been desired, on a community migration politics with a uniform migration system. Rather it can be surmised that from now there will be a co-ordinated migration policy. Such a policy would then be transferred by means of the new legal arrangements to the individual countries.

4. Conclusion: The Transformation into a Region of Immigration – and even a Move Toward More Open Societies?

I has been proven that Western Europe has transformed into a region of immigration evident in the structural and political developments in the traditional countries of immigration since the end of World War II as well presently in the new countries of immigration. Since the beginning the Seventies, an process of adjustment in the migration systems can be observed which first took place in the traditional countries of immigration. However, this process was induced through restrictive migration policies and became more and more widespread owing to a "domino effect." This went so far that political blockades were erected between the EC-members in other policy areas until it eventually endangered the project for an "European Domestic Market." It seems that it was principally this project– under the direction of the five countries that founded the Schengen Group - that forced at least thirteen of the fifteen EU-members to discontinue working against each other and co-ordinate their activities instead. It was the Treaty of Amsterdam that carried the tab. It can be assumed that conceptions over common migration policy together with a concerted migration system as offered by the European Council still remains only a vision. Additionally, the migration regimes of the individual countries still maintain distinctive characteristics which demonstrates that this process of adjustment has not yet progressed thus far to cause these particularities to completely lose their political importance in the nation-states. Moreover, it is not sufficient to undertake such a process of adjustment in only one policy area, rather it must include other areas of policy if it is to have an influence on migration policy. Further, as long it remains unclear just how a radical shift of political authority will affect nation-state policies, and in particular, how far-reaching interventions into national sovereignty is to be evaluated, there will be more a co-ordinated than a standardised migration policy at the transnational level. The latter seems to be the decisive factor inhibiting the EU-countries, most of all for Great Britain and Ireland.

It becomes clear at this point that nation-state sovereignty is strongly connected to migration politics. Among other things, this may also be the reason why the countries react especially nervously to activities in this policy area; why the creation of a joint policy is more strongly blocked than it has been in other areas of policy: 43 and why over and over again migration is politically sensationalised. In the end, as already suggested in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, this does not initially have to do with the subject of migration as a social phenomenon and the issues on how to deal with it politically. Rather, the phenomenon itself actually gives no reason for this. Along this lines, for instance, the historian and migration researcher Klaus Bade argues that the "homo migrans" has been around as long as there have been "homo sapiens, "denn Wanderungen gehören zur Conditio humana wie Geburt, Fortpflanzung, Krankheit und Tod (...). Die Geschichte der Wanderungen ist deshalb immer auch Teil der allgemeinen Ge-

43 This applies somewhat to agricultural policy, economic policy, to banks and insurance companies, environmental policy, consumer protection, and monetary policy (Cf. on the transfer of authority and its consequences, F. Scharpf 1998; M. Schmidt 1999).
schichte und nur vor diesem Hintergrund zu verstehen” (K. Bade 2000, 11)\(^{44}\). Therefore it would be - and has even already been – a subject of debate in need of greater explanation migration to ask why since the middle of the last century in its dimensions and in historical comparison it has only been marginally examined as a phenomenon (similar to Th. Faist 1996; K. Eder 1998).

Therefore, an understanding of state sovereignty and the Westphalian style of the nation-state is in need of more precise analysis in order to finally clarify why it is chiefly manifested in Western European migration policy – a policy that characteristically defines migration as a problem and focuses on the need to prevent long-term migration. Even though this topic exceeds the scope of our study, these introductory remarks might be useful for an assessment on whether West European countries, and therefore also the countries studied here, are becoming more open societies.

Within the traditional countries of immigration such as Great Britain and Germany, there seems to be a shift in the perspective on policy in progress that is opening up prospects for new immigration. Even the migration policy objectives pertaining to the Treaty of Amsterdam and the declaration by the government leaders at the European Council meeting in Tampere indicate a change in perspective. However, one cannot speak of a paradigmatic shift in migration policy as long as migration continues to be understood as a threat of state sovereignty.

In Spain as a new south European country of immigration, on the other hand, a move toward an increasingly restrictive migration policy can be observed. The conditions for this is that Spain got caught in the undertow of the European integration process before it was able to establish a migration policy fashioned according to the interests of the nation-state. Yet it is also in this case that the link between migration policy and state sovereignty becomes apparent. Since the Spanish government at this time saw itself as being forced to react more harshly to undocumented immigration as political pressures increased not only internally, but also externally from the European Union. These pressures mounted in June 2002 during a meeting in Sevilla of the ministers responsible for immigration as they discussed the issue of setting up a shared control of the external EU-boundaries and the formation a common European border police force. For Spain, this plan – which could not be realised at this meeting - would have meant that it would have to share its national authority to control its territorial borders with the EU.

All things considered, this means that more openness towards migration can be observed throughout the region of Western Europe. However, this is only because the traditional countries of immigration of the “Core of Europe” and Great Britain dominate the migration policy within the EU, and among them, there is more openness towards certain forms of migration is noticeable.

The shift of perspective discussed here, essentially touches on the external openness of the west European societies. In terms of internal openness, meaning the incorporation of migrants into the receiving societies, the countries examined here – even though using different instruments - have also adjusted to each other. This applies foremost to Germany, which for the first time included aspects of integration policy in its immigration laws of 2002 and as well reformed its citizenship laws. Great Britain already possessed an anti-discrimination legislation since the Sixties. Spain, in turn, manages a flexible system of residency and work permits and legalisation campaigns. Nonetheless, a policy for integration and anti-discrimination legislation are still missing.

These instruments alone, however, do not create an internal openness of these societies because they only take effect after migrants have been politically classified under specific forms of migration. Access to social resources are then determined according to these political con-

\(^{44}\) Translation: "since migration belongs to the *conditio humana*, just as do birth, reproduction, illness, and death (...). The history of migration, therefore, has always been part of the general history and can only be understood on this basis".
structions of migrant groups. Currently in all three countries, we can observe that it is precisely in putting people into these political constructions that access can be made even narrower. More explicitly, migration groups are subject to political redefinition again and again even if nothing has changed with regard to their countries of origin or their motives for migrating.

In the following chapter, we will show how these political constructions within countries examined in this study grant or obstruct access to social participation and how these political constructions have been inscribed in social constructions.
Chapter II: Multiculturalism or Interculturalism?
The Social and Political Situation in Britain, Germany and Spain

An examination of interculturality in the workplace and workers’ attitudes towards it requires that we clarify to whom we are actually referring. Which groups within the majority society are classed as belonging to the “us” and who is seen as “foreign”? And what kinds of concepts can we use here?

Even a cursory glance at the three countries included in this study clearly shows that minorities which are potentially viewed as “foreign” have differing make-ups (see the detailed descriptions in Chapter I).

In Britain, intercontinental migration has been dominant in the past because of the country’s colonial and Commonwealth history. As a result, the proportion of the non-white population relative to the white population is higher than it is in Germany or even in Spain. These migrants, or their forefathers, mostly came from Asia, Africa and the West Indies. Furthermore, almost all members of these groups hold a British passport, meaning that the criteria of citizenship is not very relevant for a study of possible “intercultural lines conflict”. Using the term “xenophobia” here would therefore be quite absurd. Even the term “migrant” does not seem particularly appropriate, given the fact that actual migration often took place decades and generations ago. Indeed, the discussion in Britain also revolves around the terms “race relations” and “racism”. People who are affected by xenophobic discrimination use the term “race” entirely affirmatively and often describe themselves as “Blacks” or “Asians”. However, group constructions do not revolve solely around skin colour and related attributes, but can also relate to concepts of cultural difference based on religion. More recently, group constructions have also come to relate to legal status; asylum seekers are increasingly being met with hostility (see Section 3). This means that in Britain, “intercultural conflicts” are seen especially between the white, Christian majority society and “coloured” or religious minorities with and without a recent background of migration. However, in view of increasing immigration from continental Europe, these lines could shift in the future.

In view of the specific (migration) history in Germany, we are focused in particular on people who either themselves immigrated from other countries, and on the descendants of these migrants. The majority come from Southern and South-Eastern European countries (Turkey, Italy, Spain, Greece, Yugoslavia, Portugal), countries with which Germany had agreements to advertise for guest workers between 1955 and 1973. Provided they have not naturalised in the meantime, these people and their children still hold the citizenship of their country of origin, meaning that in legal terms the word “foreigner” is (still) appropriate. Nevertheless we cannot overlook the fact that even people who have been naturalised for a long time are still affected by “xenophobia”. So too are settlers from Eastern Europe, all of whom hold German citizenship. Furthermore, not all foreigners are subjected to “xenophobia”. As a rule, white Americans or white French citizens for instance, do not experience this kind of exclusion.

What this indicates is that in Germany as in Britain, an investigation of “conflicts” is not solely about the possession or lack of a particular passport. Constructions of “ethnic groups” (see Section 1) are much more important. These are centred on supposed “cultural foreignness” as well as on nationality. They are often based on religious differences (Islam, Judaism). Traditional racism based on biological arguments can also come into play, focusing on criteria such as skin colour, hair colour and physiognomy. This affects African Germans, asylum seekers and people who have been granted asylum, from African, Asian or Latin American
countries, African Americans or non-whites from other countries. This means that in Germany the focus is on migrants from Southern or Eastern countries and their descendants, as well as on members of non-Christian religions and people of non-white skin colour.

In Spain, a country which was until recently a country of emigration and has only been a country of immigration for around a decade, the proportion of the population which is perceived as being “foreign” is quantitatively lower than in both other countries. Conflict laden prejudices particularly affect people from North African countries, primarily from Morocco, who have come to the country to look for work and a better life. The relationship with the “Moors” (“moros”) is historically ambivalent; it was thanks to these people that Spain experienced its cultural heyday, but at the same time these people were fought as the occupier of the country and they were ultimately driven out of Spain. The relationship is now breaking new ground in terms of its negative aspects, from both current disputes right through to pogroms (see Section 3). Here, concepts of difference based on biological factors (skin colour) and cultural factors (religion) are possibly being mixed with historical ideas of the enemy. There are apparently fewer reservations towards migrants from Latin American countries, many of whom went into exile in Spain as a result of military dictatorships. Even foreigners from northern countries, not just tourists but also people who come to work in the offices of international businesses, are generally tolerated. However, there are indications of certain aversions to this category of foreigner if foreign and local workers are competing for high-level managerial positions and if businesses systematically privilege foreign workers from the head office as a result of international staffing policy. However, for Spain we can generally say that potential conflicts are acute mainly between the white, Catholic majority population and non-white, non-Christian immigrants from North Africa. One additional specific situation came about as a result of domestic migration from the poorer southern agricultural regions to the industrialised northern regions of the country. Our empirical results indicate that domestic migrants are occasionally regarded as being culturally backward, but are also thought for instance to be more racist towards Moroccan immigrants. Nationality also plays a subsidiary role here in the construction of the “self” and the “foreign”.

In view of these differences, it is difficult to find useful terms which can suitably be applied in all three countries. The terms “foreigner”, “migrant” or “people with a background of migration”, “Blacks” or “ethnic/cultural/religious minorities” each relate to only one possible dimension, and are unsuitable as overarching terms. Ultimately, it is only possible to express what is meant through passive description: people who are “affected by racist or cultural discrimination”, people “who are constructed ‘foreign’ by their own or others’ assessment”. In order to avoid such linguistic clumsiness, in each case we will, as a rule, use the appropriate description in the specific context.

We consciously restrict the term “race” to the British context, where it is generally used and accepted. In other contexts - in the German language in particular - we completely reject reference to “races”. In our view this term cannot be used as a result of the fact that it is inextricably bound up with the dreadful history of National Socialism. However, even in Britain there are also critical voices concerning the use of the term “race”: in a view independent of political intentions, Miles for instance regards use of the term “race” or even “race relations” as a form of reproduction of “race constructions” (R. Miles, 1992: 96 onwards). On the other hand, the dubious nature of the term “race” by no means suggests that it is not worth examining the phenomenon of racism. In our view, it is both possible and necessary to discuss and exam-

---

45 In 711, members of the Arabian aristocracy, together with groups of North African Berbers conquered the Iberian peninsula, which was thereafter known as “Al-Andalus”. For more on the cultural and social characteristics of Islamic Al-Andalus, which existed for almost 800 years until the so-called “Reconquista” in 1492, as well as the ideological variants of related history writing and its functions, see E. Manzano Moreno, 1998.
ine “racism” without thereby accepting the existence of “races” (see D. Marx 2000: 6 onwards).

The main emphasis of this chapter is to outline the framework of our empirical analysis from a more sociological perspective. The first task is to clarify issues and terminology which are regarded as being more abstract: we therefore deal with the constructed nature of categories such as “foreigner”, “ethnicity” or “race” and with their meaning in political, economic and collective learning contexts. We also critically assess the concepts of multiculturalism and interculturalism. In the second section we then turn to the more substantive level, i.e. to the issue of how these constructions are expressed in practical terms in the three countries being investigated. We look here at (1) the social and legal conditions facing immigrants and ethnic minorities as well as (2) the current public discourse concerning the issues of migration and integration.

1. Social and Political Constructions: Classifications, Attributes and Self-Assessments

When deliberating the questionable nature of clear “ethnic” classifications in the era of globalisation, the German sociologist Beck-Gernsheim posed the following question:

“How can we write about terms of social classification which contain judgements and devaluations - how can we write about these without echoing those judgements? In other words: how can anyone go swimming without getting wet” (E. Beck-Gernsheim 1997: 428)?

This dilemma will also accompany us throughout the following sections, as we deal with both political and everyday constructions and the terminology of scientific classification, which are used to put immigrants into distinct groups. It will also inform our investigation into the social and political concepts about the co-existence of people with different backgrounds within one society.

1.1 Social Constructions between Everyday Perceptions, Political and Scientific Discourses

In dealing with attributes and people’s self-assessments, one question stands out; this is the extent to which subject matter and terminology from political and scientific discourse as well as legal categories have become commonplace in daily discourse. What categorisations are used in cultural group constructions? To put it more precisely: which groups of immigrants in Germany, Britain and Spain are even affected by processes which attribute certain characteristics to groups? Who is seen as “foreign”? And how do the “foreigners” see themselves?

As we have said, everyday constructions do not arise in a vacuum, but rather they use political and academic discourses:

“(Social) science is not just a part of the social reality which it constructs with its terminological differentiations, but it also provides the “everyday constructors” who move in their area, with help in the construction of their everyday world” (E. Dittrich/ F.-O. Radtke 1990:14).

We therefore look at how terms are discussed within theoretical debates in the context of labour migration, and thus at the same time can sharpen our the terminology we use ourselves.

Furthermore: by analysing constructions of the “foreign” within social discourse in this chapter, we are also gaining an insight into country-specific and possibly also lines of conflict within the context of migration which transcend national circumstances.
Social constructions of the “foreign” in the individual countries cannot be viewed independently of the history of migration in each particular country. Germany, as described above, was characterised by a specific policy of advertising for labour migrants in southern European countries in the sixties until the start of the seventies. These workers were termed “Gastarbeiter” or “guest workers”, as their stay in Germany was planned only to be temporary. At the same time these groups of migrants from diverse countries were subsumed in legal terms and in everyday perception under the term “foreigners” (Ausländer). Even their children and grandchildren who were born and grew up in Germany, more and more of whom hold a German passport, are still not viewed as “Germans” in everyday discourse. The general category “foreigner” is now being used primarily to characterise new groups of immigrants such as asylum seekers, refugees and ethnic German settlers, but the descendants of the guest worker generation still also continue to be classified in terms of their history. It is primarily members of the largest immigrant group, those with a Turkish migratory background, who are still perceived as being “Turks” by the indigenous population. This choice of word relates not just to the national origin but also to a supposed specific cultural context. Membership of the Islamic faith in particular is interpreted here as an expression of cultural distance.

This shift from a legal differentiation to a supposed cultural “otherness” can also be seen in academic debates from the early eighties onwards. In scientific debate, the term ethnicity is introduced to capture analytically processes of group differentiation by means of cultural characteristics - a term which is not unchallenged and is also defined very inconsistently. The term also has the stigma of “Völkisch” ideology attached to it.

As a “minimal consensus”, “ethnicities” are understood to be supposedly culturally homogenous groups as well as (national) peoples. The subdivision into different “ethnicities” draws upon external and evident characteristics such as appearance, clothing, language or dialect, but also equally draws upon perceived elements such as culture, rituals, traditions, religion and way of life, or a (supposed) shared history, descent a territory ascribed to a particular group or a territory claimed by that group (compare U. BirsI/S. Ottens/ K. Sturhan 1999). A constructivist conception of ethnicity is dominant within the German discussion, which picks up the ideas of Max Weber. In the early 20th century, Weber introduced ethnicity as an idea with which to counter naturalistic concepts. He defined ethnic groups as groups of people who “cherish subjective thinking around a common descent” (M. Weber 1980: 237).

The concept of ethnicity itself does not crop up in everyday discourse. However, to the extent that migrant groups are supposed to be foreign in cultural terms and are categorised in terms of their cultural origins, we can talk of ethnicisation. This is particularly the case when groups are said to have certain attributes on the basis of a static cultural concept, one which barely allows for cultural change and which also presumes cultural homogeneity.

Ethnic constructions could clearly be measured amongst the German interviewees in the pre-study. However, it could also be seen that mechanisms used to attribute characteristics to certain people and those used in social construction consist of several layers with varying reach: constructions of ethnicity served primarily as a template for the interpretation of relationships in the immediate sphere. They were not necessarily connected with resentment and negative judgements. To the extent that constructions of “foreignness” are structured around Islamic beliefs and religious practices, we also cannot refer to ethnic constructions in the narrower sense. On the other hand, debates from public discourse were used in the evaluation of

46 Critics talk cynically of an “ethnologisation of labour migration” (F.-O. Radtke 1996: 10), in that science is now involved in using cultural difference to explain the failure of integration policy.

47 Brumlik on the other hand points to several problematic passages in Weber's work. According to Brumlik, Weber did not entirely exclude the plausibility of biological patterns of explanation and holds on to a romantic notion of true community, a view which perceives the clan as a counterweight to 'ethnic' community. Brumlik also interprets Weber’s theory of ethnicity “as a criticism of contemporary Judaism, which he wanted to prevent being classified as an ethnicity as a protective measure” (M. Brumlik 1990:189).
social phenomena in the context of immigration, and more vague categorisations such as “economic refugees” or “ethnic German settlers” were selected. Constructions in the more distant social realm took the form of an unspecified construction of the “foreign”, and these were also exclusionary in nature. They were directed particularly towards new groups of immigrants, such as asylum seekers and recent ethnic German settlers. This view could be noted both amongst the German and the Turkish interviewees. This is an example of a generally observable mechanism of inclusion and exclusion which “old” immigrant groups use to distinguish themselves from “new” groups, and thereby to consolidate their position in German society. We can also observe a similar phenomenon in Catalonia in Spain, only in this instance it is domestic migrants who express resentment towards more recent migrants. Furthermore, these constructions on the part of German and Turkish interviewees, which are related to the more distant social realm, indicate a new line of differentiation which deserves more detailed inspection; this is the exclusion of ethnic German settlers or “Aussiedler” from the Germans’ concept of “us”.

The immigration of ethnic Germans from Eastern European countries, which continues even today, means that we encounter in Germany a unique form of migration within our international comparison. Migration research categorises this movement as “ethnic” migration, as it concerns people who are Germans “by descent”. However, in everyday discourse, members of this group are perceived less and less as “Germans”. The fact that they are today reduced to labelling in terms of their country of origin indicates that they are “ethnicised” to a certain extent, in a different manner than the concept within migration research would suggest. Everyday discourse therefore reacted to the new waves of immigration in the nineties and a shift towards the countries of origin: in the nineties, an entirely new population of ethnic German settlers from the countries of the former Soviet Union largely superseded the groups from Poland and Romania which had dominated in the eighties. Many of these more recently immigrated families of ethnic German settlers consist of dual nationalities (Russian and German) and are barely competent in the German language, at least upon their arrival. It is for this reason that they are denied access the category of “Germans” by the majority German population, and are often disparagingly termed as “Russians” or are equally subsumed under the category of “foreigner”.

In Britain, the term “alien” has (to date) only had a subordinate value. This is related to the fact that since 1945, Britain has primarily been characterised by post-colonial immigration from the New Commonwealth. Groups of migrants from Africa, the Caribbean and the Asian area were citizens in legal terms, or at least, until 1971, they could easily obtain British citizenship. This does not however mean that they are also perceived as “Britons” in social discourse. Referring to these people as “blacks” or “coloured people”, ascribes to them a particular social status. The homogenising category of “coloured people” also made it easier to draw a stereotypical image of immigrants from the Commonwealth. Describing them generally as “unskilled workers” from economically underdeveloped countries meant that the considerable social differences between the ethnic communities of different geographical, cultural and linguistic origin were also ignored:

“Those that entered Britain did so, not as an underclass recruited to poorly paid jobs, but as members of a highly diverse set of communities with a very wide range of qualifications and experience that were, taken as a whole, of a level broadly comparable to those of the ‘white’ inhabitants of Britain. To characterise Asian and black immigrants as an imported underclass of unskilled labour is inaccurate” (I. Spencer 1997: 160 onwards).

A similar characterisation of labour migrants could also be observed in the German case. An image of the professionally unqualified “guest worker” who moved to Germany from a less developed region was also prevalent. This conception does not hold up to empirical investigation, at least for the Turkish migrant group. The pioneering migrants came from relatively well-developed areas of Turkey, had often already migrated to towns within
Chapter II: Multiculturalism or Interculturalism?

The homogenising perception can also be viewed from another perspective, namely with regard to the subdivision of the population into “whites” and “blacks” or “coloureds”. In the development of British theory, the dualism of “black” and “white” is described as “race construction”; it is seen as a construction of “race” due to the fact that skin colour serves as a structural tool for the division of groups of peoples.

“Race” is the most heavily laden term we are dealing with here. In the 19th century ideology of race, genetic features were said to be the main determinants of human behaviour (see M. Brumlik 1990), and were used at the same time to justify social privilege and subordination. The concept of race is closely bound up with colonialism, but is also connected with the national socialist ideology of the “Arian” and “Jewish Race”. In British discourse, the term “race” is very much challenged, but it has much fewer negative connotations than in the German discussion. Within British research into migration, the controversy revolves around the issue of the extent to which the concept of race is based upon biological reality, and the extent to which the concept of race is appropriate as an analytical category for the description of post-colonial labour migration.

The British sociologist Rex, a representative of an ideal based on equality, captures a “multi-racial” and “multi-cultural” society (see J. Rex 1990: 152) with the concepts of “race” and “ethnicity”, in order to describe the specifics of practices of discrimination and conflict laden situations between immigrants and the “indigenous population” (ibid: 145). At the same time, he admits the value of criteria of biological difference for the description of social phenomena.

Rex’s verbal opponent Miles, on the other hand, argues in favour of a deconstructive view and conceives of “race” purely as an “ideological construct” (R. Miles 1990: 170). As “races” do not have a biological reality, but rather, their reality is only “socially imagined”, the term should be dropped and limited to that of race construction and racism. “Race construction” would then exist when “social relationships are structured by allowing biological features to construct different social groups” (R. Miles 1989: 356). If the groups which are constructed in this way are also assumed to have certain life styles and behaviours, that is, if specific cultural peculiarities are ascribed to them, the groups which have been distinguished in terms of biological criteria are “ethnicised” at the same time.

The racist discourse also always encompasses within it the “ethnic moment” (compare R. Miles 1996: 253).

Whilst for Miles, the boundaries between “ethnic” and race constructions are fluid, we maintain a terminological distinction with regard to the different construction logics: with race construction, cultural attributes are reduced to a biological substratum, but with ethnic constructions, cultural characteristics are put down to a supposed shared history or origin.

---

49 Rex assumes that “certain primordial facts belong to the conditions of human existence”, namely, “biological ties”, and these can lead to the creation of groups “on the basis of biological or racial features” (J. Rex 1990: 147). On the other hand he does not want to attribute any kind of determining force to them; he would otherwise be unable to assume that a “multi-racial society” is only a temporary feature, and will disappear in three to four generations (ibid: 152).

50 This reference to the linking of biological and cultural features and the deconstructive definition of the concept of racism can have problematic consequences if it puts too much strain concept of racism. We can see this danger in Miles’ argument. In his more recent papers he relates the concept of racism to Northern Ireland, where he suggests that the social situation of Northern Irish Catholics is comparable with that of post-colonial migrants. Both are subjected to a process whereby they are regarded as being culturally inferior (see R. Miles 1996: 250 onwards). But if Catholicism is used as a defining feature, can we refer to this as racism?
Culture is therefore given a characterising power only marginally inferior to that of race construction, but the term cultural determinism is more appropriate for culture.

However, to be able to talk of racism or ethnocentrism, the characteristics which “foreign groups” are supposed to have must be judged negatively, or the constructed “races” must be regarded as being inferior.

The construction of the ethnically and racially “other”, and their exclusion from the community of the “whites” goes in hand with a process of inner homogenisation, which binds together the indigenous British population, and hides internal contradictions. What we mean here are not just social contrasts within British society but also conflicting national interests within the countries of England, Scotland, Wales and parts of Ireland which together make up the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Until today, in place of an overarching British identity, distinctive national identities have been able to assert themselves beyond the centre.

“The nationalisation of the United Kingdom is especially uneven and incomplete…” (R. Miles 1996: 235).

Evidence of this state of affairs is provided by the revival of national movements in Scotland and Wales in the sixties, which achieved a status of political autonomy for these areas. The troubles and protests in Northern Ireland, as well as the Northern Irish question which has still not really been resolved today, also provide evidence of this point. This can be identified as a second specific line of conflict within British society, where both political influence and cultural hegemony are at issue, or to put it simply, constructions of national identity below the nation state level are important.

This now shows that discourses concerning race construction can indeed be linked with those of national constructions. This is the case when British identity is equated with English identity. Using comments made by conservative English politicians, Miles shows that the racism which constructed British citizens of New Commonwealth origin as “the racialised Other”, simultaneously brought about another exclusion, in that the “nation” was reduced to England (see R. Miles 1996: 234). On closer inspection, the British identity which was denied to migrants turns out to be an “English” construction of identity.

Thus far we have supported a reading of “ethnic” and cultural constructions which views ethnicity as a concluding criteria i.e. an instrument of exclusion and discrimination. There is also a second reading in the literature which regards ethnicity as a resource for self-assessment and for the orientation of behaviour.

The background to this view is the observation that individuals and groups with a background of migration themselves relate positively to their origin, and use cultural features for self-assessment. To a degree, descendants of Turkish labour migrants in Germany consciously describe themselves as “Turks” or as “Muslims”. In Britain, “African Caribbeans” see themselves as “Blacks”. However, “blackness” in this instance is not necessarily a question of skin colour, rather it is regarded more as a political category (political identity), which developed as a reaction to discriminatory racist practices and in opposition to racist exclusion (R. Miles 1996: 254).

The British cultural theorist Hall takes up this aspect within the concept of identity, and attempts to liberate the term ethnic from the weight of ethnology, describing it rather as an accompanying symptom of post-modern societies. He is able to do this because he does not conceive of ethnicity as an intrinsic category, but rather as a subjective process of identification, grounded in shared experience (see S. Hall 1994). Ethnicity here is constructed as a posi-

---

51 However, it was shown in the pre-study that the make-up of identity constructions is much more complex. These also contain self-assessments connected with where people live, as do certain terms of self-definition such as “Turkish-Germans”.
tive counterweight to racism: whilst the concept of race constructs the other in terms of their uniqueness, and is based on devaluation, ethnicity provides a feeling of belonging (see also F. Anthias 1992).

In German academic discourse, the recollection of a group’s own ethnic traditions, symbols and values is discussed under the keyword of “self-ethnicisation”. The question then arises as to whether we are really dealing with a return to “long standing tradition” or whether the attempt to find answers to current situations in life is drawing both on things cultures have brought with them as well as on things it has experienced in Germany. Dittrick and Radtke focus on this aspect when they put forward a dynamic and competence based concept of identity to counter a static one.

“Looking at it this way, ‘cultural identity’ would be the ability to make ‘maps of meaning’ and make cultural material people had brought with them fit in with present circumstances in life” (E. Dittrich/F.-O. Radtke 1990: 31).

The reference to the identity components highlights the fact that as a cultural and social construction, ethnicity does not present a purely ideological construct, as ethnic belonging is internalised and it creates identity. In other words: ethnicity is a constructed but powerful category. People real do feel it, and it can determine social and political behaviour. It would otherwise not be possible to explain the fact that conflicts within ethnic categories are a highly emotional area or how these can develop their own violent dynamics, as we will see later in the context of xenophobic violence in Spain, and elsewhere.

In Spain we are investigating migration from South and Central America, Africa but primarily from Western Europe and increasingly from Eastern European countries. Over 45% of those people who immigrated into Spain in 1999 came from the EU, a further 6% came from other European countries (see Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales 2001). A distinction is made in public discourse between immigrants from European countries and those from non-European countries, as each occupies a different position within the social order. As in Germany, there are also echoes of “ethnic” migration in Spain: this refers firstly to the re-migration of Spaniards who had been attracted to the industrialised countries of Western Europe in the sixties and seventies. However, this also refers to the descendants of Spanish people who had emigrated to South America at the beginning of the 20th Century and who were now looking to move back home. In the last 15 years especially there has been growing emigration from economically damaged Argentina. If these South Americans have Spanish forefathers then it is easier for them to access legally secure residence status. Recently they have also been wooed directly.

Undocumented immigration into Spain, as in Italy, has a particular status. This refers particularly to people from North American, Latin or Central American countries who enter the country without a residence permit, or come only with tourist status. If the political controversies concerning “economic refugees” in Germany and Britain led us to believe that immigrants “sin papeles” or without any kind of documentation would become the target of xenophobes. When the data is broken down on the basis of nationality, the largest group of immigrants comes from Morocco, followed by citizens from Great Britain, Germany, Portugal, France and Italy. Only then is a Latin American country included – Peru (see Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales 2001).

52 There were previously agreements between Spain and Argentina allowing Spain to accept Argentineans with Spanish ancestors in emergency situations. Today, it is still easier for them to gain permanent residency. An advertising campaign started in Buenos Aires by Spanish mayors needs to be interpreted against this background: to prevent their villages from dying out, 90 communities in Aragón in eastern Spain got together to attract foreign families with small children to resettle in Spain. They picked Argentina, as it is easy to regulate the legal residency status of descendents of Spanish emigrants. Other than this, nationality does not play a role. New citizens of any nationality are desirable. The response in Argentina was huge, and the first Romanian families have already taken up the offer (see Frankfurter Rundschau, 17.09.2002, p.7).
phobia and the focus for constructions of foreign groups, then the situation in Spain is however more complicated. Labour migrants are essential in the Spanish economy. They undertake the kind of jobs that the locals no longer want to do (see C. Solé 2001). As a rule they are seen neither as competitors for jobs – an idea that is widespread in Germany – nor are they viewed as putting a burden on the social system, an argument which is also encountered in Germany. In comparison to Germany and Britain, there is a strikingly high level of tolerance towards labour migration and asylum (see Section 3.2). In Spain, we do not see the same kind of intensive discourse about “putting too great a strain on culture”. Immigration and the presence of people with differing cultural origins have to date tended to be regarded less as a problem in Spain.

However, there are still differences in the manner in which different groups of migrants are perceived, and there is at least regionally distributed resentment towards them. In Andalusia, xenophobia is directed primarily towards Moroccan harvest workers. Immigrants from Latin American who do not have official documents are more highly regarded in public perception than those from Morocco. The greater cultural similarities with Latin American may play a role here, as its origins lie in Spanish colonial history. This is also expressed through a shared language and religion. Whilst Latin Americans who do not have proper residency status are viewed as having honest intentions (“they come here to work”), Moroccans are said to be caught up in the drugs trade, and to be carrying out “dodgy deals”. This kind of ‘criminalisation’ can also be observed in discourses in Germany, where it is directed mainly towards African and Eastern European refugees.

By referring disparagingly to Moroccans in Spain as “moros” (Moors), deep rooted collective resentment which dates back to Spanish-Moorish history is kept alive. The gang-like hunting of immigrants near Almeria in 1999, the “caza de moros”55, and the pogroms towards Moroccans in El Ejido and against Roma in Almoradí in 2000 are examples from southern Spain56 of a dramatic escalation of exclusionary group construction into openly violent persecution (see Section 3). To date, we have not been able to observe similar/comparable constructions of foreign groups relating to Eastern European labour migrants. The violence in Terrassa in Catalonia towards immigrants from black Africa, particularly from Morocco (see Section 3), show that resentment is not restricted to the southern Spanish rural population. Immigration was made into a political issue in the Catalonian case, with the use of slogans such as “Arabs out” or “get lost, Moorish sons of bitches” (see Göttinger Tageblatt, 22.7.1999; Mittelbauerische Zeitung, 8.10.1999). The disturbances in Terrassa were carried out mainly by those groups within the Spanish population who had themselves migrated to Catalonia from less industrially developed regions within Spain in the sixties and seventies. At the time, a large portion of domestic migrants settled in the newly created residential settlements on the edges of large and medium sized towns. Their territorial separation from the native townsfolk, their rural origins and their lower position within the social framework may well have contributed to the fact that they are seen as a separate group. On the other hand, Spanish regional-

54 Incidentally, “foreigners” in Spain may only be employed in jobs where no Spanish citizens competed for the post. We were familiar with this privileging of nationals from the German case. In Spain however, any immigrants who set themselves up in business are made to employ twice as many Spanish employees as citizens of their own nationality.
55 The term “hunting of the Moors” refers to the medieval punishment expeditions carried out by Christian Spaniards against the converted Christian descendants of Moorish Spaniards.
56 The fact that the ethnicisation of Moroccans here has negative connotations tries to overlook the fact that Andalusians and Moroccans are very closely related, that Moors and Spaniards have lived together quite peacefully for over eight centuries, and that the Moorish culture continues to characterise Southern Spanish culture even today.
57 Eastern Europeans are welcomed explicitly. People are now trying to replace Moroccan harvest-time workers with Lithuanians, Romanians and Poles (see Le Monde Diplomatique, 6.3.2000).
ism, which has traditionally been very strong, plays a leading role even today. This aspect appears to us to be even more important in understanding the cultural boundaries between long-term residents and domestic migrants. Spain presents a case study of a country with marked regional identities, which are even conceived of as “national” identities in people’s own conceptions. This is the only explanation for the fact that domestic migration has similar characteristics to international migration. Even today – and increasingly so – there are several regional languages alongside the official national language, Castilian. The languages of Catalan, Galician and Basque function as cultural differentiators, and people who can speak these languages have more opportunities in the job market. The area of Terrassa where the unrests we have referred to is a working class neighbourhood which played an important role in the uprising against Franco’s dictatorship. In the fifties and sixties, the area experienced a devaluation as a result of property speculation, and is characterised today by a relatively high population density in comparison with the other areas of the town. Cheap rents in the past attracted the poorest migrants from outside the EU, meaning that the population is now constituted by Catalans, domestic migrants who moved here 40 years ago, and a growing group of North African immigrants. Whilst in the sixties and seventies the domestic migrants were treated with hostility by the Catalan population, it is now largely these people who today have antipathy towards recent immigrants from Morocco and Senegal. The background to this is that they think new immigrants are now working in jobs that their parents or they themselves once did. It seems that this is expressing a fear of suppression. We have indications from our own work that every new wave of immigration is met with rejection from people who previously immigrated. Local residents’ region of birth – i.e. whether they were born in Catalonia or elsewhere in Spain – therefore correlates with attitudes towards non-EU immigrants, and is also related to the varying positioning of groups on the labour market and with the social situation (see C. Solé 1995).

Constructions of the “other” in Catalonia do not therefore uniformly relate to international migration. In linguistic terms, a difference is made between “extranjeros” (who come from EU-countries and the USA) and “inmigrantes” (from “poor” countries). But neither do constructions of the “other” in Catalonia relate solely to these groups: Spanish domestic migrants who moved to an industrial centre from the less industrialised provinces in the sixties and seventies initially had the cultural status of immigrants, and are still occasionally regarded as “foreign” even today, as they have a different culture to the locals. This shows that the construction of a Spanish “us” is fictitious. In the case where regional identities are highly politicised, national separatist movements define themselves outside this notion of a Spanish “us”.

Reminding ourselves of the questions posed at the start of this section, which address group constructions based on intercultural relations and conflicts, the following can be seen: cultural constructions of the other use several construction mechanisms: the construction of race, ethnicisation, the unspecific construction along negatively-laden general categorisations, but also the use of regional cultural identities. The question as to who is regarded as “foreign” is answered very differently in the discourses in the three countries being investigated, due to the fact that this is closely related to the individual migration history in each of the countries. Whilst in Germany, general categorisations play a role, such as “foreigner” and “economic migrant” as well as cultural classifications; in Britain, the dualism of “white” and “black”, “ethnic” constructions and national identities are all used in classifying the foreign, and in self-assessment. Despite the large range of heterogeneous migratory groups in Spain, exclusionary constructions are only directed towards specific groups. Religion plays a role as a characterising feature particularly in instances where cultural difference is attached to a different belief. Confessional differences can however also be stylised to become an essential criteria of differentiation, as is shown by the Northern Irish conflict. In this case, a multi-
dimensional conflict is reduced to its religious components when it is described as a conflict between Catholics and Protestants.

The same is true for the problem of the US “Race Relations” approach, which people initially tried to apply in the British context. This is due not only to the fact that it proved to be unsuitable for the analysis of labour migration in Britain (see J. Rex 1990; R. Miles 1990). But by reducing social relationships fundamentally to “racial” relations, this approach ignores the underlying social lines of conflict.

At the same time, several examples highlight the existence of a general dilemma, which is true for our entire depiction of social constructions. By describing cultural boundaries, we are ourselves constructing reality, and are confronted with the problem of recording analytically specific forms of distinction and exclusion without ourselves becoming entangled in the conceptual nature of the constructions themselves. Or as Barzun put it in 1938 with regard to the “terminology of race”:

“One of the punishments of playing with the concept of race is that even attempts consciously to repudiate the concept find themselves making assumptions and passing judgements on the basis of exactly the theory that they wish to challenge” (cited in R. Miles 1990: 155).

Therefore, we fall back on a deconstructivist perspective and assume that the category of “race” does not have a natural equivalent in the real world. We also assume that “ethnic” identity does not “exist beyond historical constructions or is even constitutive for human existence” (E. Dittrich/F.-O. Radtke 1990:23).

This view also has consequences for the evaluation of social and political concepts on the co-existence of people of different cultural backgrounds in one society. Whilst Rex argues in favour of a “multi-racial” and “multi-cultural” society, where “ethnic” groups have the same rights to practice publicly their own “distinctive cultural identity” (language, traditions, religious concepts) without the interference of the state, proponents of a deconstructivist perspective would see in this kind of social and political concept the danger of a reification of cultural differences, and would relegate these instead to the area of “privately experienced differences” (E. Dittrich/F. – O. Radtke 1990: 33). Behind these opposing programmatic conceptions lies the controversy over an approach based on difference or a universalistic approach, as well as the question as to the cultural theoretical approaches to the construction of unitary, homogenous and static entities.

In the following section we will therefore examine which central themes are developed in scientific and political discourse concerning the co-existence of groups of immigrants and the indigenous population, the extent to which the discussion of static versus dynamic cultural concepts is addressed within these, and which themes ultimately lead to an alternative conception. More precisely, the issue here is the extent to which the increasingly used alternative concept of “interculturality” can overcome the trap of the “multiculturalism” concept.

1.2 Multiculturality versus Interculturality: Confusion over Terminology in Political and Scientific Debate

Scientific investigations and political debates concerning the relationship between population groups of varying origins or “cultural traditions” cannot avoid having to deal with the concepts of multiculturality and interculturality. The terms multiculturality and interculturality are used today in a very wide range of contexts. The spectrum of issues which they are aiming to describe or to explain is broad, meaning that we need to define the concepts before using them further.
The history of the term multiculturalism is that of a political idea. The term itself comes from Canada, and was first introduced in around 1964 or 1965 by Charles Hobart, a Professor of Sociology. It was then characterised further from 1965 onwards by Paul Yuzyk, a Professor of Slavonic Studies. The idea of multiculturalism was bound up with criticism of the Canadian policy of biculturalism and bilingulism which took account solely of the cultures of French Canadians and Anglo Canadians, ignoring other cultural groups living in Canada, such as the Inuit or the various Native American Indian peoples. In relation to our three case study countries, the term is important primarily in the political debates concerning immigrants and immigration in Germany and Britain. In Spain, on the other hand, it is not yet quite as widespread, because of the relatively recent history of immigration into the country. In Spain the term is discussed mainly in connection with the new fact reality of multicultural school classes and the resulting demands placed on education. However, the concept of interculturality is much more common (see below).

In Britain, as in Germany, multiculturalism can be said to be more of a political agenda than a scientific concept. Debate on multiculturalism in Britain was started in 1966 by a speech delivered by the then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins. Jenkins argued in favour of an integration policy based on equal rights for all, taking account of cultural diversity in an atmosphere of tolerance. Until that point in Britain there had been a one-sided policy of the assimilation of immigrants. Post-colonial immigrants from the Caribbean and Asia who had come to Britain after the Second World War in particular were constructed as a group “racially” and culturally different from British society and as a threat to the “British race”. For years, this led both to a policy of limiting the immigration of these groups, as well as to the demands that they be assimilated into British national culture. British national culture was conceived as being homogenous. The increase in xenophobic violence and the growing social inequality between ethnic minorities and the British majority society in the 1960s may have been the reason for Jenkins’ speech and the starting point for thinking about a multicultural policy.

In Germany, the politics of multiculturalism ran similarly as they did in Britain, albeit somewhat later. When the term “multicultural society” was first applied to Germany, by the country’s regional churches on “Foreigner Fellow Citizens’ Day” in 1980, it was tied up primarily with an alternative design of the German nation, which had until that point been claimed to be homogenous. As in Britain, migrants had previously been viewed as an exception and had tended to be seen as a problem. In the “multicultural society”, the presence of foreigners in Germany should be accepted, and the co-existence of different cultural groups should be seen as an enrichment. Again like in Britain, tolerance to people who are “culturally different” was demanded of the majority society.

So much for the political debate. Today no standard definition of the terms multiculturality, multiculturalism or a multicultural society exists in social science in either Britain, Germany or Spain. Only very few social scientists have tried to draw up a theory of multiculturalism. The most well-known representatives are surely John Rex in Britain (1986), and in Germany, Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny (1996). The fact that social scientists have been so restrained in this area may possibly be explained by the varied political criticism made of the concept. Scientists such as Avtar Brah (1996), Nikos Papastergiadis (2000) and Nira Yuval-

58 In the countries of Latin America which are characterised by a high proportion of different indigenous groups within the population, such as Peru, Guatemala or Mexico, the political and educational implications of the fact that several cultures coexist within one society, or “multiculturalidad”, have on the other hand been made an issue of – necessarily – for years already.

59 At this point it is important to highlight the difference between multiculturalism and multiculturality: whilst multiculturalism describes the concept of multiculturality with all its political and educational implications and objectives, i.e. how striving to achieve multiculturality is an ideal, multiculturality describes the empirical fact of cultural diversity.
Chapter II: Multiculturalism or Interculturalism?

Davis (1997: 193 onwards) in Britain, and Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez (1996), Frank-Olaf Radtke (1993) and Axel Schulte (1990) in Germany warned against a culturalisation of social differences which would reduce social conflicts to their essential core. The main criticisms were directed towards a possible avoidance of instances of social and political exclusion of migrants, in favour of a discourse on cultural difference (see A. Brah 1996: 231; A. Schulte 1990: 9). Opposing interests of social groups threatened to be redefined by references to cultural difference (see F.-O. Radtke 1993: 86). Even “cultures” were said to be being defined rigidly as closed entities and thereby as a static cultural concept which negated the dynamism of cultural processes and allowed instead recourse to national cultures. It was as a challenge to this idea that the concept of the multicultural society was after all conceived (see N. Papastergiadis 2000: 147; A. Schulte, 1991: 22 onwards; N. Yuval-Davis 1997: 200).

There was also thought to be a danger that only minority culture was being seen as culture (A. Brah 1996: 230; E. Gutiérrez Rodríguez 1996; F.-O. Radtke 1993: 88). Criticisms were made that migrants’ original culture was being examined, as opposed to the political make-up of the host society. Even in Spain, warnings were made against the interpretation of multiculturalism as a juxtaposition of distinct and individually homogenous cultures, of the rejection of cultures being mixed together (“rechazo del mestizaje”) and against the “principio de exclusión basado en la diferenciación por la raza” (M. Rodrigo Alsina 1997).

The question therefore arises of the extent to which the concept of multiculturality can be used at all. The concept of pluriculturalism (see C. Solé 2002) looks beyond the problems of the concept of multiculturalism. This places the emphasis on the diversity of cultures rather than on the level of their presence, meaning a more precise examination of cultures beyond the concept of national cultures. Yet even this concept is not applicable for our actual investigation environment without further comment: in a study which aims to investigate the relationship and the interaction between immigrants and the indigenous population in the workplace needs to take account of the level of the respondents’ perception. And – as is shown by both the results of the pre-study and those of this present study - these perceptions have two levels: on one level, day to day discourses about various national cultures are effective, and serve as a tool with which the interviewees structure their experiences. On the second level, cultural attributes lose in meaning or are not even or no longer carried out. Both levels need to be captured so that we do not fail to analyse constructions of the “self” and the “other” and capture them conceptually the same way that we do the backgrounds to their resolution. In other words, we must be aware of the more descriptive interpretation of the concept of culture within this study. However, it needs to be separated heuristically from structural issues, so as to avoid the danger of culturalising social aspects in our analysis.

In order to place the aspect of interaction at the centre of this study, we will use the term interculturality as a “working category”, instead of the term of pluriculturality. This description is not yet widespread in general social science research, but it has made its way into discourse in Spain and is now gradually doing so in Germany. The adjective “intercultural” is used in education and in communications science at least, and this therefore indicates the development of the term. Interculturality can thus be seen as an answer to the tensions and conflicts within a multicultural society, as it is both negotiable “negociable” and educatable “educable”, according to Díaz Aguilera (see J. Díaz Aguilera 2002). For Mintzel, “in debates today (…) interculturality is used to describe all manner of relationships which do or can possibly exist between two or more (members of different) cultures” (A. Mintzel 1997: 61). Whilst multiculturalism describes the existence of different cultures and their presence within a territory, interculturality characterises the process of the exchange between individual members of one culture with those of another. Gemende, Sting and Schröer put it as follows:

---

60 In Section 4 we will summarise the understanding of culture upon which this investigation is based.
In a world of increasing mobility, certain cultures lose their inevitability, without becoming like other cultures or being subsumed within a single global culture. “They become part of a tense and relationship-rich juxtaposition – a situation which can be described as intercultural-ity” (M. Gemende/ S. Sting/ W. Schröer 1993: 11). The process is a dynamic dialogue, an exchange of values, lifestyles and symbols. This cannot be neutral but must lead towards overcoming discrimination and social inequality (see D. de Vallescar Palanca 2002: 144), and must lead right to a “cooperación” and “humanización” between cultures (see M. Rodrigo Alsina 1997). González R. Arnaiz goes as far as to call interculturality a “categoría moral” (see G. Gonzáles R. Arnaiz 2002).

However, to describe a relationship between two people as intercultural assumes that the two people who come into contact with one another can be defined as belonging to different cultures. As we see the danger of a culturalisation of the social, as we described above, we are also uneasy about using the term interculturality. We use the term due to a lack of alternatives. The more recent concept of transculturality does indeed appear to offer a way around this problem, as it puts more emphasis on the porous nature of “cultural borders” and on the potential to overcome them through interconnection and fusion. Yet it is not suited to the analysis of constructions of these kind of boundaries. For want of a better term, we are therefore prepared to put up with this uneasiness, in order to approach the respondents’ level of perception. Everyday practices are often imbued with cultural meaning, even if they related more to the social situation of those being observed, or to the “culturalising” perceptions held by the people we are observing, either of themselves or of others. This is focused solely on differences, some of which are real and some of which are imagined. The use of the term interculturality takes up these active constructions of the self and others in cultural terms and thereby makes a differentiated analysis of what has been said possible.

Discussion of multiculturalism and interculturalism always touches on the personal circumstances and opportunities in life of the minority groups. One criticism of the term multiculturalism is the fact that by focusing on cultural aspects, it blocks the view of the structural disadvantage to which migrants are subjected and thereby excludes issues of equal social opportunities, legal equality, and political participation. We will deal with precisely this issue in the following chapter. For now we will focus on the legal, political and social status of immigrant groups, by carrying out a cross-country comparison.

2. The legal, Political and Social Position of Immigrants in the Case Study countries

Increasingly, when international migration research deals with the legal, political and social position of immigrants and their dependents, the issue of citizenship takes centre stage. The starting point is a critical discussion of the work of the Marshall, a British sociologist, who in now well-known lecture in 1949 analysed the subject of “Citizenship and social class”, with the conflicting logics of citizenship in the process of modernisation. To sum this up briefly, Marshall analysed the paradox of citizenship law, which on the one hand promised equality with universal membership and participation potential, and on the other hand is subjugated/subject to the inequality in industrial capitalism with a liberal economic order (see T. H. Marshall 1992). This means that all people, at least under normal circumstances, have a nationality by virtue of which they are included as citizens of a state. But the fundamental idea of nationality thereby also attains an exclusive character only for members of a particular state; it therefore has an exclusionary effect towards all other people. However: in the Marshallian sense, in the capitalist market order, holding legal citizenship i.e. nationality, by no means
fully guarantees unlimited access to social resources, that is, to potential social and political participation or to the social and political civil rights of a society organised in a state form\textsuperscript{61}. Bound up with this critical analysis is a sociological debate concerning the effects on citizenship of international migratory movements. This beginnings of this current debate can be found in particular in Canada and in the USA, and was developed by R. Brubaker (1992), Y. Soysal (1994) and W. Kymlicka (1995). We cannot go into the controversial discussion here\textsuperscript{62}. However, one aspect is of central importance for our context: the splitting up of citizenship into legal, social and political citizenship (on this point, see K. Eder 1998). This reveals which potential social participation and civil rights are granted even when migrants and their descendants do not hold the host country’s citizenship, and which are denied. In Eder’s view, structural inclusion and exclusion in migratory societies manifests itself by means of this split citizenship (ibid.: 67 onwards). What is attractive in this approach is that – at least theoretically – this means that it is not only immigrants and non-citizens who are or who can be the focus of attention. This allowed social situations and possibilities for political participation to be compared with one another, or to be differentiated on the basis of class. This had the advantage that we could check whether immigrants and their families are subject to specific patterns of inequality only as a result of their background of migration, or whether their legal, social and political position is also connected with their class. We could therefore see whether there are patterns which can be explained primarily through class and not by their individual migration histories and a lack of nationality.

However, this is only a theoretical advantage which is difficult to implement in practice. The political and social constructions of migration groups, “minorities” and “races”, which we discussed in the previous section, are reflected as much in day to day perception as in discourses in both political and social science, and therefore in publicly available data and studies. This means that there are few statistics or studies which could provide information about the social and political opportunity structure of immigrants and their families, as well as their incorporation into the class structure of the host society. It would be useful in studies initially to “deconstruct” migratory groups, then to analyse their opportunity structure, and only then to examine the influence that migration and putting immigrants into politically defined groups has on this opportunity structure. In the pre-study to this present investigation carried out in a German car manufacturing company, we found plausible empirical evidence for the fact that patterns of discrimination and inequality based on migration and the status as foreigner weaken over the generations, and that general social and political barriers to political participation become more important determinants. To put it briefly: characteristics common amongst a whole social class begin to dominate in personal situations, patterns of discrimination common to migration break down, although they do not entirely lose their meaning, a point which needs to be highlighted (on this, see U. BirsI/ S. Ottens/ K. Sturhan 1999: 299 onwards).

For our study of the legal, political and social situation of migrants and their successor generations in Britain, Germany and Spain in this section, we can, for the time being, only rely on official statistics and generally available studies. These studies follow the common construction patterns. It is only in Chapter V that we will be able to follow the path of “deconstruction – reconstruction” as suggested above.

\textsuperscript{61} However, Marshall does not take into consideration the fact that women were not viewed as citizens right up until the twentieth century, irrespective of class status and the fact that their formal incorporation into citizenship – meaning social and political civil rights – only took place over the course of the last century in most Western European countries (on this, see E. Appelt 1999: 69, 119 onwards).

\textsuperscript{62} Various approaches to this subject are connected with these three authors (see C. Joppke 1999; A. Nassehi/M. Schroer 1999).
We now return to citizenship rights in migratory societies. For our purposes, the various different areas of citizenship can be operationalised as follows:

- **Legal citizenship or nationality:** this constitutes a legal community, which generates a legal order and provides the basis for membership of a state. The nation state uses this to institutionalise membership within but also beyond its territorial boundaries, i.e. membership of the political sphere of a nation state. The principle of citizenship assumes the existence of a homogeneous or homogenised community based on ideas of equality, along the lines of the French Enlightenment and its Western European interpretation. This can however be defined in different ways. Individual rights towards the state are based on nationality but so too are the rights of the state towards its members – civil duties. This includes for instance the obligation to carry out military service, and in a number of countries, such as Belgium, the obligation to vote.

- **Political citizenship:** this concerns the opportunities for political participation, such as the active and the passive right to vote, law and access to political and social organisations, freedom of association and access to the process whereby political demands are formulated.

- **Social citizenship:** This defines social rights and access to social resources, i.e. participation in the labour market and in the welfare state – including the education system and the social security system.

We will now assess the rights and freedoms of these three citizenships within the three case study countries. To this end, we rely primarily on statistics provided by and studies carried out by EUROSTAT and the OECD. These sometimes provide only general data, but they are at least comparable. In each instance, this material is supplemented with studies from the individual countries, when such studies are available. The basic difficulty here is that in many instances only certain particular groups of migrants or “minorities” have been investigated, and their opportunities for being incorporated into society are seen to be problematic. An overview of the full situation in countries of immigration is often lacking.

**Legal citizenship or nationality:** Nationality law has, in principle, fundamental and extensive consequences for the access to a number of basic rights and to central political civil rights. Central fundamental and political rights are either independent of formal nationality or can only be accessed via formal nationality, according to whether legal citizenship follows the territorial principle of ‘jus soli’ or whether it tends more to follow the idea of “ethnic belonging” or “belonging to a people”, the ‘jus sanguinis’ principle. We already established in Chapter 1, Section 2 that the process whereby the structure and politics of the case study countries is harmonising does not exclude naturalisation law. This means that Great Britain is increasingly moving away from the principle of jus soli, and both Spain and Germany are gradually moving away from the jus sanguinis principle. Yet differences do remain. But with regard to naturalisation they have less to do with the size of the barriers, but mainly in what people can gain as migrants through their new nationality.

To begin with, a few points on naturalisation itself: the barriers to naturalisation are comparable, even though as a rule people can only apply for the relevant nationality after 10 years in Spain, 8 years in Germany and as early as after only 5 years in Britain. There are numerous exceptions for many groups and these can reduce waiting periods. Further demands are adequate language competencies, or independent financial security. However, in Britain applicants must also provide evidence of “good character”, although what this actually means is not defined precisely. Germany is the only one of our three case study countries which allows

---

63 This conceptual separation is carried out on the basis of the contributions of K. Eder 1998, M. Greven 1998 and E. Appelt 1999 (see U. Birsl 2005).
dual nationality on request, albeit on a limited basis (see Chapter 1, Section 2; R. Bank/R. Grote 2001: 328 onwards; M.P. Carazo Ortiz 2001: 299 onwards; U. Davy/D. Çinar 2001: 352 onwards). Generally, the acquisition of each nationality is linked to the principle of descent, and this has now come to be true in all three countries. The number of naturalisations is therefore correspondingly low. Whilst Spain and Germany have seen growing numbers of naturalisations – at the end of the nineties, Germany’s total number of naturalisations had reached the same number as in France, yet it has a larger foreign population – in Britain, naturalisations have been declining sharply over the past two decades. This is due to the movement away from ‘jus soli’ and the redefinition of groups of post-colonial immigrant groups as refugee groups for instance (see Chapter 1, Section 2.1). In 1988/89 there were again larger numbers of naturalisations. The background to this was the threat of more stringent laws for Commonwealth citizens as a result of the 1988 Immigration Act (see Annex II. A).

**Figure 5: Naturalisations in Britain, Germany and Spain between 1980 and 1997**

In general, it can be said that legal citizenship always increases in importance when it is based upon the principle of descent. The reason for this is that in countries such as Germany and Spain a distinction is made in the principle of descent between so-called “rights for everybody” and “domestic rights”, and these particularly affect fundamental rights. If we take this idea further, this may possibly explain why West European countries of immigration such as France, the Netherlands or even Great Britain, which in the past tended to follow the jus soli principle, have been turning more towards the principle of descent since the seventies/eighties. As it is difficult to separate nation state territory for international migratory movements and as the completion of the single European market has ushered in the freedom for EU citizens to travel and to settle, migration policy is now increasingly aimed at restricting access to the political sphere of a nation state. Citizenship law is one instrument which can influence the manner in which people access the political sphere in particular, and especially access to po-

---

64 In Britain and Spain, children from dual nationality marriages are the only people able to have multiple citizenship. If neither of the parents holds Spanish or British citizenship, and yet they make an application for this nationality for their child, then the other citizenships must be surrendered.
itical civil rights. As the principle of descent within citizenship law has indivisible fundamental political rights only for nationals, it is therefore one possible way of excluding immigrants of a different nationality from areas of the political realm. This also means that this kind of citizenship law can act as a selection tool, and as an instrument for steering and controlling migration. For immigrants it therefore has a special significance. A further instrument of selection is the labour market in Western European countries and its system of social security based on wage labour. Access to wage labour in turn influences access to social rights or to social citizenship rights. Before moving on to discuss these, we will firstly look again at the political rights.

Political citizenship: the principle of descent is most restrictive in Germany’s nationality law. The Basic Law makes an even more strict distinction between “domestic rights” and universal human rights than in Spain. As a result, central freedoms such as the freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of domicile, freedom to earn a living or a ban on extradition are reserved solely for German citizens, at least according to the constitution’s catalogue of fundamental rights. In Spain, there are similar limits on freedoms. However, these “get out clauses” in that laws can control deviations. The foreigners’ law therefore also guarantees freedom of organisation, assembly and association for non-citizens. The only condition was initially that they register with local authorities; they did not need to hold a formal residence permit. However, these freedoms firstly have no constitutional status, and can be restricted at any time, and secondly, the people to whom this refers was limited to immigrants with a residence permit by law 8/2000. Whilst Spain therefore guarantees such freedoms for foreigners in law, these exist in Germany only in practice.

Active and passive voting rights are equally varied. By and large it is restricted in both countries to citizens; however in Spain, the Comunidades Autónomas have a certain freedom of action to allow foreigners a right to vote, at least in their own spheres of influence. In Germany, the possibility of this is ruled out. When Spain and all EU countries was forced by EU law to give all EU citizens the right to vote at the local level, the constitution had to be changed (see M. P. Carazo Ortiz 2001: 293 onwards; U. Davy/D. Çinar 2001: 335 onwards).

In Britain, the jus soli principle still continues to influence fundamental rights. Furthermore, in contrast to Spain and Germany, no written, constitution style charter of fundamental rights exists. This comes more from restrictions on general freedoms of action in laws and in Common Law. Immigrants are therefore in principle subject to the same civil freedoms and restrictions as British citizens. But on the British Isles an opposing trend in this area has recently been noted: the Human Rights Act of 1998 indeed now secures legal freedoms in line with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 and this includes foreigners. However, their rights can now legally be restricted.

Areas of voting rights are regulated more openly on the British isles, and give Irish and Commonwealth citizens with a residence permit both passive and active voting rights (see R. Bank/R. Grote 2001: 322 onwards). However this also means that this right is denied to other foreigners, who are increasing rapidly both in number and as a proportion of the migration structure.

The right to vote can be understood as the central split between civil rights in the representative democracies in these three countries. Non-citizens can only articulate their interests through so-called “foreigners’ advisory councils” or “integration councils” in the parliamentary milieu.

As can be seen in the empirical data from both the pre-study and this present study, the right to vote is given a very high value by the interviewees as a central civil right. They feel that this should be reserved exclusively to nationals or to the expanded circle of those entitled to vote, in the case of Britain (see Chapter V, Sections 2 and 3).
One further point is decisive: all freedoms and rights, and therefore fundamental rights, which apply to non-nationals cannot be exercised by immigrants who are in the country illegally. But even asylum seekers who are still in the process of being recognised as such are excluded from exercising these rights, as they do not have the necessary residence documentation.

In practice, hardly any limitations are placed on all other areas of political citizenship for foreigners with valid documentation. In all three countries, a number of migrants’ organisations exist, and these organise political and social representation as do religious and cultural groups. In Spain, a number of migrants’ trade unions have even been established – albeit under the umbrella of the socialist union UGT. In Germany, the only instances of this are under the umbrella of the Islamic fundamentalist organisation “Milli Görüs”. Aside from this, foreign workers in Germany as in Britain tend primarily to work through unions of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) and the Trade Unions Congress (TUC). Their proportion amongst the union’s entire membership corresponds largely to their proportion amongst the working population in both countries. The DGB and TUC unions have however had a lot of trouble in opening up their organisations to immigrant workers and organising labour relations for these workers. In both cases, the unions only successfully opened up at the end of the 1970s, and this was primarily as a response to pressure from the workers who had come to Germany through the workers’ advertising campaigns or from the post-colonial labour migrants themselves. In Spain, things developed differently: after the Franco era and the re-authorisation of free unions in 1977, immigrants could become members of unions without any problem. The socialist Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) in particular and the communist Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO) were very open to migrants from Latin America. This was essentially due to the fact that many of these immigrants came from countries with dictatorial regimes, and had been at the mercy of a similar fate as the Spanish unions had been shortly beforehand; what came into play here was therefore a solidarity effect. In all, unions in all three countries have problems with the issue of the interests of more recent groups of immigrants and their field of work. This particularly affects women migrants in private service companies and in the tourist trade, as well as seasonal and contract workers in the three countries.

It should now have been made clear that political citizenship is particularly closely linked to citizenship law when the principle of descent is a fundamental principle. Unrestricted access to civil rights and freedoms – including the right to vote – i.e. to essential fundamental rights, is only possible through formal citizenship. This excludes foreigners from the core area of representative democracy. The effects are not quite as decisive in the remaining areas of political practice. However, the freedoms of organisation, association and assembly have a weak basis, as these rights and freedoms do not enjoy a constitutional position, and can therefore be limited by a simple majority decision in the parliaments. In Germany, not even this is necessary. However, the extent of fundamental rights is not only distributed differently in du alistic terms, towards nationality and lack of nationality, but is also distributed according to

---

65 September 11 showed however just how unstable the legal situation is, as political and Muslim associations were quickly suspected of being connected with the attacks in New York and Washington, or of supporting them. In a few instances, this led to bans which could come into force more rapidly as a result of the tense legal situation.

66 However, this is difficult to assess for Spain, as to date there are no comprehensive investigations or studies researching this issue (see Collectif Ioe 1999).

67 For more on this organisation see U. Birs/E. Bucak/C. Zeyrek 2002.

68 There are no figures available on the foreign membership of Spanish unions. It is clear only that their proportion is growing (see L. Cachón 1997: 29).

69 For further details on the position of labour immigrants within trade unions in the three countries, and on the activities of organisations promoting equality in the workplace, see INFIS 1997; S. Virdee 1997; L. Cachón 1997.
EU-citizenship and residency status, meaning that asylum seekers and immigrants without documentation are entirely excluded.

*Social citizenship*: here, access to the education system and to the labour market are of primary importance. Participation in education influences opportunities on the labour market and people’s professional career paths. Whether or not claims are made of the social systems is also dependent upon access to the labour market. However, in all three countries the area of the health service is independent of access to the labour market; people can make use of its outputs regardless of their position in the labour market or whether or not they have a residence permit. Asylum seekers are therefore included, although immigrants without any documentation are generally not\(^{70} \). The same is true for the general education systems within these countries.

Let us begin by looking at participation in education. As we are looking at differently structured education systems in the three case study countries, we are able here to rely on international studies of specific aspects. We will therefore concentrate on two indicators where we find a comparable basis of data: (1) the participation of foreign students in tertiary educational institutions, i.e. in technical colleges and universities, as well as vocationally oriented higher education institutions, and (2) the opportunities of children with a background of migration to acquire similar competences in schools as local children. The first indicator is investigated using OECD statistics, balanced against EUROSTAT data. For the second indicator, results from the OECD’s international PISA study are reinterpreted for our purposes.

On the issue of the participation in tertiary education, the statistics provide information on the proportions of foreign students and how this varies according to nationality. This allows us to check whether they come primarily from other Western, industrialised countries or whether they are from regions and countries from which immigration is traditional in Britain, Germany and Spain\(^{71} \).

Figure 6 shows that a larger than average proportion of young people of other nationalities are studying in Great Britain when compared with the proportion of foreigners amongst the population as a whole. In Germany and Spain, the proportion of young people of other nationalities who are studying in technical colleges and universities or in vocational courses is below average\(^{72} \).

Whilst this is the first indication in Germany of problems in incorporating children from foreign families into the education system, the situation in Spain is much more varied. Unlike in Britain and in Germany, where the foreign population in both instances is quite young on average, in Spain it is older; the most dominant group are immigrants within the working age range, upwards of 25 years. To a large extent, young people of school and university age are therefore absent (see EUROSTAT 2001: 42 onwards). Yet in comparison to Britain and Germany, there are hardly any students from Latin American in Spain, in spite of the fact that the oldest immigrant groups come from this region. This is due to the fact that the number of naturalisations in this group are very high, and we are therefore dealing with Spanish nationals.

\(^{70}\) In contrast to nationals and foreigners who hold a residence permit, both groups cannot claim social security. Asylum seekers in all three countries may only claim special transfer rates, which are lower for these groups.

\(^{71}\) Unfortunately, the level of each affected age group’s participation in education cannot be determined, the available statistics provide no appropriate separation of age groups within the populations on the basis of citizenship.

\(^{72}\) In comparison, see the figures in Chapter I, in sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.
Generally speaking we can note that in all three countries, the largest group of foreign students come from a European country. Only in Germany does this mean that classical countries of origin from the guest worker advertising period are represented. In order of their relative importance, these are students of Turkish nationality (1.24%), those from Greece (0.40%), Italy (0.33%) and Spain (0.25%). But students from a more recent country of origin, Poland, are also present, at a level 0.33%. Beyond this the remaining European young people and young adults come from Finland and France, in similar numbers as those from Poland. In Britain, on the other hand, as in Spain, the majority of European students come from France and Germany.

As is well known, in Britain, citizenship alone does not allow us to assess the participation in education of the largest minorities from the era of postcolonial immigration. A study for the UK’s Departments for Education and Employment in 2000 concluded that the participation in higher education of “ethnic groups” from the post-colonial context of immigration is on average lower than that of white British youths. This result is however differentiated if the parents’ educational levels are also taken into account, or more specifically, the father’s educational level. A study by Trevor Jones (see 1996) also confirms that the majority of men from the first generation of immigrants were incorporated into the labour market as “blue-collar workers”. If we look more closely at the participation in education of children and youths from families with backgrounds of manual training, then we can see that the younger members of “ethnic groups” aspire to higher levels of qualification than do youths from comparable white, British families. However, this applies more to “Asian minorities”, and is less ap-
plicable to “Blacks”. The former also aspire to more academic qualifications, whilst the latter aim towards more vocational qualifications (see S. Pathak 2000).

In general, in Germany foreign children from families which immigrated to Germany during the period where the state was advertising overseas for labourers, particularly from Turkey, experience a first cleavage in their educational paths in the transition from primary to secondary level schooling. Their chances of going to a higher level of school are, on average, lower. There is only a very slim chance that this cutback can be compensated for over the course of schooling, meaning that as a long-term consequence, access to educational institutions in the area of tertiary and higher qualification is blocked. Investigations carried out by the Max Planck Institute for Educational Research in Berlin, which was also involved in the international PISA study in 2001, show very clearly that the transition from primary to secondary level schooling actually represents a first threshold within the German education system. Selection takes place on the basis of social circumstance, gender and “ethnicity”: on the one hand, the level of the father’s education and to an extent also the child’s sex determine the choice of educational path. On the other hand, patterns of selection are often reflected in primary level teachers’ recommendations for a child’s further educational career which are oriented towards a child’s social/family and “ethnic” background (see Arbeitsgruppe Bildungsbericht am MPI für Bildungsforschung 1994).

This social disadvantage is confirmed by the OECD’s international PISA study, particularly within the German school system, where it is considerably more marked than in Britain and Spain. This is also directly reflected in school pupils’ opportunities to develop core competences and abilities at school (see OECD 2001: 139 onwards). At the same time, the disadvantaging of children who have a background of migration also becomes obvious. As Table 4 shows, this gap in Spain is however only small, not just in comparison to both our other case study countries but also in comparison to other large OECD countries. Spain is then followed in the rankings by Britain. Germany on the other hand ranks second to last amongst the large countries of immigration, which means that there is a very large gap between immigrant and indigenous children in terms of the competences which are taught. Only in Belgium is this gap even more exaggerated.

The rankings conceal a pattern which may be central for the interpretation of the results, for the current situation in migration societies and for migration policy. This pattern reveals a gap between those countries which advertised abroad for labour migrants from the fifties to the seventies, and all other countries of immigration which did not run large advertising campaigns.

Only the large OECD countries of immigration were selected for the calculations in Table 4, with the exception of Spain. All countries above the OECD average are migration societies, which for decades have allowed large amounts of immigration by means of a points or quota system. Britain represents a country which has experienced almost exclusive post-colonial immigration. The labour market may have been the central reference point underly-
ing immigration policy in each of these cases, but there has not been a large-scale advertising campaign solely for certain sections of the labour market. What is more, these countries have invested in more balanced, durable immigration and a balanced social structure amongst migrants. They are now facing the concept followed by the countries who fall below the OECD average. This concept – which also applies to both France and Belgium, countries which experienced post-colonial immigration – centred upon an extensive advertising campaign overseas for labour migrants, which was supposed to act merely as a brief period of labour immigration to satisfy the needs of the economy. The concept did not plan for any permanent immigration. In addition, the advertising campaign focused only on poorly or unqualified jobs with correspondingly low wages, which would place the migrant workers in a low hierarchical position in the social structure irrespective of any school level and professional qualifications that they would bring with them from their home countries.

**Table 4: “Knowledge and Skills for Life”: Opportunities for Immigrant 15-year-olds in Selected OECD Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>“Natives” &lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>“First Generation” &lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>“Non-Natives” &lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>“All Immigrants” &lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean of Performance</td>
<td>% of all</td>
<td>Difference of the Means to the Natives</td>
<td>% of all</td>
<td>Difference of the Means to the Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-44&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-86</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-68</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>-57</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>-113</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own calculations based on OECD 2001: 293.

1. All children who themselves and whose parents were born in the respective case study country come under the category of “Natives” or “Native Students”.
2. All children whose parents were born abroad, but they themselves were born in the respective case study country come under the category of “First Generation” or “First Generation Students”.
3. All children who themselves and whose parents were born abroad come under the category of “non-natives” or “non-native students”. (For more information on categorisations, see ibid.: 153).
4. The differences in the figures in columns (2) and (3) are a result of rounding.
5. The “mean of performance” in this table determined using the mean values of the three indicators investigated – “reading competence”, “basic mathematical education” and “basic scientific education” (For more on the indicators see ibid: 21 onwards).
6. We only have the mean value for “reading competence” for Spain; for the other two indicators, the number of cases among “First Generation Students” was too small. As a reference value, the mean value for “reading competence” amongst the “Native Students” referred to is 494.

In recent years, Spain has been advertising overseas for workers needed for similar areas of the labour market. However, this is not yet reflected in the results of surveys like the PISA study. The immigrant children captured here may come primarily from industrialised European countries or from the families of Latin American refugees in the 70s and 80s, most of
whom had a very high level of education and professional status. Furthermore, social disadvantage has not set in here to anywhere near the same extent that it has done in Germany.

The disadvantaged position of immigrant children in the countries affected – Sweden, France, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, Germany and Belgium – had to be attributable firstly to the advertising policies of the time, and this is connected to a low level of incorporation into the education system. In Germany and Switzerland this is tied up even more closely with social disadvantage in access to education in comparison to the other five countries.

A number of central features of the disadvantage structure in the education systems again can be seen regarding incorporation into the labour market in the three case study countries; to a degree, they are even more striking in this area. In the following text we will concentrate heavily on the risk of unemployment facing immigrants and their families, along with the way in which they access the labour market in each of these countries.

It is noticeable, firstly, that the risk of becoming unemployed is not simply distributed unevenly on the basis of whether someone is a national or a foreigner, but rather whether or not those people in employment come from a Western, industrialised country. The whole picture is further differentiated on the basis of gender. Unemployment figures drawn from EUROSTAT’s workforce study are collated in Table 5. This study distinguishes between nationals, non-nationals from the EU, and non-nationals from countries outside the EU, as well as distinguishing between men and women in each category. The results show that foreigners from EU countries are subject to a similar level of labour market risk as are nationals in each of these countries. In Spain, the number of non-nationals from the EU who are unemployed is even substantially lower.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th></th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>women</td>
<td>men</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total unemployment rates</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nationals</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Non-nationals from the EU</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Non-nationals from outside the EU</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate amongst all non-nationals</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference between unemployment rates of non-nationals and nationals</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EUROSTAT 2001: 182 onwards and own calculations. Variations in the percentages are a result of rounding.

In general, the relatively favourable position of EU nationals on the labour market is due to their very high level of education and their professional status. This is true in particular for immigrants to Spain from EU countries. These are found mainly in higher professional positions. But this diagnosis also holds true for Germany, although very large proportions of EU nationals come from countries where advertising campaigns for workers were run in the fifties through to the seventies, and who have already been living in the country for three generations. Over the past two decades, these people have caught up slightly, tending to approach

---

77 On social disadvantage in the teaching of competences, see OECD 2001: 141.
the structure of the German population as a whole in terms of their employment, and therefore also in terms of their position within the social structure. At least, this is the result of a data report from the German federal statistical office, carried out together with other research institutes. According to this report, in 1984, “70% of the foreign population were employed as unskilled or semi-skilled workers (…), as opposed to only 16% of the West German population. Between 1984 and 1989, the proportion of foreign workers from Mediterranean countries in unskilled jobs fell, whilst the proportion working as skilled workers rose. The proportion of those employed as middle and higher level salaried workers also doubled over this period. However, this proportion was many times higher amongst German employees” (W. Seifert 2000b: 571). This trend continued in subsequent years (see ibid.). What we can record is therefore a process which can be interpreted as an approximation, though it is not quite full alignment. A clear shift towards higher professional positions can be noted even amongst second and third generation Turks. Their proportion has fallen particularly in the area of unskilled labour. However, the trend is not as strongly marked amongst this group as it is amongst successor generations of immigrants from southern Europe: almost half of all Turks in employment still work in the area of semi-skilled labour (see ibid: 572). This is also bound up with an increased level of labour market risk, that is in part reflected in the rate of unemployment amongst non-nationals from countries outside the EU.

However, it is not unemployment amongst Turks which pushes the figure in this category up to 15.5 percent in Germany 78. This figure may well be a result of the low position of immigrants from other countries of origin, as in Britain and Spain. However, there are no statistics or studies available on these data which are differentiated enough to provide information on countries of origin. This is true for both international data material, such as EUROSTAT – and also for statistics and studies in the case study countries. Closest attention is still paid to the old migrant groups in Britain and Germany especially; in Spain, the phenomenon is still too new to be systematically researched in all areas. It can therefore only be surmised that the high levels of unemployment in Britain and Germany are seen principally amongst recognised refugees who come from South Eastern European countries, or from Asia or Africa. This last point may well also hold for Spain, especially for immigrants from Morocco.

The fact that migrants from Asian countries are not necessarily subject to high labour market risk is highlighted by the position of “ethnic minorities” from the context of post-colonial immigration in Britain. This group is not covered by the categorisations in Table 5. In a report on the subject of “black and excluded”, the TUC compared the labour market situation of various minorities and concluded that the level of unemployment amongst “Indians” is only slightly higher than amongst white British workers. By contrast, the number of “African Caribbeans” who are unemployed is more than twice as high. The situation is even more dramatic amongst “Pakistanis” and “Bangladeshis”: the number of unemployed people amongst these groups is three times greater than that of white Britons (see TUC 1999; also S. Pathak 2000: 10). This is confirmed by a study by Jones, whose analysis goes even deeper. If we look at the position of minorities in the labour market from the perspective of their opportunities for employment – as we did above with Germany – then it can be noted that:

“There has been important developments in the distribution of ethnic minorities between job levels. The LFS data suggest that by the end of the 1980s, the proportion of Chinese, African Asian, and Indian male employees having jobs in the top category (…) was as similar or higher than for white men. As shown by the earlier surveys, the job levels of Indian men are more polarised than those of white men (…). African Caribbean men, as before, tend to be concentrated in skilled manual jobs, while Pakistani and Bangladeshi still tend to be much lower job levels than white men” (T. Jones 1996: 84).

78 The unemployment rate is around 4.5 percentage points lower amongst Turkish nationals. This is true at least for the group aged between 16 and 64 and in West Germany, where almost all Turks in Germany live (see W. Seifert 2000b: 570).
Jones also notes a further central indicator of differentiation – that of gender. What is initially noticeable in Table 5 is the fact that in Britain, women in general – and that means in all of the categories – are less often affected by unemployment than are men. Therefore the number of people unemployed amongst non-nationals from countries outside the EU, which is twice as high as that amongst Britons, can be attributed primarily to unemployment amongst foreign men. In Germany, we can see a similar pattern in the same category, even though it does not have entirely the same dimensions as in the British Isles. Women in Germany, as in Spain, are subject to greater labour market risk. In Spain, the discrepancies between men and women are particularly evident. In addition, in both countries we can note that female nationals from other EU states are threatened less by unemployment as are nationals.

On the other hand, studies from Spain can provide us with information on the position of foreigners within the labour market. These studies take particular account of groups of migrants who are still inadequately researched in Britain and Germany. An analysis by EUROSTAT in 2000 of “Patterns and trends in international migration in Western Europe” reveals that their proportion has not just risen in Spain, but has also been increasing continuously in Britain. This study notes that:

“A recent phenomenon is the change of gender composition among migrants. An increasing proportion of migrants are young women, which potentially poses demographic and social imbalances both in the place of origin and the receiving society (…). Greece and the UK are only two countries with a consistent increase in the total number of female migrants since 1992 and 1993 respectively. Switzerland, Germany and Spain experienced a decline in all years after 1993. Despite the rise in numbers of female immigrants during the early 1990s, only Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands and the UK were the numbers of female migrants in 1996/97 higher than in 1988” (EUROSTAT 2000: 93).

We approach the situation of migrants on the labour market in Spain as we did previously for Germany and Britain, from the perspective of employment opportunities. These opportunities are limited to one sector, even though migrants still have a certain spectrum of opportunities within this. We find that almost 93% of migrants employed in the Spanish labour market only have a job in the service sector, that is, primarily in private homes. The jobs encompass cleaning and babysitting, as well as care of the elderly and sick people. Whilst the first of these tasks are carried out almost exclusively by women, both men and women are involved in care work. Labour relations are completely heterogeneous in terms of what is demanded of workers, their working conditions – including the level of autonomy in the way in which work is carried out – and pay. Sometimes these labour relations are protected by contract, but they also may not be. With cleaning jobs and childminding in particular, there is often a lack of binding contracts. The situation is made more difficult due to the fact that women employed in this sector sometimes live in the homes of their employers, as a rule earn less than house helps who do not live in, and have no form of social security. Even when in these instances, employers promise to pay social contributions for household employees, this often does not happen.

Migrants carrying out these private services generally prefer part time work in one or a small number of households. They feel that the earnings potential and working conditions are better than were they to live in a household and work there only for a few hours. And they are even more favourable than in the hotel trade (see C. Solé et al. 2000). Yet working conditions and therefore also the labour market position is in general extremely precarious, a fact which is reflected in the high level of unemployment at 21.3%. This figure only encompasses the number of immigrants who are residing legally in Spain. Workers without residence or work permits are especially common in the private service sector. Apparently, entry into the official labour market is only possible for most migrants after first carrying out illegal employment.
This was the finding of at least one survey dating back to 1987. The survey questioned immigrants from Morocco, Central Africa and the Philippines: 80% of those migrants interviewed were initially employed in the illegal economy for around three to four years before they could enter into a normal job (see C. Solé 1995: 28).

In summary, what all of this means is that splitting citizenship into a legal, political and social dimension leads to a stronger differentiation of migration societies. For Britain, Germany and Spain, this means firstly that nationality law based on the principle of jus sanguinis makes a relatively strict distinction between nationals and non-nationals, and this is seen particularly in fundamental rights as well as political and democratic rights. Exceptions are only seen in Britain, in relation to immigration from the Commonwealth and from Ireland. Even the incorporation of EU citizens in this area is limited. But otherwise, their position is essentially more favourable in comparison to that of non-nationals from countries outside the EU and particularly to those from regions on other continents. This spectrum encompasses asylum seekers, refugees, and those residing illegally in these countries. This describes not only a hierarchy and a differentiation as it is established through legal status (see Chapter I, Section 1.1, Table 1), but also simultaneously describes a split within societies. It is a split because it denies access to opportunities for political participation, education and on the labour market. In the area of social citizenship, which we measured using the three indicators of “participation in education in tertiary level higher education”, “opportunities for immigrant children to acquire important competences and ability in the school systems” and “position on the labour market”, there is a clear dividing line between the groups (1) of nationals and EU-nationals, (2) groups of migrants from the first years and decades of immigration who are now partially incorporated into society – this also holds true with regard to the groups of Latin American immigrants in Spain – and, (3) all other migration groups who are “refugees” by political definition, or who are “sin papeles”. It represents a split on account of the fact that inequality does not simply follow the pattern of “inclusion versus exclusion”. It is much more a pattern of dividing lines which develop along the corresponding legal, political and social opportunity structures. Here the split means a split within the political arena and is a component part of a migration policy based on control and surveillance.

3. Political Debates and Conflicts at the Millennium: Impressions from Britain, German, and Spain

The dividing lines between EU nationals, minority groups who have been in the country a long time, refugees and immigrants without documentation can be seen with respect to opportunity structures. These essentially reflect parts of the patterns which we highlighted in the first section of this chapter, patterns of everyday constructions of the “foreign”. Whilst EU nationals are barely perceived as groups separate from the majority population, and groups which have been living in the country for a long time are the main focus for processes whereby they are held to have certain cultural attributes or are excluded if they come from other original cultural contexts, the social construction of the “foreign” affects in particular those marginalised groups of migrants who come into the country as (poverty stricken) refugees and as “illegal” immigrants. In the past few years, it has been precisely these groups of people who have become the target of political campaigns and xenophobia. In the following descriptions we wish to look at current political discussions concerning migration, as well as current political events which are shaping discourse in each of these countries. This builds on the outline of country-specific migration policy sketched in the first chapter. To an extent here, we again encounter familiar set patterns perception which were already noted in the analysis of social constructions of the “foreign”. Some positive aspects can be noted alongside processes of closure and conflict laden situations, as the plans for changes in the law in Germany
show. We introduce current discussions here not just to paint a comprehensive picture of the subject of migration in each of the countries, but also to capture the political climate within which the present study was carried out.

The surveys carried out for this study took place between early 2000 and early 2001 in Spain, in summer and autumn 2000 in Germany and in summer 2001 in Britain. Certain aspects of the subject area of migration became very important in the media, the politics and public awareness at the time, such as illegal immigration and employment, changing immigration laws or xenophobia. It can be assumed that the current issues in each of the countries and the dominant social and political climate regarding migration at the time of the surveys will also be reflected in the respondents’ opinions. This is why the following text presents issues and debates which were relevant over the corresponding time period in these countries. For each country, we refer to the results of the Eurobarometer 2000, published by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, in order to be able to take issue with specific xenophobic tendencies within the populations. On its own, the Eurobarometer is only partly able to convey meaning, as it deals with a very general operationalisation of xenophobia, but the study does contain comparable data.

3.1 The Political Atmosphere

In Britain, public debate at the time of our survey was characterised firstly by moves by the British government towards limiting migration on the grounds of asylum and the serious, violent clashes between white and Asian youths. One of the biggest issues was the Immigration and Asylum Act which was finalised in 1999 and came into force in 2000, developed to counteract the growing number of asylum seekers. The new law makes the situation worse for asylum seekers, and was even described as a “draconian regime” which serves to “humiliate refugees and feed populist chauvinism” by the Financial Times (Financial Times, cited in M. Sontheimer 2000).

The attempt to reduce the number of applications for asylum could be seen in many forms: for instance, at the meeting of EU internal ministers in February 2001, the British Home Secretary Jack Straw suggested introducing a stricter European asylum policy, revising the Geneva Convention on Refugees so as to be able to distinguish “real” refugees from economic refugees. Repressive controls carried out by British immigration officials at Prague airport in the summer of 2001 caused controversy; the reason behind these measures was the increased immigration of Roma from the Czech Republic as a result of the severe xenophobic threat (see FR, 31.08.2001). The practice was heavily criticised by the public, and was stopped by the British immigration authorities after only a short period. However, this was not without indicating that were the numbers of those seeking asylum in Britain from the Czech Republic to increase again, then the controls would be recommenced.

In a bid to prevent illegal immigration in particular, the British government put pressure on the company running Eurotunnel to take extensive security precautions at the tunnel entrance. This move aimed to stop the illegal immigration of people from the Sangatte refugee centre near to the tunnel entrance in Calais; in the first six months of 2001, around 18 500 people had been picked up here. This move was also echoed in the media; at Christmas 2001, several TV stations broadcast pictures of the highly secured tunnel. In July 2002, the French interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy and the British Home Secretary David Blunkett agreed to close the refugee centre at the beginning of 2003.

Violence between white and Asian youths and the police dominated the press in the summer of 2001. In Oldham, Leeds, Burnley and Bradford, there were violent clashes or even street battles, which caused numerous injuries on all sides and a great deal of damage to property (The Guardian 06.06 and 25/26.06.2001). What these riots have in common is that they
took place in areas with a relatively high proportion of unemployed members of “ethnic minorities”, a fact which highlights a potential for conflict. Further investigations also showed that the violent incidents were preceded by provocation from right wing parties such as the British National Party (BNP) and the National Front (NF), or discriminatory treatment of “Asians” by the local police (The Guardian 07.06.2001; taz 09.07.2001).

In Germany the discussion about migration and racism has changed a great deal over the last three years. This is due to the change of government in autumn 1998 which saw the Red-Green government take office. The reference point for this debate, led by the Red-Green government, is the admission that Germany is a country of immigration and that this fact must be taken into account with corresponding laws and regulations.

The start of this new discourse on migration is marked by the reform of the citizenship law in January 1999. One of the central changes here was to make it possible for immigrants to hold dual nationality. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) were heavily opposed to the plans, even using a public petition in their battle against the so-called “dual passport”. Although charities, immigrant groups, trade unions and political parties warned the CDU and CSU against encouraging xenophobic tendencies within society, the collection of public signatures for the petition was a success: The CDU, which had a heavy presence in the German Land of Hesse, won the subsequent regional elections, a fact which persuaded the Red-Green government to water down its next version of the new citizenship law.

In an attempts to win support for their own party, the leaders of the CDU in North Rhine Westphalia attacked plans to introduce a “Green Card” for non-European IT specialists, using the slogan “children, not Indians” in regional elections in early 2000. This was less successful. Unions, churches and even some members of the CDU distanced themselves from the campaign, which was regarded as xenophobic, and the CDU lost the election. This incident opened the debate about immigration as necessary to secure the economic success of Germany, as opposed to being viewed as a threat. The “Green Card” was introduced on 1st August 2000, and to date the programme has been seen as a success.

The debate about a general revision of the regulations governing immigration was countered in autumn 2000 by the president of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group with the idea of a German “core culture”. This would serve as a measure of the integration of immigrants and thereby act as an alternative to multicultural society. Public criticism this time extended as far as the economic associations, and as a result this idea of “core culture” was not taken up in the general election campaign in 2002. However, the term was widely used in the media in the following months as a slogan.

The discussion about immigration came to a head following the period of our study, when the German government presented a draft of the new immigration law in the autumn of 2001. The Union parties (CDU and CSU) accused the Red-Green coalition of using the new regulations to promote immigration rather than limit it. The age at which children of immigrants could follow their parents to Germany was particularly controversial, as was the recognition of non-state and gender-specific persecution as a reason for fleeing the country, along with the issue of whether a limit on immigration should be established as an aim of the law or not. The long, highly charged debate surrounding this law even led to a split between the critics: whilst refugee associations and human rights groups, such as Pro Asyl, criticised the law’s rigidity, which would make the situation worse particularly for refugees already living in Germany, and would limit opportunities to claim asylum (see A. Kothen/K. Weber 2002), other groups, such as the German Foreigners’ Advisory Committee, who were originally against the law, came to plead in support of the law because they feared further limits for migrants if there were additional delays in ratifying the law. Despite all of these opposing stances, the parties’ opinions began to converge following the presentation of the first draft of the law. In the 2002
general election, which was after the time period when the empirical survey for this present study had been carried out, the immigration law did however become a bone of contention between the two parties. After the law had passed through the lower house of parliament, the Bundestag, with the government’s majority, the party political confrontation was carried over into the upper house, the Bundesrat or chamber of the Länder. Here, there was no clear majority between SPD and CDU-led Länder, and the balance was held by those Länder where a grand coalition of the SPD and the CDU was in power. The Land of Brandenburg, which was one of the Länder governed by a grand coalition, voted both for and against the new law. However, the president of the Bundesrat at the time, who was from the SPD, took the yes vote given by Brandenburg’s SPD Minister President as the Land’s support for the law. The law thereby won a bare majority. But the Länder where the CDU was in power brought an action before the constitutional court as to whether this decision was constitutional. In December 2002, the highest constitutional court decided that the vote in the Bundesrat was invalid, as every Land in the chamber of the Länder only has one consensual vote. A split vote, as in the case of Brandenburg, should have been counted as an abstention. On this basis, the immigration law would not have won a majority in the Bundesrat. The consequence of this is that in early 2003, the law is being negotiated by the Bundestag and Bundesrat conciliatory committee. The Länder governed by the CDU have in the meantime won a majority in the upper house, leading us to assume that the draft law will be made even stricter.

The decision to allow some forms of migration and to regulate migration by way of an immigration law also led to the German government adopting a new approach to dealing with xenophobia and anti-semitism. In the summer of 2000, the Red-Green government made an explicit issue of xenophobia towards foreigners in Germany, and the debate widened to encompass anti-semitism and right wing extremism in general. The catalysts were increased attacks on immigrants, including the murder of Alberto Adriano in the town park in Dessau in June 2000, an arson attack on the synagogue in Erfurt in April which was started with Molotov cocktails, and a bomb attack on a group of Jewish immigrants in Düsseldorf in July which injured ten people, some of them critically. In 2000, the German Interior Ministry registered a 40% increase in violent xenophobic acts compared to 1999. A total of 641 acts were recorded (see German Interior Ministry/Bundesministerium des Inneren 2001b). As a “counter measure”, the government approved a three-year programme known as Xenos, which provided money for projects and initiatives to counteract xenophobia. The government also banned the skinhead organisation “Blood and Honour”, and its youth movement. Furthermore, efforts were made to review the ban on the right wing extremist nationalist party, the Nationale Partei Deutschlands (NPD). The process has still not been completed, as it was noticed in March 2002 that some of the anti-semitic and xenophobic comments being made by members of the NPD – the reason why the process to ban them had come into action – had also originated from informants within the authorities responsible for the protection of the constitution. These people had been smuggled into the NPD to monitor the organisation.

One of the major issues in Spain was the revised foreigners’ law 8/2000 which came into force in January 2001. In comparison with the first draft of the foreigners’ law (4/2000) the new regulations represent a worsening of the situation for immigrants (see Chapter I, Section 2.3). The opposition parties Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and Izquierda Unida (IU) along with humanitarian and church organisations criticised the arbitrary use of legal power and the insecurity that the law would mean for immigrants. In early 2001, immigrants protested against the new foreigners’ law, often for weeks, with hunger strikes in churches in a number of towns (El País, 08.03.2001). What is noticeable here in contrast to Germany and Britain is that the Spanish population showed very strong solidarity with the immigrants. In February and March, tens of thousands of Spaniards demonstrated against the new foreigners’ law in Madrid, Valencia and Barcelona. Their displeasure also focused on the campaign hold
in March and July 2000 to legalise so-called “indocumentados”; although 140,000 residence permits had been issued during this action, 90,000 applications had been refused. At the beginning of 2001, several hundred immigrants occupied a number of churches in Barcelona for weeks to protest against the threat that some people were to be deported. In this instance as well, the support of the Spanish population, with their petitions and financial donations, was enormous. The protest was successful: the government ensured that all people who had submitted an application for residency before 23rd January 2001 were issued with their documentation. Some 30,000 immigrants got a residence permit this way.

One of the aims of the Spanish government’s new immigration policy is to prevent as much illegal immigration in advance as possible. The latest figures show a clear rise in this area. From the middle of January to the middle of July 2001, 35% more immigrants without a residence permit were picked up than over the same period in the previous year (see Migration und Bevölkerung 2001). An agreement between Spain and Ecuador from February 2001 was one spectacular attempt to encourage these people to leave; the agreement provided for all Ecuadorians living in Spain without a residence permit to leave the country voluntarily. The plan was that when they were back in Ecuador they should then apply for a visa to be able to enter Spain legally again, once they could prove they had a job. Only 3000 of the estimated 150,000 Ecuadorians living in Spain emigrated; the Interior Minister Mariano Rajoy, regarded the expensive project as a failure.

The second large group of illegal immigrants, people from North Africa, try to reach the Spanish mainland by boat, over the Strait of Gibraltar. They also attempt to reach the Canary Islands by boat. The virtually daily reports about people who have drowned doing so, and the fact that dealing with the rising number of people who immigrate by this dangerous means is obviously too much for the communities, which have to deal with them have caused a lot of concern. In 1999, on board 475 boats which were discovered, there were 3569 people. In 2000, that number had grown to 780 boats, with 15,365 immigrants being counted on them. Since the new foreigners’ law was passed, in the six months to June in 2001, 10% more people without documentation were discovered on the beaches of the Canary Islands than during the same period the year before (El País 19.6.2001). On 27th June 2001, more than 1000 people without an entry permit landed near Tarifas, the largest number to arrive in one day to date.

The illegal immigrants are increasingly fighting against their precarious situation: in August 2001, almost 200 Africans in Barcelona, members of the CGT union, demanded a residence and work permit; the same demands were made by a group of around 100 Moroccans who moved through the Comunidad Autónoma Castilla-La Mancha to Cuenca (taz, 17.08.2001). These campaigns were viewed positively by the public, and the protestors’ requests were supported by the media.

The much higher acceptance of immigration amongst the Spanish population than in Britain and Germany continues today. It is also reflected in our investigation of attitudes (see Section 3.2). Yet the particular atmosphere of solidarity in 2001 must also be seen as a reaction to the xenophobic pogroms in 1999 and 2000. In July 1999, a demonstration in Terrassa in Cata-

---

79 Over half a million people had applied for documentation by the deadline. Prior to this, officials and aid agencies had assumed that there were only one million foreigners in Spain.

80 The campaign cost the Spanish government 500 million pesetas, which covered the costs of return flights (see El País, 08.05.2001).

81 It is estimated that in the first eight months of 2001 alone, around 700 people died trying to get across the Strait of Gibraltar and to enter Spain illegally (see taz, 21.08.2001).

82 In April 2000, around 90 immigrants were left to camp in the town park in Las Palmas, Gran Canaria (see Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 26.04.2000).

83 For instance, the newspaper El País published a report entitled “My Friend Smart”, which emphatically described the life of a black African without any documentation living and working in Spain.
lonia involving around 1 300 people (see Chapter 1, Section 2.3) turned into a hunt for Moroccan and black African immigrants\textsuperscript{84}.

In El Ejido in Southern Spain, the most serious xenophobic violence since the end of Franco’s dictatorship broke out in February 2000. Immigrants were seriously injured, the offices of the women’s group of the socialist party PSOE and a support group were devastated. Bars, shops and houses were destroyed along with a mosque, copies of the Koran were desecrated and cars were burnt out (taz, 8.2. and 10.2.2000; Göttinger Tageblatt, 10.2.2000). There was a further pogrom in June 2000, when an area in Almorad in Southern Spain which is populated largely by Roma was attacked by around 800 people armed with steel bars, chains, knives and petrol cans (jungle world, 28.6.2000). The Spanish population reacted to the events with a great deal of outrage and disapproval, and not just to the pogroms themselves but to the behaviour of the police as well; the police only got involved in El Ejido after three days of violence. In Almorad they did not even get involved at all. The local authority and the central government subsequently introduced measures to improve the infrastructure in the affected areas.

3.2 Xenophobic Resentments as Reflected in Comparisons of Attitudes in the Different Countries

For our comparison it must be firstly be noted that very similar issues are relevant in Spain, Britain and Germany. The passing of new laws on immigration or new legal regulations on asylum, as in Britain, occupies a large part of the public debate. All three cases deal with laws which plan stricter restrictions on refugees and asylum seekers\textsuperscript{85}, whilst at the same time – at least in Britain and Germany – also broaden the possibilities for the immigration of highly skilled people. This development must also be seen against the backdrop of a growing orientation towards Europe, and common European legislation. Xenophobia is a further important issue, even though the violence in all three countries is directed towards different groups, and the states react differently to it. In Germany, anti-semitic and xenophobically motivated xenophobic attacks in the year 2000 resulted in a political debate – after several years of trivialisation. In Spain, it is primarily Moroccan labour migrants and Roma who are the focus of xenophobic attacks; however, the vast majority of the population disapproves of such attacks. In Britain, the riots between white and Asian youths characterised public discussion. In this instance, xenophobic violence cannot be seen in the “street battles” themselves (many were started by the Asians themselves), but rather – as we have shown – it can be seen in the threats and attacks which preceded them and in the discriminatory behaviour of the police.

To illustrate more fully xenophobic tendencies in Spain, Britain and Germany, we will refer in the following section to certain results from the 2000 Eurobarometer. We will only document results from the study which are interesting for a comparison of the three countries. The subjects of labour migration, the cultural acceptance of immigrants and the acceptance of asylum seekers are especially important for our own purposes.

As Figure 7 shows, the lowest acceptance of labour migration is found in Germany, within a European comparison. Labour migration from Muslim countries is welcomed even less than

\textsuperscript{84} Slogans like “Arabs out”, “Get lost, Moorish sons of bitches” were used when the windows of Moroccan shops were broken in and several apartments were ransacked (see Göttinger Tageblatt, 22.07.1999). The term “Moorish sons of bitches” points to deep-seated and historically motivated hostility on the part of the Spanish population towards North African immigrants, “the Moors”.

\textsuperscript{85} The recognition of gender-specific and non-state persecution within the new German immigration law does represent an improvement in the protection of people who are being persecuted. However, how people can prove that they are being persecuted in this way is still unclear. This law must also be viewed more as a kind of “belated recognition” of an area of the Geneva Convention on Refugees.
that from Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{86}. Religion can clearly be seen as a criteria for inclusion and exclusion (see the results of the case study in Chapter V).

These results reflect two antipathies: firstly, they reflect general scepticism towards labour migrants, who in Germany have for years been presented as competition to German workers. Secondly these results show the sizeable gap between the majority society and the largest group of immigrants in Germany – Turks – who are identified primarily in terms of their religion. In Spain on the other hand, labour migration generally seems to be accepted. Despite hostilities, particularly towards the “Moors”, awareness of the need for labour migration for economic reasons seems to have gained acceptance. The ethnic segmentation of the labour market, which relegates Eastern European and North African migrants to agriculture in particular and to the service sector where work is rarely legally recognised also leads to a situation where Spaniards – with only a few exceptions – barely regard immigrants as competing with them for jobs, a fact which presumably raises the acceptance of labour migration. In Britain, the acceptance of this form of migration is only somewhat below the European average.

\textit{Figure 7: Acceptance and Non-acceptance of Immigration of Muslims and from Eastern European countries – a Comparison of Britain, Germany, Spain and the EU as a Whole (Figures in %)}

A. Immigration of Muslims

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure7}
\end{figure}

\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Country & GB & D & E & EU \\
\hline
not accepted & 57 & 64 & 34 & 60 \\
accepted with restriction & 16 & 10 & 20 & 20 \\
don’t know & 11 & 5 & 7 & 7 \\
accepted without restriction & 21 & 2 & 34 & 20 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{86} Incidentally, this is also true for the majority of European states.
A further interesting set of issues is presented by the question of the acceptance of immigrants. The most striking results on this point come from Spain: in response to the question as to whether they are bothered by the presence of people of different nationalities, ethnicities or religions, Spanish interviewees in each case replied in the negative – and indeed with a consistency vastly above the EU average. In this area, Britain and Germany display values roughly in line with the European average. 75% of Spaniards say that it is good when a society is composed of people of different ethnicities, religions and cultures, which compares to only 53% of Germans – below the European average (see E. Thalhammer et al. 2001: 44). This reflects decades of policy in Germany of not recognising immigration and defending the homogeneous nation, a factor which causes fear about multi-culture.

The above average level of acceptance of immigrants amongst the Spanish interviewees makes it clear that the violent xenophobic attacks described in Section 3.1 are in no way supported by the vast majority of the population. These attitudes contain barely any resentment in a comparison of European countries, a fact which is also seen on the issue of the acceptance of asylum seekers; asylum is widely supported, without restrictions for refugees. In Britain, on the other hand, the majority of the population is opposed to asylum-seeking migration; acceptance of migration on the basis of seeking asylum is lower here than in the other countries investigated in Europe (see ibid.: 35). It seems that the discussion led by the British government on tightening the right to asylum, as well as the polemics against asylum seekers themselves is also being reflected in Britons’ opinions.

3.3 September 11th 2001 – an Aside

The surveys in Britain, Germany and Spain were carried out before September 11th 2001. Attitudes and opinions were therefore not affected by the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, nor by the discussion surrounding them.

The results of these events and its effects on migration policy in the three countries we investigated cannot yet entirely be established, nor can the impact on attitudes amongst the public. However, tendencies can be seen. The situation in Spain, Germany and Britain is characterised by three factors in particular (for more on the following points, see EUMC 2002):
firstly, by an increase in xenophobic behaviour directed primarily towards immigrants thought to be Muslims. Secondly, by broad statements of solidarity from leading politicians towards Muslim communities and institutions, as well as attempts to strengthen intercultural dialogue/dialogue between religions. Thirdly, the situation is marked by the tightening of security laws which aim to limit a newly-perceived risk of terrorism. At their core, these laws are directed at immigrants and to a degree they represent extensions of legislation concerning foreigners.

Hostility towards Muslims, as people of Arab or Asian appearance, and Islamic institutions has intensified. What can especially be noted right across Europe is an increase in abuse and verbal attacks (see EUMC 2002). But there have also been physical injuries, a few murders and attacks on mosques, ranging from stones being thrown and windows being broken right through to arson attacks and bomb threats. In Spain, the new phobia of Islam is being mixed up with the rhetoric against Moroccans, the “Moors”, which was active even before September 11th. In Germany and Britain too, differentiating between anti-Islamic attitudes and general xenophobic beliefs in the search for reasons for such acts is not always possible (see *ibid*).

For Muslim immigrants in Europe, these developments mean an increase in uncertainty or even fear in their daily lives. In the period immediately following September 11th 2001 in particular, they were placed under a great deal of pressure to distance themselves time and time again from the fundamentalist elements of Islam and from terrorism (see *ibid*).

As a reaction and an opposing pole, politicians in Britain, Germany and Spain spoke of their solidarity with the Muslim communities and emphasised the fact that there was no connection between the religion of Islam and terrorist attacks (The Guardian, 28.09.2000; FR, 17.12.2001).

Despite declarations of solidarity from the politicians, an increasing number of laws are being passed in all three countries which place immigrants and their religious communities under a general suspicion. The British Home Office, for instance, in mid-November declared a national emergency and repealed parts of the European Convention on Human Rights in the name of the fight against terror. The British Home Secretary also unveiled a broad package of emergency laws, which would mean for instance that people could be jailed without charge, or that people from Afghanistan and Iraq suspected of terrorist activity could be held until a third country accepted them, or until their harmlessness could convincingly be proved (taz, 13.11.2001).

In Germany too, the discussion surrounding “security package II” increasingly obscured attempts to launch an intercultural dialogue. Extensions to the Federal Border Police’s powers were introduced, biometric data were included in foreigners’ passports and fingerprints were taken from people applying for visas (Pro Asyl 2001). The reintroduction of the process of pinpointing criminal suspects by means of computer analysis of data on many people was highly controversial within the general public; foreign male students right across Germany were now faced with suspicion of terrorism as a result of this process being reintroduced.

In Spain, the situation is slightly different. Patrols along the Moroccan border were increased (see Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales 2002), yet the discussion about security concepts took a very different direction from than in Germany and Britain: the threat of terrorism here is located here internally, with the armed Basque liberation movement, ETA. Security concepts developed in the wake of the attacks on the WTC are all focused on this organi-
sation. The Spanish government is clearly less concerned about external threats than the British and the German governments.

4. Summary: Internally Open Societies?

Picking up on a central theme of the first chapter, what do recent political debates and events tell us about the development of these three societies of immigration towards internal and external openness? In approaching this question it is useful to review the most important results from this chapter.

Xenophobic resentment, such as that recently observed in the shape of anti-Islamic violence connected with September 11th 2001, as well as in the form of explosive local conflicts in Spain and Britain, do not arise in a vacuum. They build on patterns of perception and categorisation which firstly target individual groups of people distinct from the majority population, and accord them a specific legal status or even attribute them with particular characteristics.

In our three case study countries we are looking at a conglomeration of social constructions and categorisations, on the basis of which the migration societies are divided up into groups. The focus is on group constructions which vary according to the historical background of migration and the migration system, and according to the social situation and social discourse. Alternatively, these group constructions can put people in different groups according to the specific political context. The social and political constructions are entirely bound up with one another, but can also differ from one another. A good example of this are the categorisations used in national immigration policies which are used to define the forms of migration and migratory groups (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1). These categorisations are closely connected to the extent to which certain migrants are legally able to access the national territory, or the political realm. At the same time, politically speaking, an attempt is made to create some kind of schematic order through which a hierarchy is established amongst immigrants. This is also reproduced in the access to legal, political and social citizenship.

In social situations, i.e. in social relationships, only a few of the political categories are effective, such as “asylum seekers” or “refugees”. Other than this, much more general categorisations play a role, and these are expressed for example in dualisms such as “native citizen – foreigner”. Whilst this dualism has been in effect in Germany since the period during which the country was advertising for labourers overseas, it has increasingly been appearing in Britain, but this has only recently begun. Aside from this, the contrast between “whites and blacks” is more likely to be dominant, i.e. a differentiation on the basis of the category of race. In Spain, on the other hand, we are less likely to see a general dualistic differentiation, rather more of a trichotomy, consisting of “Españoles – Inmigrantes – Extranjeros”. Here, “Extranjeros” refers to immigrants from EU countries and the USA, whereas “Inmigrantes” refers to immigrants from outside the EU and from poorer regions of the world. This contains a clear meaning: the first category has more positive connotations, and the second category is more negative.

A further general allocation into specific groups can occur on the basis of religion. Putting people into groups takes place along the divisions of “Christianity – Islam” or “Christianity – Judaism”. The latter, however, hardly has anything to do with immigration, rather with the construction of a minority independent of migration, and this can be accompanied by historical anti-semitism. What unifies both dualisms is the fact that it is of no importance whether a protestant religion is dominant, as in Britain, whether Catholicism is predominant as in Spain, or whether both religions dominate, as in Germany. Of equally little relevance is the extent to which a state is secular and how strong or weak the church is within a society. Political discourse and attacks on Muslims following the assassination attacks of September 11th 2001
have highlighted how easily values which are passed down the generations can be activated along this religious dualism. The dualism of “Christianity – Islam” was transferred into the medieval paradigm of “good versus evil”, virtually without problems. What was noticeable in this case was that the public discourse centred not just on the fight against terrorism or even on the causes of the attacks, but in all three countries more of a debate was held about cultural hegemony in a society of immigration. This debate was then focused primarily on certain “ethnicities” – as were some of the attacks – which are amongst the old established immigrant groups in these countries. In Britain it affected Pakistanis, in Germany it was Turks and in Spain, Moroccans.

However, these reactions in the three countries are not based equally on deep-seated resentment, as the results of the special evaluation of the 2000 Eurobarometer on public attitudes towards Muslims show. This recorded a negative stance towards and a lack of acceptance of immigrants with the Islamic faith in Germany especially. Britain lies roughly around the average of all EU countries in terms of its acceptance and non-acceptance. Spain was again found to be the most tolerant of the countries, not just in comparison to our two other case study countries but in comparison to all EU countries, along with Sweden (see Section 3.2; E. Thalhammer et al. 2001: 32). But even in Germany what we see happening does not relate to one-dimensional attitudes based on rejection and exclusion; in Germany, as in Britain and Spain, increasing willingness to incorporate migrants more into society can be observed. There is therefore “movement” within these attitudes.

Even if characteristics based on “ethnicity” can play a role in the context of religious differentiation, this does not mean that this construction is meaningful in general, or serves as a template for attributing characteristics. Much more striking is the fact that it has an effect in specific social contexts. As a social construction, our observations show that “ethnicity” has the strongest effect in the definition of people’s “own group”, in drawing a line between themselves and others, even though these groups of others tend not to be further defined. This is true both for so-called majority societies, and for so-called minorities, who also define themselves in terms of an “ethnos”. However, in this process, “ethnicity is often not automatically bound up with “nationality” or citizenship. People who have naturalised, for instance, are therefore not necessarily regarded as “Britons”, “Germans” or “Spaniards”. The identification of a person’s “ethnos” is based rather on external features such as skin colour, hair colour or clothing and on their language. It can also be based on concepts of a shared and thereby binding history and culture, which can be bound up with belief in a common descent. However, not all of the aforementioned features and criteria need be used in this self-identification.

In Western countries, the construction of an individual’s supposed own “ethnos” is not simply a question posed in the wake of immigration. As is well known, it can also lead to the drawing of boundaries within a majority society, as we saw in Spain with the example of the Catalan Comunidad Autónoma; after the end of the Franco era, the process of normalisation in this region was viewed as a process of Catalanisation.

Britain is an exception amongst our case study countries in that the official anti-discrimination policy gives “ethnic minorities” a formal status. This mixes political and social constructions and perceived characteristics. “Ethnicity” is therefore a category which influences social relationships more strongly than in Germany or in Spain. It is not just used in people’s definitions and characterisations of themselves, but is also used in the definition and characterisation of “others”.

89 In Germany in particular, there are calls for discrimination on the basis of religion, “race” and culture to be outlawed. These calls are louder than they are in Britain and Spain. Furthermore, there is a noticeable increasing willingness in both Germany and Spain to promote cultural co-existence and social equality (see previous section; E. Thalhammer et al. 2001: 27, 50 onwards).
Chapter II: Multiculturalism or Interculturalism?

Paradoxically, the danger arises in Britain that alongside this official construct of ethnicity that the division between “ethnicities” will repeatedly be emphasised and the way will be blocked for members of “minorities” in particular to move beyond their group characterisation – something which runs entirely counter to political intentions. This danger relates not only to social opportunities but also exists in everyday perception. From our own research on Germany, we have indications that classifying people in terms of certain “ethnicities” or “nationalities” in everyday perception need not mean exclusion per se, or even that resentment becomes a factor. As least, we could measure this empirically in the social relationships in the workplace at industrial companies. This means that as soon as immigrants are not assigned to general or vague categories such as “foreigner” or “refugee” but are perceived on a differentiated basis, such as on the basis of nationality, we can as a rule no longer measure xenophobic attitudes towards them. This primarily affects labour migrants from the period when labourers were advertised for overseas, i.e. from the guest worker system, and their descendent generations. A tendency to include even Turks – the society towards which most hostility is engendered – is clearly recognisable.

This issue is examined again in Chapter V, where we look more closely at the results for the three countries. To a degree, this finding was confirmed within the selected companies, and in terms of how minorities are constructed differently in Britain and Spain.

Social constructions – such as all of those outlined above – are repeatedly produced and within social relationships in a society and are reproduced in cultural terms both by the majority society as well as by minorities. This means that the cultural practices of these “groups” are each related to one another, are actively formed by their members. Cultural practices are therefore also constantly changing, and at the same time are new practices are constantly being established. This conception of cultural practice and therefore also of culture(s), draws on the work of J. Clarke/ S. Hall/ T. Jefferson/B. Roberts (1979). It encompasses the stock of knowledge derived from concepts of values, norms, rules governing behaviour and procedures within a society (see also J. Hoffmann-Nowotny 1996: 104), as well as of social groups and classes, or class factions. This stock of knowledge is reflected in styles and types of behaviour, which are themselves forms of expressing social, gender-based and material experiences in life. With regard to migration societies, this means that the cultural practices and cultures of minorities feed on experiences of society and gender and on material experiences of life, which were made by the first generation of immigrants in their country of origin, though this sometimes also applies to the second generation immigrants as well. Minorities’ cultural practices and material experiences in life then build on experiences from the phase of actual emigration and then finally on experience of the destination country, i.e. in various different contexts. Cultural practice changes over the course of migration. The third generation’s experience is based solely on experiences within the host society, although these are supplemented by the family’s background of migration and in certain instances also by incorporation into a migration network. To this extent, cultural practices may well show individual features; however they are in no way “ethnically” specific cultures which can clearly be delineated. Yet this is precisely what is assumed in the description of migration societies as “multi-ethnic societies” or as “multicultural societies”. In addition, the term culture is reduced to concepts of values and the setting of norms, or even to religion. The aspect of the social incorporation of cultural practices is not taken into account. This leads to a situation whereby immigrants and their families are classified as belonging to cultural groups in discourse on multiculturalism and multiculturality. They are not viewed as members of social groups and classes. A central criticism of this discourse is therefore that the social aspect is being ‘culturalised’, and cultural differences are being made an issue of; unlike social, structural distances within a society, cultural differences cannot be measured empirically. Moreover, this view of societies of immigration ignores the interplay or the dialectical relationship between cultural disputes over
experiences in life and means of expression. Terms such as “pluricultural society”, “intercultural society” or “interculturality” therefore relate more to the situation in societies of migration. They emphasise the process of exchange as well as the production and the cultural reproduction of cultures.

In the present study, the description of social relationships as intercultural always includes social, gender and material experiences in life. These therefore include the central social constructions of class and gender, which become effective in cultural practice as “doing class” and “doing gender”. These are connected with both the general and the precise differentiations within a society of migration, which are outlined above. With dualistic or trichotomistic general differentiations especially with people’s own “ethnic” identification, particular patterns do shine through in comparison to “doing class” and “doing gender”. These can be characterised as reciprocal processes of building communities. This means that communities and groups are constructed as being homogenous; neither their own society or group nor others are perceived as being differentiated in social terms. Hierarchies in gender arrangements within people’s own community or group are similarly ignored, and are at best discussed and evaluated in relation to “the” others.

This has consequences: these kinds of patterns of creating a community can allow an image of a “multicultural”, multi-ethnic” or “multi-racial” society to be built up, and national immigration and incorporation policy then develops from this. This is particularly clear with restrictive policy, where people act as if there were real threats to the society – within the majority society, for instance. For this reason, in all three countries, but particularly in Britain and in Germany, we could see that political actors’ hostility towards refugees from African, Asian or Eastern European countries could, for instance, be activated in connection with discussion on the right to asylum. The same pattern could be seen when a redefinition of immigrant groups was on the agenda – and in this instance in all three countries. To put this more precisely: a restrictive migration policy can only be legitimised by making migration a highly contentious political issue in the public imagination if there is an idea socially constructed community beyond class and gender, which can be called upon. This constructed community is then perceived as being threatened by migration, and by “foreigners”. It must however be remembered that political actors also share the belief in an (“ethnic”) community, which is the subject of a major political issue. They do not just use it instrumentally.

The splitting of citizenship into various elements can also be legitimised in this way, as this highlights the “ethnic community” via legal citizenship, i.e. nationality, and yet social and political rights are still accorded to non-nationals.

At this point the differences between our case study countries become apparent: the lowest level of permeability in accessing nationality exists in Germany, and affects all three dimensions. Even when the opportunities for political and social participation have improved over time, particularly for older groups of migrants dating back to the period during which labourers were being advertised for overseas, we cannot yet call this equality. Particularly striking are the limited political rights. In Britain, by comparison, permeability and incorporation are more advanced; even political rights are more strongly founded.

Whilst there is a noticeable trend towards more incorporation in Germany, on the British Isles, the willingness to move towards further incorporation is declining. Furthermore, there is a clear privileging of Irish and Commonwealth citizens. Spain may be regarded as the country amongst our case study countries with the most permeable citizenship system, despite a more restrictive policy in recent times. However, it remains to be seen whether Spain over time can maintain its position in relation to that of Germany and Britain. The demographic structure of the immigrants shows that to date, family connections are still generally lacking as a result of the very recent history of migration. Real permeability and incorporation, however, will only become visible with children in the second and third generation.
Chapter III: Company Case Studies: Structure of the Empirical Investigation

The company case studies, which are conducted in a total of four industrial companies in the three countries, build on a pre-study carried out in two industrial plants in Germany, mentioned on several occasions above. This allowed us to find a theoretical entry point into a field for investigation where interculturality is a long established and long practiced tradition, and where interculturality is therefore a daily experience. We wanted to know how individual groups of workers view each other in terms of their national origins, which social constructions are important, such as that of ethnicity, what sort of conflicts play a role and what kind of conflict resolution strategies can be seen. In Germany, only a limited number of studies involving culturally heterogenous samples had been carried out at the time, so we had firstly to carry out initial tests with respect to methodology, and concentrate the investigation on only two groups, workers of German and Turkish citizenship.

In this study we were interested in finding out whether we could observe similar fundamental patterns of attitudes to interculturality, migration and social relationships as were seen in the pre-study, in another German company as well as in companies in Great Britain and Spain, or whether these would differ. The methodological conclusions from the pre-study were equally important and we tried to make these useful for the international project. These conclusions and therefore the methodological approach adopted in the case studies here are the central theme of this chapter.

This chapter will also provide insights into the research process itself. We will outline our original plans and then explain how these were implemented. We will also not refrain from discussing any difficulties we encountered. They were probably no more serious than is usual in such projects, but lessons can possibly be learned from these for other projects. They underline why it is necessary to repeatedly point out the scope and the interpretative limits of the findings.

The biggest problems arose in gaining access to the companies to be investigated. This was particularly the case in Britain, but even in Spain, the effort required to gain access to companies was greater than in Germany. However, this ultimately had no effect on the quality of the empirical investigation. With the investigation in Britain, however, we did have to lower our expectations and set our goals at a lower level. We encountered insurmountable hurdles when collective negotiations were due to be carried out in the firms we had contacted or when some other conflict was high on the company’s agenda at that time. Fears arose on the part of the company management or the trade unions that a social science survey would engender too much uneasiness in the company and could possibly have a counterproductive effect on future conflict resolution. In one company, conflicts between black employees and management had arisen which were directly relevant to the subject of our investigation (see Section 3 for more detail). In many instances in British companies the highly sensitive subject matter of our study may possibly have caused reservations or led people to say yes in the first instance only to withdraw that acceptance later on.

All in all, we discovered that elements of the economy and the unions have very different attitudes to scientific research or rather, to social science research in the three countries. Whilst some are very responsive, others remain more closed.

However, it was not merely difficulties we encountered which led us to rethink our plans and certain aspects of the methodology. The present study is an investigation carried out not just in one country, but by researchers at universities in Birmingham or Keele, Göttingen and Barcelona. This means that the further conceptual development and implementation of the project is the result of both “internal” and “external” viewpoints. That is to say, the project teams at the participating universities brought judgements, research and practical experience
from their “own” countries into the project, and could cast a critical glance over the “other” countries. This allowed us to rein in the danger that evaluation of “other” countries in particular would be too “ethnocentric”, as we were forced repeatedly to reflect critically on paradigms and judgements on the situation in our “own” countries. It was particularly revealing that the same terms, categories and constructions, which we detail in chapter II, are interpreted differently in Britain, Germany and Spain, and this is true even in social science research on migration and migration policy (compare Section I). Taken as a whole, all of this means that we were researching interculturality, but at the same time were also working in an intercultural situation.

The result was that we quickly gave up our plan simply to replicate the empirical investigation from the pre-study in German companies. We were therefore frequently faced with the decision as to whether to stick strictly to our methodological plans to replicate and compare empirical results directly, or whether we should forgo both in certain sections, and instead give preference to deeper insights into the political and social attitudes of employees in the companies being investigated. As this study is dealing with case studies rather than representative investigations, we were able to agree on deviations to certain aspects of the standardised written survey and in the group discussions.

All the above-mentioned issues will be discussed further in the following sections. We will begin by detailing basic points discovered in the pre-study, we will address how the basic central questions for this present study were developed from these and we will outline the modifications which were carried out to the research process. In Section 3 the sample surveys in the three countries are also presented.

As we have decided not to discuss the empirical results separately in terms of country or quantitative or qualitative survey in Chapters IV and V, favouring instead an “integrative” concept based around content, we will outline briefly at the end of this chapter the method of evaluation and our presentation of the results.

1. Initial Questions, Conceptual Structure and Aim of the Case Studies

In order to explain the initial questions more precisely, it is necessary to look back at the pre-study in Germany, as research interest in the present study arose from this.

In this pre-study a total of 399 employees were questioned in the summer and autumn of 1997. These employees worked in a plant belonging to an international car manufacturer and in a motor industry supplier company. Of these employees, 73 were Turkish citizens. Our main attention was focused on the car manufacturer, which at the time employed a total workforce of 20,000 people in the location we were looking at. One quarter of this workforce were foreign citizens, primarily from countries with which Germany had recruitment agreements from the 50s to the 70s. This company was particularly interesting for three reasons: (1) it is part of a branch of industry which had a great need for foreign workers during this period, when they were being recruited from overseas. We could therefore assume that the workforce is culturally heterogeneous, with the majority of non-German employees coming from old-established groups of immigrants, and that decades of practical experience with interculturality in the workplace exists. (2) The plant is located in an industrial conurbation that has a tradition of immigration stretching back to the nineteenth century and which is today home to a well above average proportion of foreigners. This means that both the working environment and the broader social milieu is characterised by interculturality. (3) Whilst slightly over 60% of the employees are members of the responsible DGB union IG Metall, and the level of union membership is particularly high amongst the foreign workforce, tensions still exist between German and Turkish union members, and there are further conflicts between the IG Metall dominated works council and an Islamic Milli Görüs works council voting list (see Chapter II, Section 2). This plant therefore offered us an ideal research environment in which
to examine social constructions in the context of interculturality, along with methods of inter-action, conflicts and conflict resolutions strategies. We were interested primarily in people’s everyday perceptions and their methods of interaction in the workplace. Conflicts, and strategies for their resolution through organised interest representation were of secondary importance. These constructions (the construction of the concept of ‘ethnicity’ was the main focus initially) were to be compared with the social construction of gender, or more precisely, of gender roles. We interviewed 347 employees in this company in the course of this study.

As the framework conditions at this company seemed particularly favourable, that is, that the integration into the union (environment) guaranteed a certain degree of political and social participation and that the jobs were relatively secure in spite of rising unemployment and a worsening economic crisis in Germany, we took the supplier company outlined above as the control company. In this firm, the level of organised union activity is around the same; however integration into the union (environment) is less pronounced. Furthermore, the firm is based in a region with a weak economic infra-structure and the location is threatened in economic terms, a fact which has seen the number of jobs more than halved since the study was carried out in 1997. The social situation of the majority of the workforce could be classified as being precarious. As in the car company, the workforce here is heterogeneously structured in cultural terms; however, the broader social environment is not. Our assumption was that we would see a much greater number of instances of xenophobia and resentment along with conflicts between workers as a result of these conditions. We presumed that this would lead to an ‘ethnicisation’ of social problems and beyond this to a defensive reaction towards immigrants. In addition, our earlier research into xenophobia and right wing extremism amongst German youths had offered some indications that such defensive reactions occur particularly when chances for political participation are limited, that is, when individuals’ social problems cannot be dealt with through a political forum, such as a union, and when this is combined with limited prospects in life\(^90\). As the supplier company should only take on a control function in order to check these factors influencing attitudes, only 52 employees were surveyed.

The results from both companies surprised us in a number of ways. The first surprise was that we could not discern any differences between the companies in terms of the issues of interculturality in the workplace and immigration in general. Our assumption that we would encounter xenophobia and resentment more frequently in the control company did not hold true, in spite of the fact that the social situation was viewed as being much more threatened in comparison to that of the interviewees in the car company, both objectively speaking as well as in the interviewees’ own estimation. It was not social circumstances which proved to be central to these attitudes but rather intercultural practice in both companies being investigated. However, we could discern a clear correlation between the relative distance to the union environment on the one hand and both the evaluation of the social situation and xenophobia on the other. To put it simply, the lower the relationship to a union environment, the more negative the evaluation of the individuals’ own social opportunities and social relations, and the more pronounced the resentment to foreigners. In spite of this result, there is no clear dividing line between the main company being studied and the control company. Even in the car company, where integration into the union environment was shown still to have a strong effect, a relatively large group amongst those union members interviewed regarded themselves as tending to be excluded from the union environment\(^91\) and they then demonstrated similar attitudes to interviewees in the supplier company. It is important to note from this result that life pros-

\(^90\) It is important to note that youths with limited prospects in life were not in situations which were directly threatened by social risks such as unemployment or poverty. These were youths in an industrial training scheme who had little scope for action and taking decisions concerning their future in life, or at least saw it that way (see U. Birsl, 1994).

\(^91\) This mainly concerned older specialist workers who formerly regarded themselves as the avant garde of the unionised workforce and of the union idea, and who have rejected that today for various reasons, but primarily through disappointment.
pects which were felt to be limited are more likely to combine with xenophobia when no behvavioural option in the individual’s cultural life exists which would be able to counter these reservations. However, this situation principally affects the construction of the ‘other’, rather than the understanding of interculturality in the workplace; xenophobia, or fear of ‘strangers’ comes from xenon, the Greek word for strange and the term can therefore be understood here in its original linguistic sense.

The second surprise was that xenophobia was only measurable to a very minor extent. Indeed, the potential for xenophobic attitudes in the entire sample from both companies was even considerably less than for the average of the entire German population. To a certain degree, we saw this incongruity as possibly arising from the fact that we had borrowed sets of questions and scales of attitudes from representative surveys for Germany and from Eurobarometer, making only minor modifications.

The third surprise was that the construction of “ethnicity” – which we described in Chapter II – only played a specific role and was barely significant in relation to xenophobia, if at all. This construction became more important in the so-called immediate area, i.e. in the employee’s direct process of interaction; it was generally not present in the evaluation of broader social phenomena, such as in relation to immigration. Here, more diffuse categorisations, constructions and dualisms dominate and these follow on from the construction of the “other”.

We termed the resentment-laden cultural practices which are bound up with this as “doing stranger”. This “doing stranger” is directed at newer groups of immigrants (asylum seekers) and emigrants, and can be found amongst both the Germans and the Turks interviewed here.

Nor could we observe an “ethnicisation” of social problems and conflicts, in the sense that it has been discussed in social science research in Germany. We did not find processes of ethnicisation and of de-ethnicisation, as we have termed it, or the construction of “ethnicity” in connection with evaluations of phenomena on the social macro-level and in relation to xenophobia. However, these were observable in the evaluation of more concrete life contexts, i.e. at the micro-level, in the evaluation of personal experiences. This was particularly true of the second and third generation Turkish interviewees, who have begun to put their life and employment situation on the political agenda. They classified social disadvantages as disadvantages typically experienced by foreigners, and made this into a political issue. This also affected issues which were put down to more general social disadvantages. Here, “patterns of ethnicisation” were clearly discernable. The reverse could also happen, in that specific instances of discrimination were not made an issue of as such, because those affected no longer wanted to be allocated to part of a separate group. This raises the problem which we detail in Chapter II Section 2, that workers affected and actors such as trade unions and works interest representatives have a very difficult balancing act when judging to what extent the personal situation of immigrants and their families is subject to discrimination against foreigners generally, or whether this is a result of discrimination against their low social status. As we had already seen, this is a problem which also affects (incorporation) policy and social science research.

The fourth surprise was that instances of racism were less common than expected. Even those interviewees who exhibited a biologically-determined image of humanity and ascribed “natural” characteristics to “ethnic groups” – including their own – did not automatically connect this with hostility or a need for exclusion and defence. Nor did this necessarily lead to a hierarchisation of groups according to supposedly “natural” characteristics.

92 These modifications were necessary due to the fact that several of the Items/Statements in the sets of questions use in the pre-tests turned out not to be clearly distinguishable.

93 This means for example a connection is made between social problems such as mass unemployment and immigrations, and this is then made responsible for the state of the labour market. We could establish that this connection is created essentially when migration has become a big political issue. It only becomes active in people’s attitudes if it is made an issue of explicitly, such as in the group discussions. The resentments which were seen here were also observable in the context of “doing stranger”.

However, the situation turned out to be different regarding the understanding of a gender specific division of labour and of gender roles. Male interviewees in particular emphasised natural differences between men and women and saw justification in this for the traditional division of roles between the sexes, between production and reproduction tasks. This concept put men and women into a clear hierarchical order. This was less surprising. However, the differences between the construction of “ethnicity” in the immediate sphere and of the “other” in the social, more distant sphere (a category which we had included for the first time) and of gender roles were interesting.

Amongst a group of German specialist workers we discovered an image of society which particularly clearly outlines – almost prototypically - the differentiated integration of the three constructions. Characteristic for this image of society is that it is underpinned by a naturally justified or naturalistic conception of a community. This forms the core of a society which is constituted by the individual’s own “ethnic” group. Patterns of a community creating process can be seen here, such as we discussed in Section 4 of the preceding chapter. This shows moreover that a citizenship law based on the principle of descent is not just a political construct but can also be found as a basic orientation in people’s attitudes. Figure 8 depicts this image of society with the three areas of social constructions.

As the diagram here shows, ethnic groups with which individuals interact on a day to day basis can be included in concepts of the community. However, this also means that groups can be located in a border area between inclusion and exclusion – as with Turkish people, in our case study. In the case of “doing stranger” on the other hand, groups which are excluded from the “core community” of a society, as this is understood in naturalistic terms, are sometimes seen as being members of that society. This could not entirely be supported empirically, but there were indications that exclusionary attitudes were particularly common when a particular group of migrants had previously been the focus of a big political issue.

Despite these differences it was possible to make out an important common feature within the two constructions of “ethnicity” and of the “other”, compared to orientations towards gender roles. Whilst the first two constructions are politicisable, the relationship between the sexes, gender arrangements and the resulting gender roles are not regarded as a “political” issue, neither by men nor by women. The contradictions, conflicts and problems which arise in connection with relations between the sexes do not therefore qualify as issues which can be resolved politically. These are issues which instead need to be dealt with individually. The resolution of contradictions, conflicts and problems is therefore individualised, and an understanding of this is apparently deeply rooted in people’s orientations. It may well be that this might provide the answer as to why traditional images of masculinity and femininity, gendered arrangements and gender roles are so tenacious, and that constructions of “ethnicity” and of the “other” by contrast prove to be considerably less static, and are indeed much more flexible. Our results show that there is movement in particular in the area of “doing stranger”. Depending on the individual background of experiences, groups can be isolated and (partially) integrated in social terms.

94 Equal numbers of both German and Turkish men displayed a naturalistic conception of masculinity and femininity. Patterns of attitudes did, however, vary. In particular, Turkish men proved to be more flexible regarding the “natural determination” of women as mothers. Despite this viewpoint, this did not necessarily mean for them that women had to follow this supposed determination. To a degree, women were granted more scope for taking their own decisions in planning their lives by Turkish men than by German men in the sample. It became clear that we could not simply order these attitudes according to standards of gender role orientations on a continuum between “progressive/emancipatory” to “handed down/traditional” in the context of relations between the sexes as they have developed in Germany. Rather, orientations were observed amongst Turkish men which relied upon their personal experiences, and relating to their home society, the experience of migration and the host society. (On this point, compare the informative analysis by S. Ottens, 1998).
All of these observations and indications led us in our international research not to examine the level of xenophobia and the role of the construction of “ethnicity” and of the “other” as is commonly done, but rather to find out what can be understood as interculturality in empirical terms. Whilst this does include resentments and hostilities, the focus is not entirely concentrated on these. Furthermore, we want to get at attitudes which indicate the disintegration of resentments and hostilities and which filter out differentiations in these constructions. This therefore also concerns ‘areas of tolerance’ in terms of perceptions of and interaction with migration. As the pre-study was carried out in a German company, one central aspect remains open, namely the question as to what form social experiences of interaction with migration are reproduced in the understanding of interculturality. Sharpening the focus more concretely onto Great Britain, Germany and Spain, this means that we are dealing here with three cases where the history of migration, migration policy and migration systems have been structured very differently since the 1970s and early 1980s. Whilst a relatively rapid process of policy harmonisation has been ongoing since that time, the different degree of incorporation of migrants in these countries, and the different levels of incorporation between the groups of immigrants indicates that these differences do have a knock-on effect on the social level. Our first central starting point for the empirical section of the investigation is therefore: can we see differing understandings of interculturality and differing constructions in connection with migration in the company case studies in Great Britain, Germany and Spain, or are there also common features in people’s attitudes?

In methodological terms, we treat our company case studies in the three different countries being studied as “most different cases”$^{95}$. Our initial focus here to take the differences which we had discovered through our depiction of migration, migration policy and incorporation policy in these countries, and to identifying these on the empirical level of attitudes amongst industrial workers. The examination of the external and internal factors relating to the degree

---

$^{95}$ On the comparative methods, see the in summary J. Hartmann 1995: 30 onwards.
of openness in the societies of these three countries serves here as a background against which to interpret the empirical analysis, as does our examination of public discourses in the first two chapters. However, we cannot establish any causal relationships between people’s attitudes on the one hand and histories of migration, the political treatment of migration and public discourse about migration on the other. We do not need to stress that such interrelations do indeed exist; yet how these work individually cannot be understood in empirical terms. We can however check whether we find the patterns of argument used in public discourse replicated in workers’ attitudes, so that we can at least form plausible explanations about those relationships. A further limit on the scope of the empirical study is the fact that it is no longer possible today to test which has a stronger effect: the past or the present, i.e. the period with the biggest differences in policies and structural factors or the period of the harmonisation process, which has been underway for more than twenty years now.

As a second step we turn our attention to the common aspects of the attitudes, and here we can make use of the image of society outlined in Figure 8. We can use this model to the extent that whilst we assume that we will encounter varying constructions in the context of migration and interculturality, we also expect to find a comparable level of integration amongst these constructions. Common features were foreseen in central areas of the orientations towards gender roles, which serve a corrective purpose in this study. These common features were expected to be found primarily in the fact that these orientations are embedded in a system of two different genders as well as in the basic structure of gender arrangements and the hierarchy concerning these. Two aspects however remain open to question: (1) will we find that amongst industrial workers in Britain and Spain, gender arrangements and hierarchies are not at all, or only marginally, politicisable and that these are individualised instead? Furthermore, will we find in another German company the same results as in the pre-study? (2) Do the aforementioned common features in attitudes produce similar consequences for the formulation of gender roles, or are there noticeable differences here between the three countries?

For the first central starting question, the British, German and Spanish companies are the level of comparison. For the second question, individual groups amongst the companies’ workforces are taken as the level of comparison. Our central category is that of “life prospects”. We investigate how the understanding of interculturality and the meaning of the constructions discussed above varies according to life prospects, both in the “sphere of tolerance” as well as in the sphere of exclusion and hostility towards “others”.

By life prospects, we mean individuals’ social interaction areas, opportunities for individuals to participate socially, politically and culturally in society. It is a question of the availability of and interaction with social resources, and therefore opportunity structures. By life prospect we do not therefore just mean structural indicators such as education, career, income, gender, age, citizenship, legal residency status and such like, but equally, experiences in life and cultural practices. Groups, class factions and classes can be identified more precisely through common features in opportunity structures or in life prospects. However, in this study, experiences in life and cultural practices can only be captured through perceptions and interpretations of social relationships, individuals’ own assessments of their life and work situation, political and social preferences and values, i.e. through people’s attitudes and their patterns of argumentation in the social situation of a group discussion. This covers behavioural options; it does not however cover actual behaviour, behavioural styles and the concrete expression of cultural practices.

As we want to follow the “deconstruction – reconstruction” route suggested in Chapter 2 Section 2, we will deal with attitudes in the context of immigration and interculturality as independent and intervening variables in the empirical study; attitudes in relation to prospects in

---

life, to gender role orientations, to the evaluation of social relationships and structural indicators especially will be taken as dependent variables. This methodological choice is directed particularly towards the category of gender and towards all of those indicators through which interviewees with a background of migration or “ethnic minorities” are identified. These include citizenship, legal residency status, region of origin – including that of the parents – and so on. This procedure checks whether attitudes towards life prospects and furthermore, towards interculturality, along with the other structural indicators such as education, income and career display gender-typical and migration-typical patterns or whether distinctions between men and women and between the majority and minorities disappear.

To summarise, for the first initial question we started from the thesis that on the level of the company we are dealing with cases where we can measure differences between the attitudes of the interviewees in their understanding of interculturality and in effective social constructions. We believed that a convincing connection could then be made between these outcomes and the experiences of migration in British, German and Spanish society and that we would thereby find typical attitudes. Our assumption was that the common feature of these “most different cases” is to be found in underlying pattern of attitudes based upon experiences in the “immediate area” and in the “distant sphere”. These dictate both the inclusion and the exclusion of groups of migrants and minorities from day to day intercultural experiences.

This directly addresses the hypothesis of our second initial question at the group level in the samples. This hypothesis leads us to expect that in terms of the “most similar cases”, life prospects are distributed similarly in relation to respective social conditions and that this is reproduced in the basic patterns amongst the groups and in their typical attitudes. This hypothesis also allows us then to cross check on the micro level whether (1) a plausible relationship between common social and political experiences of migration on the one hand and the perception and the evaluation of immigration on the other hand does indeed exist and (2) what effect daily intercultural experiences have on self-perception and on the perception of others. Last but not least, (3), this hypothesis will allow us critically to examine the question as to whether certain limitations on the opportunity structures of groups and class factions lead to comparable patterns of rejection, exclusion and hostilities particularly in the context of “doing stranger”.

All of this brings us to the goal of the empirical investigation and to the fundamental question of whether we are formulating explanations for xenophobia which are valid for Western European industrial societies in general or whether these are society-specific. This should show us which prospects can lead to a resolution of resentment and hostility. At this point, the degree to which these countries are open to immigration comes back into the frame, this time on the level of members of society that society.

2. Methodological Approach

This study therefore aims to investigate comparatively migration and interculturality, by tying together the social and the political macro level, the meso level of the company and the micro level of the workforce.

As we are dealing with three different cases at the macro level, it is necessary to find a field of investigation on the meso and the micro level which is similarly structured, for both the empirical analysis and comparison. Otherwise, the factors affecting attitudes cannot be checked. In other words, we need a comparable starting point. Using the goal of the empirical investigation as our basis, we tried to find a field of investigation which we could assume offered us similar conditions in the three countries concerned, at least in certain areas of prospects in life. The decision fell on manufacturing plants belonging to international car manufacturers. The research process had shown that we could take similar standards in production and working conditions here for granted, so that experiences and opportunities in the working
world at least have comparable features. A further practical research advantage is the fact that such plants allow us to capture different groups of jobs and status in the one study, and therefore also groups with differing life prospects. However, one disadvantage is that women are relatively poorly represented in car manufacturing and that as in the pre-study we then have to deal with a “surplus of men” in the company samples. In order to balance out this surplus, we have evaluated attitudes in the phase of “reconstruction” separately, according to gender.

A further problem is the differing representation of immigrant and minority groups in the car industry in the three countries. As is well known, this sector has only been a large demander of foreign workers in Germany. In Britain, minorities from post-colonial immigration are indeed employed in the industry, but other sectors in the economy are more dominant in terms of their incorporation into the labour market. In Spain, it is only new immigrants who are now finding jobs with car manufacturers. Switching our study to other sectors altogether would not have solved the problem as we would have encountered the same inconsistencies. Alternatively, selecting companies from various different industry sectors would have given us an uneven basis in the field of our investigation (compare Chapter 1, Sections 2.1 to 2.3 and the following section in this chapter).

This problem became particularly acute for Spain, but it was still manageable. (1) In addition to a car manufacturer’s production location, a further company from the textile industry was brought into the study as a control company. Migrant groups, especially women, work in this company, and it therefore provided an intercultural working context. (2) The company case studies in Spain were carried out in the Comunidad Autónoma de Catalunya (Autonomous Community of Catalonia). This places at the centre of the empirical study a region which was a destination for domestic migration from the 50s through to the 70s. This migration was similar to that in Germany and Britain at the time in terms of its progression and its structure, including the pattern of incorporation of migrants in the labour market. What is more, in cultural terms, domestic migrants also had the same status as immigrants; today they are still classified as such in public and scientific discourse. This therefore provides us with a roughly comparable group of migrants in the car industry such as we find in our British and German case study companies as a result of international immigration. We would otherwise have had to concentrate on newer migrant groups, whose residence circumstances, labour and incorporation situation would have differed considerably from those of long established minorities in Britain and Germany (on this point, see also Chapter I, Section 2.3).

The inclusion of both the textile company as a control company and the domestic migrants are two of the central modifications and specifications which we made to the original methodological concept. This resulted in the development of a questionnaire. Included in the questionnaire were sets of questions specially tailored for the Spanish study, which served on the one hand to identify the domestic migrants as a group; citizenship alone for instance does not provide any information on this. Questions were therefore formulated which asked about the interviewee’s region of birth within the country and that of their parents. On the other hand, the “softer” indicators are of prime importance for this group, in order to be able to assess life prospects. For this reason, questions were asked relating to competence in the Catalan language, an important requirement for people to establish themselves culturally as well as in gaining a foothold into the labour market.

A further modification was necessary due to the fact that the empirical study in Britain was conceived as a component project within a larger study with a more pointed question. This carried the working title “Preventing racial discrimination at the workplace”, as was mentioned at the beginning of this study. Here, company level measures and agreements to break down discrimination against minorities play a particular role. These are evaluated by the interviewees in the British and the German samples and the results are compared. For this rea-

97 “Harder” indicators included such things as a further citizenship, a legal residency status and a work permit or overseas educational qualifications which are not recognised in the host country.
son, sets of questions on this subject were included here which are not included in the Spanish questionnaire. Anti-discrimination measures are however also a topic in the group discussions in the Spanish companies under investigation.

Beyond these deviations, the questionnaires and the guiding thread for the group discussions were tailored with regard to the social constructions in public discourse in the three countries. This means that for Britain, categories such as “race”, “whites”, “blacks”, “ethnic minorities” and “aliens” were inserted. For the study of “blacks/ethnic minorities”, the current differentiations used for instance in the Labour Force Survey were applied. In Germany, we stuck with the term “foreigner” (Ausländer) as was used in the pre-study, and in Spain the differentiation between “immigrantes” and “extranjeros” was employed. Strictly speaking, these specifications already weaken the comparability of the quantitative data, as we gave our samples questions which were not phrased exactly the same. We cannot therefore entirely check whether we have really found out the same things in all of the samples. However, if we had not woven in these specifications, then we would have been able to assume from the very start that we were asking different questions in the companies in the three countries. Particularly in Britain, the term “foreigners” would only have captured a particular element of interviewees’ understanding of immigration and interculturality.

The empirical study was therefore carried out in two Spanish companies in the textile and the car industries, and in one car manufacturing plant in both Britain and Germany. The study ran in two stages; in the first step, a standardised written survey was carried out using a sample whose size and make-up which would provide representative results for the waged, i.e. production, workforce. In the second step, interviewees from this quantitative study took part in group discussions. The use and combination of these two quantitative and qualitative instruments offers two central advantages for our purposes: (1) the standardised survey allows us to collect a larger number of attitudes and social data, and from different status groups. Even though we are dealing here with case studies, this will provide relevant results which then lead to convincing conclusions on the interrelationship with the macro level, as well as a comparison of the data on the micro and meso levels. (2) The group discussion enables us to construct social situations in which patterns of arguments, basic orientations and – depending on the course of the discussion – structures of consciousness become apparent, which cannot be captured through a study of attitudes or even through oral interviews. The scope of this methodological tool is limited to the extent that the social situation in the groups are each specific, and depend on the make-up of the participants as well as on the development and structure of the discussion. This means that patterns of argument, basic orientations and structures of consciousness are therefore not replicable; as a result, the study of these conditions is impossible to repeat and the outcomes are not comparable. For this reason, they serve a primarily corrective purpose for the attitudes measured by the standardised tests, and also provide us with an insight into forms of consciousness which perhaps underpin those attitudes. They should therefore help us to support/back up qualitatively the results of the quantitative survey. This is also the reason why in this study, contrary to normal practice, the standardised survey is discussed first (see U.Birsl/S.Ottens/K.Sturhan 1999: 96 onwards).

In addition to collecting detailed social data, the standardised written survey also examined four dimensions of attitudes which aimed to capture the relationship to immigration and interculturality as well as to central social and political aspects of life prospects and cultural practices. The questionnaire is a revised and modified version of the tool used in the pre-study (see annex II), which in turn is based in large sections on scales of attitudes and sets of questions from other studies, particularly international studies on aspects of this present study (see

---

98 For more information on the samples or the participants in the group discussion, see section 4 of this chapter.
99 There are heuristic reasons for separating dimensions of attitudes according to “immigration and interculturality” as well as “life perspectives and cultural practices”; even attitudes to immigration and interculturality can be understood as forms of the expression of perspectives in life.
annex II for more detail). The individual social data and dimensions of attitudes were operationalised as follows:

- The study of **social data** should provide information on the social situation and position of the interviewees going beyond the “meritocratic triad” of education, career and income (see R. Kreckel 1992: 94 onwards), or differentiates between them. The aim is to understand disadvantage in terms of common social, gender and migration patterns. To this end, questions were formulated which addressed not only age, sex, union membership, married status, number of children, highest general education qualification and current job, but which also addressed education paths (professional education and further training), working circumstances (part-time or full-time employment, work in shifts or in work groups), region of birth and region of origin – of parents as well – citizenship, length of residency and legal residency status, mother tongue, individual earnings as well as the earnings and professional status of the individual’s partner. The variables relating to education paths have a particularly central role for the categories of gender and minorities, as we know from experience that the barriers to accessing training towards professional qualifications or further professional training are very high for women and people from ethnic minorities. Variables relating to family background, such as the number of children and the professional and income status of an individual’s partner are getting primarily at two aspects: They should provide information (1) about the social position and risks in women’s circumstances in life and (2) about the gender arrangement in the interviewees’ partnerships.

- The dimension of attitudes concerning the relationship to **immigration and interculturality**, which encompasses the construction of the “self”, “different” and the “other”, is divided into three blocks. (1) Attitudes to general questions on the social and political level: items which fall into this category are those concerning (a) the acceptance/non-acceptance of immigration, refugee status and asylum (b) supposedly cultural and biological differences between the own group and other groups, which should provide us with indications of patterns of construction, (c) cultural tolerance, with an emphasis on the practicing of other religions and (d) the acceptance/non-acceptance of the incorporation of non-citizens into the education system, the labour market and political citizenship. (2) Attitudes towards intercultural co-operation in the working world: this deals with things such as problems in the workplace and strategies for resolving these including the incorporation of minorities in the work process and in the company.

- Whilst all interviewees have to answer questions on all of these items, we included supplementary sets of questions which are only to be filled in by members of ethnic minorities groups. These investigate perceptions of and experiences with common forms of discrimination regarding education, work and leisure time, but also related to experiences with violence.

- In both of the first blocks we used the commonplace, roughly outlined constructions and categories of social discourse which we mentioned earlier. In order to check exactly which minority groups the interviewees meant in their answers to the sets of questions, they are asked to indicate on a list the three groups which they associate most closely with the categories. This procedure is borrowed from the 1989 Eurobarometer study of “Racism and Xenophobia”.

- The dimension of attitudes concerning **social interest orientation** and the following two dimensions form part of our understanding of life prospects and cultural practices. This includes variables related to life plans and to the individual’s perception of their life circumstances. Questions were asked which addressed: (1) the evaluation of their professional development, including questions on career progression and on breaks due to unemployment, child rearing etc, or on whether or not they regard themselves as having improved socially in comparison to their parents, and so on. (2) Questions were asked regarding career and work orientations, i.e. whether these are materialistic or essentially
subject related, or whether they are more extrinsic or intrinsic. (3) The relationship towards union and company interest representation. Particularly interesting here is how strong or weak integration is into collective contexts and the level of political participation opportunities.

- With the attitudinal dimension relating to the perception of social inequality and equality, we move away from the level of the individual situation and turn our attention to the social level. The concern here is the assessment and evaluation of social relationships such as (1) the evaluation of the individual’s own society as “anti-egalitarian” or “egalitarian”, (2) the assessment of the dimensions and the scope of inequalities as well as their causes, i.e. whether inequalities can be explained better in structural and political terms or whether the causes can be found rather in the behaviour of those individuals who are socially disadvantaged. This seeks to measure whether rather socially critical attitudes dominate or whether people deal with social problems without criticising society as a whole. In correlation with variables on social interest orientation, the individual’s social situation can be seen to be nested in an broader picture of social relationships. These do play a role in connection to trade unions. Finally, (3), the understanding of gender roles and arrangements and conceptions of masculinity and femininity are investigated within this attitudinal dimension.

- The final attitudinal dimension concerns political participation and preferences which are not connected to union and company interest representation. The questions here research active participation in and support for leisure and cultural organisations, as well as organisations in the religious sphere and in the field of politics, including political parties as well as new social movements groups and initiatives. Activities within and sympathies towards nationalist and right wing extremist organisations and groups were also investigated. Questions were also asked regarding party preferences and political self-evaluation, where interviewees were asked to position themselves on a left-right continuum.

In conceptual and methodological terms, the group discussions were carried out in the same manner in Spain and Germany; in Britain, however, they were carried out differently. The planning of this qualitative phase was common for all three countries, in that the formulation of the content should be led by the quantitative study; the emphasis was then different in each case. A further aspect that the group discussions all had in common was that they were carried out using one main connecting theme. This means that not only were different types of stimuli used to get discussions started and to then let these run totally freely, but orientation questions were also devised to help those leading the discussion, i.e. the interviewers, dig further on certain issues. These questions were however to be used flexibly, when points which are central to our research interest did not come up, or when a discussion was developing in a totally different direction or indeed was faltering entirely.

Following the standardised survey, the decision was taken to follow similar procedures to those used in the pre-study for the Spanish and German companies. This means firstly, that we would only use two issues or stimuli as before and secondly that it was again relevant to check whether the participants in the discussion were connecting social problems to immigration, without those leading the discussion picking this out as a central issue. It was interesting to note here whether we would find evidence of migration being made into an important political issue, as is done in political discourse in these countries and whether constructions such as that of the other are active and whether these are then used “deal with” issues of social inequality.

As in the pre-study, the interviewees in both Spanish companies and in the German car plant defined labour market risks as a central social problem and, moreover, as one by which

---

100 As a basis for this we used the empirical, comparative country analyses by M. Haller 1989, M. Haller/B. Mach/H. Zwicky 1995.
they personally feel threatened. How real these threats indeed are is illustrated by the case of the Spanish textile company which had to register insolvency in the summer of 2002 (see the following section). As the issue of the “labour market and unemployment” therefore dominated people’s attitudes, we also made this a topic in the group discussions. Results from the written survey on this subject area were given to the participants as a stimulus; they were then asked to comment on the results from their own perspective. This topic was chosen as an opening topic and was thereby prioritised ahead of the issue of immigration and interculturality over the course of the discussions. The aim here was to make a social problem a subject in the discussion rather than making people think about immigration issues straight away. This was because, as we have mentioned already, it should be clear whether the participants create these connections by themselves.

“Spain/Germany as a country of immigration and a multicultural society” was then the second topic of the group discussions. Again, certain results from the quantitative survey were used as a stimulus in Spain. In Germany, the front page of a political, more social-liberal leaning weekly magazine headlining news about immigration was used as a stimulus. This introduced the subject with a negative stimulus, and we would observe whether the participants would then also begin their discussion negatively and which sort of arguments they would use. The first inquiries and stimuli related initially to the social and political level of migration and asylum, as well as in particular to the term “foreign”. Further stimuli then incorporated intercultural connections in the immediate area – i.e. in the workplace and in the company. This process has two main goals. We wanted to know whether (1) positions from public discourse are taken up in individuals’ arguments or whether these are excluded. Furthermore, (2) it was to cross check the results from the standardised survey as to whether perceptions, arguments and ideas regarding migration and interculturality and constructions differ according to how close or removed they are from the individual’s own situation.

In the British car plant the discussions were set up differently in two areas: firstly, three issues were the subject of the discussion. The background to this is the special research interest in the British project, making “race relations and equal opportunity policy” a third issue in the group discussions at the company involved in the study. In the German and also the Spanish group discussions, stimuli relating to this subject had been included as part of the second topic. Secondly – and this is the decisive difference – social problems did not form a separate topic. Even the first two stimuli, not just the third, were based on “race relations” together with immigration, refugees and Britain as a multicultural society. On this last point, the procedure was the same here as in Spain and Germany. This means that we now have results for this issue which can be included in Chapter 5 to provide a qualitative background to the types of attitudes measured quantitatively in all of the companies. However, in the British sample we cannot deduce whether the participants create connections between social problems and immigration of their own accord.

Both newspaper articles and results from the quantitative survey were used as stimuli for the two issues of “immigration and asylum/Britain as a multicultural society” and “race relations”. Concrete “ethnic conflicts” in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford were also discussed, which were of topical interest at the time of the group discussions (see Chapter II, Section 3).

The quantitative and qualitative studies were supported by so-called “expert interviews” with representatives from the responsible unions and company interest representations, as well as with representatives from the administration and the management of the companies being studied. These act as sources for background information about conflicts, the general atmosphere, company and union policy strategies and anti-discrimination measures taken within the companies, as well about the organisation of the work, the structure of the workforce, the salary structure and company policy etc in general.

101 The term “multicultural society” was therefore not selected, as it is common in public discourse in the countries concerned.
3. Companies Being Studied: Making Contact, Denials and Access

In making contact with possible companies to be studied\textsuperscript{102}, very different strategies had to be employed and very different paths were taken. The key requirement for all of the companies which were ultimately selected was that the work process would not be disrupted by our study, i.e. that the filling out of the questionnaire and participation in the group discussions would not have to take place during working time.

In gaining access to the field of investigation in Germany we were able to fall back on the many years of scientific co-operation with IG Metall, the union responsible for the car industry. This meant that contact could very quickly be established with the works council at Michel Motors, our favoured company. We were able to outline the research project and the organisation of the quantitative and qualitative surveys in several different discussion rounds made up of different people, as well as in bigger assemblies where we also spoke to trade union representatives and members of the works council. Background information was made available to us at this point, providing a more precise insight into the organisation of work, the structure of the workforce, conflicts and anti-discrimination measures. Spokespeople and members of the works council said they were prepared to distribute the questionnaires in selected workshops on the plant and amongst particular groups of workers, and to set out sealed boxes for their return. The group discussions could be carried out in the works council’s rooms, so that those interested could take part straight after their shift had ended, as these were situated directly on the plant site. The conditions were therefore optimal, and the co-operation ran expertly and professionally; it was clear that both the company and the firm’s interest representation – even at the selected location – are receptive to social science research. In return for their co-operation, sets of questions were incorporated into the written survey from which the works council would be able to gain feedback from employees regarding its own work.

As we were unable to concentrate solely on the car industry in the search for a company in Spain, due to the reasons outlined in the previous section, requests and contact making had to be spread much more widely and we repeatedly had to sound out the situation. However, two companies did crystallize themselves relatively quickly as potential research areas, although the negotiations regarding access resulted in different experiences. One company, which later became the main company of investigation in Spain, is a car manufacturing plant and belongs to the German group of companies, Michel Motors. In the present study it is therefore called “AutoCat”. At the start of our negotiations it became clear that the subject of the study was regarded as being highly sensitive in nature and that we would firstly have to overcome concerns that the survey may allow potential latent conflicts in the company to erupt, thereby hindering the ongoing collective negotiations. Consequently the study could only be commenced at the second attempt; however, thereafter it did run smoothly. As in Germany, this could be attributed to the many years of trade union contacts, meaning that the study here also proceeded with the assistance of the unions UGT, CC.OO and CGT\textsuperscript{103}.

Gaining access to the textile company “Textil S.A.” proved to be very different. From the beginning we could establish a good working relationship with the human resources manager and the president of the Comité de Empresa. In the end, the quantitative and the qualitative surveys were carried out in three of the company’s locations. Problems did not therefore arise whilst we were gaining access; however, they did arise in another area, namely in the very low willingness amongst Moroccan employees to participate in our study. The sample composition which we had originally envisaged therefore had to be revised on several occasions.

\textsuperscript{102} The companies where we were eventually able to carry out the study have been given fictitious names in the text that follows.

\textsuperscript{103} CGT = Confederación General del Trabajo.
Textil S.A. serves as a control company in the study, as in contrast to AutoCat, it has a culturally heterogeneous workforce and we could assume that an intercultural context exists in the workplace. Even so, it cannot be used as a comparative company, or at least only partially, because the working conditions, pay and the risks to jobs differ too greatly from those in the car manufacturing company. There are classic female jobs at Textil S.A., meaning that female workers constitute the majority of the workforce (see Section 3.3 in this chapter).

The situation in Britain was the most complicated and the barriers to gaining access were very high by comparison. Firstly, several attempts to gain access which were already well advanced fell victim to the fact that the economic situation in those particular companies became so critical that a scientific study was refused. Secondly, the general acceptance of social science research is lower than in Germany and Spain. For this reason, we estimated a survey return rate at around 15-20%; in Germany, 30% is seen as normal and indeed necessary for a successful empirical study, and in Spain that figure is 20-25%. As a result, the scepticism towards the research proposals was greater amongst the British companies contacted than in both the other countries. Thirdly, some company management had special company policy reasons to refuse access for research into our question. In one company within the car industry which had not initially rejected our approach but which did then refuse access, the situation developed particularly dramatically. Conflicts which had long been smouldering in the company escalated, leading to strikes and to heated protests. The catalyst was a case of long standing discrimination against an Indian employee, including threats and attacks, carried out by white colleagues. This only became public at the time we were making contact with the company in 1999. This conflict firstly had to be resolved by taking the employer before an industrial tribunal. Added to this, an Asian shop steward was physically attacked by a white superior. Fundamental criticism was also being voiced within the company against the uneven distribution of members of “ethnic minorities” amongst the better and worse paid jobs. Furthermore, memories of a scandal three years earlier were still fresh in people’s minds; for an advertising brochure which was to be distributed in Poland, the management of the car company had had a photo with members of the workforce in it be touched up so as to “whiten” the people with dark skin. All these incidents resulted in heated public disputes, in the media as well, and led to an agreement between unions and company management for a stronger fight against both direct and indirect forms of discrimination (see T. MacAlister 1999; D. Atkinson 1999; A. Beckett 1999; D. Gow 1999; European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 1999; BBC online 1999a, 1999b, 1999c).

In another instance, our request was rejected because the human resources management of a particular company, which had developed a “diversity” concept to resolve race relations issues, was concerned that the investigation could open up “old” lines of conflict.

The fourth variant according to which several initially promising negotiations broke down after a few months were changes in personnel in the companies, which affected who we were negotiating with. Even the attempt to gain access by means of a further institute at another university failed as a result of the same or similar barriers. We were eventually able to carry out the empirical study in a car company belonging to another German car producer with the fictitious name “Special Motor Plant”. As however only a small workforce is employed at this location, the sample turned out to be small in comparison to that in Germany and Spain. Access was secured here principally through the contact between the Institute for German Studies at the University of Birmingham and the plant’s human resources manager. Additional contacts were established through regional union officers at the AEEU\textsuperscript{104}. Besides the AEEU, other trade unions represented in the company are the MSF\textsuperscript{105} and the TGWU\textsuperscript{106}. Co-

\textsuperscript{104} AEEU = Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union.
\textsuperscript{105} MSF = Manufacturing, Science and Finance (salaried employee union).
\textsuperscript{106} TGWU = Transport and General Workers Union. The AEEU and MSF have since been combined to form AMICUS (AMICUS = the union for “manufacturing, public utilities, construction, energy generation”).
operation with the management and the shop stewards was less intensive in comparison to in the German and Spanish companies, and this then had an effect on the employees’ willingness to participate. All in all this means that the research situation in Britain proved to be very difficult. The fundamental consequence for the present study is that we can only carry out a very limited comparison of the quantitative results. The numbers are too low for an evaluation which would provide valid results or meet to data protection standards. A re-anonymification would have been possible in certain instances, meaning that some of the evaluation steps were only carried out for the German and Spanish studies – and in Spain, likewise, only for those interviewees with a background of domestic migration.

In the following, the companies to which it was possible to gain access for research purposes will be described briefly.

3.1 Survey Company “Michel Motors”

Michel Motors is a group of companies in the motor industry in Germany which is rich in tradition, has partial government share ownership and which, as a “global player”, has production locations in Europe and overseas. The locations are each specialised for the production of certain of the make’s models, or for particular modules such as axles or motors. As is common in other similar groups of companies, the individual locations compete for contracts for new products or resulting from changes in production, by submitting bids to the company’s head office.

The location chosen by us for our investigation, in a medium-sized city in northern Germany produces minibuses (vans) in particular. Whilst the workshops are quite old, the production facilities inside the plant have been modernised in phases and in segments. This means that there are now fully automated facilities as well as some which are partially automated\(^\text{107}\), some almost clinically clean sections in the workshops as well as some in which the working conditions are severely hazardous to people’s health, due to noise for instance, or dust or chemical vapour. The core workforce have permanent employment contracts, and pay and conditions are regulated by a company pay agreement which puts wages at above the level of a sectoral pay agreement in the metal working industry. Alongside these there are however also temporary workers with lower wages, and who are employed by a temporary work agency established by Michel Motors as a labour market policy initiative. Work is carried out in varying parallel shift models following the so-called “lego principle”, meaning that the organisation of staffing on the shifts is oriented in part towards the individual needs of the employees. Group work is dominant in production, both at fixed working points and on the conveyor belt.

Whilst in 1987, 22 000 employees were still working in the plant, this number subsequently fell considerably to 12 000, before rising again to 15 000. At the time of our empirical study, 15 238 people were working in the plant; of these, 2 396 or 15.7% had foreign citizenship. These people were employed almost exclusively in production or in waged jobs – at a rate of almost 96%, compared to 78% amongst Germans. A similar picture exists in the distribution across the salaried area of work\(^\text{108}\): the proportion of the total number of German em-

\(^{107}\) Incidentally, some tasks which had already been automated were partially moved back to being done manually, in order to guarantee quality levels.

\(^{108}\) The distinction between into “wages” and “salary” will in future no longer exist in this form if the workers get their way: the payment tables, which have until now traditionally been divided into salaried employees on the one hand and production workers on the other, only show the criteria of “responsibility” as being relevant to the earnings of salaried employees. In view of changes to the cut off points between tasks, which has led to a growing assumption of responsibility amongst the manual workers, one single table with the same criteria should be used.
ployees who are salaried employees is 17.2%. This compares with a total of 1.3% of the foreign workforce who are salaried employees. 10.4% of apprentices do not hold German citizenship; the proportion of non-Germans is therefore lower in the area of professional training than for the plant as a whole.

More than half of the foreign workforce (56.8%) are of Turkish nationality. Greeks and Spaniards are further large “minorities within the minority”, forming 12.4% and 10.9% of the workforce respectively. They are followed by workers from the former Yugoslavia (9%), from Italy (5%) and Portugal (1%), as well as “other” foreign workers, who total 5%.

The proportion of women is generally very low: amongst the foreign workforce, only 8.4% are women, and 11.7% of German workers are women. However, as 16.2% of salaried employees are women, their representation in this area is much greater than in production. With an average age of 38.7 years, the workforce in the waged area is very young, a fact which can be traced back to cutbacks in staffing levels in production in the 1980s, which at the time affected mainly younger workers. Those who were at the time mid-way through their careers have left the working world over the past two decades and new workers have since been employed. The salaried employees are also correspondingly older, with an average age of 41.1 years.

The degree of trade union organisation is very high in comparison to other similarly well-organised car companies. Almost all workers are members of IG Metall, with a membership level of 97%. In the plant as a whole there are around 859 union representatives.

In the 1970s, there were still up to 13 candidate lists for the works council elections, and of these, two were from IG Metall; on one of these two lists only foreign members of the union were standing for a seat on the works council. Despite the large number of electoral lists, IG Metall was always the dominating force. Today, there are only two small “opponents” against one joint IG Metall list made up of German and foreign workers: these are the Christian Metalworkers Union (CGM – die Christliche Gewerkschaft Metall), which holds one of a total of 42 seats on the works council, and a left wing opposition list called “Justice ’98” (“Gerechtigkeit ’98”), which holds two seats.

According to IG Metall agreements, the lists must contain the same proportion of women and foreign workers as there are represented in the workforce as a whole. However, this quota regulation no longer has any practical use in the company being studied here, as the representation of female and foreign union members is guaranteed on the IG Metall list, and therefore also in the works council.

At the time of our survey, Michel Motors was one of the four single companies in the metal working sector which had implemented a company agreement on anti-discrimination. That number has since risen to well over 20. In July 1997, the company’s top leadership and the entire works council signed a works agreement on “partnership in the workplace”, which aimed to combat “discrimination, sexual harassment and mobbing”, and which outlined complaints procedures as well as degrees of possible sanctions. The company agreement also

---

109 The remaining percentages making up the full 100% are to be found, amongst non-classified apprentices (605) for the Germans; amongst non-Germans these can be found (1) amongst the non-classified apprentices (70) and (2) amongst the people classified as “other foreigners” in the statistics (121), who are similarly not broken down according to wages/salary.

110 In the youth and apprentice workers interest representation (JAV: Jugend- und Auszubildende-Vertretung), there are above average numbers of non-Germans represented (6 out of 11 seats).

111 The data concerning the nationality proportions were provided to us in November 1999; we were given the data on the numbers of female and male workers and on the average age of workers in November 2000 (i.e. shortly before and shortly after our survey in the summer and autumn of 2000. The absolute totals are therefore not entirely congruent (November 1999: 15 238; November 2000: 14 838). However, little is likely to have changed in the percentage proportions.

112 IG Metall, and in particular its department for “foreign workers” in the federal executive committee, has been trying for several years now to encourage the uptake of this kind of company agreement in an increasing number of firms. Furthermore, it also shares knowledge and experience with partner unions in other European countries.
states that, from the top down, staff will gradually be made aware of these issues in seminars. The education process is subject to a monitoring procedure as it progresses. Company staff who have experienced discrimination or harassment can turn to social workers in the company’s department in each plant. Even if the agreement’s full range of contents, aims and measures across the company’s locations are not yet known, the staff responsible for consultation told us in an “expert interview” that quite a few cases had been reported in each of the three problem areas. In each instance they had tried to resolve conflicts as rapidly as possible and taking account of the direct social environment, for instance through formal apologies in the presence of colleagues. In the few instances of more serious cases, possible sanctions can lead to enforced transfers or dismissals. In total, the expert interviewees told us, the company agreement has had the positive effect that some problems which had previously been more diffuse “now had a name” and that those affected had strengthened their resolve legitimately to take a stand against cases of discrimination. This had then also led to an increasing number of incidences of complaints, which the entire works council registered in an initial stock-taking in 1999. This increase in the number of complaints is, however, not the sign of a worsening situation, but is blamed on the fact that a large portion of the incidents have only just come to light (see Forum Migration 2000, 1). We received varying assessments in both the standardised survey and in the group discussions regarding questions about basic lines of conflict, such as those between members of different nationalities or between men and women. People we spoke to referred mostly to “xenophobic toilet graffiti” and drawings which appeared sporadically as obvious examples. Moreover, these are highly sexist in nature.

Interestingly, the works councils in the company being investigated in the pre-study and in Michel Motors run different strategies to incorporate “culturally” foreign workers – particularly those from the Islamic religion. The company in the pre-study had set up prayer rooms, and had included prayer times into the organisation of working times and rules on breaks, and they had also taken into account the time required by their foreign employees to travel back home to their home countries. At Michel Motors, on the other hand, whilst many of these practices were common, special regulations were refused by the works council. So whilst the first company underlined “cultural differences” with their decision, Michel Motors reject them. It is difficult to discern which of the two strategies can claim to be fairer to an intercultural workforce. This question was possibly formulated too abstractly, as closer examination about the possibility of encouraging such agreements there. There has been a department such as this at IG Metall since 1962, although it was initially merely a section. It works with a lot of social players such as churches, NGOs, associations and societies etc. in order to improve the situation of immigrants in the workplace and in society. 10% of IG Metall’s members are non-Germans. Whilst the level of membership is higher than it is amongst Germans, their representation on committees is lower. According to the department’s head, there is more of a need within the union’s internal structures to make up for shortcomings on this front than there is within works councils or amongst union representatives. As part of the ongoing restructuring of IG Metall’s executive committee structure, the department is due to be directly incorporated into the area of the “first chairperson”. It remains to be seen whether this will lead to a strengthening or a weakening of the issue. One of the main aims of the work at present, along with the intensification of further company agreements, is the fostering of qualified foreign workers.

113 Since the introduction of the company agreement, members of the works council estimate that “two to three handfuls” of cases in the staff committee have gone on file. However, a lot more complaints are being handled below this level. The responsible social advisor reported that there are 70 to 80 cases a year in this plant alone, although most of these were related to mobbing.

114 Whether any meaningful levels of “racist” or “xenophobic” discrimination can be found inside a company is a question of how you assess the situation. In an exam dissertation at the University of Hanover, which has not been published, various different views are reflected in a survey in the company we are studying. Whilst some people refer to a worrying “new quality” of discriminatory remarks, others are convinced that much less “xenophobia” can be noticed now in comparison to in earlier years. A third assessment assumes that it is a matter of repeating waves, which are accompanied by economic fluctuations (see Stobbe 1999: 90 onwards). These three assessments were also encountered in our expert interviews.
the situation inside the two companies and of the external conditions show that these are very different.

As we have already mentioned, the company being studied in the pre-study is located in a conurbation with a long tradition of immigration. Within the company, issues relating not just to instances of discrimination common amongst migrants but also to religion and religious practices are strongly politicised. The latter is also used by an Islamic works council election list to polarize and to enforce solidarity amongst Turkish workers in particular. This is only successful on isolated occasions, but this list, which comes from the plant’s Milli Görüs group, can in certain situations also reach Muslims who would normally have a more distanced relationship to Islam. This makes the atmosphere in general more politicised, more tension laden and more confrontational. In a situation such as this, special regulations can be entirely necessary. These circumstances are not present at the other survey company, Michel Motors. Organisations such as Milli Görüs are still in a development phase in the social environment of this plant, or they are only very weak. In the company itself, its influence at least cannot be felt; conflicts do not surface as openly as in the company studied in the pre-study. The empirical survey should then now provide indications as to whether the situation in general is less tension laden at the Michel Motors plant or whether conflicts are smouldering out of the public eye. Although the type of graffiti found in the toilets have a highly aggressive effect, they do at least draw attention to dissatisfactions.115

All in all both the company management and the works council follow the guideline of “the same rights and duties for all”. The prevailing view in the “expert interviews” was that this is also supported and shaped from below”. The idea that special rules possibly create more problems than they could solve was dominant amongst our interview partners.

The plant is located in an outlying district of the city. The neighbouring residential areas are traditional working class estates where the proportion of the foreign population is between 14 and 18 percent, and is therefore above the average for the city as a whole (15%), and above the proportion of foreigners amongst the plant’s workforce. However, the figures for these areas are lower than in certain other areas of the city.

Migratory movements between city and country show that Germans are increasingly moving to the surrounding district, whilst foreign citizens move in greater numbers from the surrounding area into the city (see Department of Youth and Social Affairs (Jugend- und Sozialdezernat), Hanover 2002 page 27 onwards).116

In the summer of 2000, 1000 questionnaires were distributed amongst the employees at Michel Motors. The interviewees were able to choose a Turkish- or Spanish-language form instead of the German one, and we had prepared 200 copies in Turkish and 100 in Spanish. We also had 200 copies of a version for apprentices which the interviewees could also select. This version contained explicit questions on social data and on youth and apprentice representation. We received 337 questionnaires returned to us filled in, a return rate of 33.7%.

3.2 Survey Company “AutoCat”

This company has its headquarters near Barcelona and is the most important in the Spanish motor industry. Since the 1970s it has grown to become one of the largest employers in this sector. It was founded in 1950, and the shareholders were the Spanish government and an Italian motor industry group, which held only a small proportion of the shares. However, this company withdrew in the early 1980s and the German motor group Michel Motors gradually

115 The drawings and graffiti are photographed by the works council and are discussed in the company’s social committee. We were able to look at the pictures.

bought its way in, finally taking over the entire company. During the Franco era, military personnel were active in the technical corps and an extremely authoritarian climate dominated. However production processes and the organisation of work were considerably reformed by the German mother company in the wake of Spain’s democratisation. Pressure from the unionised workforce also exerted considerable pressure for reform; with a workforce of 20 000 to 32 000 employees between the 1960s and the 1980s, the unions found a favourable mobilisation structure. This could however not prevent the number of jobs being cut back by several thousand as a result of modernisation and efficiency measures, particularly in the 90s.

Today the working conditions at AutoCat are extremely good in comparison to other companies in Spain. The organisation of work has continuously been improved and working times have been made more flexible. As in the German locations, the degree of trade union membership is very high, at 87%, and the unions have a strong position within the company. In terms of union membership, 45% of employees are in the UGT, 35% are in the CC.OO and 6% are in the CGT. To some extent, union membership follows the “closed shop principle”, whereby people looking for work without the relevant recommendation have little chance of being recruited.

At the beginning of our investigation in autumn 1999, 14 429 workers were employed at AutoCat, spread over four centres: two production sites, one technology centre and one parts warehouse. 94.5% of the workforce were waged, 5.5% were salaried employees. The proportion of women in the company was 5% in total. However, a quota of 12% of women in the workforce had been set for future recruitment. The overwhelming majority of the workforce (14 288) are Spanish citizens; only 161 workers or 1.1% of the workforce are of foreign origin. The majority of the foreign workforce are German (104), who work primarily in key management positions, in their secretariats or as engineers, and who therefore belong to the salaried workforce outwith the agreed payment structure. This is due to the company policy set by the group’s management, who want to preserve their control over firms they have incorporated, by filling half of their management positions with staff seconded from the German group. The remaining foreign workers (53) are made up of 23 different nationalities. They consist mainly of engineers recruited in Europe or in Latin America.

At the end of the 90s, two groups of 150 Chinese workers were recruited temporarily for the dismantling of production sites. However, these were external workers, contracted by an Iranian business group which then transported the facilities to China. The job lasted in each instance no longer than two months; the workers did not speak any Spanish, and there was practically no contact with the permanent workforce in the company.

Under half of the Spanish workforce at AutoCat, 42.4%, was born in Catalonia; the majority or 57.6% come from other Spanish regions. However, the current recruitment policy gives preference to Catalans by birth, particularly children or relatives of workers who are also union members.

The workforce is therefore still dominated in numerical terms by Spanish domestic migrants. Beyond this group of migrants in the Barcelona area, there are also Latin Americans, and more recently people from the Maghreb, particularly Moroccan immigrants. Just 60 000 or around 4% of the 1.5 million people living in Barcelona in 2000 held foreign citizenship. Of these, 32.4% were from South America, 10% were from Central America, 12.4% were from the Maghreb and the rest of North Africa; further small groups of immigrants were from Asian countries, other African countries, from Central and Eastern European countries as well as from other regions. As we already noted in the previous chapter (see section 3), this co-existence does not always run smoothly, particularly in relation to the Moroccan immigrants.

117 The individual regions of origin are as follows: 9.2% from Central Asia, 5.4% from South East Asia, 2.9% from Central and Eastern Europe. Only relatively small groups come from Sub-Saharan Africa (2.2%), the Middle East (1.3%), from Central and Southern Africa (0.4%) and other regions (23.8%). (See Departament d’Estadística, Ajuntament de Barcelona 2000 and 2001).
Conflicts are heavily influenced by the social situation. The part of the city in the small town of Terrassa, where the disturbances we described took place, is a working class housing estate which played an important role in the resistance to Franco. In the 1950s and 60s the area experienced a devaluation as a result of housing market speculation and is characterised today by a high population density in comparison with other areas of the city. Over the past few years, cheap rents have drawn in a large number of impoverished migrants from outside the EU, meaning that the inhabitants now consist of a Catalan population, Spanish migrants who arrived here 40 years ago, and a growing group of North African immigrants. Whilst the Spanish migrants encountered rejection amongst the Catalan population in the 60s and 70s, it is today those who have newly arrived from Morocco and Senegal who meet resentment. The background to this is that Catalans feel that the new immigrants are now working in jobs which they themselves or their parents once held. Evidently, fears of suppression are being expressed through this. We have indications from our own research that each new immigration is met with rejection from those who previously immigrated. In this respect the immigrant’s region of birth – i.e. whether they were born in Catalonia or somewhere else in Spain – corresponds with attitudes towards non-EU immigrants, which is also related to the differing position of groups on the labour market and to their social circumstances (see C. Solé 1995).

A further interesting point concerns the “intercultural” situation amongst the management and the group of engineers at AutoCat. As this can be termed “elite migration”, these are certainly not comparable with the “ethnically” heterogeneous situations amongst the workforces in the other companies surveyed. Nevertheless, this does suggest that there is scope for further studies in the area of migration and the incorporation of highly qualified workers, something which has not been researched to any great extent. On this point, in one of the “expert interviews”, a Spanish member of the management team said that internal relations with the Germans were by no means conflict free. In his opinion, the Germans acted like “Nazis, who come to Spain and think that all Spanish people are incompetent”. This illustrates the low degree to which Germans are incorporated into the company. Furthermore, the interviewee complained about the barriers facing Spanish management personnel in getting promoted within the company. He blames company policy, which reserves key positions for Germans from the head office.

As a result of the limited willingness amongst management to co-operate in our investigation, only a few managers could in the end be included in the systematic survey. The 600 questionnaires were distributed in nine areas of the company by 60 union representatives at the end of May 2000, 275 of these by the UGT, 250 by the CC.OO and 75 by the CGT. 305 questionnaires were returned to us at the beginning of June, giving us a high return rate of over 50.8%.

3.3 Survey Company “Textil S.A.”

Textil S.A., the second industrial company to be included in the study, is one of the most important textile companies in both Spain and in Europe. It was founded in 1956 by two

---

[118] The textile sector is one of the most characteristic in Catalonia, and played a pioneering role in Spain’s industrialisation. Almost 85% of Spanish textile production and 65 to 70% of jobs in this sector are concentrated in Catalonia. After Lombardy, this is the region in Europe with the highest percentage of jobs in the textile and clothing industry. Small and medium sized enterprises are predominant, and these are often family businesses. Textil S.A. is an exception in the textile industry both because it is a large enterprise and it has large production volumes, even though its origins were equally that of a family business and relics of this fact can still be observed in the system of labour relations. Even though Textil S.A. was one of the leading textile companies in terms of technological investment, the present restructuring process and the cutbacks in staffing is a result of the enormous size of the business.
brothers in the rural Catalan district of Osana, near to the town of Vic. After a modest beginning, within a few years, it had turned itself into an “empire”. Textil S.A. specialises in the production of cotton, polyester, acrylic and linen yarns as well as fabrics and household textiles. The most important markets are other EU countries, Australia, Israel, Canada and Morocco.

The company has been operating two further production sites in nearby locations since the 70s. In the 80s, the company expanded further, and bought a cotton factory in Andalusia as well as portions of a British company.

Textil S.A. survived the general crisis in the textile industry in the 80s and 90s which caused a large number of Spanish companies to go under, by taking out extensive loans and investing in modernisation and restructuring. Not only did the company’s good relationship with politicians and with the army, for which it is the main textiles supplier come in useful, but so too did the extensive relief granted through the government’s 1981 “textile restructuring plan” such as duty reductions, securities or subsidies. The company also withstood several legal scandals relatively unscathed. In the early 1980s, the owners were found guilty of social security fraud – as were other Catalan companies – by falsifying data on the numbers of employees and their wages, working in unison with corrupt officials from industrial supervision boards. At the end of the 1990s one of the owners had to serve a two year jail sentence for an environmental offence – continued water pollution. Further cases relating to environmental offences are still outstanding.

Cases of unfair dismissal of members of the Comité de Empresa also had to be resolved in court. This indicates a more than tense relationship which has long dominated dealings between the company’s management and its employees and their representatives. The management described union activities as damaging to the company’s interests. The unions repeatedly pointed to illegal practices in the transposition of working standards. The relationship only appears to have improved since the end of the 90s.

A court case brought against Textil S.A. for illegal employment in 1989 is also interesting. In order to cover its need for workers, the company employed a number of foreigners, particularly Moroccans. Legal proceedings were instituted against this and a delegation from the Labour Ministry in Madrid found during an inspection that 160 immigrants without legal residence permits and therefore without a valid work contract were employed by the company, and this led to a severe fine. Subsequently, the management developed a new recruitment principle: they advertised for workers in Andalusia, and in Galicia, though in smaller numbers. As a result of this campaign, 100 workers arrived in Barcelona by train in May 1990, were picked up and brought to the factory, housed in barracks and provided with a three month contract. In June 1990 a second group arrived. The contracts could be extended but after the three months had passed, only two of the workers decided to stay; the remainder all wanted to return. The unions harshly criticised the working and living conditions of these workers. As this method now was also no longer effective, the company resorted to employing foreign workers legally, again primarily Moroccans. The background to this recruitment practice was that despite high unemployment in Spain, not enough local workers could be found to work at Textil S.A.

Although the company has tried to withstand despite critical developments in the sector by means of different factory operational and personnel policy strategies, it finally did have to register its insolvency in summer 2002. Closure of the business would have been a disaster for the area where Textil S.A.’s headquarters is located, as 80% of the active working population work there; the agricultural sector on the other hands only offers job possibilities for 9% of the population. Textil S.A. had also drawn labour migrants from Spain and from abroad to the village, and their presence can clearly be seen in the external appearance of local dwellings. Such dwellings are equipped with noticeable satellite dishes, in order to be able to receive foreign broadcasters or broadcasts from other regions.
In fact, of the 1,215 inhabitants in the village in 1996, 22.6% were born outside of Catalonia and 8.6% were foreigners. In other words, just over a third of the inhabitants have immigrated. In comparison, in the region of Osana in total the proportion of foreigners was recorded as being 2.3%; in Catalonia as a whole it was 2.8%.

At the time of our survey in early 2000, Textil S.A. had 1,771 employees, 757 men and 1,008 women. The proportion of foreign workers was about 10 percent, of these, 172 came from Morocco, and 6 came from other countries.

The workers from Morocco can be divided into three groups, according to the personnel manager: firstly, there are those who were employed as early as the 70s, and who had integrated; secondly, there were young people who had joined the firm in recent years, had a high level of education, were more prepared to engage in confrontations and displayed a lower level of motivation to work; thirdly there were the second generation workers, children of those who had migrated previously and who are today aged between 16 and 20, most of whom were born in Catalonia and went to school here, and who could speak both the regional language of Catalan as well as Castilian Spanish.

A clear hierarchy can be seen in terms of the various career categories within the company, depending on nationality and gender. Jobs such as washing dishes, folding materials, winding yarn and carrying out repairs are filled 100% by women, whilst the proportion of women in higher administrative positions, sales and management is only 17%, and is 12% for technical jobs. The foreign workforce is concentrated primarily in categories such as sewerage workers, manual workers, warehouse staff, weighing staff and labourers. Furthermore, it is noticeable that amongst those employees without an exact job title, 47% are foreign workers. 72 new employees were hired in the first four months of 2000; 30% of these were Moroccan.

The questionnaires used in our study were distributed to all employees at the three sites in Catalonia, i.e. to 1,771 people, in February and March 2000. As the president of the Comité de Empresa undertook distribution, it could be guaranteed that the workers would not misinterpret the survey as an “eavesdropping exercise” on the part of the company management. Despite this, the return rate of 8.5% (149 questionnaires) was exceptionally low. The low level of participation of Moroccan employees was particularly disappointing. Of the 81 women and 67 men who filled in the questionnaire120, only 5 were of Moroccan origin. An additional attempt to conduct oral interviews with Moroccan employees with the approval and mediation of the personnel manager failed due to their lack of willingness.

3.4 Survey Company “Special Motor Plant”

Special Motor Plant is a relatively new branch of a large group of companies in the motor industry with its headquarters in Germany. It is located in the British conurbation of the West Midlands, and is specially geared to the assembly of motors. In future, 400,000 motors of differing types will be built there per year, in a two-shift operation. The aim is to supply all of the company’s factories in Germany with four-cylinder petrol motors. Over 90% of the component parts such as crankshafts or cylinder heads are supplied by other factories belonging to the group. The central production hall is fully automated. Working practices are organised in group work; the teams themselves decide on their own internal distribution of tasks and of working times.

Diverse skills are expected of the workers, in order to be able to undertake the various tasks in the team. Each team selects a spokesperson to represent its interests to management. The working organisation therefore has comparable basic structures to that of Michel Motors/AutoCat.

120 As one interviewee did not provide any details on their gender, the sum total here only adds up to 148 not 149.
At the time of the study the workforce consisted of 660 employees, although the workforce was still being built up with the plan being to reach a total of 1,500 employees. These worked for the time being in a single shift operation; a multi-shift working pattern was, similarly, still being planned. The first 400 workers were taken on from factories belonging to a traditional British motor group, which we will call “Vagabond”. Vagabond’s ownership relations changed several times in recent years, in part under highly dramatic circumstances. In 1994, Vagabond was entirely bought out by the aforementioned German group; in 2000 however, this company then sold three of the four Vagabond car brands, including each of their production sites to other groups or consortia. Only one make and its plant were kept and the new motor production branch, Special Motor Plant was added to this, as we have mentioned. After the first 400 had been occupied here, the remainder were advertised. There was a huge demand for these positions, even though the labour market situation in the region is relatively favourable, at least for the white population. In response to the advertisement for the first 100 positions there were 8,500 applications.

A previous conflict at Vagabond concerning the disadvantaging of ethnic minorities in the classification and wage system is also implicitly relevant for the new branch. One the one hand, the management highlights that there has not yet been enough time to set up an equal opportunities policy; on the other hand one manager expressed the opinion that the old Vagabond agreement on this subject would be sufficient in the meantime and that there was no need to rush. The workforce however does not seem to be informed about this.

No concrete “ethnic conflicts” or discriminations were known within the new location - in contrast to gender specific discrimination. However, as was seen at AutoCat in Spain, there appear to be tensions at the management level due to the occupation of the highest positions by German managers and also due to the fact that British managers had found that they first had to learn German in order to “get on” in their careers.

Many of the workers taken on from a particular Vagabond plant had, according to the regional “Commission for Racial Equality” (CRE) clearly experienced a series of instances of “ethnic minority” discrimination in their previous workplace. These cases were related to an internal factory segmentation of jobs and to the disadvantaging of minorities in promotion processes as well as in the selection of workers for the production of the brand’s new model. It was alleged that local managers together with union representatives has prevented black workers from progressing and getting better jobs in certain sections of the operation. There have similar cases of discrimination at Vagabond at the industrial tribunal since 1978; the last case which was supported by the CRE dates from 2000. However, a manager told us in an “expert interview” that there had never been problems with issues of equal opportunities within the company. The interviewee instead put all “racism issues” down to “intra-racial conflicts”, meaning for instance conflicts between Hindus and Afro-Caribbean employees.

The survey company, Special Motor Plant, is situated at the edge of the West Midlands conurbation. Most employees live in Tamworth, Lichfield, Solihull, Birmingham and Coventry. The proportion of ethnic minority inhabitants in the West Midlands regions is above the British average, at over 9.9% (see Chapter 1, Section 2.1). In the “West Midlands metropolitan county”\(^\text{121}\), the proportion is over 17.7% of the population, according to our own calculations based on ONS data estimations, making levels here almost three times higher than the country average\(^\text{122}\).

As we already established in section 2 of the previous chapter on social citizenship, members of “ethnic minorities” are around three times more affected by unemployment than white

---

\(^{121}\) This county is part of the West Midlands and includes the seven urban centres of Birmingham, Coventry, Wolverhampton, Dudley, Sandwell, Solihull and Walsall.

Britons. The TUC acknowledges that in geographical terms, the distribution of unemployment amongst minorities is varied and the West Midlands is the region where it is highest. At the end of the 90s, the unemployment rate rose amongst the non-white population in the West Midlands region as a whole to 17%, and to 18% in the main city region, whilst the unemployment rate amongst the white population in the West Midlands fell to 6% over the same period (see TUC 1999, p.1 onwards and p.5).

For the purposes of our study, questionnaires were distributed to all 660 employees in June 2001. Returns in July 2001 numbered 132, a rate of 20%.

4. The Interviewees: The Composition of the Samples

We will turn firstly to the surveys in the individual companies investigated in the quantitative study, that is, in the standardised written survey. In terms of social structure, these essentially correspond to the make-up of the work force in their representation of women and men. Only at Michel Motors and AutoCat are groups of employees with a “background of migration” represented to a comparable extent in the samples.

As we have outlined above, however, foreign workers at Textil S.A. largely refused to take part in the survey. The same applies to members of “ethnic minorities” at Special Motor Plant. We can only speculate about the reasons for workers’ refusal to participate at Textil S.A.; at Special Motor Plant this could perhaps be because of the employees’ experiences with “ethnic conflicts” which had become manifest at their previous workplaces and which had apparently involved not just the previous company management or superior level but also the shop floor and the unionised interest representation. As will also be shown in the following chapters, in the British case in particular, conflict situations between the “ethnic groups”, between “whites” and “blacks” are clearly visible in the attitudes of white Britons. The issue of “race relations” is highly politicised here, and to a degree it is also charged with aggression. But even at Textil S.A. resentments amongst Spanish interviewees become apparent which point to a tension-laden situation, though not to the same extent that this is found in the British sample. Nevertheless, reasons for this are possibly to be found in the fact that this could have combined with an insecure social and legal residency status and led to foreign workers – mainly Moroccan workers not taking part in the survey.

In other words: at Textil S.A., we can only compare the attitudes of “indigenous”, that is, Catalan employees, with those of workers with a background of domestic migration. In the British case of Special Motor Plant, we concentrate on the white Britons amongst the workforce.

123 By “interviewees with a background of migration” we mean different generations of both international labour migration, such as we see above all in the German car industry and in isolated instances in the Spanish textile industry, as well as domestic labour migration which we see to a large degree in Spain. In the empirical section of the study, domestic migration is only dealt with explicitly regarding Spain. Similarly, groups from post-colonial immigration into Britain are subsumed within this category. The majorities within these groups can no longer be described as migrants, as they have already been living in the host country for up to four generations and often hold that country’s citizenship, or, in the Spanish case, they have become settled in a host region, such as in Catalonia.

124 However, to qualify this we ought to mention that we could not in the end assume with certainty that members of “ethnic minorities” would not take part in the survey, as the responses to questions relating to self classification and to migration backgrounds are, to a degree, inconsistent. It could be possible that reservations which we outlined above are being confirmed here, as to whether interviewees with a background of post-colonial migration are prepared to classify themselves as “minorities” without any further qualification. However, even if we take this problem into account, the number of returns from members of “ethnic minorities” in total remains too low to include them in the evaluation.
In the German sample at Michel Motors, interviewees with a background of migration are represented at an above average level in relation to their proportion in the workforce, at almost 29%. This is shown in table 6.

Table 6: Sample Survey at “Michel Motors” (figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey group</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Of these, number with a history of migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of sample (absolute figures)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Of this: women</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Of this: men</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Apprentices</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Untrained and trained workers</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Specialist workers in direct and indirect production</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Low level salaried employees</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mid level salaried employees</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High level salaried employees</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No data provided</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest general education qualification*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No qualification/ISCED 2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ISCED 3A and 3B</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ISCED 4</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ISCED 5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ISCED 5A and 5B</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No data provided/other</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Under 21</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 21 to 30 inclusive</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 31 to 40 inclusive</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 41 to 50 inclusive</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 51 to 60 inclusive</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 61 and over</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No data provided</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Catholic</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protestant</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Muslim</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other religion</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No religion</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No data provided</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Membership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Level of organisation</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For the classification of educational qualifications in this and in the other tables relating to the sample surveys we employ the “International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)” for OECD countries. How we carried out the classification in the case studies is documented in the overview in Annex V.
The highest level of participation in the German case was amongst younger workers up to and including 40 years of age, who are employed as untrained and trained workers and have a low to medium level educational qualification. A further career group which is relatively strongly represented are the qualified and the more highly qualified specialist workers. This pattern of responses amongst the various career groups is replicated amongst interviewees with a background of migration. This therefore means that there are clear differences here to the sample survey in the case study company in the pre-study. There, the level of professional status of the German interviewees was markedly higher than that of the interviewees with a background of migration, that is, the Turkish workers.

In terms of “interviewees with a background of migration”, the previous study concentrated on Turks. In the present case study of Michel Motors, a heterogeneous structure of countries of origin was planned. Although interviewees of (former) Turkish citizenship were dominant here again as in the workforce of the plant as a whole, and indeed made up almost half of this part sample, (former) Spanish and Greek citizens are now also represented as well. Of those interviewees with a background of migration, just over 40% have been naturalized; just over 21% were born in Germany and a further 21% have been living in Germany for 10 to 20 years. Over 47% have been living in Germany for 20 years and more.

There are two obvious differences in the Spanish sample surveys in comparison to the German case. The Spanish cases involve a much higher proportion of qualified workers: in the control company Textil S.A., this occupational group even constitutes the majority. However, the occupational groups are very different as a result of the differing systems of professional training and the prerequisites for entry into this occupational sector, and are therefore not comparable without further qualification. In this group there are therefore also workers who have been trained intensively. However, it is noticeable that the general level of education in the sample survey at AutoCat, i.e. at the main case study company, is much higher in total than in the sample at Michel Motors. The general level of education there was more similar to that found at Textil S.A.. As table 7 shows, the interviewees at Textil S.A. are on average older than those at Michel Motors, but younger than those at AutoCat.

Table 7: Sample Surveys at “AutoCat” and “Textil S.A.” (figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey group</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Of these, number with a background of migration*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AutoCat</td>
<td>Textil S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of sample (absolute figures)</td>
<td>100.0 (305)</td>
<td>100.0 (149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Of this: women</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Of this: men</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Apprentices</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Untrained and trained workers</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Specialist workers in direct and indirect production</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>62.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Low level salaried employees</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mid level salaried employees</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High level salaried employees</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No data provided</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

125 For a comparison of the most important structural data from the sample surveys in the case study companies in the pre-study and from Michel Motors see Annex 5.
## Chapter III: Company Case Studies

### Survey group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest general education qualification</th>
<th>AutoCat</th>
<th>Textil S.A.</th>
<th>Of these, number with a background of migration*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• No qualification/ISCED 2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ISCED 3A and 3B</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ISCED 4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ISCED 5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ISCED 5A and 5B</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No data provided/other</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Age groups

| • Under 21                              | 0.7     | 3.4         | --                                              |
| • 21 to 30 inclusive                    | 22.0    | 22.8        | 3.1                                            |
| • 31 to 40 inclusive                    | 32.1    | 36.2        | 16.0                                            |
| • 41 to 50 inclusive                    | 11.8    | 22.8        | 18.3                                            |
| • 51 to 60 inclusive                    | 32.8    | 14.1        | 62.6                                            |
| • 61 and over                           | --      | 0.7         | --                                              |
| • No data provided                      | 0.7     | --          | --                                              |

### Religion

| • Catholic                              | 74.4    | 87.9        | 80.5                                            |
| • Protestant                            | 0.3     | --          | --                                              |
| • Muslim                                | 0.3     | 4.0         | --                                              |
| • Other religion                        | 1.6     | 0.7         | 1.6                                            |
| • No religion                           | 19.3    | 2.0         | 18.0                                            |
| • No data provided                      | 3.9     | 5.4         | --                                              |

### Union Membership

| • Level of organisation                 | 92.3    | 21.7        | 95.3                                            |

* Here, interviewees with a “background of migration” encompasses solely domestic migrants. At “AutoCat” there were only 3 foreigners in the sample, who all came from EU countries. At Textil S.A. there were only 6, who principally held Moroccan citizenship. The number of cases is therefore too small to be able to include these separately in the table.

In the part sample survey of interviewees with a background of migration, the biggest groups are domestic migrants from Andalusia and respondents whose families come from this southern Spanish region. At AutoCat, these constitute almost 46% of the part sample survey; at Textil S.A. they constitute just over two thirds of the part sample, at just over 67%.

In the British case of Special Motor Plant, we did not use the “background of migration” category, for the reasons outlined above. The structural data in table 8 therefore relate to all respondents, including the 16 workers investigated who had moved from other EU countries or who belong to an “ethnic minority”.

### Table 8: Sample Survey at “Special Motor Plant” (figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey group</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of sample</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(absolute figures)</td>
<td>(132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Of this: women</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Of this: men</td>
<td>81.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupational groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Survey group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey group</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apprentices</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untrained and trained workers</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist workers in direct and indirect production</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low level salaried employees</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid level salaried employees</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level salaried employees</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data provided</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Highest general education qualification *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest general education qualification *</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No qualification/ ISCED 2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCED 3A and 3B</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCED 4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCED 5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCED 5A and 5B</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data provided/other</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Age groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age groups</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 21</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 30 inclusive</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 to 40 inclusive</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 to 50 inclusive</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 to 60 inclusive</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 and over</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data provided</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religion</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data provided</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Union Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Membership</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of organisation</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In the sample there were only 11 respondents of foreign origin – mainly from EU countries – and 5 respondents, who categorised themselves as belonging to an “ethnic minority”. The number of cases is therefore too small to be able to include these separately in the table.

In the sample survey at Special Motor Plant the respondents are more evenly distributed across the individual occupational groups than in the German and Spanish cases. Whilst the group of trained specialist workers is the biggest group here as well, this is not by the same gap as in the other case study companies. The age make-up is also comparatively more even. It is noticeable that there is a kind of “gap” amongst the general educational qualifications. On the one hand, slightly more than a quarter of respondents had a low level qualification, and more than half had higher to high level certificates; mid-range qualifications are almost entirely absent.

One feature shared by Michel Motors, AutoCat and Special Motor Plant is the gender representation: in each instance over 80% of the respondents are men and only slightly more than 15% to just over 19% are women. In absolute figures this means that 58 women are repre-
sent at Michel Motors, 47 female respondents are represented nonetheless at AutoCat, whilst at Special Motor Plant we see only 25 female respondents due to the small size of the sample as a whole. For this reason, a few precise analyses can still be made regarding gender specific characteristics – the same is true particularly for Textil S.A. with 81 female respondents – but this can largely not be done in the British case. Here, types of attitudes which differ according to gender could merely be confirmed; however, these could not be presented according to status group, comparing males and females.

How were the sample surveys made up in the group discussions in the three countries? Together with the standardised surveys, advertisements were distributed in the case study companies asking about workers’ willingness to participate in group discussions. The declarations of willingness which were handed in separately, and included the name, address and a few details about the employee allowed us to make direct contact and to organise the discussion groups. Although in the end not all of the employees expected turned up to the agreed appointment, several group discussions could be carried out in all of the countries. The groups were constituted partly homogenously, partly as heterogeneous as possible, in terms of nationality or “ethnicity”, gender and social status. However, the fact that in several instances certain people did not show up meant that the composition of the groups shifted towards smaller and more homogenous groups.

Along with the participants, in each instance there were two people from the research team present: one person led the discussion, the other took notes, for instance about the sequence of oral contributions made by the various participants. Names were not asked from this point on. For the purposes of remaining anonymous, all participants received a letter of the alphabet as identification.

In Britain, a total of 13 employees from Special Motors took part in 3 group discussions, 4 women and 9 men. All participants were British citizens and apart from one “black Asian” of Indian origin, all were members of the white, majority population.

Groups I and II each consisted of 4 men; in Group I, all worked in production, and one of them was non-white. Group II comprised two production workers and two salaried employees. In Group III there were four women, three of them manual workers and one manager, and one male worker.

### Table 9: Participants in the Group Interviews at “Special Motor Plant”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>White/ethnic minority</th>
<th>Profession/Grade</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group I</td>
<td>UK.A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>51-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK.B</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>31-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK.C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>51-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK.D</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Indian (Black Asian)</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>31-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group II</td>
<td>UK.E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>PG1</td>
<td>21-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK.F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK.G</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK.H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>PG2</td>
<td>51-60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

126 At the start of this discussion, the interviewers asked the participants for certain social data, and these are presented in tables 9 – 11. Selected gaps in the responses could unfortunately not be followed up on due to the anonymity of the respondents. The discussions lasted for about an hour to an hour and a half, and were recorded with the permission of the participants and were typed up afterwards. The identifying letters of the alphabet in the table and in the quotes in this report are not identical to those which the discussions had during the discussion.

127 Grades A to C relate to production workers (A is “the lowest”, C is the “highest” level). PG1 to PG4 indicate the levels in the area of salaried employees (middle management) (PG 1 is the “lowest” level, PG4 is the “highest” level). Management positions are indicated by FL5 and upwards.
A total of 21 employees took part in the group discussions at Michel Motors in Germany (15 men and 6 women). 15 of the participants had a German passport, 6 had a different citizenship. Six group discussions were carried out; 3 additional one-to-one discussions were carried out in instances where the absence of planned participants or the uneasiness felt by certain people due to the planned group make-up made this necessary.

In both Groups I and II there were two male, German (specialist) workers; in Group III there were three male workers of foreign origin, two of whom were active in the works council. In Group IV, two male salaried employees took part in the discussion, one German and one Austrian citizen. Group V was made up entirely of women, amongst them one German apprentice, two German specialist workers along with one German and one Turkish trained worker. Group VI again brought together four German workers.

The individual conversations were carried out with one German apprentice and two Turkish trained worker, all of whom were male.\[128\]

### Table 10: Participants in the Group Interviews at “Michel Motors”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>White/ethnic minority</th>
<th>Profession/Grade[127]</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group III</td>
<td>UK.I</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>21-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK.J</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>FL5</td>
<td>21-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK.K</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK.L</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>31-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK.M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[128\] One of the individual conversations is however not included systematically in the results presentation, as it barely touched on our central questions.
In Spain, a total of four group discussions were carried out with five employees in each. Two were held at AutoCat, two at Textil S.A.. Whilst at AutoCat all participants were Spanish, and Group I consisted of four male trained worker and one female trained worker, Group II incorporated exclusively male specialist workers, Groups III and IV at Textil S.A. differed in the sense that Group III was made up of two male and three female indigenous Catalans and Group IV was made up of five male migrants from Morocco.

Table 11: Participants in the Group Interviews at “AutoCat” and “Textil S.A.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group I (Mot. Mig.)</td>
<td>E.A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>31-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.B</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>21-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>31-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.D</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>21-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.E</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group II (Mot. Mig.)</td>
<td>E.F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Specialist worker</td>
<td>51-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.G</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Specialist worker</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Specialist worker</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.I</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Specialist worker</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.J</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Specialist worker</td>
<td>51-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group III (Text.)</td>
<td>E.K</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Salaried employee</td>
<td>21-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.L</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.N</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.O</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Specialist worker</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group IV (Text.)</td>
<td>E.P</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.Q</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>31-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.R</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>41-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.S</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>31-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E.T</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>Trained worker</td>
<td>31-40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Presentation of the Results and the Process of Evaluation

The presentation of the empirical results is centred around main thematic focal points and not around the company case studies. The quantitative and qualitative results are partly presented separately, but dovetail closely in thematic terms. At times they are also dealt with together. This means for both variants that quantitative and qualitative results should complement each other; attitudes gathered quantitatively are backed up analytically in terms of content by the patterns of argument in the group discussions, and are qualified if necessary.

As regards the thematic focal points, the data from the quantitative surveys are evaluated according to the dimensions of attitudes outlined in section 2, (using multivariate correlation and factor analysis) and are aggregated according to attitude type. As far as the number of cases from individual part samples allow, the results – including those on the social situation – are differentiated according to gender and the category of “interviewees with a background of migration”. The life situation of the interviewees and an initial overview of the attitudes on immigration and interculturality are still evaluated separately in terms of our case studies and are compared with each other. For further analysis, we established types of attitude with the help of a cluster analysis, into which all 923 interviewees are included regardless of their company, nationality or gender. In the sense of “deconstruction – reconstruction” we then ask in the next step whether types of attitude are supported by particular sample surveys, status
groups, age cohorts or more by women or men. At the same time, a differentiation is also made between interviewees with and without a background of migration. Types of attitude are established for the interculturalism scale on the basis of attitudinal dimensions, which are formulated as scales; these are our independent variables. In terms of dependent variables, we use the structural data, the types of attitude regarding social interest orientation, the perception of social inequality and gender role orientations.

Combining the quantitative and qualitative results plays a central role in the investigation of the structural and the “subjective” side of circumstances in life in our sample surveys. Firstly, social status groups are determined using the social data, which should offer an insight into the distribution of social opportunities from an “objective” perspective. In order to capture aspects of cultural practices which affect the opportunity structure, the “subjective” side of life circumstances are also taken addressed. This is then in turn highlighted using selected attitudes towards “social interest orientation” from the standardised survey, and patterns of argument and forms of awareness, which became active in the group discussions on the subject of “labour market and unemployment” (Chapter IV).

Regarding the issue of the perception and evaluation of immigration and interculturality, of work and career, social circumstances and gender arrangements, the qualitative and quantitative results are, however, presented and discussed separately, albeit with a close reference back (Chapter V), so that the attitudes from the written survey can be put alongside the patterns of argument from the group discussions. We can see from this, that only the group discussions provide an explanation for several “confusions” in the results from the quantitative survey.

In order to filter out patterns of argument and shapes of awareness from the group discussions, the extensive data provided by the documented up discussions was subjected to several evaluation steps. The methodological “objective dilemma” which is fundamental to any group discussion (see Friedrichs, 1980: 254 onwards; Lamnek 1989: 136; Birsl/Ottens/Sturhan 1999: 99 onwards), could not be removed during our research either. However, to keep additional distortions minimal, we agreed that a) in all three teams the same process of evaluation would be used and b) that at least two of the team would be involved in every evaluation step, in order to set up an interactive control mechanism by which colleagues would act as a corrective force and they could then agree amongst themselves about interpretations which were unclear.

The first step in the evaluation (Level 1) consisted of a paraphrasing of everything that had been said during the discussions and categorising these in terms of content, which were broadly in line with the main connecting threads used for the running of the group discussions (see annex IV). Each of the spokespeople remain highlighted in this process, comments from the notes on the discussion concerning certain environmental issues are expanded upon and any succinct quotes were included verbatim. By then sorting the content data according to participants, we could gain a clearer impression about which pattern of argument individual participants followed used.

The second level was to present what had been said within the groups in a condensed form, and on an abstract analytical level. Using the issue of unemployment in the Spanish and German group discussions, we asked: are any concerns regarding the labour market or other social concerns noticeable, where are the causes for this seen, where can possible counter-strategies be seen and are more individual or collective resolution strategies outlined, are these performance related or essentially equality related? How and in terms of which categories is social inequality perceived and evaluated? During this step, the issue of immigration, which was the object of the discussions in all three countries, was narrowed down to the following questions: are relations to other social issues established? Do more liberal or more restrictive ideas concerning immigration in the future and interculturality dominate? How do people think about discrimination and anti-discrimination in society and in the workplace?
How pronounced are group constructions, what are these, with which attributes are they associated and with which evaluations? All in all, we should now keep hold of what role is attributed to the unions, what role is seen to be played by current events and social debates, what issues prove to be “stimulating subjects” and which additional subjects, wishes and demands do the participants say are central for them.

In an ensuing horizontal study, the results for the individual group discussions in each country are examined comparatively. This aims to look particularly at possible relationships between specific argument patterns and the social make-up of people who adopt these – their gender, age, “ethnicity”, nationality or professional status. The conclusions which resulted from this, and which were illustrated with succinct quotes, then served as a basis for (1) building up a picture of common features and differences in the dominant patterns of argumentation in a comparative country perspective and (2) relating the qualitative results to the quantitative results, taking these findings into account.

This last step forms the basis of the next chapter, the form of presentation is then structured around the questions according to their subject matter. We will also present the quantitative results and then move on to substantiate these directly afterwards, using insights gleaned from the qualitative study.
Chapter IV: Personal Situation of the Industrial Workers

The personal situation of the industrial workers interviewed in both Spanish companies as well as in the German and British companies will now be examined from the “objective” or structural side and from the “subjective” side. On the structural side, the main question which will be addressed is whether we can establish patterns of inequality amongst the workforce that do not just follow social criteria; can we identify patterns of inequality beyond these, which are related to interviewees’ gender and migratory background? If there are “gaps” between the women and men’s personal circumstances and between interviewees with and without a history of migration, then a comparison of the various age groups should help us to cross check whether these inequality effects gradually weaken or whether we can perceive a hierarchisation of social circumstances according to gender or to migratory background.

The “subjective” side encompasses people’s perception of their own personal situation. Here social concerns such as fear of unemployment or a decline in social status play a role, as does how interviewees position their own situation in relation to that of their parents, and strategies favoured for influencing career development. These strategies concern people’s plans regarding the future in general and their careers, as well as behavioural options in the workplace and their relationship to their work and career.

Amongst some of the interviewees with a history of migration we could observe a marked awareness of discrimination. These interviewees relate this discrimination to their status as foreigners and it has a limiting effect on the “subjective” side of their personal situation in life.\textsuperscript{129} The individual effects are surveyed in our concluding analysis of the interviewees’ social background. This analysis looks solely at Michel Motors, the only case study company with a larger number of (former) foreigners amongst the sample. The interviewees in the Spanish companies investigated, whose migratory background is characterised by domestic migration, would not consider the sets of questions on experience of discrimination relevant to them, and would therefore not answer them. The items relate exclusively to (former) non-citizens, or to “ethnic minorities” in Britain.

1. The structural Side of Personal Circumstances

To determine the structural side of people’s personal circumstances we used the variables commonly used in structural analyses, “education”, “career” and “income” as a basis - the so-called “meritocratic triad” (see Chapter III, Section 2). We built indices using these factors and these were then used to classify the interviewees into different social groups. These groups are related to each other, and are ordered in a hierarchy, and in this sense they can be said to be “status groups”.

As we are dealing with four workforces from three countries in this study, these status groups are confirmed by their relationship to the social situation and structure in each of the individual societies concerned. This avoids the problem of trying directly to compare educational qualifications, career positions and levels of income which relate to differing education systems, career systems and income structures. The process used here weights education, ca-

\textsuperscript{129} As we are concerned here with people’s own perception of experiences of discrimination, these can only be classified as belonging to the “subjective” side. In the end it is however irrelevant whether this is rooted in “measurable” instances of discrimination common to migrants or whether they are “ethnicising” bad experiences which have no common migration background. The negative effect on the personal situation of the interviewees should not be underestimated.
reer and income levels according to the respective social context, and creates indices and groups on this basis.\textsuperscript{130} 

As the following report will show, in reality the “meritocratic triad” often does not fulfil its function. Higher educational qualifications, for instance, do not automatically lead to higher level jobs and careers or to good earnings potential. It is particularly noticeable in the German and British sample surveys that in structural terms, it is not “success” in the areas of education or career training which ultimately influences the other two categories. In the Spanish case, however, the triad forms more of a measurable entity. But here too, as in the other two countries (where it is indeed more pronounced than in Spain) additional structural categories affecting individuals’ social status have an influence, such as that of gender. Social selection on the basis of gender does not necessarily begin with the fact that there are fewer possibilities for women to use their educational qualifications but rather with the opportunities to build on school leaving qualifications and gain initial professional training, such as additional qualifications, or in other words, in opportunities to access further professional training. As a result, the educational variable proved to be a central variable in terms of both content and analysis, in our effort to find out typical patterns of inequality. In each of our case studies we therefore examined the extent to which the highest school level qualification, professional training qualifications and successful participation in a training scheme leading to a further professional qualification are related to each other. A factor analysis confirmed that these three categories only mesh together in the two Spanish companies; in the German and British cases the school leaving qualification does influence the level of professional training but neither of the two categories is connected to opportunities to participate in further training.\textsuperscript{131} For Spain therefore an education index was proved between all three educational variables; in Germany and Britain, an education index was only proved between the variables “highest school level qualification” and “level of professional qualification” following initial professional training. The three or alternatively two statistically weighted educational variables then form part of our index of the social status groups.

In confirming status groups, the question is raised about how we evaluate the social status of married women. To date, there is no methodological procedure available in empirical social research on how to deal with this issue, in spite of intensive debates in the 1980s, particularly in Britain.\textsuperscript{132} 

In all, there are three basic methodological procedures to choose from: (1) the status of a (family) household in total, although this neglects the social risks resulting from the break-up of the family household unit through divorce for instance, including the risk of a drop in status. (2) The status of the head of the household: this is focused more strongly on the main breadwinner than the first variant. On the basis of employment and level of income, these still tend to be male. Here, the risks of a separation do not have any bearing. However, if we want to gain an insight into opportunity structures and thereby into future opportunities in life and not just capture a particular set of personal circumstances at one point in time, then neither of the above variants are convincing on their own. The social status which is determined on either of these bases is highly likely to be a status derived in part from that of the male partner.

\textsuperscript{130} The index was created using a factor analysis where variables related to the first factor are loaded with a minimum value of 0.5 and reach an individual value of over 50% on the first component. All further analyses of the status groups’ profile, the meaning and relationships of the individual variables in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 are carried out using matrices and bivariate correlations. Following Pearson’s method of correlations, for small sample surveys only those with a coefficient of at least 0.5 and a significance level of 95% in both directions or at least 99% in both directions are taken into account.

\textsuperscript{131} In the German and British cases the further education variable loads onto another factor as do the variables “highest school leaving qualification” and “level of professional qualification” following initial training.

\textsuperscript{132} For this assessment we rely both on literature published in the three countries as well as direct research (by phone or email) carried out by specialist research organisations and scientists, particularly in Germany and Britain. See J.H Goldthorpe 1983; R. Erikson/J.H. Goldthorpe 1988 and S. Walby 1986.
and may possibly be only a temporary status. This refers not only to the issue of income and provision, but to social and cultural status as well, in the sense of a meritocratic triad. The divorce rates in these countries tell an important tale. In 1997 the divorce rate amongst all marriages in Britain was 52% and in Germany it was slightly over 44%. In Spain, the divorce rate was relatively low, at 18%, but this has risen sharply since 1985, when it was only 8%. This also means that the risk of women losing their social and socio-cultural status as a result of divorce is a lot greater than the risk of loss of status amongst working women as a result of unemployment. As the divorce rates are high and are indeed still climbing, there is a plausible argument for ignoring this in analyses of social structures or social status. (3) Individual status: with this variant the family and partner background are again blended out and the social status is determined solely on the basis of individual access to education, career/employment opportunities, and income. This procedure has the clear advantage of being able to measure the social opportunities and socio-cultural positions which people are able to achieve “on their own”. Risks in life can also be traced through this. However, even this variant cannot satisfy everyone, as there is one area of social relationships which it does not cover and which can be important for the allocation of status and the distribution of opportunities amongst married women at least.

The question of how to allocate status to (married) women appropriate to their specific personal circumstances therefore remains open. The three options outlined here provide evidence of a fundamental dilemma facing social research, for which there are no easy solutions. Even the present study cannot offer any methodological procedure which would come near to providing a satisfactory solution. In the following text, we move somewhere between variants (1) and (3) with a heavy emphasis on the individual’s status. We had to discard any ideas we had about including the partner’s social position (data on which was provided in the quantitative survey of career and income) in building our index concerning the individual’s status, and making this one of our statistical factors. This leads to serious distortions in the allocation of status. Instead, we again created an index for the social position of partners using the variables “profession/position in the labour market” and “income”, which provides information on how these relate to the social status of the interviewees.

1.1 Education – Profession – Income: the Social Status of the Interviewees

The interviewees’ personal circumstances in the four case study companies are different in two respects. Firstly, there is a visible discrepancy between the personal circumstances in the different companies. This discrepancy can be seen when comparing the main companies investigated in the motor industry, and also when comparing these companies and the control company Textil S.A.. A comparison of the arithmetic mean values of average social status in the sample surveys shows that personal circumstances at Special Motor Plant in the UK are most favourable (mean value: 3.11). There is a considerable gap between this and the next company, Michel Motors in Germany (2.34), which is then closely followed by AutoCat in Spain (2.25). One reason for this drop is a slight distortion as a result of the sample composition. In Special Motor Plant there is a higher proportion of salaried employees from middle management represented in the survey than in both the other car plants. Furthermore, whilst

---

133 What is more, this is often bound up with a loss of social capital.
134 Own calculations based on Eurostat’s population statistics 1999: 122 onwards, 138 onwards. For Spain, the figures date back only as far as 1985.
135 “Position in the labour market” means that even a lack of employment, due perhaps to caring for a family or training and such like is also included. This also shows us the state of gender arrangements within partnerships.
136 The status groups are arranged on a five-point scale. The mean value was calculated at a value of 2.3; the arithmetic mean value can be measured alongside this (see also further explanations and the individual values in overviews 12 to 14 in the following Section, Section 1.2).
we were dealing with more highly qualified workers in the areas of direct and indirect production, such as engineers, in these other two plants and especially at Michel Motors, these cannot entirely even out this distortion. The reason is therefore to be found primarily in other areas, namely in the “profiles” of the status groups within the companies. In this respect, the weight of the three variables “education”, “professional position” and “income” varies in our establishing of status.

The drop between the three car companies on the one hand and Textil S.A. on the other is particularly dramatic. By comparison, personal circumstances amongst interviewees at Textil S.A. are very low (1.55). It is particularly important in this instance that despite having relatively good school level education, the employees could not translate this into professional qualification, and thereby into corresponding career positions and earnings potential. This is true in the basic structure for both sexes as well as for interviewees whose families had moved from southern Spanish regions to settle in Catalonia.

Secondly, discrepancies were seen to exist in the opportunity structures. These discrepancies were particularly marked between the two sexes, but are only weakly in evidence between male indigenous workers and male interviewees with a background of migration. These discrepancies prove to be patterns of inequality for female interviewees in terms of opportunities to access professional qualifications; despite a higher level of school education in general, their opportunities to access such training are worse than for the men interviewed. This then has a negative effect on our establishment of groups according to profession and financial status.

At Michel Motors, the centre of the status group profiles is the professional position: this has a stronger effect on our allocation of status than does general and professional training. Income is derived from this. This means that amongst the 23.7% of interviewees shown in Figure 9 who belong to Group 1 we find untrained and trained workers with a relatively small wage and no school leaving qualification, or an ISCED level 3A or 3B school leaving qualification. The majority of these workers had followed professional training leading to a qualification, but only at a low level and often in fields different to those where they were now working. Group 2 consists essentially of skilled workers with training and qualifications appropriate for their profession, which lasts three years and longer in Germany, mainly in dual systems of professional training\(^\text{137}\). They differ from the next group in that they work in the waged area and not in the area of salaried jobs, as the employees in Group 3 do. Group 4 is composed of higher level salaried employees in middle management positions, and engineers. Both of these have an ISCED level 5A ranked qualification from a specialist, vocationally focused technical university, together with a relatively high income. Those with a university degree are put in Group 5. The gap between these two highest groups in this sample is very narrow, as their occupational profile in terms of leadership roles and responsibility for instance differ only marginally.

We also see this sample survey composition in the other three companies investigated in the study, with only small variations. The difference between them is however that here, the weight is on their professional position. More exactly, this means that the category of education, or the variables which constitute this, do not stand in a uniform relationship to professional position, as this is differentiated according to gender. Income does however derive from professional position.

\(^\text{137}\) This means that the training is carried out both within the company and in vocational training schools.
In comparing the career opportunities open to female and male interviewees, clear differences can be seen in terms of their ability to make use of their education. We already noted these differences in the company investigated in the pre-study: on average, women had a higher level of school education than the men, but they then experience a first cut during their transition to professional training, and later when accessing professional positions. As in the pre-study, male interviewees can more than compensate for lower school leaving qualifications through professional qualification. Their career paths are more open as they progress in their professions than women’s are.

In the pre-study we had also established that the patterns of social status amongst women are similar to those of Turkish men, i.e. men with a background of migration. Whilst on average these interviewees did have lower school leaving qualifications than the women, their future career was determined on the basis of their schooling, as was that of female interviewees. Unlike their male colleagues who held German citizenship they could not compensate for deficits in the area of general education through training and further professional qualification. However, the situation was different in the sample at Michel Motors. Although there are no interviewees with a background of migration amongst the highest status group, and they are only represented below proportion in the second highest social position, there is a higher than proportionate number of them found in Group 3 and they only constitute a very small portion of the untrained and trained workers. If we trace the training paths of interviewees with a background of migration through to their present professional positions then we do not see any meaningful differences between male interviewees without a background of migration. This is partially due to the fact that (male) interviewees in the part sample are not solely from migrant families originally from Turkey, as was the case in the pre-study, but also come from Spain or Greece; these people are however already more incorporated into society.

All in all, the similar basic patterns in the distribution of status groups in the samples at Michel Motors and the case study company used in the pre-study indicate that we are dealing here with common status allocations on the basis of employment, at least in the German car industry. With both of our sample surveys we are encompassing a total of 736 interviewees. In the case of Michel Motors their composition can be said to be representative for the area of
waged workers, whereas in the pre-study the sample survey is representative for the entire workforce\textsuperscript{138}.

The three variables of “education”, “career” and “income” at both AutoCat and Textil S.A. provide a clearer meritocratic triad in comparison to Michel Motors or to the company studied in the pre-study. However, in contrast to the German sample surveys, initial professional training does not assume the central role in the area of training as a whole. This role is occupied rather by school leaving qualifications and the opportunities for qualifications based on further professional training. The effects can be felt most clearly at Textil S.A. and have an obstructive character for the (mainly female) interviewees’ future prospects in life. What we mean is that whilst at AutoCat over 70% of the interviewees have undertaken some kind of further professional training over the course of their careers, and this has had a positive effect on their careers, the qualification rate amongst the sample at Textil S.A. was just over 29%. This is even more important here as the employees at the textile company do not have either particularly low nor any particularly high school qualifications; moreover, 62% have undertaken no initial professional training at all, whereas this figure is only 32% for AutoCat.

\textit{Figure 10: Distribution of Status Groups within the Sample at AutoCat and Textil S.A. (figures in %, excluding apprentices)}

A. AutoCat

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}[scale=0.8]
\begin{axis}[
    title={Distribution of Status Groups within the Sample at AutoCat and Textil S.A. (figures in %, excluding apprentices)},
    xlabel={Groups},
    ylabel={Percentage},
    xtick={1,2,3,4,5},
    xticklabels={Group 1, Group 2, Group 3, Group 4, Group 5},
    ytick={0,10,20,30,40,50,60,70},
    legend pos=north east,
]
\addplot[fill=blue!20] coordinates {
(1,13.4)
(2,16.0)
(3,53.4)
(4,28.2)
(5,6.1)
};
\addplot[fill=yellow!20] coordinates {
(1,0)
(2,0)
(3,57.3)
(4,27.7)
(5,0)
};
\addplot[fill=red!20] coordinates {
(1,0)
(2,0)
(3,0)
(4,0)
(5,0)
};
\legend{Total, Women, Interviewees with a background of migration}
\end{axis}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{138} As it is solely the area of waged workers which is covered at Michel Motors, the normal distribution curve has a corresponding shift to the left. The sample survey from the pre-study is however distributed normally.
The values depicted in Figure 10.A for AutoCat illustrate both common features and specific characteristics in the distribution of prospects in life, when compared with Michel Motors. One common feature is the fact that the opportunities and the barriers to gaining access to professional positions are based on a combination of school education and qualification throughout people’s careers. However – and this is where the differences begin – the lowest status group is dominated by interviewees with a background of migration, as well as by female interviewees. A slightly higher than proportionate number of interviewees with a background of migration and female interviewees are represented in the group of trained and skilled workers, but in the next highest status group, Group 3, their proportion already starts to decline. The main reason for this is to be found in the lower involvement in training in comparison with indigenous males. This fact can already be seen in the somewhat lower level of school education, but is underlined by the low level of participation in further professional training. Those with a background of migration therefore only constitute a third of interviewees who have previously completed one of these courses.

A further noticeable point is that with the exception of the lowest and the second highest status group, women and men are represented to almost equal degrees. In the “middle range”, social status is therefore distributed evenly across the genders. But another feature in common with the sample survey at Michel Motors is that school leaving qualifications are more influential for women than further training. Furthermore, they aim to achieve a lower wage than their male colleagues in comparable professional positions.

Life circumstances are shown to be much more precarious at Textil S.A., yet they are distributed in a similar pattern as at AutoCat. These features common to the Spanish companies investigated lead us to suspect that they are not untypical for the industry we are dealing with at least.

In the sample survey at Special Motor Plant we can make out barely any parallels to the companies investigated in Germany and Spain. In the British company the variables “professional position” and “income” form a (statistical) unit; education on the other hand is only a subordinate category in the allocation to one of the five status groups.

---

139 We cannot make any more precise conclusions about the distribution in status Group 4 on account of the low number of cases investigated.
However this unit of professional position and income, which is essentially constituted by the status groups depicted in Figure 11, can largely only be measured for the male interviewees: their potential income is in line with their professional position, women earn less in a comparable professional position. A parallel can be seen here to the Spanish companies. However, unlike in these and in the German companies, education plays a secondary role, and an even more secondary role than for men. This is true not just for initial professional training, but also for school leaving qualifications. The number of female interviewees is too small to be able to draw conclusions about the causes of this. It is however noticeable that their average level of education is very low in both areas. With regard to initial professional training within the company, this also holds for men that were interviewed; they do however display a relatively high level of school education. As professional qualification in Britain is mainly carried out within the general education system, with skilled workers then being recruited from this base, this advantaged the men we interviewed over the women. Added to this is the very great importance attached to professional experience. This is accompanied by further training schemes which often do not look like a training course leading to a higher qualification, such as those found in the other companies investigated in Germany and Spain.

Professional experience comes through relatively strongly in our allocation of status for the sample survey at Special Motor Plant, and this is also closely related to the age structure. The average age is higher in comparison with Michel Motors and Textil S.A., and in comparison with the general trend at AutoCat. In the higher status groups of skilled workers through to middle management we therefore find an above proportionate number of workers within the age ranges from 41 to 60. This means that in relation to the younger workforce and sample surveys in the other companies being investigated, the interviewees in the British company were more likely to have the opportunity to climb up the career ladder within the company, as a result of their experience and sometimes also due to their having spent a longer time within the company. The age make-up of this sample is not typical across our comparisons, and it is no accident; it is a result of the company’s human resources policy in the context of the process of restructuring being carried out at the Special Motor Plant location we investigated. At the time of our survey just over 16% of the planned workforce had been achieved; i.e. just a small core workforce was employed in the factory, which had been recruited from various locations belonging to the original group (compare Chapter III, Section 3.4). In this respect, the
sample survey was in fact representative for this core workforce at the time of the study, but not for the planned full workforce. This again underlines the special nature of the empirical survey at Special Motor Plant in this study.

In the following text we will now analyse more closely the structural category of gender. The issue here will be the relationship between the individual status of the interviewees, the social position of their partners and their family background. A further issue will be to see whether we can discern a weakening effect in the differences we have outlined above, using a comparison of gender or age cohort, or whether these differences remain relatively constant and prove to be a “gap” between the sexes.

The same procedure of a comparison of the age cohort will be carried out with regard to possible patterns of inequality common to migration, and we will check at the same time whether these remain stable across the generations, or whether these become weaker, as has already been hinted at.

1.2 Social Inequalities:

Do They Follow Patterns Based on Gender or Migration?

We can confirm whether social inequalities follow gender-specific patterns, as has already been indicated in the previous section on the allocation of status, by looking more closely at the personal circumstances of women and men. However, we need several differentiations here. The trans-generational comparison of a number of different factors has already played a role in our comparison of status, but amongst female interviewees – in comparison to amongst the men we interviewed – there is a clearly discernable “age gap” between young women and older women. Whilst young women’s opportunity structure differs from that of their male counterparts only in minor details, older women’s opportunities differ not only to that of their male colleagues but also to that of their younger female colleagues. Whilst young women mainly have an uninterrupted education and professional career history, restrictions facing older women can partially be explained by career breaks due to families. We do not see the same amongst male interviewees. But this explanation is not the only plausible explanation here for our sample surveys and it is not equally relevant for all of the sample surveys. Furthermore, restrictions can also be noted amongst the men, although they first show up amongst the older interviewees and can be said to be typical across the board.

As a rule, a comparison of generations or age cohorts is used for analyses of the course of people’s lives. It cannot however, or can no longer entirely assume this function. It can indeed make clear the risks due to career breaks for family reasons or the opportunities over the course of people’s lives, such as career progression, if these follow relatively constant patterns. In our cases, it can however be seen that we are dealing with the social opportunities open to the men and women we interviewed, but also the opportunities which sometimes change over time and which enable them to shape their career paths. This needs to be taken into account in the comparisons.

At Michel Motors we carried out the trans-generational gender comparison solely amongst those interviewees without a background of migration. This aims to avoid patterns of inequality common amongst migrants possibly leading to distortions. Later on, this part sample is then checked for possible limitations on opportunity structures common amongst migrants.

In the initial instance it is important to remember that on two points we encounter similar working conditions amongst the females and males interviewed, which are not unimportant for their prospects in life: (1) almost 100% of them have unlimited, full time working contracts (2) almost 90% work in so-called one-shift or two-shift operations, and the working time for these is almost entirely during the day. Almost 47% of women and only just over

---

140 The status groups in the sample are normally distributed.
28% of men work in a single shift operation. To put it differently, about 60% of the men work in alternating early and late shifts, a further 11% even work in a three-shift operation, covering early, late and night shifts\(^{141}\). This does improve earnings potential; however, we could already see from the pre-study the consequences that shift work has on health and the quality of life (see U. Birsl/S. Ottens/K. Sturhan 1999: 147 onwards). All in all, the working conditions amongst both sexes essentially do not diverge.

We again used the meritocratic triad of education, career and income for our trans-generational gender comparison.

\[\text{Table 12: Michel Motors - Education, Profession and Income in Trans-Generational and Cross-Gender Comparison (N = 337, arithmetic mean values)}^{*}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort According to Gender</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Professional Position (Index) (1)</th>
<th>Income Index (3)</th>
<th>Social Status (Index) Made up of (1), (2), (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>highest educational qualification (ISCED)</td>
<td>initial qualified professional training (Index)</td>
<td>education index (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>up to and including 20</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 up to and including 30</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 up to and including 40</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 up to and including 50</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 up to and including 60</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All of the indices used, including the ISCED areas, have five levels, ranging from 1 = very low to 5 = very high. The arithmetic average is 2.5. The age group up to and including 20 years consists almost entirely of apprentices, meaning that the variables of education, profession and income cannot be determined, or cannot yet be determined conclusively. In the age groups over 51, there are too few women to provide any conclusive values. The same is also true for the group of men over 61.

As Table 12 shows, the women surveyed demonstrate an increasing participation in the area of further training in particular, and this increase is evident right across the age groups. This holds true not just for school leaving qualifications, but also for initial professional training. Younger women up to the age range of 30-plus, are at the same level as men of the same age, and indeed, score more highly in terms of school education. It must however be remembered that at the same time, and across the generations, the general level of education has risen for both men and women. Amongst the 21 – 30 years age group there has also been a near harmonisation of other factors between the sexes, namely “professional position” and “income”. However, a slight discrepancy in favour of the young men can still be discerned. Disparities between the sexes are much clearer amongst the older age groups. Here a “gap” can also be

\(^{141}\) At the Michel Motors location we investigated, there was an option to select not only the classic three shift operation, but also to choose for six months to work in a single shift during the night. This is mostly chosen by male workers.
seen, particularly as a result of women’s relatively low level of education; amongst the men this is a lot higher, principally for professional training.

If we include further indicators such as family status and the number of children, reasons for a job change or a career break etc., then there are clear indications that there are risks in life which are not dependent on people’s participation in education and training. These play a role in later life, and influence disparities between the sexes which already exist.

It is noticeable firstly that the family background barely differs for women and men in the age range up to 30-plus. In the majority of cases they are not married or live with their partner, and have no children. Their educational and professional paths have largely been uninterrupted, if we ignore short breaks on account of the labour market situation. As age increases, this situation changes: women with children – mainly one or two – have interrupted their careers in the past to devote time to their families. We also see that the majority of these women cannot find employment appropriate to their education and training after such a break. Amongst men of the same age, on the other hand, career paths have been in a much straighter line, irrespective of marriage and children. Opportunities for professional advancement have also not been affected. Furthermore, we also find amongst this group those people who work in a multiple shift operation to improve their earnings. The majority of these live in marriages where the traditional gender arrangement is dominant. This means that wives are as a rule not employed, and the men are the main breadwinners in the family. Amongst these men in the age range 41-plus, we also find people who have had to interrupt their careers or have had to change their job within the company for health reasons. This has not necessarily led to a collapse of their professional career, but it has put the brakes on it. All of this means that women and men are largely subject to very typical restrictions. For women, a period spent looking after their children means a break in their professional careers. Whether this will have similar effects for today’s younger women over the course of their lives to come as it has had for women who are today older, cannot be concluded here. Younger women have more favourable starting conditions, as a result of their levels of education and their greater number of years’ professional experience already. However, this may still remain a risk factor. We cannot discern a similar break in men’s career progression. Their risk factor is found much more in the increasing strain of work and the health strain of work during periods of raising a family.

At AutoCat as with the sample survey at Michel Motors, we again restrict ourselves initially to interviewees without a background of migration in order to avoid possible distortions amongst the male interviewees.

Unlike for the sample at Michel Motors, the working conditions in this sample are different for women and men. In terms of working times, we found there were more burdensome factors amongst the men we interviewed. In fact, almost 68% of the men work in a three-shift operation, and only 29% work in a one-shift operation. This is different for the female interviewees: by comparison, only marginally more than 55% of them work in alternating early, late and night shifts, and 42% work during regular working hours. But over a quarter of the women are working at AutoCat for a limited period of time, compared to 13% of the men. This means that unlike at Michel Motors, we cannot assume comparable working conditions as a starting point. The only exception is that full time work is the norm for both sexes.

In spite of this, there are parallels in a trans-generational and cross-gender comparison, but there are also differences to the German case, which are not connected to the working conditions we have mentioned.
Table 13: AutoCat - Education, Profession and Income in Trans-Generational and Cross-Gender Comparison (N = 305, arithmetic mean values)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort According to Gender</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Professional Position (Index) (2)</th>
<th>Income Index (3)</th>
<th>Social Status (Index) made up of (1), (2), (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>highest educational qualification (ISCED)</td>
<td>initial qualified professional training (Index)</td>
<td>education index (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 up to and including 30</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 up to and including 40</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 up to and including 50</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 up to and including 60</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The explanation of the indices used here can be found for Table 12; where no value is recorded, the number of cases was too low.

It is instantly noticeable from Table 13 that again at AutoCat, the women constitute a very young part sample amongst the interviewees. They are even totally absent amongst the age groups from 51 years and up. Across the generations we can also note a similarly motivated process of harmonisation between female and male interviewees – however, there are nuances in comparison to Michel Motors, which in the end are more than just slight differences. The process of harmonisation between the two sexes is a result of two opposing trends: (1) in terms of education, the female interviewees have caught up with and indeed overtaken the men, though only in the area of school level education. The background to this is the high unemployment amongst young women in particular (see Chapter II, Section 2) which results in people choosing to spend more time in formal education. In contrast to Germany, say, where youth unemployment tends to lead to so-called queues in the education system, this is accompanied in Spain by the higher qualification of women. With regard to the concrete situation in the companies being investigated here, this had the result that women in this sample could compensate for deficits in professional training by their higher level of educational qualifications. This may be the reason for them now also having caught up in terms of their professional position and their earnings potential. (2) At the same time, however, the situation of the men in terms of professional position, income and therefore also in terms of the protection of their status, has worsened. This differs to the results from the German sample survey, and is also in spite of continued pursuit of training options right across the age ranges. This means that the sexes have moved closer to one another.

In comparison to the indigenous interviewees at Michel Motors, the employees at Michel Motors marry earlier. Whilst in the age ranges up to and including 30 years of age, well above 60% of women and men remained unmarried, and as a rule childless, people over the age of 31 do start to get married, meaning that in the age group of 31 to 40 year olds around two thirds are no longer single. This does not however mean that children are then born as soon as people get married. But it is noticeable that almost 62% of the employed women in all age groups represented here have no children. This leads us to only two conclusions: (1) Women who want to remain at work, or who possibly have to remain at work, abstain from having
families with children. (2) In instances where they do have children, women normally tend then to leave their professional life. This also provides one explanation as to why we have a very young part sample here. Mothers, and therefore women in the older age groups, tend not to return to gainful employment following a period spent raising children. It is therefore not surprising that we find hardly any returning workers amongst our female interviewees. If during the course of their career development they have changed job or even moved companies – which applies to three quarters of the women surveyed – or have had to interrupt their employment, then this was as a result of the prospect of better earnings potential, the loss of a job or health reasons, not by periods of time spent raising their families.

Whilst similarly, a relatively high proportion of the men surveyed were childless – almost 55% - this group is made up predominantly of younger men. Fatherhood begins in the age group 31 years and above. In the age group over the age of 41, 90% are already father to at least one child, and as a rule, they also tend to be the main breadwinner in the family. As at Michel Motors as well, employment in a multiple shift operation increases amongst men in this age cohort.

The sample survey at AutoCat therefore shows that the traditional gender specific division of labour asserts itself from the point in time when people have children. The somewhat opposing trend can be seen in the fact that women do not necessarily marry at an early age, and that marriage is not automatically accompanied by the birth of children.

If men change their job or move companies, something which 86% of respondents had done, then it was more likely than amongst the women to have been motivated by better income elsewhere, and the opportunity for career advancement. If they had had to interrupt their careers, then this was also due to health reasons but was more likely to be due to the fact that men had been more affected by unemployment than had the women interviewees. The reason that women had been less affected by unemployment is not that the position of women in the labour market generally stabilises once they have accessed the employment system; the situation here is also relatively insecure. As at AutoCat, employed women relatively often work under temporary working contracts on the Spanish labour market in general. According to EUROSTAT’s workforce study, one third of all female workers in the age groups up to 49 years work solely under temporary employment contracts. This figure is only just over 28% for men (see EUROSTAT 2001:116). The fact that women have had to interrupt their careers less due to unemployment is a result more of the fact that they have to leave employment again relatively early to raise a family. As this is not the case for men, they are more affected by unemployment as their careers develop. This may provide a central reason for why we found indications in the sample at AutoCat of the problem of protecting their social status amongst the male interviewees in our comparison of all age ranges.

The fact that a precarious labour market for men has far-reaching consequences not only for the men themselves, but also for (married) women is no new finding. However, our case study Textil S.A. portrays this very well. Similarly here, we initially took just the indigenous part sample as our focus. In this case however this was in order to avoid distortions amongst the women surveyed.

\[\text{As we have already mentioned, women remain in the education system for longer, as a result of a more precarious labour market. Men on the other hand often return to formal education upon losing their job when their careers are already developing (see L. Toharia 1997:10).}\]
Table 14: Textil S.A. - Education, Profession and Income in Trans-Generational and Cross-Gender Comparison (N = 305, arithmetic mean values)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort According to Gender</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Professional Position (Index) (2)</th>
<th>Income Index (3)</th>
<th>Social Status (Index) made up of (1), (2), (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>highest educational qualification (ISCED)</td>
<td>Initial qualified professional training (Index)</td>
<td>education index (1)</td>
<td>made up of (1), (2), (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 up to and including 30</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 up to and including 40</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 up to and including 50</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 up to and including 60</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The explanation of the indices used here can be found for Table 12; where no value is recorded, the number of cases was too low.

As Table 14 shows, we can observe the same process of harmonisation at Textil S.A. and the same opposing trends in the social situation of both sexes across the whole range of age groupings, as was observed at AutoCat. Overall, this takes place here on a lower level. In addition, amongst the women we can observe that despite relatively stable or a slightly improving professional position, income deteriorates. Furthermore, unlike at AutoCat, we did not have an overwhelming young part sample of women, but rather the women we surveyed here on the whole were older. The background to this has already been hinted at: unlike the general pattern of employment of women in Spain, we see here that around 65% are married women almost all of whom have children, the majority having more than two. 26% of the women surveyed are the main breadwinners in their families, as their husbands are not employed and receive no earnings. As a result of these circumstances at Textil S.A., we can assume that we will find the husbands of the women surveyed amongst the men employed in the company (see Chapter III, Section 3.3). In most instances, the spouses are in a comparable professional position to the women surveyed, in some instances in a more favourable position and in others again in a less favourable position. Taking the relatively poor earnings potential into account we can assume that a single income is not sufficient to support a family adequately and it is for this reason that both spouses work.

Furthermore, 27% of the women surveyed at Textil S.A. and again 22% of the men surveyed are only temporary employees. However, most of these do not work in a multiple shift operation, and work full time. More than 70% of the part sample of those surveyed without a background of migration have changed jobs over the course of their careers. This is a smaller proportion than at AutoCat. Amongst the women, this was the change to Textil S.A., and no motives were given; men however listed motivating factors such as career advancement and better earnings. Well over half of the interviewees had had to interrupt their career in the past, more workers than at the car manufacturer. Amongst the men this was primarily due to job loss and illness. Amongst the women, health problems were again responsible for the interruption of their careers, but so too was raising a family. Yet despite the high proportion of mothers in the sample, only 15% had taken a career break to raise a family.
As was the case in the German survey, the trans-generational and cross-gender comparison of the sample surveys at the two Spanish companies points to general social conditions in the relationship between the sexes, but at the same time reveals the differences. Whilst in the German case there are gender-typical risks on the part of women which mean that starting a family can lead to breaks in their career development, the course of peoples lives in the Spanish cases shows that this leads to women ending their professional careers – unless the spouse’s income or their job situation do not allow for this. In the Spanish cases we see that there are indications of problems in retaining their status which affect not only their professional positions but also the development of their earnings. This runs counter to the situation amongst the women.

In the sample survey at Special Motor Plant we see almost exclusively white Britons, meaning that no differentiation between majority and minorities is necessary here. The opportunities to carry out gender comparisons is also limited due to the relatively low proportion of women interviewed.

Table 15 outlines how we are dealing here with a sample survey across both sexes made up of relatively highly qualified workers in higher professional and earnings brackets. This may be due to the unique situation at the location investigated, where the core workforce is simultaneously the workforce which is restructuring the workplace.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort According to Gender</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Professional Position (Index)</th>
<th>Income Index</th>
<th>Social Status (Index) made up of (1), (2), (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>highest educational qualification (ISCED)</td>
<td>Initial qualified professional training (Index)</td>
<td>education index (1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 up to and including 30</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 up to and including 40</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 up to and including 50</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 up to and including 60</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The explanation of the indices used here can be found for Table 12; where no value is recorded, the number of cases was too low.

This very favourable picture of the social situation is completed when working conditions and career development are included as well. Hardly surprisingly, almost 90% of those surveyed had changed jobs, from, amongst other places, branches of companies now belonging to the same company. For both sexes, this was tied up with a professional promotion. There had been hardly any career interruptions. Several of the women, however, did say that they had interrupted their employment from time to time on account of their families, and this appeared to have occurred at a very young age. If we now compare the professional position and income situation of both age cohorts up to and including 40, as outlined in Table 15, then

---

143 In the following text, no percentage figures will be given for the women surveyed, due to the low number of cases.
there are indications at least that starting a family with children does not necessarily lead to
breaks in people’s professional careers. However, a clear majority of the women have no
children.

In contrast to the other sample surveys, unemployment or health problems were not listed
as reasons for a career break.

Almost all of those we surveyed have permanent employment contracts and work full time,
and indeed, primarily during regular working hours and not in a multiple shift operation.

However there is one difference to the German and Spanish cases: as a rule, the women’s
partners and spouses have a higher social position. In the other sample surveys there were few
or no deviations from this, unless – as in the case of Textil S.A. – the partner is unemployed.
In the British case, amongst the men surveyed, and particularly amongst those in the older age
groups, we find the classic or traditional family constellation, even if this is not to the same
large extent that we see it in the other sample surveys.

What this means is that with the exception of the women surveyed in the British sample,
the result is not the empirical social research dilemma outlined at the start here, of looking for
a methodological instrument which would take women’s family backgrounds into account in
accordance with a social status. However, this is not to say that this dilemma does not really
exist or perhaps no longer exists. If we include the pre-study, we can only conclude that the
issue of an appropriate accordance of status is not as pressing if working women are included
in the survey. It only relieves studies such as this one, and even then, only partially. The Ger-
man and Spanish cases in particular could have shown that there are common risks for women
over the course of their lives, and therefore also in their prospects in life, which do not follow
general patterns of social inequality. On first sight, for men these are seen in the phase when
they are starting families, due to greater workloads. However, we still have to ask whether we
should really rather be talking about common male patterns of social inequality, when we
consider that traditional gender arrangements are not yet dissipating despite several changes
in behaviour.

Furthermore, what all of this underlines is that in the sample surveys in all three countries
– with the exception of Textil S.A. – we are constantly dealing with young female part sam-
pies. This is due not to an imbalance in the sample surveys but rather it reflects the age struc-
ture in the companies investigated, and beyond that, the age structure of the female working
population in the three countries, which are each characterised by a - sometimes sharply - de-
clining employment rate in the older working age ranges (see EUROSTAT 2001: 78 on-
wards). Moreover, according to EUROSTAT’s workforce study, on average, amongst EU
countries (the results are not separated on a country basis) the two most important reasons for
non-employment amongst the active population are firstly “personal and family commit-
ments” and secondly “illness/inability to work” (see EUROSTAT 2001: 211). These are the
factors which we could discern in our sample surveys as being risks for the further course of
the interviewees’ lives, both for men and for women.

To now speak of a “gap” between the personal circumstances of the two sexes seems inex-
act. It should however have been made clear that we can assume gender specific opportunities
and risks, which then have an effect on the “subjective” side of people’s personal circum-
stances (see Section 1.2).

At first sight, a less uniform picture of the basic patterns emerges from our trans-
generational comparison of the personal circumstances of interviewees with and without a
background of migration. The hypothesis that discrimination common to migrants declines
successively over the generations and that this is then transferred into general patterns of so-
cial inequality can only be supported in this sharpened emphasis in the German case of Mi-
chel Motors, as in the pre-study. However, we can only hypothesise this for male industry
workers, as in our study we are lacking data on the personal circumstances of women with a
background of migration.
Table 16: Michel Motors - Education, Profession and Income of Male Respondents with and without a Background of Migration, in Trans-Generational Comparison (N = 279, arithmetic mean values)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Professional Position (Index)</th>
<th>Income Index</th>
<th>Social Status (Index) made up of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highest educational qualification (ISCED)</td>
<td>Initial qualified professional training (Index)</td>
<td>education index (1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>up to and including 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Without migration background</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With migration background</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 up to and including 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Without migration background</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With migration background</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 up to and including 40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Without migration background</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With migration background</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 up to and including 50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Without migration background</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With migration background</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 up to and including 60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Without migration background</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With migration background</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Table 12 for an explanation of these indices.

As Table 16 shows, we can discern a harmonisation process in the area of education, profession and income as well as in the accordance of status, that is, on the structural side of the personal circumstances of male respondents without and with a background of migration. In the age group of 31 to 40 year olds, we can see the change from different to more similar, though not entirely identical personal circumstances. One thing remains noticeable in this approximation: despite a higher level of participation in school education amongst respondents from families who have migrated, where they have not only made up the indigenous workers’ lead, but have at the same time also caught up to the indigenous workers’ increased participation in education, this is not yet similarly reflected in their acquiring more appropriate profes-
sional positions. The reasons here are partly hidden in the opportunities to access professional training and to exploit professional qualifications on the labour market. What we mean here is that interviewees with a background of migration more often have no professional training, or only a low level training qualification, and are more frequently employed as untrained workers or workers who are trained on the job, or are employed in jobs unrelated to their training\textsuperscript{144}. This reveals two barriers in the access to social status positions which continue still to have a certain effect, even though this has become weaker: the first threshold is to be found in the transition from the general education system to the professional education system, and the second is in the transition to the employment system, and this appears even to have an effect when people have the required qualifications.

However, there are very clear disadvantages commonly facing migrants of the older generations. For this group, the values of all our indices, of education, profession and income, are lower. This cannot simply be put down to the fact that we are possibly dealing here with a majority of first generation immigrants, who brought only limited educational resources with them from their home countries. This is not the case. Only 20\% of the entire part sample survey, of migrants with a background of migration, had even completed a school leaving qualification in their home country, and this was not necessarily one of the lower ISCED-Level qualifications. This means that 80\% went to a school in Germany, and are therefore definitely already members of second and third generation immigrants. Similarly, in the older age groups over 41 years, only just over one third completed their schooling overseas; they do not account for the low average participation in schooling and the low value of the education index. Here, it is primarily incorporation problems for immigrants, in this case elder youths in the German education system of the 1960s and 70s, which are more likely to be the cause.

The fact stands out in Table 16 that male interviewees from families which have migrated often aim to earn more in relation to their professional position than do indigenous male interviewees. The first, rather stereotypical suspicion that a higher proportion of interviewees with a background of migration work in a multiple shift operation and therefore receive supplementary income, proved not to hold true. The explanation is much more straightforward: the proportion of married men amongst these interviewees is greater than amongst indigenous males, at almost 62\%. In particular, in the age group of 31 to 40 year-olds we hardly find any unmarried men at all. On account of tax benefits, these men therefore attain a higher net income than their indigenous colleagues. Apart from this, there are hardly any differences between male interviewees with a background of migration, or only very marginal ones, in terms of family and gender arrangements in marriage. The higher rate of marriage amongst this group does not generally lead to a greater proportion of families with more children. Furthermore, the same holds true for these men as for indigenous males: when children have been born, then the traditional gender-specific division of labour asserts itself and the women do not work; they are housewives and mothers. In addition, even amongst this group there are some men who change working patterns to work in a multiple shift operation at the time when they are starting a family.

A higher proportion of interviewees with a background of migration have changed jobs or companies and have had to interrupt their employment than those with no migration history. The reasons for this are the same, although in terms of having to interrupt their employment, there are two differences: unemployment was slightly less often the reason than amongst indigenous males, at 15.5\% compared to 17.7\%, and they were much less likely to have had to

\textsuperscript{144} Low level qualification training encompasses all courses which last for less than 2 years. Amongst interviewees from immigrant families, 26.6\% have no qualification or only one of these low level qualifications. Amongst indigenous interviewees, on the other hand, this figure is only 16.2\%. Only 36.3\% of those interviewees with a background of migration can be said to be employed in a position equal to their training and education, compared to 45.7\% of male respondents without a background of migration. However, for both groups it can be said that the majority have not found work appropriate to their education and training.
take a career break on health grounds, at 14.4% compared with 21.1% amongst indigenous males. On this last point, the reason as to why the difference between interviewees with and without a background of migration is relatively large cannot be established from the data collected here. Working conditions, including work in multiple shift operations are not less burdensome for those from migrant families than for indigenous respondents. It could possibly be that workers with a background of migration less often dare to interrupt their careers as they fear they may be unable simply to take up their positions again. However, this possible explanation is pure speculation for our sample.

At AutoCat we do not see a similar process of harmonisation as that observed at Michel Motors. However we do see several comparable differences in the personal circumstances of interviewees without and interviewees with a background of migration. Yet we do have to point out once again that a background of migration here means Spanish workers who have either moved themselves or whose families moved from southern regions – primarily Andalusia – to Catalonia.

Similar levels can only be perceived comprehensively across all values of social status amongst the youngest age group of 21 to 30 year olds, as is shown in Table 17.

Table 17: AutoCat - Education, Profession and Income of Male Respondents without and with a Background of Migration, in Trans-Generational Comparison

\[N = 256, \text{arithmetic mean values}\]^*  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort</th>
<th>Highest educational qualification (ISCED)</th>
<th>Initial qualified professional training (Index)</th>
<th>education index (1)</th>
<th>Professional Position (Index) (2)</th>
<th>Income Index (3)</th>
<th>Social Status (Index) made up of (1), (2), (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 up to and including 30</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Without migration background</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With migration background</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 up to and including 40</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Without migration background</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With migration background</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 up to and including 50</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Without migration background</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The explanation of the indices used here can be found for Table 12; where no value is recorded, the number of cases was too low.

In total, the discrepancies between the groups in this part sample are not as clearly outlined right across the generations as they are in the German case. With the exception of the oldest generation, in terms of the structural factors in their personal circumstances interviewees with and without a background of migration are more similar than in the sample survey at Michel
Motors. Yet a familiar pattern is being repeated here: again in this sample, male respondents from immigrant families cannot exploit their general school level qualifications in the same way as their indigenous colleagues use theirs in terms of professional qualification and attaining a better professional position. Similar barriers are manifest here in accessing the professional education and employment systems, even if these are lower for almost all age ranges here than in the German case.

A further familiar pattern is clear here which can be recognised not in the company comparison but in the gender comparison in the sample survey at AutoCat. The level of participation in education amongst male respondents from immigrant families had improved, as had that of the women we surveyed, but this had not had a similar impact on improving these worker’s professional position, their income and social status in general. The approximation – if it were indeed an approximation in this case it only manifests itself amongst the youngest generation at best – is completed through the problems male indigenous interviewees have in stabilising their social position. This possibly means that indications of social deprivation are manifest across all the age cohorts.

Let us return to the comparison of male interviewees without and with a background of migration: there are much clearer differences between other factors in personal circumstances than in the German case. Almost all the men from families which have migrated within Spain are married, whilst barely 56% of the indigenous males in our sample are. On average, they marry later and as a rule, this is accompanied by the birth of children. However, interviewees with a background of migration are no more likely to change their working pattern to a multiple shift operation than their indigenous colleagues are. Instead, in many cases wives remain employed, and indeed, in professional positions which are perfectly comparable to those of their husbands. This is however no indication that the traditional understanding of roles amongst the sexes is beginning to weaken. As we will see in the following chapter, Chapter V, there is absolutely no indication for this at all. The reasons for the increased employment of married women is more likely to be found in the situation of the men. There are indications that interviewees from the part sample of those with a “background of migration” are not in a position to undertake a higher workload, such as working in several shifts, on account of health problems. Almost 40% of those people who had had to interrupt their careers in the past – who constituted just over 60% of the part sample – said that this had been due to illness. A further reason for the untypical gender arrangement may also be found in the less favourable development of income amongst the men we surveyed. For a third of those we interviewed, the fact that they largely earn as much as the indigenous workers we surveyed is due to their role at the time we conducted our investigation: they moved jobs or companies in the past in order to earn more money; all in all, professional advancement did not play a role. It is for this reason as well that a greater proportion of these people work as untrained labourers or workers trained on the job than do male interviewees without a background of migration (29% to 12%).

At Textil S.A., in our international comparison of female interviewees without and with a background of migration – similarly, the context here is that of domestic migration – we again see patterns on the structural side of people’s personal circumstances, and these differ greatly from those of the male interviewees in the two car plants. The issue of whether these are now typical patterns for the personal circumstances of female industrial workers in Spain in total and can therefore also be seen as being relevant for women in the car industry cannot be resolved conclusively. In our trans-generational and cross-gender comparison, we already saw that the personal circumstances and working conditions of the women at AutoCat and Textil S.A. differ greatly from one another in particular with relation to the background to employment behaviour and the family situation, as well as the professional position and income relationships; in total, the personal circumstances of those in the sample survey at Textil S.A. can be categorised as being more precarious in social terms. However, in both samples, parallels
were apparent in the harmonisation process between the two sexes. In other words: the women surveyed at Textil S.A. are not representative for female industrial workers, nor for those working in the motor industry. Yet we can assume that we encounter patterns in the relationship between the women surveyed without a background of migration and those with a background of migration which allow possible conclusions to be drawn – at least at this level – about typical characteristics, or which provide us with indications about the converging or diverging situation of the men surveyed.

Table 18 now points out both the convergences and divergences, even though differences dominate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Cohort</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Professional Position (Index)</th>
<th>Income Index</th>
<th>Social Status (Index) made up of (1), (2), (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highest educational qualification (ISCED)</td>
<td>Initial qualified professional training (Index)</td>
<td>education index (1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 up to and including 30</td>
<td>Without migration background</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With migration background</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 up to and including 40</td>
<td>Without migration background</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With migration background</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 up to and including 50</td>
<td>Without migration background</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With migration background</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 up to and including 60</td>
<td>Without migration background</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With migration background</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The explanation of the indices used here can be found for Table 12; where no value is recorded, the number of cases was too low.

Across the generations, both groups, i.e., females without and with a background of migration, have been able marginally to improve their personal circumstances. However, stronger efforts have been made again in the area of school level education, which is not reflected in their professional position or in their income and earnings. The values for both of these indices have not increased to the same extent as those in school level education. Whilst the social status of both groups of women surveyed in the highest age group of 51 to 60 years demonstrate almost identical structural features, these values start to diverge amongst the subsequent generations. Initially, a slight advantage can be seen in the education, profession and income of interviewees with a background of migration, yet from the age group 31 to 40 years we see the first indications of a reversal of the relationship in favour of interviewees without a background of migration. It is particularly noticeable that this group are more likely to have certified professional qualifications than older generations and than their female colleagues from immigrant
families. For these groups, the general pattern is for them to build on their school qualifications. In all of this, whilst their family background is not a dramatic factor, it is more problematic in social terms than that of indigenous females, who already have a low level of personal circumstances. As with their indigenous female colleagues, two-thirds of women surveyed from immigrant families are married. By contrast however a much higher proportion of indigenous female workers have to feed a family alone, at over 34% compared to 26%, and this is on top of the fact that they have a higher total number of children.

2. The “Subjective” Side of Personal Circumstances

In the following text we now turn to the “subjective” side of personal circumstances, to the respondents’ own assessments and perceptions concerning their social situation, as well as their views on how to secure this, or to what extent they regard this as being threatened. In addition to quantitative results from the standardised survey we also include here results and impressions from the group discussions carried out in the companies investigated in Spain and in Germany.\textsuperscript{145}

2.1 Social Orientations, Fears and Self-Evaluation

In societies oriented to employment, such as our case study countries, the issue of job security is of fundamental importance for the subjective assessment of people’s own personal circumstances. We are therefore interested in whether the interviewees a) feel that they are actually threatened by the danger of becoming unemployed b) don’t feel threatened, but do feel insecure as a result of the general situation of the labour market or c) if they do not feel any of these fears or insecurities at all.

\textbf{Table 19: Effects of the general situation of the labour market on the assessment of the individual’s situation (N = 923, figures in %)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Michel Motors (n = 337)</th>
<th>AutoCat (n = 305)</th>
<th>Textil S.A. (n = 149)</th>
<th>Special Motor Plant (n = 132)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“I feel personally threatened by the danger of being made redundant.”</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Whilst I personally do not feel directly threatened by unemployment, the growing risk of losing my job is disconcerting.”</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Personally I do not fear that I will be made redundant”.</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that the lowest levels of concern are recorded in the quantitative survey at Special Motor Plant in Great Britain is hardly surprising given the relatively buoyant labour market for white Britons at the time, and also due to the fact that the company we investigated was being built up at the time, with the idea of areas of the company being cut back not an issue at all. In comparison to the other companies investigated, 4.7% of those interviewed here said that they personally felt threatened by unemployment, the lowest number, and 44.2% or the highest number said that they had no fears about unemployment. Even the category of the “latentlly insecure” was only measured at 42.6%, much lower than the levels recorded in the other two countries.

\textsuperscript{145} The results of the group discussions in Britain relate exclusively to the areas of migration and interculturality, so we do not include them in this chapter.
In Spain and Germany, unemployment is generally a much bigger social problem at the minute, and this is presumably reflected in the very high rates of the "latently insecure", at 53% and 63% respectively. However, not a great deal of those interviewed felt directly threatened – 8.4% and 14.7% respectively – a fact which could be attributable to the general situation in the two countries. Even those interviewees who harbour no concerns on this issue are also relatively large in number, at 21% and 31%. The contributions made in the group discussions give us an insight into the backgrounds to this: here, similarly, most participants did not actually feel threatened by unemployment, but they based this on the secure status of their own jobs within the companies where they worked, something which they felt exceptionally privileged by.

During the discussions at Michel Motors, only one female participant reported having been unemployed for a longer period of time, and found this very unpleasant: “Getting your money from the dole office feels really crap” (D.L)\(^\text{146}\). It is for this reason that both D.J and D.L make it explicit how it is “very lucky” that Michel Motors took them on. All discussants of both sexes agreed that people who worked here could feel “sheltered” (D.A). The clearly predominant feeling of security feeds on various different observations. For instance, the large number of overtime hours at present would indicate that there is a lot of work (D.D) and that in general one could assume that at Michel Motors you would “always be put somewhere” (D.C), even when jobs were being axed in certain areas of the company. One salaried employee had also had a similar experience, moving from one of the company’s locations where jobs were being cut to another location entirely (D.H). Almost all of the participants see themselves as privileged, as they regard the general labour market as being much more insecure, and some of them find the high unemployment figures “deeply distressing” (D.H). One worker however underlined the fact that even at Michel Motors there was no such thing as 100% security: “it can affect all of us” (D.C).

The role of trade unions and the works council was viewed positively only on isolated occasions during the discussions. They could have seen to it that areas which had already been “outsourced” would be brought back into the company (D.A). Their efforts in general were defended by the female Turkish worker D.N (“they’re trying”). The only participant who had a completely positive image of the unions and the works council was the German apprentice D.S: he felt that the trade unions’ say in a large number of areas makes them a relevant force. Furthermore, it was important, he felt, that the unions are people the employers can talk to, so that companies “don’t just do what they like”. Unions were also effective in combating unemployment, he felt.

However, D.S and the German workers from Group VI also recognise the limits on the trade unions’ ability to participate, particularly when the economy is in a slump and times are hard (Group VI), when the company has to streamline its operations to remain competitive or when a company goes bust (D.S). In Group VI, the participants also underline that it is up to the employees in a company to use the unions and to show solidarity.

Aside from these instances, more critical evaluations of the work of the trade unions and the works council are dominant amongst the participants at Michel Motors. To an extent, the criticism is more general, and is more company related. In the “consensual society”, the unions no longer represented a “countervailing force”, which really represented workers’ interests and developed their visions (D.E). The works council in their own company often worked too slowly, and was more concerned with leave and securing their own privileges (D.I). It had made the atmosphere worse with its anti-discrimination policy and had disadvantaged German employees (Group VI). Several participants criticised the works council in particular in connection with a drastic reduction in their working time, which had officially been brought in to give jobs to the unemployed. Whilst some people find fault with the works council here – as in general – for not having found out more about what the workers wanted (D.T) or criti-

\(^{146}\) For these abbreviations and group descriptions, see Tables 9-11 in Chapter III, Section 4.
exercise the rule itself (Group V), others were more concerned about the low level to which it had been implemented. Instead of having the planned effect of distributing the work out, more and more overtime was being carried out. It should be up to the works council to fight for the proper implementation of the concept (Group II, salaried employee D.I). In Group II, the works council is diffusely termed as “somewhat reactionary”. D.T no longer has any trust in the works council on account of his own experience: when he applied for a transfer, his wish was not taken seriously.

Amongst the Spanish companies investigated, “objective” job security is varied. At Auto-Cat it can be quite high, but it cannot by any means be taken for granted at Textil S.A., as in this crisis-rocked company there are repeated waves of redundancies. However, this fact is not accompanied by corresponding or “proportionate” fears. In the group discussions it was clear that there are different “channelling mechanisms” relating to the problem: at AutoCat, one participant in the group discussion with workers trained on the job said that the relative job stability there had only been achieved through lower wages:

“Ya no podemos hablar de un tanto por ciento, económicamente hablando, con respecto a otros... a otros ingresos que hubo en AutoCat. Pero bueno, se está cediendo por un lado para intentar conseguir empleo y empleo que no sea precario, sino empleo que sea sólido y estable dentro de la empresa. Está claro que se está perdiendo algo económicamente, no voy a entrar a valorar... pues bueno... una cosa por otra ¿no?” (E.C).

One issue which was often discussed and which seems to be fear-laden is early retirement plans, which would prevent younger people from having to be made redundant or would allow more younger people to be recruited. Some people welcome the plans on account of this effect, particularly those in the group of workers trained on the job. Many, on the other hand, are more concerned about early retirement, particularly older workers in view of the central role their job has played throughout their life. They feel that their experience is not being valued by the employer nor by society.

“Entonces piensas: bueno que hay, tú estás trabajando aquí ayer, entonces puede ser una de las cosas. Primeros se cree que a lo mejor sacan ingeniería, se crea otra cosa... Entonces llega un momento que dices: bueno, la edad que tienes, son años que estás aquí, la edad que tienes pues siempre te da un poco de reparo decir: ¿me quedare? ¿No me quedará? [...]Claro es que la respuesta no es exactamente la misma, ¿no? Si tú preguntas, por ejemplo, a los que estamos en esta situación de edad: ¿tenemos miedo al paro? No. ¿Nos tenemos que nos prejubilen? Sí. No es lo mismo el paro que la prejubilación” (E.G).

“Pero es que conozco gente, y además he estado yo en frente a ellos que les dije: señores, váyanse ustedes han cerrado la fábrica de Barcelona y tuve que ser el menda: señores, a su casa. Tenían 55. ¿Tú sabes lo mal que lo están pasando la gente que se prejubiló a los 55 años por cojones? Muy mal ¿eh?” (E.I).

Further concerns are raised by the group of skilled workers at AutoCat which cast a shadow on their feelings of security: on the one hand a general weakening of the economy could mean less turnover and therefore lower production, on the other hand, the allocation of new products within the company could be put at risk. They regard both of these factors as job risks.

“Producción principal es una, es una chorrera que saca coches y allá va, porque si AutoCat no hace coches los que estamos técnicamente no estaríamos. Entonces, me imagino yo que lo que se refiere a todo lo que has dicho a que este 82 por ciento no tienen miedo al paro, yo pienso que hoy en día, aquí en el centro técnico, se tiene algo de miedo por lo que está pasando, por esta razón.” (E.G).

In spite of there being greater levels of concern amongst our discussions with skilled workers than amongst workers trained on the job, one thing that the participants at AutoCat have in common is that they are relatively well represented by the unions, and the majority of the workers are also union members. The workers feel they are relatively well protected by the
unions as well. Their role is perceived as being both necessary and appropriate. In their eyes it is the unions who guarantee job stability and comparatively good working conditions.

At Textil S.A. on the other hand we encounter a very different sentiment. Here, the unions are trusted with doing virtually nothing, whilst the management is entrusted with everything. Most workers even regard the unions as a hindrance on the company’s directors efforts to stabilise the company’s economic position. They are perceived as being ineffective institutions, who only follow their own interests and are incapable of contributing to economic goals. A clear anti-union attitude is in evidence right across the workforce.

“Casi no fío al comité de empresa porque te dicen una palabra y no tienen ninguna. ¿Cómo se llama? Como si fuera que no están. No tienen poder, siempre están de reunión y están de ... no hacen nada. Si les preguntas por una maldita cosa, por una sencilla cosa y no saben de qué va el tema. Ellos buscan solamente gente para afiliar, para tener tanto dinero. Si ya está y nada más. ¿No recuerdas de XXX que ha vendido pisos sin duchas a los trabajadores hace años? Igual. Mira ir a UGT, era jefe de UGT y ¿qué ha hecho? Vender pisos sin duchas. Se ha llevado todo el dinero y fuera.” (E.S).

“Los sindicatos allí, y yo en mi trabajo. Y si quieren que los defienda, que me paguen el jornal. Que eso no me lo paga la empresa a mí. Por tanto que los sindicatos se queden en su casa.” (E.N).

However, the indigenous workers at Textil S.A. say that the works council has acted appropriately in times of crisis. From this angle it is important not just in particular situations, but in the day to day running of the factory operation.

On the other hand, the participants in the group discussions at Textil S.A. feel that they have been treated well by the management, in a kind of paternalistic way, and that they have been looked after. The relative lack of concern is particularly noticeable amongst the indigenous workers. According to these interviewees, everyone who wanted to continue working at Textil S.A. could do so. It was only during more detailed discussions that the unequal manner in which jobs were distributed became an issue: it became clear that the workers seemingly often only had the choice between being moved somewhere with tougher conditions and worse jobs, or to be made redundant. This means that they too took part in a “trade in”: they were exchanging security for worse jobs. Women, for instance, were carrying out physically demanding work that men had previously done. In addition, as at AutoCat, the worry of age gradually became apparent. In this instance it was linked to redundancy rather than enforced early retirement; indigenous workers thought it possible they may lose their job when they were already quite old. This was seen as a very big problem, as they thought it would be very hard to find a new job once they were over 40. If they also had a family to feed, then it was seen as an even bigger problem, one which was not as prominent amongst many younger interviewees.

The participants in the group discussion with Moroccan workers regarded the company as a relative oasis of job security in comparison with other employment opportunities in the region. If they did their jobs well, then that would lead to stability, if not to promotion. They almost all work in low categories of jobs. The foremen created a “glass ceiling”, so as not to annoy indigenous colleagues; the possible advancement to middle-ranking and higher positions was reserved for indigenous workers. Management was not held responsible for this as it was seen to base its own actions solely on the suggestions made by the foremen. The interviewees regarded this situation in Spain as generally contrasting with the examples of Germany and the Netherlands, where they felt there were more vertical mobility opportunities for immigrants:

“Aquí la empresa es grande y es un poco distinto. Si ven que eres un buen trabajador, va bien los primeros meses y te acostumbras a la faena tú puedes figurar que es una faena que va a durar mucho tiempo. Te dan más oportunidad. Cada vez que destacas, te ponen en un nivel más alto, pero aquí en España, como le toca a un inmigrante, bueno un marroquí no, pero un inmigrante de fuera, nunca le apoyan para que sea un algo
especial en el trabajo y en la oficina. Siempre están contentos de lo que está haciendo un trabajador, bien para adelante y listo y esto pero no lo apoyan.” (E.R).

“Pero sin nivel, sin nivel. Eso es lo que tienen aquí, bueno en España. No es así en Alemania, Holanda. Pero es diferente el trabajo allí que aquí. Allí es algo que se va para adelante, de trabajo y de todo. Si te ven más inteligente, te apoyan, te ponen en un nivel mayor cada vez.” (E.P)

Working in a pro-active manner in a bid to keep their jobs can also mean going without social rights, in the eyes of the Moroccan workers. On the other hand, jobs were seen as being fundamentally important in life in the absence of any social protection. Added to this is the fact that in most Moroccan families only one member of the household is in paid employment, meaning that unemployment is an untenable position. For this reason, people were prepared to go to work even when they were ill.

“Yo de aquí hace seis meses estuve de baja, estuve de baja porque estuve un poco enfermo y ha durado tres meses y me pagaban casi ochenta mil pesetas cada mes. ¿Sabes cuanto pago de hipoteca? Sólo trabajo yo. Pago sesenta cuatro mil.Y me fui para pedir una ayuda a la asistenta social. ¿Sabes que me dijo, si no tenemos nada para ti, te voy a rellenar papeles para darte ayuda de Cruz Roja, macarrones y, ¿Para qué quiero yo macarrones si voy al mercado y con mil pesetas voy a llenar un carro de macarrones. Por eso que volví a trabajar aunque estuve un poco mal. Vuelvo al trabajo... A veces veo al futuro y está muy mal. Ahora, yo personalmente, me siento como esclavo de los capitalistas. Me siento esclavo” (E.S).

It is therefore clear that the initial positive assessment of people's own personal job security needs to be relativised on closer inspection: it only exists in the Spanish companies being investigated here because a price is being paid for it - older workers are being forced out and wages are being cut back, harder work and/or lower social protection regarding illness is being accepted. The fact that the discussant employees still regard themselves as privileged can be explained by their measure of comparison: the situation of many other people in the region is relatively much more precarious. Furthermore, the majority of the interviewees in all of the companies being investigated here are in better social positions than their parents were, and this fact could also contribute to their evaluation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Michel Motors (n = 337)</th>
<th>AutoCat (n = 305)</th>
<th>Textil S.A. (n = 149)</th>
<th>Special Motor Plant (n = 132)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In comparison to their parents,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>they regard themselves as having</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... a higher social position.</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... a lower social position.</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the same social position.</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 20 indicates, in all companies investigated here, the group of interviewees who regard themselves as having a lower social position than that of their parents only constitutes a small minority. The overwhelming majority either see no difference in the level of their personal circumstances or regard themselves as having risen socially. This latter assessment is particularly marked amongst respondents at AutoCat, and even more so at Special Motor Plant. At Michel Motors however the number of those regarding themselves as having risen socially or retained the social status of their parents are roughly the same. At Textil S.A., people who feel they now have the same social status as their parents constitute the biggest groups. These results tend more towards “success stories” than “stories of failures”, and this may well contribute to an evaluation of what people have achieved in the sense of what is know as a feeling of being privileged.
When asked which important factors they feel have influenced them in terms of their career development, the quantitative results show the dominance of a focus on individual success over more structural factors.

Table 21: Assessment of Important Influences on Individual Career Development
(N = 923, figures in %, only assent*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Michel Motors (n = 337)</th>
<th>AutoCat (n = 305)</th>
<th>Textil S.A. (n = 149)</th>
<th>Special-Motor Plant (n = 132)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;For my career development...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... the most important thing is to have finished school with good grades&quot;</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... it is not so important how well off my parents are (were), because it is up to me to make the most of my opportunities&quot;</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... my success at work is not so important, because my opportunities depend particularly on the labour market and on the general economic situation.&quot;</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... it is important to act according to the saying &quot;at work, quality and personal achievement will always ultimately win through.&quot;</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... being a success in professional terms is not as important as having a secure job and thereby a secure income.&quot;</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The answer categories “I agree more than disagree” and “I agree” have been combined here.

The comments which underline the relevance of motivation and personal willingness to be successful, as well as the results concerning performance and success, score differently amongst the companies being studied (at Michel Motors and Special Motor Plant the score was generally higher than at AutoCat and Textil S.A.). However, these comments are consistently seen as being more important than the comments which put a secure income above particular career success or which underline structural factors such as the economic situation and the labour market. If we recall again the assessment made in our earlier analysis of the “objective” side of personal circumstances that a good education and training cannot necessarily be transformed into appropriate professional positions and a corresponding income, then it becomes clear that there is a discrepancy between perception and actual opportunity, particularly given the high relevance ascribed to this aspect in the subjective appreciation.

To a degree, the impressions collected in the group discussions can confirm the quantitative result of an (over) emphasis on individual performance criteria, but to a degree they also do not confirm these. The relevance of good education, training and further professional training is also emphasised by many of the participants in the discussions, for instance when the possibilities for avoiding unemployment were being discussed. At the same time, people also gave the warning during the discussions that this is no guarantee and that the structural labour market conditions were relevant as well.

The dominant focus on individual performance, which is a fundamental orientation in people’s lives, comes to light repeatedly during the discussions. Yet it is not described as a principle which has is already in operation, and tends rather to be seen as a principle which has yet to be put into practice (even more). This means that the saying “performance always wins out in the end”, which received high rates of agreement in the quantitative survey, is not necessarily something people have experienced themselves, but rather it expresses the wish of
quite a few of the discussants. In the group discussions with German workers at Michel Motors in particular, this is seen as being important in two ways: the point is made on several occasions that it is often not personal performance which matters in the company, but relationships.

“Here at Michel Motors, if I am honest, it’s less about your success. It’s really more about relationships. [...] If you don’t have contacts, it’s very, very difficult. [...] Put it this way: if you have contacts, you’ll always get on quicker, you’ll get up higher, you’ll get further. You’ll even get into entirely different jobs where you’d otherwise not have got” (D.B).

As a contrast to this, the principle of promotion based on personal performance is regarded as a fairer alternative. The other aspect which is demanded of this personal performance principle is that it rectify the discrepancy between the incomes of the employed on the one hand and the unemployed, recipients of social security benefits and so-called “black market workers” on the other. The material difference should be able to be felt much more, performance should pay off more. A state-subsidised balancing out of this discrepancy is therefore rejected; however, the participants in several of the discussion groups do criticise the different wages earned by permanent and temporary workers, despite the fact that they are doing the same work.

Some of the discussants see a lack of motivation and willingness to work as being the reasons why the unemployed were out of work. In all of the companies surveyed we encountered the opinion that people who wanted to work could find jobs. However, this opinion is by no means universal. People qualified the opinion by agreeing that those over 35 or 40 really did have trouble finding a new job, and that not every job was reasonable. Finally, personal reasons are not the only ones which are held responsible for unemployment.

In the group discussions at Michel Motors this issue is argued either in strongly personal or strongly structural terms. There are only controversies amongst the salaried employees. Female salaried employees support a more individual argument, as does the group of female workers and two of the groups of German, male workers (a total of 12 people). On the other hand, the German salaried employee, all foreign male workers and the remaining German male workers (a total of 8 people) all support a structural argument. The individualistic arguments underline the personal influence people have in keeping their jobs safe: working properly, not taking extended break times, and general good behaviour towards superiors does not just lower personal risk, but also fosters the competitiveness of the company through higher quality and productivity. They criticise a lack of willingness to work hard on the part of some of their colleagues. Permanent overtime is however also criticised, as this prevent new recruits being hired. Alongside the opinion we have mentioned, that the unemployed showed a lack of willingness to work and received too much social security support, people also accused them of a lack of flexibility, particularly in terms of geographic mobility.

“Six years ago I was allowed to move to XXX [company location] and I therefore knew that I was showing the kind of flexibility that an employee ultimately has to have. I also knew that my job was thereby guaranteed. [...] I’m being challenged. Not my employer. At the end of the day, I want something from my employer” (...). It’s up to people to sort out further professional training themselves” (D.H).

In terms of structural arguments, a number of discussants said that unemployment was a part of capitalism. Modernisation, outsourcing to countries where wages are a lot lower, mergers and a focus on profit all lead to job cuts. Whereas one German apprentice regards this kind of employer behaviour as understandable in the free market economy, and therefore finds it “normal” (he also sees no alternative and regards the state as the “loser”, as it has to look after the unemployed), others criticise the focus on profit.

“Some large players (are) simply a bit too greedy (...) because they just put profits before humanity” (D.B).
The comments made by foreign workers formulate this criticism even more sharply, alongside the structural mechanisms discussed above and other ones (over-supply of qualified people; high taxes, leading to outsourcing, state support for companies’ temporary contracts): the capital economy is based upon “keeping people in the race” (D.E) and high unemployment help employers, because they can use it to oppress workers and pay them badly (D.T).

The controversial situation in the group of salaried employees leads to a direct reference of both arguments. The male Austrian worker assumes that there are multiple causes of unemployment on both a personal and a structural level, but he then argues particularly against individual attribution of blame. He says that:

“it’s just stupid to say that if you try hard enough, then you will find a job” (D.I).

D.I also does not think much of people being well-behaved:

“Of course I could always improve how I am compared to other people, by making myself so helpful and good that I am no longer me. Then I’ll maybe go mad or something. But in the end that is faking my behaviour and will only lead to bullying” (D.I).

He too sees the fact that production is being relocated elsewhere as the main reason for unemployment, which can be seen even in his own company:

“The capacities we’re building up in Poland is a clear reduction of jobs here in XXX [location of the company being investigated]” (D.I).

A structural perspective is dominant amongst the workers at AutoCat in Spain. They highlight political factors and capitalist exploitation as the reason for unemployment. The skilled workers see “multiple and variable” reasons. They list poor management, technological streamlining, competition overseas and the interests of multinational groups who buy and sell firms speculatively. The problem of global competition and the shifting of production elsewhere should be no real problem for Spain, they feel, in view of the higher quality of European production. Globalisation is only an argument used by companies and the political elite, they feel, in a bid to reduce the power of the unions and the working class.

“Yo creo que la empresa también valora la calidad, no solo valora el coste, el coste medio del coche o las pelas que les sale cada coche, sino que también valora la calidad. Y evidentemente no es lo mismo los trabajadores chinos, con todos los respetos para los chinos, que un trabajador que está más calificado europeo sea tanto en Bruselas, en Portugal, en España o donde sea. Está claro que allí se les mandan piezas, que son piezas que se les mandan. Y, bueno, es obvio que si les saliera más barato y con la misma calidad no creo que la cantidad de volumen de producción que hacemos aquí la siguiéramos haciendo” (E.C).

The skilled workers at AutoCat also regard the individualisation bound up with deregulation and the resulting division amongst workers as a further weakening of the workforce. Working from home is also seen as an alternative to being present at the workplace.

“El problema del miedo al paro yo creo que viene un poco por el cambio de cultura que quieren implantar[...] Porque, evidentemente, hace unos años, hace quince o veinte años se tenía muy arraigado el concepto de contrato indefinido. Eso era una seguridad que te daba, era una seguridad psíquica. Física no lo era, porque estábamos viendo siempre los problemas de, de lugares de empleo. Entonces, el miedo yo creo que está potenciado un poco por el cambio de cultura que no se ve en un momento apoyado por el mercado exterior. O sea, es decir, se pretende un tipo de liberalización del mercado de trabajo que no se corresponde con las ofertas que puedas encontrar en cuanto a los niveles que tú necesitas básicos” (E.H).
Chapter IV: Personal Situation of the Industrial Workers

This means that the subjective view of work has changed in the eyes of the discussants, and job insecurity and fears about unemployment have experienced a ‘normalisation’. Experiences built up over the years on the other hand are devalued.

The group of workers trained on the job at AutoCat says that it is personal habits and the socialisation into a particular career which prevents people from fitting into a new job and showing geographical mobility. For this reason, people are worried about losing a job that they’ve had for 10 or 20 years. However, they see the main reason for unemployment in the behaviour of the state and the ruling party. The government has a direct interest in job insecurity and in unemployment so as to reduce wage costs for companies and also to get more money from the EU.

“Incluso yo pienso a veces que interesa al paro a los estados. En los estados hay unas bolsas de la Comunidad Europea que son un dinero que hay para el paro. Que se genera ahí. Que lo reparte cada estado como le parece más correcto. Y yo creo que les interesa a los estados tener ahí parados. ¿Porque? Porque son unas pelas, que a lo mejor soy malpensado, pero que se van perdiendo y que gente va chupando de ahí y se van llenando los bolsillo” (E.C).

Nevertheless the workers trained on the job are mainly supportive of the idea of creating jobs for young people by getting older workers to retire early, at 60 or 61, and regard this as a means of reducing unemployment. This method is however viewed much more harshly by the skilled workers.

Although the skilled workers assume that individuals constantly need to adjust to the demands of the labour market, they also highlight the fact that not all conditions are acceptable to the same extent, particularly not for those with family responsibilities who cannot compete with younger workers. They go on to discuss the view that one key way of avoiding unemployment is experience. However, it must be useful experience and further training is indispensable in the new organisation structures, in their view. They distinguish between experience earned through professional employment and more or less targeted training for specific competencies in the production process. This kind of training is less important in today's job market.

As unemployment is, all in all, less the fault of the individual and more a result of structural factors, the unemployed deserve solidarity, according to the discussion groups at AutoCat.

“Creo que el 99 por ciento de los trabajadores que están en paro, como los compañeros de 45 años lo están pasando muy mal. Yo por suerte o desgracia tengo relaciones laborales en INEM y lo están pasando muy mal. No les gusta ir a firmar cada mes. No les gusta. Quieren un trabajo. Pero un trabajo digno” (E.E).

Female workers in the discussion group at Michel Motors in Germany also emphasise the point that the unemployed should be supported by the trade unions. One German apprentice also holds this view - but says however that the unions should only look after them if the unemployed workers are paying membership dues.

Whilst structural factors dominate at AutoCat, the workers in the Spanish textile factory Textil S.A., much fewer of whom are union members than is the norm in the other companies we are investigating, emphasise individual factors when talking about job insecurity in Spain. They only make anecdotal reference to unemployment as a result of technology or competition from other textile-producing countries. However, the extent to which Spanish workers are prepared to accept jobs offered on the labour market is the most deeply rooted in their discussions. They think there are enough jobs around, but Spanish workers don't want to take them. Both immigrants and indigenous workers would always have the opportunity to work, at least in the region they are familiar with, the Catalan region of Osona. It's a matter then primarily of the willingness to work. The perspective also focuses on differences amongst the generations in being able to access jobs. Younger people are accused of rejecting offers of work
which don't meet their expectations, particularly jobs which are not “fulfilling” and are generally hard work.

In contrast to the dominant discourse at Textil S.A. and the statement that everyone could have work if they accepted conditions, Moroccan workers are concerned about losing their jobs.

“Pero también, yo personalmente tengo miedo que se vuelva aquí menos faena y que si nos vamos de aquí tarde o temprano podamos encontrar que la persona tenga ganas de trabajar y no pueda encontrar. Aunque hay muchos paisanos que trabajan en muchos sitios, como talleres” (E.P).

Not everyone who wants to work finds a job easily. Apart from that, not all immigrants are ready to work under exploitative conditions, he said. If they could, they would also use other mechanisms to earn money for themselves and their families, such as social security. Finding a job was often made easier through a recommendation by a fellow countryman.

“Bueno, no, no, cada uno, para algunos paisanos no, pero otros, a lo mejor para encontrar una faena tardan un mes o dos, si tiene algo de dinero, alguna ayuda. Pero si uno busca, acaba encontrando. Con otros paisano que dan la cara. Siempre hay empresas que necesitan. Por ejemplo ahora aquí, como opinan muchos, siempre la faena se da por conocimiento. Por ejemplo, un paisano le dice a cada uno, como opinas tú de mi paisano, es buen trabajador bueno para pasarle trabajo. Conozco a muchos que les han dado faena por ese camín” (E.P).

But Moroccan workers have even taken on the paternalistic view of the management at Textil S.A., as the indigenous workers have done: they are therefore convinced that those people who need the work most could stay no matter what.

“...hay personas que puede que estén en mejor en una situación, depende de cada persona, no? Hay una persona que lo necesita más que una que, pues ya no se irá a la calles, en cambia quien está (...) pues igual se queda. Es lógico que se quede las personas que realmente lo necesitan más” (E.L).

They seem to rely more on this management logic than on a structured interest representation.

Amongst the discussants in the German company being surveyed, Michel Motors, people see the main possibilities to engage collectively against job insecurity as being the trade unions and interest politics via the works council, alongside individual efforts. The works council should - according to the German male workers in one group - ban overtime, so that new recruits would be supported (D.C, D.D). The collective focus is most strongly represented by one participant in the group of foreign workers: he pleads for unified counter-strategies, displaying solidarity. He believes that there needs to be a fundamental change in the system to allow people to live a materially secure life, one in which people could develop their full potential. He argued that people needed to stop accepting injustices. He is also convinced that this will one day happen, because too many people would suffer as a result of the present system (D.E).

An important question which interested us during the group discussions was, as we have pointed out, the issue of whether the participants would establish a connection to immigration themselves during discussions on the first subject of unemployment and job insecurity. We wanted to find out from this the extent to which economic problems are interpreted in this way and how they are channelled in order for them to use the exclusion of foreigners as a general view, and whether phrases such as “foreigners take our jobs away” therefore constitute a part of everyday language or not.

The result was that most of the participants at Michel Motors do not establish a connection between unemployment and immigration. Only one male German apprentice felt that foreign families were oppressing German families by taking their jobs away. Distributing immigrants better amongst different countries would help rectify this (D.S). In other groups, this kind of
connection is either not made an issue of at all (Groups III, IV, VI) or arguments are made against it. This was the case in the group of women (Group V), where one female Turkish participant said that the idea that migrants were taking all the jobs away is a common prejudice amongst Germans (D.N). The Turkish worker D.T deconstructs this prejudice, by highlighting the primacy of natives, meaning the legally founded priority given to natives in the allocation of jobs. Furthermore, in Group I, where there were two male German discussants, a ban on highly qualified asylum seekers working was disapproved of (D.A, D.B). A further group of male German workers (Group II) was critical of the employment of highly qualified skilled workers from abroad. The criticism was directed mainly at the fact that companies would use these workers so as not to have to invest in training themselves. The foreigners themselves are not held responsible for unemployment. On the contrary, one participant emphasises that immigrants would create jobs in Germany (D.C).

All in all, the discussants at both Spanish companies being surveyed did not establish a causal relationship between unemployment and immigration. There is much rather a consensus amongst them all that to an extent there are two separate job markets for locals and for immigrants: people who have immigrated carried out the less specialised and more poorly paid jobs, which indigenous workers would refuse to do (particularly in the areas of construction, housework and agriculture). In this respect, immigrants are seen as creating an inferior but necessary workforce complementary to that of the indigenous workers. The working regime and conditions under which immigrants work place them in a lower section of the workforce compared to the indigenous workers. Indigenous workers are no longer prepared to work in lowly regarded jobs, which are high in risk and have dirty working conditions, and for this reason it is necessary to employ migrants for these jobs.

“En España falta del orden de ciento y algo mil inmigrantes anuales o algo así y estamos por debajo de estas cifras. Quiere decir que el número de inmigrantes que tenemos es insuficiente para cubrir aquellos puestos de trabajo que los del país no están dispuestos a realizar” (E.J).

“Normalmente el que viene, viene a ocupar los puestos de trabajo que los de aquí no quieren” (E.M).


“Las empresas que hay en Vic, por ejemplo aquí en Osona, los inmigrantes siempre tienen una oportunidad de trabajar porque el trabajo que hacen lo deja la gente de aquí, los españoles. Prefieren trabajar en las oficinas. Los mataderos, por ejemplo, están llenos de inmigrantes. Lo rechazan los españoles. En el campo hay mucho trabajo. En Osona siempre hay una oportunidad de trabajar.” (E.R).

It is also for this reason that Moroccan discussants emphasise the fact that they are not taking jobs away from anyone. They feel that this view is part of an ideological discourse represented by the extreme right and only a portion of the native population, but far removed from reality. The group suddenly highlighted in a very engaged manner that the problem of unemployment has nothing to do with immigration.

“Yo, lo que opino es que quien está en el paro, no tiene ganas de trabajar. Por ejemplo en el campo hay mucho trabajo. Por eso que vienen los inmigrantes. Se hace el trabajo que no hace la gente de aquí. En los mataderos está lleno de inmigrantes porque uno de aquí se va, no le gusta porque le gusta más trabajar en las oficinas y las oficinas están todas llenas. Esperan a que se jubilan. Lo que sí... hay mucho paro, y no entiendo si hay mucho paro y el gobierno de España cada día firma convenio con países de tercer, por ejemplo con Marruecos, últimamente ha firmado un convenio, con ¿cómo se llama?... Ecuador, con Colombia, con Polonia, no lo entiendo. Mira, la gente de ultraderecha piensa que los inmigrantes, que por culpa de los inmigrants que el paro está elevado. Para mí, gracias a los inmigrantes, los países mejoran, se progresa. Como Alemania, mira cuantos inmigrantes hay, millones y millones y se ha puesto el primer país de Europa. Y encima cuando se dice que hay mucho paro, bueno eso muchas veces la Generalitat y los otros gobiernos se explican de otra forma pero hay la población que está un poco, que dice ‘¡uy! Que no hay faena porque hay...”
Although the Moroccan discussants reject this prejudice entirely, one of them expresses the fear that were there in future to be mass, uncontrolled new immigration, there would be higher unemployment for everyone. The interpretation of this shows that we can expect to see competition for jobs even amongst immigrants themselves, between those who have been settled in the new country for longer and those who have newly arrived.

The skilled workers at AutoCat are aware about the “social security system crisis”. For this reason, they do not regard immigrants as being necessary to fill gaps in the labour market, but emphasise rather their importance as potential contributors who could finance social security and pensions, in view of the ageing native population as well.

“They are critical about the effects of the irregular employment of immigrants. They denounce the fact that employers would prefer workers “without papers” so they could exploit them. One the one hand, this hinders immigrants from paying social security contributions (see above), they felt, but it could on the other hand lead to a fall in wages for all employees. The state is responsible for making an issue of irregular work, and combating the problem.

Only the skilled workers at AutoCat also emphasise the need for Spanish companies to employ qualified foreign workers to counteract the lack of particular skilled workers (such as welders or machinists), as the companies themselves are not training enough of these people.

Indigenous workers at Textil S.A. legitimise the employment of immigrants in the lower labour market positions either through their supposed lack of education and language skills, or through the fact whilst they are often over-qualified for these jobs, they still earned more here than they would in jobs more appropriate to their status in their home countries. However, in both cases immigrants are held responsible for their own positions, and discrimination within the host society is never made a topic for discussion.

Moroccan workers, on the other hand, relate their inferior position to discriminatory practices in the host society. Spain does not try to support the vertical mobility of immigrants, and qualifications are not recognised, they say. This differs to their view of the examples of Germany and the Netherlands, which have a long tradition as a country of immigration. As a result of what they regard as the very rigid ethnic hierarchy within the Spanish labour market immigrants’ human capital is not used. This corresponds to the indigenous workers’ description of a complementary labour market for immigrants. As a result, the interpretation can be made that it limits spectacularly immigrants’ prospects of possible social advancement.
2.2 Experiences of Discrimination Made by Respondents with a Background of Migration in the German case study

In this section, we want to examine separately the perception of respondents with a background of migration, with regard to their experience of different types of discrimination. In the light of the low numbers of cases in our sample surveys in Spain and in Britain, we will concentrate here on the results from our survey in the German company being investigated. Interviewees with a background of migration made the following points over the course of our standardised survey:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>very often</th>
<th>often</th>
<th>not particularly</th>
<th>seldom</th>
<th>not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal experience of discrimination...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at school.</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.... at college.</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... in the workplace.</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... when looking for a flat.</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... in the neighbourhood.</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... during spare time activities.</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... in dealing with officials.</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... with the police.</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of discrimination:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• various refusals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• derogatory comments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• xenophobic insults.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• threat of physical violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• physical attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• serious physical injury.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• refused a job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• refused a training position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• refused a flat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• refused entry into a pub/club.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• refused membership of an organisation or similar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figures are made up to 100% by people who did not give any answer. Not all of those surveyed with a background of migration answered or wanted to answer these sets of questions.

The very high values do not provide any information as to whether all these experiences really were a result of discrimination, whether conscious or subconscious. But the results do highlight the subjective perceptions of the interviewees and lead us to guess how they experience the climate in which they live. Amongst the areas of life which are surveyed it is noticeable that more than a third have felt themselves to have been discriminated against often in each of the following: in looking for a flat, in leisure activities and in their dealings with officials, and with the police. Or to put it the other way round: only between one fifth and one tenth of the respondents said that they had never experienced discrimination.

In terms of the type of discrimination, the first thing which is noticeable is that around half of the respondents have often or very often been refused entry to a pub or a club. Secondly, (only) a third of people said that they had never been faced with the threat of physical vio-
lence or actual physical attacks. More than 18% had experienced these kind of threats often or very often, and 13% of respondents with a background of migration had experienced actual attacks often or very often. 7.8% said they had often or very often experienced severe physical injury in the context of discrimination.

Whilst all forms of discrimination are relevant for the general climate in everyday life - the derogatory comments, which well over half of the interviewees said was a common or very common experience stand out in particular here - the group discussions showed that the issue of physical violence proved to be the subject which occupied foreign discussants most intensely.

Whilst they initially described xenophobia as being more pronounced amongst old people than amongst the young, in the context of their experiences of discrimination they go into detail particularly about physical attacks which were undoubtedly carried out more by younger generations. It is noticeable that they see themselves or their children as actually being at risk from physical attacks “on the street”. They draw not just on “newspaper knowledge” here: one of the participants, Turkish worker D.G, had been the victim of an arson attack four years previously. As a result of the social rejection he has been repeatedly been experiencing since then, he has not yet been able to decide to start a family. But for D.E. and D.F. as well, violence seems to be a threat experienced daily:

“Do we need to be scared on the street (…) (that) we’re going to be attacked or hit or killed?” (D.F)

They list three aspects which they regard as being responsible for the fact that there are such a high number of acts of violence: 1. The failure of the justice system to follow up xenophobically-motivated attacks, in their view, 2. A failure of politics in not showing enough interest in combating this kind of violence and 3. A lack of direct participation on the part of Germans when they witness such attacks.

But it is not solely a question of direct violence. Turkish male worker D.T talks about various aspects of discrimination at the level of society in his individual interview. The atmosphere between foreigners and Germans has got worse in comparison to the 1970s. He says that today there is only a “false smile” on the part of the Germans today. Germans often spoke badly about foreigners when they were with other Germans, not, he felt, because they really thought badly of them but as a result of a kind of group pressure. The second point which concerned D.T greatly and which corresponds to the high levels of discrimination experienced in schools, shown up in the quantitative survey, is that foreign children received too little support in schools. His children had for instance been sent to a secondary modern school (Hauptschule) to start with, but were now attending a grammar school sixth form (gymnasiale Oberstufe) on account of their good grades. Foreign children, he said, were taken as being stupid, and were not nurtured. This meant that they lost their will to learn. He said people just didn't want foreign children to take their Abitur (school leaving certificate - equivalent to A levels), and that they should do the less privileged jobs like their parents did, such as “grafters and cleaning ladies”.

But in relation to the working world, or the company, the discussants say they have the impression that there is systematic discrimination. D.E. for instance points to the difficulties faced by migrants, and by German women, in gaining further qualifications, becoming a qualified ‘master’ of a profession, getting a job as a ‘master’ of a trade or to be given leadership responsibilities. D.F also believes that there is a disparity in the ways in which people are treated, which offers migrants fewer opportunities. In subjective terms, D.E has the feeling that more foreign colleagues had been made unemployed than Germans had, and that foreign apprentices are less often taken on than Germans upon finishing their training. Even if this is not a targeted practice within the company we were investigating, these views do at least fit in with the breaks and barriers many of the interviewees with a background of migration had ex-
Chapter IV: Personal Situation of the Industrial Workers

experienced in their professional lives, as was shown by the quantitative analysis (see the Section on the “objective” side of personal circumstances). A few specific examples of discrimination in the company were however not made an issue during this discussion group.

Turkish female interviewee D.N, however, said in the group of women that her colleagues would be disparaging about her and other foreign workers “behind our backs”. Turkish male worker D.T has the impression that his master tradesman often disadvantages foreigners. He grounds this with an example of how accommodating or restrictive the master tradesman would be in dealing with people’s requests for time off for personal reasons. In other situations as well the master tradesman had treated him badly, for instance when he was sick and had asked for easier work and had instead been given more difficult work, threatening him that if he couldn’t manage his job, then he would lose it. Overall, Germans had better jobs than the foreigners, he said. The latter did the work that was left over. The fact that foreign workers are concentrated in those areas of work which are characterised by more dangerous, dirtier, louder working conditions which are damaging to people’s health is entirely confirmed by several German discussants. Several of them do not, however, regard this as a consequence of discrimination, but rather they blame foreigners themselves, both in terms of its origins and its motives. This also demonstrates a similar pattern of varied perception and meaning as regards discrimination versus self blame as was encountered in the Spanish discussion groups, particularly at Textil S.A..

We will however discuss fully the interviewees’ general views on interculturality and on issues relating to immigration in the next chapter.

3. Taking Stock: Personal Circumstances as Reflected in Structural Inequalities, Experience of Discrimination and the Feeling of Privilege

On the structural side of personal circumstances in life, we can see from our comparison of all four companies that (1) ordering employees into status groups follows different “rules” in different instances, and this is in spite of the fact that three of the companies are all internationally operating car manufacturers, and all of them have a head office based in the same country - Germany. In the German and Spanish cases it is even one and the same head office. If we also include the company investigated in the pre-study, whose head office was located in the USA, but which still displays similar patterns to those found at Michel Motors, then we can assume that country-specific modes of status amongst employees exist within the car industry - or in the Spanish case, within the processing industry. Yet the level of prospects in life is (2) comparable. The fact that the British company investigated here is an exception is more likely to be a result of the particular situation at the time of our survey. The thing which unites all of the companies investigated is (3) the situation of the women interviewed to that of the men. They experience breaks either over the course of their training and / or in the transition to their careers for which the meritocratic triad of “education”, “profession” and “income” is less effective than it is for men. A further aspect which unites the German and Spanish companies is (4) the position of the interviewees with a background of migration. On the one hand, the comparison of the sample surveys confirmed our assumption that the opportunity structure for interviewees in Germany is similar to that of Spanish interviewees. In Germany, the interviewees’ families had immigrated to Germany from southern and South Eastern Europe in the 50s, 60s and 70s as a result of recruitment drives in their own countries at the time. In Spain, the interviewees’ families had moved to Catalonia - primarily in our cases from the southern region of Andalusia - during the same time period. On the other hand, our allocation of status had indicated that there is a gradual process of harmonisation between these groups and indigenous men in our sample surveys.
The comparison of age ranges provides further evidence of common aspects: as was the case in our sample surveys at all of the companies, after bringing together the variables of “education”, “profession” and “income” three recurring common elements are clear which share the same basic pattern. These are particularly acute in the German and the Spanish cases: (1) school education does not directly influence people's chances of gaining higher professional training and better professional positions and higher earnings. (2) Despite increased efforts to gain school education, the two barriers to accessing professional training - whether in the company or in the education system - and the employment system are higher for interviewees with a background of migration of both genders, in all sample surveys. (3) This is also true for indigenous females, at least for all female interviewees in our companies who did not have a background of migration. To summarise and sharpen our focus here, this means that the meritocratic triad of education, profession and income is a paradigm based on success, and it is more relevant for indigenous men's lives, or more exactly, for the men we surveyed. The paradigm is getting more relevant for men with a background of migration, at a time when it seems on the surface at least that it does not have the same effect for younger indigenous men as for older ones. The best evidence of these first indications is found at AutoCat. The question therefore has to be asked at this point, as to whether the harmonisation and approximation processes in the structural requirements of allocating status to men and women are ultimately characterised by the fact that in reality, men's personal circumstances are equalising or approaching those of women, and that these processes are not happening in reverse. We will however leave this question unanswered at this point.

If we include the aspect of a trans-generational comparison of how people's lives progress, then we still see common gender-specific patterns which can be explained by the tenacity of a traditional gender arrangement. The fact that this is manifest in all four case study companies in Germany, Spain and Britain primarily indicates a social anchoring of a gender relationship. Whilst there are clearly specific variations between the countries - and as the Spanish interviewees who have a background of domestic migration provide evidence of, also there is also variation in the distribution of roles within countries - the basic structure is nonetheless the same. This basic structure characterises people's personal circumstances according to whether they are women or men. Certainly, according to the results of our surveys, it would be too extreme to talk of a “gap” between the personal circumstances of men and women, especially between young men and women. It is however clear that we can assume there are gender specific risks in people's lives and that there are specific patterns of selection in gaining access to professional training and to the employment system.

On the issue of patterns common to migrants, or more exactly, patterns of inequality common to migrants, we can conclude for our sample surveys that these are visible, but are fluid across the various age ranges. We can therefore perceive a tendency for these to dissipate. This point not only supports the thesis we outlined above, but our sample surveys fit into the assessment of the overall situation of migrants and their families in migration societies, carried out in Section 2, Chapter II. A further point here is the fact that the manner in which immigrants and their successor generations are incorporated into the host society is reliant upon whether these immigrants were directed mainly into lower areas of the labour market, a point which a comparison of the German and Spanish cases confirms. A comparison of the various age ranges shows that the oldest age group, coming from the first and second generations of immigrants - the latter were as a rule older youths at the time of their resettlement - have been given a very low social status and a professional position in the areas of unskilled workers or workers who were trained on the job. Following generations will then have to make an effort to move out of this social status. Our analysis of the younger age groups shows that this is already happening. They exhibit a social mobility which can overcome the danger of social enclosure and exclusion which affects the lower working classes (on this point, see R. Geißler 1992: 146 onwards; U. Birsl/S. Ottens/K. Sturhan 1999: 300 onwards). It is interesting to note
that in our comparison of the German and Spanish cases, these patterns constitute a basic structure which plays a determining role for interviewees both from families who have experienced international labour migration as well as for those who have migrated domestically.

On the “subjective” side of personal circumstances it is noticeable that the majority of the respondents do not actually feel threatened by unemployment but yet they do feel insecure as a result of the situation on the job market, particularly in Spain and in Germany. At the same time, the general job market situation leads them generally to feel privileged, as the interviewees compare this to the situation in their own specific companies. Furthermore, in a transgenerational comparison they regard themselves more as having the same status as their parents or indeed to have risen in social terms, as opposed to having fallen. Even the Moroccan workers at Textil S.A. who expressed the clearest fears about unemployment feel considerably privileged compared to the employment conditions faced by fellow Moroccans working in the same region. It became clear in the Spanish companies that an “exchange practice” is occurring: relative job security is guaranteed in return for workers’ acceptance of early retirement, harder work and cutbacks in wages and in social rights. The causes and cures for the dominant situation of unemployment are largely viewed in structural terms by the discussants at AutoCat and in individual, performance-related terms at Textil S.A.. At Michel Motors they are either described in structural terms or in individual, performance-related terms. The dominance of an individual, performance-related view which was evident in the quantitative survey can therefore be seen here again, to a degree, but is supplemented by the extensive presence of structural considerations.

The role of trade unions and works interest representations is viewed extremely positively at AutoCat, and extremely negatively at Textil S.A.. Employees tend to have adopted the paternalistic views of the management and the majority of the employees feel they have been treated well by management. At Michel Motors, a critical and ambivalent attitude towards the representative bodies is predominant, as is a similar attitude towards the management.

The labour market in Spain is described as being divided into two complementary sections. Immigrants will take on the (poor) working conditions which locals do not want. This means that no causal relationship is visible between unemployment and immigration; this is seen rather as an ideological discourse amongst the extreme right and elements of the local population. Interviewees in the German company also do not make these kind of connections on their own accord, apart from a few exceptions.

Discrimination both within the world of work and outside it, experienced by those interviewees in the German company with a background of migration, can also be said to be relatively pronounced in our quantitative results. In the discussion groups, both structural disadvantages (school, further education) and derogatory comments were made an issue of, as were threats of xenophobically motivated attacks “on the street”.

Chapter V: Interculturalism and Social Images:
Between Individualism and a Sense of Community

Two central issues have crystallised out of our analysis of the “subjective” side of personal circumstances: (1) Despite the fact that at the time of our empirical investigation hardly any of our interviewees felt themselves to be directly threatened by unemployment, we found a general uncertainty regarding jobs amongst the majority of interviewees, with the exception of the British. This was even the case in both Michel Motors and AutoCat, where employment can be viewed as being comparatively secure. (2) In all of our sample surveys and amongst the German and British interviewees in particular, we can discern a clear performance orientation which takes no account of general social relationships and developments, such as changes in the labour market. Furthermore, these are strongly individualistically structured. Amongst both these samples, the meritocratic triad of education, profession and income is therefore not just a social structural category but is also a social and cultural category, and this constitutes part of people’s attitudes in the form of an individualistic performance orientation. The group discussions will then show us whether, beyond this, this is also part of cultural practice in people’s lives.

In the following text, we will now leave this individual micro-level and turn to the attitudes which relate to the meso-level of the company and the macro-level of society itself in our study. This will show that this orientation towards individual performance runs through the attitudes of a majority of the interviewees like a connecting thread, both in perceptions of social inequality and in attitudes towards immigration and interculturality.

However, this individualistic performance orientation cannot be maintained with regards to both the issue of “social relationships” and that of “immigration and interculturality”. But neither is it entirely abandoned. We found several instances of very clear empirical evidence for the fact that contradictions in the evaluation of social relationships, be they in the context of immigration or of general social issues, are countered with two “strategies”: (1) Areas of social relationships, such as between immigrants and their families on one hand and indigenous people on the other or the relationship between the sexes, are not taken account of in peoples’ conceptions and images of society: in other words, they are separated, excluded. (2) Things which are assumed to be inexplicable, or issues about which people only have vague ideas, are explained and answered with naturalistic or biological arguments. These may “order” people’s ideas and images relating to their own social contexts and to society, and may also support the performance paradigm. Here, naturalistic arguments are generally oriented towards “others” and create a free space for exclusion and for the blocking off of problematic issues. Beyond that, these also serve to legitimate social differences. This affects not only foreigners or “ethnic minorities” but can for instance also affect women – as we noted amongst the men we interviewed – or social groups such as the unemployed.

Whilst the first “strategy” is a relatively consistent pattern amongst interviewees’ ideas and is only seldom deviated from, the second “strategy” can be observed in terms of various stages, and in various degrees of intensity. We identified these “strategies” through our creation of a typology of attitudes, using a cluster analysis involving all 923 interviewees. This means that the cluster analysis was carried out independently of the relationship to any one of the countries or companies being investigated, the gender or status group and without ordering respondents into groups of interviewees with or without a background of migration. The aim of this procedure is not to explain people’s membership of any of these categories from the outset as being constitutive for characteristics in their attitudes. In the sense of “deconstruction – reconstruction” we only “reconstructed” membership of a group relating to the kinds of attitudes we discovered. At the same time, this means that attitudes functioned as an independent variable.
However, only those attitudes which relate to the central aspect of the present study were included in the cluster analysis, i.e. attitudes which provide information about the relationship towards immigration and interculturality in the three migratory societies of Britain, Germany and Spain, on a case study basis. For this, responses relating to this set of issues in the individual sample surveys are initially evaluated and are then condensed using factor analyses of attitude syndromes or of “interculturalism scales” with five dimensions of attitudes.

These scales are outlined below and are analysed to pinpoint their common features and their differences. At this point we still differentiate on the basis of company, for two reasons: firstly, the sample surveys have a very varied scope, meaning that the surveys at Michel Motors and AutoCat would have dominated the other two in the factor analysis. Whilst this could have been avoided using a statistical weighting of the sample surveys, we were, however, at the same time also investigating the extent to which the composition of the variables in the attitude syndromes have special features. We would not have been able to trace this by creating a unified scale.

Building on this, in Section 2 the four types of attitudes pinpointed using the cluster analysis will then be presented, and these highlight pointedly the value of both “strategies” outlined above. These also make it clear just how broadly attitudes towards immigration and interculturality can be spread. Furthermore, this demonstrates just how varied the motives and how unclear the social backgrounds are for open attitudes which accept immigration and interculturality and for the whole scope of attitudes, right through to more intolerant and xenophobic views. There are no simple explanations for the phenomena which we have measured here.

In Section 3, the arguments used in the group discussions concerning the issue of “immigration” are then placed alongside these attitudes which were recorded quantitatively. This again concerns the dimensions of the “interculturalism scale”, with regard in particular to constructions in the context of “doing stranger” as well as on varying group constructions. Beyond this, and as with the discussion of our types of attitudes, we will also look at whether and if so, how the issue of “immigration” is bound up with people’s ideas of society and social problems. We will also look at how the issue of “interculturality” is bound up with the participants’ performance paradigm.

1. The Interculturalism of the German, Spanish and British Interviewees

A total of 26 statements or items relating to attitudes towards immigration and the acceptance or non-acceptance of immigrants were investigated using the standardised survey. Of these, 18 statements or items aim to confirm an attitude syndrome in the samples at Michel Motors and Textil S.A., 20 at Special-Motor Plant and 21 at AutoCat. We describe this as an “inter-culturalism scale” and it is divided into five attitude dimensions. These dimensions capture attitudes which relate to different contexts of social experience, to political contexts and to basic orientations – in this case, constructions. At the same time, these also mark the individual levels of contexts of experiences in the immediate and the more distant spheres. In this way, statements (1) regarding interculturality in the workplace and (2) outside of the work environment were included, as were (3) statements about incorporation policy, where civil rights played a particular role in our survey, (4) about general political questions concerning immigration and asylum, and also – last but not least – (5) concerning basic ideas about the supposedly natural differences between the majority population and immigrated minorities, as well as fears about threats which – we assumed initially – could possibly be connected to this “naturalistic way of thinking”. This prior assumption was confirmed in our survey, as it had already been in the pre-study.

\footnote{On the category of “interculturalism” and its usage in the present study, compare Chapter II, Section 1 and Chapter III, Section 2.}
The 26 items were partially condensed into short sets of questions, which were then distributed throughout the whole questionnaire. Certain items were also distributed amongst sets of questions on other issues. We did this for example with the set of questions on a “naturalistic way of thinking”; items relating to this were integrated into a set of questions on the perception of social inequality. The conception of the questionnaire and the sets of questions aimed to prevent suggesting connections to the interviewees at the outset; the importance of these connections in people’s attitudes was to be measured and checked in our study. Furthermore, the wording of the statements is relatively evenly distributed both towards tolerance and acceptance and towards intolerance and the rejection of immigration and interculturality.

In Table 23, the interculturalism scales and their five dimensions are broken down according to the sample surveys in the companies. It is clear from this, that indeed, when viewed in total, the attitude syndromes of the samples hardly differ from each other in the structure of the relevant items, regardless of which of the three countries or which of the four companies they belong to. Our sample surveys display a relative openness towards immigration and interculturality. However, on closer inspection we can see that differences between the sample surveys do exist in terms of the interviewees’ responses to the questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Michel Motors (n = 337)</th>
<th>AutoCat (n = 305)</th>
<th>Textil S.A. (n = 149)</th>
<th>Special Motor Plant (n = 132)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dimension: Tolerance in the workplace</strong></td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality of superior is not important</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality of colleague is not important; it’s experience and ability that matter.</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different mentalities lead to problems in the workplace</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dimension: Cultural tolerance</strong></td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners should be able to maintain their own cultural practices.</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living closely together results in a better relationship</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice another culture overseas. Here you have to adapt.</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be nice to have more contact.</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dimension: Attitudes towards legal integration.</strong></td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners should have voting rights.</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalisation should be made easier.</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>3.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should be allowed to settle here for an unlimited period of time.</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should obtain citizenship instantly on marrying a German/ Spanish/ British national.</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The attitude syndromes were determined using factor-based analyses, which were carried out individually according to sample survey. Both the scales of the individual attitude dimensions and the entire interculturalism scale display initial intrinsic values of variance of at least 50%. They are mostly higher; it was only at Textil S.A. where the individual value regarding the dimension of “attitude towards immigration and asylum” was 47%. In this sample survey it could generally be seen that interviewees’ attitudes towards immigration and interculturality were less coherent than were those of the other sample surveys (see also the following Section). The components of the variables included in the attitude scales have a lowest value of 0.5, but as a rule tend to be somewhere between 0.6 and 0.8.
Chapter V: Interculturalism and Social Images

### Statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Michel Motors (n = 337)</th>
<th>AutoCat (n = 305)</th>
<th>Textil S.A. (n = 149)</th>
<th>Special Motor Plant (n = 132)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dimension: Attitudes towards immigration and asylum.</strong></td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should accept people being politically persecuted.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too many people are immigrating, so we need to tighten the law.</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners living here illegally should be deported.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration poses a threat to German/Spanish/British identity.</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should make allowances for illegal immigration when there is a crisis in the immigrants’ country of origin.</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We need more effective measures for integration.</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany/Spain/Britain is a country of immigration.</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dimension: Naturalistic way of thinking</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.30</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.74</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.21</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.53</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration poses a threat to German/Spanish/British identity.</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are naturally defined differences between peoples.</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be social differences on the basis of natural differences.</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be understanding for natives, as they feel threatened by the increasing number of foreigners.</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interculturalism scale</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.73</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.42</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.54</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.87</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*We used a five-level Likert scale to measure intercultural attitudes. The answer categories were “strongly agree”, “agree”, “partly agree/partly disagree” or “don’t know”, “disagree” and “strongly disagree”. We codified the answers to our statements by weighting the values of 1 to 5 “positively” towards xenophobia. So for instance, if a statement aimed at measuring xenophobia, intolerance, exclusion or a naturalistic point of view were strongly agreed with, it would be given a value of 5 on our scale, and would get a value of 1 if the respondent strongly disagreed. On the other hand, if a statement is formulated “negatively” in terms of our scale, that is, it tends towards tolerance, ideas of equality an such like, and this were to be strongly agreed with, then the answer would receive a value of 1, and would receive 5 if it was strongly rejected. The arithmetical average here is similarly 2.5.

It is firstly noticeable that the acceptance of interculturality and therefore also of immigration is highest when we refer to people’s immediate sphere in life. Acceptance then declines when we leave this area and refer instead to the social or political level. AutoCat is the only company we investigated where interculturality as a result of international labour immigration plays no role at all – apart from Western European or German management and specialists in the company – and is therefore also not an element of people’s daily experience in the workplace. The statements relating particularly to the dimension of “tolerance in the workplace” are therefore more hypothetical for the participants in our study of attitudes; they are more abstract in nature. This is clear in the way people answer in the context of this dimension, and it is also very balanced for the other four attitudinal dimensions, even when compared generally to the other sample surveys.

In the three other sample surveys we see evidence of some very strong “crucial factors”. In the German case study at Michel Motors and the British case study at Special Motor Plant in particular, both of which are workplaces which are characterised by decades of experience of interculturality we can discern a willingness to incorporate and a very high level of acceptance of migratory groups, both in the company sphere and to a degree, also in the sphere be-
yond the company. Even the idea of incorporating foreigners into the country’s civil rights system meets with rejection, and this is more the case in the British sample than in the German one. The issue of immigration and asylum similarly finds little resonance. However, the relatively widespread and deeply rooted naturalistic way of thinking, which we observe at Textil S.A. but not at AutoCat, is particularly noteworthy. Two things become clear in this attitude dimension: (1) German and British interviewees both feel to the same extent that social differences are also justified by natural differences between people, and use “naturally determined differences between peoples” especially as the basis for their assumption. (2) In all of the sample surveys, concerns about threats are in evidence. However, amongst the Spanish interviewees at Textil S.A. and the British interviewees at Special Motor Plant, this is accompanied by the fear that national identity is threatened by immigration. This statement is a variable which is also meaningful in the area of attitudes towards immigration and asylum, and which assumes an important role overall in attitudes towards immigration and interculturality.

Viewed as a whole, despite the reactions of rejection and exclusion which we have described in our answers, we are dealing here with sample surveys where we cannot measure any potential for xenophobic attitudes or only to a very limited extent. The latter of these in particular is a thoroughly surprising result and refers only the Spanish cases. By comparison, the greatest potential for xenophobic attitudes can be found in the German sample survey at Michel Motors. This is followed, though by a long way, by the British sample survey at Special Motor Plant.

The relations between our companies investigated here correspond more or less to the distribution pattern of xenophobic attitudes in the three migratory societies which crystallised out of the results of the Eurobarometer entitled “Attitudes towards minority groups in the European Union” (2001). Measured against this, we can put together a “ranking” of our countries being investigated here: the greatest proportion of xenophobic attitudes and resentment can be measured in Germany, and it assumes first place amongst our case study countries. Britain is in second place and the lowest values can be seen in Spain, in third place (see Chapter II, Section 3.2).

**Figure 12: Distribution of the Potential for Tolerant and Xenophobic Attitudes at Michel Motors (N = 337, Figures in %)*

* Explanation: values between 1 and 5 inclusive can be reached on the interculturalism scale (Table 23). The receptive/tolerant potential lies in the area between 1 and 2.5. The potential for tolerant – intolerant views lies between the values 2.5 and 4.0 and the xenophobic potential is between 4 and 5 inclusively.

As is clear from Figure 12, we have determined three potential attitudes in the sample surveys from the values measures on the interculturalism scale. The result for the German sample is that 41.3% of the interviewees demonstrate a “potentially receptive/tolerant attitude”. The term “receptive” should indicate that we see here a high degree of “openness” towards immigration and incorporation. “Openness” also refers to the category which we defined as being
central for the evaluation of the three migration societies in Chapter 1, Section 1, drawing on the work of the German sociologist Seifert. These open or receptive attitudes are more tolerant, as they have already attained the level of very uninhibited acceptance. As this openness is not maintained entirely unbroken in people’s attitudes, we also include the aspect of “only” tolerating it, in our description of this potential. Tolerance marks the crossover point to the 50.6% of the interviewees whose attitudes lie on a continuum between the poles of “still tolerant” to “partially intolerant”. In line with the results outlined above, the more tolerant responses in the answers relate primarily to the respondents’ immediate spheres in life, the partially intolerant answers to the more distant realms. In addition, a naturalistic way of thinking also comes into play at this point for the first time.

We can speak of clearly xenophobic attitudes amongst 8.1% of the interviewees in total, and amongst 10.9% of interviewees without a background of migration. This means that for all five attitude dimensions on the interculturalism scale, we can consistently measure attitudes ranging from rejection to strong rejection of immigration and interculturality and this is in part supported by naturalistic arguments. Here, the threshold to racism is at least reached, even if it is not crossed. It is noticeable that there are no relevant differentiations made in these attitudes between the immediate sphere and the more distant sphere. It is hardly surprising that the value is much higher amongst those interviewees without a background of migration than for the whole sample. The 97 interviewees with a background of migration express this for obvious reasons: most of the statements relate directly to their individual situation as an immigrant or a member of an immigrant family. Accordingly, they stand for incorporation in the workplace, cultural freedoms and civil rights. However, we also find a comparable level of rejection amongst these interviewees, when the issue is further immigration or a comparable level of support for naturalistic concepts as is found in the rest of the sample.

By contrast, at AutoCat and Textil S.A. we see no potential for xenophobic attitudes, as Figure 13 shows.

*Figure 13: Distribution of Potential for Tolerant and Xenophobic Attitudes at AutoCat (N = 305) and Textil S.A. (N = 149, figures in %)*

AutoCat

In the pre-study, this potential was just over 6% for all interviewees and just over 8% amongst interviewees without a background of migration.
We see a balanced distribution of the two potential attitudes at the Spanish car manufacturer, a feature already observed above on the interculturalism scale. In comparison with their German counterpart, it is noticeable that the potential for “receptive/tolerant” attitudes is greater and the potential for “tolerant-intolerant” attitudes is roughly the same size. We can observe a distribution of one-third to two-thirds at the Spanish textile company, which is again closer to the British car manufacturer. The thing which keeps the “potential for receptive/tolerant attitudes” proportionately relatively small are essentially the prejudices towards immigration and asylum, or against accepting Spain as a country of immigration. Further important aspects are also naturalistic concepts as well as echoes of fears about threats and the lower level of tolerance in the workplace in comparison to Michel Motors and Special Motor Plant, the two other companies with an intercultural workforce.

This again characterises the attitudes at the British car manufacturer both in terms of the “receptive/tolerant potential” and the “tolerant-intolerant potential”. However, in the British sample we find the lowest proportion of interviewees whose attitudes are essentially open, at 26.5%. Instead, the sample is dominated by interviewees who are very receptive in the workplace but are more sceptical towards the incorporation of immigrants into civil rights and support a more rigid immigration policy. A naturalistic way of thinking is also widespread here.

* See figure 12 for an explanation.

Figure 14: Distribution of Potential for Tolerant and Xenophobic Attitudes at Special Motor Plant (N = 132, figures in %)*

* See figure 12 for an explanation.
The potential for xenophobic attitudes does not differ in structure from that found at the German car company. However, according to Figure 14 it is proportionately less than half that of interviewees without a background of migration at Michel Motors.

We now have to ask towards whom these attitudes are directed, both acceptance, a willingness to incorporate migrants and tolerance and lower acceptance levels, intolerance and even attitudes ranging from rejection right through to a xenophobic stance. In order therefore to find out with whom the interviewees associate the general categories of “foreigner”, “ethnic minorities” or “immigrants”, we presented them with an alphabetical list of the important immigrant groups in each of the countries in the questionnaires. We chose descriptions which are common in public discourse. This means that the groups are broken down according to citizenship, a formal description of minorities such as that in Britain, their belonging to an emigrant region such as a “South American” for instance, or according to religion. The respondents were asked to mark the first three groups which they connected with the categories listed above.

It is noticeable from the results that groups who are represented in the respondents’ immediate sphere of the workplace are only partly mentioned. Moreover, the results are also not necessarily geared towards the size of an immigrant or ethnic group. The most important factor determining interviewees’ answers is again the importance of groups in public discourse (on this point, see also Chapter 1, Sections 2.1 to 2.3; Chapter II, Section 3.1).

At Michel Motors, as a rule the interviewees associate the category of “foreigner” used here with “Turks” firstly, then “Kurds and in third place “Black Africans”. This last group is not present in the company, but is brought into public consciousness through public debates on asylum. By contrast, “Turks” and “Kurds” are very strongly represented in the workplace. At the same time, Turks are repeatedly at the centre of public controversies about successful and unsuccessful incorporation policies. It is interesting here that nationals of other countries than Turkey where Germany advertised for workers from the 1950s through to the 1970s, countries such as Italy, Greece or Spain, are hardly mentioned. This supports the thesis we outlined earlier that these immigrants and their successor generations are no longer necessarily perceived as “foreigners”. The responses of interviewees with a background of migration are also noteworthy: those whose country of origin is Turkey, or whose families come from this southern European country, likewise associate “Turks” and “Kurds” with the category of “foreigner”. In doing so, they are reflecting what they are regarded as in German society, and also what they feel themselves to be in that same society. The other interviewees in the part sample react in a similar manner as the interviewees without a background of migration, and therefore also list the three groups listed above rather than those which describe their own origins. These employees seem to reject being termed as “foreigners” and being categorised as such, a fact which also came through in direct conversations surrounding our investigation. We can conclude from this that the category of “foreigner” has thoroughly negative connotations. We cannot rule out the possibility that these interviewees with a background of migration are now also trying to separate themselves from Turks. However, this cannot be checked with our study and with our data.

At both AutoCat and Textil S.A., Moroccans are the group most commonly associated with the category “foreigner”. Whilst with this term, the interviewees at AutoCat are referring to a very small group of migrants that they know primarily from public discourse, this motivational basis is mixed with experiences of intercultural relationships in the workplace at Textil S.A.. The employees at the Spanish car manufacturer may also have been thinking of these when they put “Chinese” in second place in the association question. Chinese labourers worked in the plant at the beginning of the 1990s and were then the only group of foreign employees in the production process (see Chapter II, Section 3.2). The group of “Germans” who are represented in the company at the level of skilled workers and management, is ranked only in 5th position. This may be for two reasons: (1) The majority of the interviewees work in
the production process and have little contact with the German employees. (2) Germans and other Western immigrants are rarely associated with the term “foreigners” and tend rather to be associated with the term “immigrants” (“Inmigrantes”), which has more positive connotations (see Chapter II, Sections 1 and 4).

The respondents at AutoCat list “black Africans” as the third group, and this group is even in second place amongst respondents at Textil S.A.. As in the German case, the asylum question is also in the background, and beyond this, so too is the public perception of refugees crossing the gulf of Gibraltar. Furthermore, in the sample survey, the third most commonly cited group in the “association question” are the “Berbers”. It is not clear whether this group is represented as a foreign group from North Africa or whether domestic migrants are also meant (there is a “Berber” minority living in Andalusia). However, they are not a subject of public discourse. For this reason they are also hardly mentioned by the interviewees at AutoCat.

In the British sample survey we did not ask about associations with the term “foreigner” as we did in the other cases, but rather with the term “ethnic minority”. The order of groups most commonly cited by the respondents put “Pakistani” in first place, “Indians” in second place and “Bangladeshi” in third place. As in the case of Michel Motors and Textil S.A., the reasons for this are mixed: on the one hand, these groups are present in Special Motor Plant, and on the other hand, they were at the centre of public interest at the time of our survey. The background to this was the violent clashes in several small cities between white British youths and youths from Asian minorities. These violent conflicts were a dominant subject in the media in the summer of 2001 (see Chapter II, Section 3.1). But there is a further explanation for people frequently citing Asian minorities: another minority group, Blacks, are also present in the workforce of the car manufacturer, and the interviewees do have experience of conflicts in the workplace, which were perceived as conflicts between “whites” and “blacks” (compare Chapter II, Section 3.4). Yet Blacks only rank in fourth and fifth position in the association question, as “Africans” and “West Indians”. One reason for this may be that they are the oldest immigrant and minority group in Britain – with the exception of the Irish – and now tend to be viewed more as incorporated and part of society than do groups which immigrated later. This motivation was made a subject in the group discussion and the results of this in Section 3 of this chapter offer further information on this point.

All in all, we find a differentiated picture of attitudes towards immigration and interculturality. On central points, the fact that daily intercultural practice brings with it receptiveness and tolerance in the workplace at least, is confirmed. If this is absent, as is the case at AutoCat, this does not however lead to the reverse conclusion, that we would encounter more rejection and intolerance or indeed even hostilities. Without being able to follow the empirical evidence through, we can however conclude from the Spanish case with good reason that alongside intercultural experience, public – or more precisely, political – discourse about immigration, interculturality and incorporation has an important influence on people’s attitudes which should not be underestimated.

Regarding the “potential for tolerant-intolerant attitudes”, the relatively clear separation between the immediate sphere and the more distant sphere is apparent: in the personal sphere, to put it simply, more tolerant – and receptive – attitudes are predominant, whilst tolerance declines markedly in the more distant sphere.

It is noticeable that a naturalistic way of thinking is a widespread phenomenon, apart from in the “potential for receptive/tolerant” views. And yet, we cannot speak here of racist views. Firstly, agreement on this issue is only muted and secondly, it is not automatically linked to ideas of an inequality of peoples, even if respondents do make differentiations on a naturalistic basis, such as between “peoples” and “ethnicities” and so on. We may indeed sit up when we hear that social differences are being explained by supposedly natural differences. But these kind of concepts are less a result of racist thinking than of the performance ideology
which we mentioned above, in connection with a specific understanding of equality: the ideology of equal opportunities. To sum it up briefly, this follows the motto that “life’s what you make it”, and “quality and performance will always prevail in the end. As we already saw in Chapter IV, Section 2.1, these concepts find a great deal of resonance both amongst the interviewees in the quantitative survey and the participants in the group discussions. The ability to perform and to carry something through are practically naturally determined in this construct but do however need material substantiation, in order to present them independently of their belonging to a class or a level of society. In this sense we encounter a performance paradigm here – which can also be characterised as performance orientated individualism – the core of an ideology of equal opportunities. This is again conceptionally anchored in the socialist or social democratic parties and in union organisations in Western Europe, and follows a belief in the meritocratic triad of education, profession and income. In this respect, performance orientated individualism as we could observe it in our investigation, is not a peculiarity but a widespread social phenomenon.

Furthermore, in the context of a naturalistic way of thinking we find resonances of insecurities right through to concerns of threats, which become effective in the context of immigration. These fears relate not just to daily intercultural experiences but primarily to the more abstract social level of immigration and asylum. As early as in the association question and in the items relating to the dimension of “attitudes to immigration and asylum” on the interculturalism scale something which is again confirmed in the group discussions is clear: patterns of arguments from public discourse are reproduced. These seem to capture and strengthen fears about threats.

Even if when viewed as a whole we are hardly dealing here with rigid exclusion and rejection of immigration, immigrants and interculturality, we should nevertheless investigate how this is constituted, particularly in the “potential for tolerant-intolerant views”. We should also look more closely at which further social and political views these people represent. Whereas we could discern very tight attitude syndromes in the sense of coherent patterns of views both amongst the “receptive” interviewees and amongst those with xenophobic views, this is generally not the case amongst the “tolerant-intolerant” group. They give the impression that their views could polarise in conflict situations or possibly during a more intense public debate on immigration, asylum and incorporation. By this we also mean that a potential for threat could develop amongst this group, which tends towards stronger resentment and even towards xenophobia. In the cluster analysis this potential attitude stands out even further. In the following text we come back to this threat and analyse it more closely.

2. The Four Types of Attitude towards Immigration and Interculturality

Four types of attitude crystallised out of our grouping or clumping together of attitudes towards immigration and interculturality. This process recorded 838 of the 923 interviewees, or 92% of all sample surveys. The 85 interviewees to whom no type of attitude could be attributed come mainly from Textil S.A.. A smaller proportion of them are from AutoCat and Special Motor Plant. In general, these respondents give relatively incoherent answers to the statements from the interculturalism scale. This means that their attitudes do not form a separate profile of preferences on the issue of “immigration and interculturality”.

---

150 We used a cluster-centre analysis for this typification. The basis was the five dimensions of attitudes on the interculturalism scale, which were each condensed into scales using/via factor analyses and were depicted as a variable. The number of the clusters were then selected according to whether these depicted clearly separated attitude profiles, using the mean values. Using four clusters and an iteration test, a maximum distance of 0.0154 was obtained, around which a centre was changed. A maximum of 10 iterations were carried out. The minimum distance between the initial centres is 5.2%, and therefore lies at a significance level of just over 95%.
This is different for the four types of attitudes we had determined. Here we find profiles of views which are inwardly more harmonious and can be delineated from each other. As with the potential attitudes we measured above, they move on a continuum between the two poles of “receptive” and “xenophobic”. If we now also include further attitude dimensions which provide information on individual social interests, the perception of social relationships and gender roles, then we encounter characteristics in these views which provide us with explanations for the differing relationship towards immigration and interculturality. Nevertheless, for those interviewees who could be categorised into a type of attitude, it is true to say that they mostly do not have a closed political image of the world where preferences and patterns of attitudes on social and political issues interact seamlessly and coherently with one another.

The types of attitudes run right through the sample surveys in the various countries and companies. However, we can make out emphases in the sample surveys. More than this, in two key areas the results confirm the results from the pre-study – though this time they are more precise, due to the greater number of interviewees and the variety of fields being investigated, transcending national boundaries: (1) There is no sign of a clear social and structural classification of attitudes having any effect. This means for instance that receptive social and political views which are supported by a public spirit are not reserved solely for higher status groups. Similarly, xenophobic views or views marked by individualism are not characteristic for lower status groups. (2) Even in this investigation there are hardly any differences between women’s and men’s attitudes. This means, for instance, that women do not react more receptively towards immigration and interculturality, with men tending more to reject it. To put it another way, likewise, a sense of community and performance oriented individualism cannot be explained in terms of gender-specific paradigms. However, where the genders do differ, and this is hardly surprising, is in their ideas about femininity and masculinity, as well as about gender arrangements.

On this last issue and on the relationship of the interviewees to immigration and interculturality, that is, on both the areas of social group constructions which we had selected, we are trying to check how these are tied into social interest orientations and into the evaluation of social (inequality) relationships, or whether these are even bound in at all. There is then a direct relationship between this and the effect of the performance paradigm. At the centre is the issue of in what form this paradigm can be maintained, where it breaks down with social experience, at which points it therefore comes into conflict with ideas of justice or injustice and beyond this, why there are social constructions which are excluded from this paradigm.

2.1 Type 1: “The Receptive”

The type of attitude which we define as “receptive” is supported by 188 interviewees in our sample surveys. These come almost exclusively from the car manufacturers which we investigated. Whilst 19.3% of the sample at AutoCat and 16.7% at Special Motor Plant could be classed as “receptive”, at Michel Motors this figure was almost 28%. A greater proportion of men than women could be classed as belonging to this type. The distribution of age ranges is thoroughly balanced. There is a greater proportion of interviewees in the highest status group who are “receptive”. However, the number of these is too low to be able to establish solid evaluations concerning their views. Table 24 outlines again the structure of this group.
The openness which characterises the views of this group runs through all dimensions related to immigration and interculturality. The fact that a certain degree of “normalism” is a consequence of this openness is also characteristic. This means that there are no indications of reactions oriented towards the “demonstrative” or the “socially desired” in the answers. These kind of reactions are not totally absent from the other types of attitudes, particularly when “tolerance” towards minority groups in the workplace is highlighted, but this is not reproduced in the same way in the answers on the other statements. Another instance would be if there are differences between action options in various areas of the immediate sphere, i.e. in the workplace or in the neighbourhood, such as we established amongst several of the participants in the group discussions. Beyond this, the group discussions also offer us an insight into whether “tolerance in the workplace” can also be an “prescribed practice” which does not always have an equivalent in people’s attitudes. This is a circumstance which cannot be captured quantitatively to the degree necessary.

The fact that answers oriented towards “demonstrative” or “socially desired” views has had less of an influence on “the receptive” can be seen from two points: firstly, incorporation in the workplace and in the sphere outside of the company meets with almost as much support as does the incorporation into civil rights and an openness towards immigration and asylum. Furthermore, naturalistic arguments are essentially rejected by people with this kind of attitude. Secondly, this very firmly fixed attitude syndrome (we could also call it a basic attitude) is confirmed through control variables in the questionnaire.

In addition, as Figure 15 shows, the answers to the statements on the other issues relevant in this study are contiguous with the understanding of interculturalism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From the part sample...</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... at Michel Motors</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at AutoCat</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at Textil S.A.</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at Special-Motor Plant</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of female interviewees</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of male interviewees</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those up to and including 20 years old</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 21 up to and including 30</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 31 up to and including 40</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 41 up to and including 50</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 51 up to and including 60</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 3</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of interviewees without a background of migration</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of interviewees with a background of migration</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* For all of the scales the same methodology was used as was described in Table 23 in Chapter V, on the interculturalism scale. Therefore for the scales “materialistic work and career orientation”, “anti-egalitarian conception of society” and “traditional orientation towards gender roles”, the higher the mean value is, then the more the answers tend towards views which are “materialistic”, “anti-egalitarian” and “traditional”, and vice versa. The lower the mean values are, the more “intrinsic”, “egalitarian” and “open” the attitudes are. The arithmetic mean value for all scales is 2.5.

The scale of “materialistic orientation towards work and career” concerns individual social interests in people’s work and careers, and data on this was collected through set of questions 17 in the questionnaire (see Annexe III). The aim was to measure the extent to which more extrinsic or materialistic orientations predominate in this field, i.e. whether a secure job, regulated working times and opportunities for professional advancement as well as the possibility to earn good, secure money is preferred by the interviewees, or whether on the other hand people formulate more intrinsic or subjectively oriented interests in their work and career. This category would include options such as the desire for instance to be able to work creatively and independently, to have contact with other people or to do something worthwhile in their career. This set out to check the hypothesis that materialistic orientations promote the creation of resentment towards and rejection of immigration and immigrants, a view which is frequently assumed in empirical investigations on xenophobia. In this context, we mean that fears of a decline in social status have an effect when they are bound up with the loss of a job, income and therefore of prestige. These fears encompass ideas of competition with minorities. We could reason further here that interviewees who have a more intrinsic orientation towards work and career, on the other hand, draw a certain “sense of purpose” from their work and career which goes beyond material security. This would mean that for them, losing their job and their income would not automatically be connected with a loss of prestige, and would also not rock a central area of their whole conception of life.
It was not very surprising to us that we did however find a mixture of materialistic and intrinsic work and career orientations amongst the majority of the interviewees across all our sample surveys and within all the types of attitude. These were however not all at the same level and there were variations which lead the hypothesis outlined here not towards an absurd conclusion, but rather, distinguish between elements of it.

This means that for the “receptive”, opportunities to advance professionally and to earn more do play a thoroughly important role. Yet these people also connect subjectively oriented interests with work and career. This is true even for the lower status groups whose activities often do not allow scope for people to use any creativity and such like. Nevertheless – and depending on the company’s unionisation\(^1\) – the ability to work independently and the possibility of having contact with other people does characterise their orientation towards their work and their career. Furthermore, the majority of interviewees from this group believe that their activities correspond with what they want from their careers. This therefore means that we can assume a certain level of satisfaction with their work and with their chosen career.

However, it would be too simple for us to conclude from this result that only the intrinsic orientation to work and career leads to a receptive understanding of interculturalism. We need to ask much more how far a materialistic or intrinsic way of thinking connects itself with an individualistic performance ethic, one which is fundamentally anti-egalitarian. Or does this instead tend to connect itself more with a sense of community, that is, a social critique which is substantially focused on ideas of equality? Similarly, this performance ethic does not exclude social criticism; however, it is a question here of whether “performance” structures social relationships or whether “unjust” barriers prevent them.

In terms of the scale of “anti-egalitarian conceptions of society”, where the potential for agreement and disagreement was measured using sets of questions 8 to 12, we were interested in three central questions: (1) Are social relationships seen to be unequal in Germany, Spain and Britain? (2) If so, is this put down to a distribution of the “chances to perform” which is felt to be unjust, or to lines of social conflict, such as the socio-economic cleavage? The first targets the individual performance ethic, the second option targets rather egalitarian orientations which are measured using a rejection of this performance ethic, and using instead support for substantive conceptions of equality. (3) Are all social relationships and groups incorporated into images of a society or are others separated or even excluded from them? In our context, interculturality and the relationship between the sexes are addressed as two social relationships; the degree to which these are incorporated or excluded is then being investigated.

With regards to the “receptive” type of attitude, criticism of social inequality relationships is very strong, and interviewees tend to view these as unjust. They express the opinion that social disparities are related to the traditional line of conflict between labour and capital, which they regard as still being influential. Individual performance can break through this line of conflict only to a very limited extent.

The answers to two questions which we have selected as examples are shown in Table 25. These demonstrate the extent to which this group of interviewees make a connection between their evaluation of society in Germany, Spain and Britain as having great social differences and a vision of an egalitarian society.

---
\(^1\) The majority of all interviewees – with the exception of Textil S.A. – work in teams or in groups in production.
Table 25: Perception of Social Inequality Relationships amongst the “Receptive” (figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 10: “In your opinion, how big are social differences in Germany/ in Spain/ in Britain?”</th>
<th>“very big”</th>
<th>“big”</th>
<th>“not particularly big”</th>
<th>“limited”</th>
<th>“very limited”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 14: “Do you think we should try to achieve a society where there are no social differences between people?”</td>
<td>“we should try and achieve this”</td>
<td>“it would be more worth trying to achieve this than not”</td>
<td>“not particularly”</td>
<td>“it would not be worth trying to achieve this”</td>
<td>“we should not try and achieve this”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the critical evaluation of society apparently does not automatically include foreigners or members of “ethnic minorities”. Over a third of these respondents still said that the social “opportunities for foreigners/ ethnic minorities are dependent on personal capability and performance”. This is in spite of the fact that personal performance is otherwise not seen as being suitable to break through social differences which are based on traditional lines of conflict.

An almost equally high proportion regards women and men as being relatively equal in social terms. Whether this also means an equality within inequality remains an open question. However, the men we interviewed in this group were more likely to regard equality of the sexes as having been achieved than were the women in this group.

As regards the orientation towards gender roles, which was investigated mainly in set of questions 13152, the majority of respondents rejected traditional gender arrangements. This is also true for the attribution of supposedly natural characteristics, and a distribution of peoples’ roles based on this. Nevertheless, a very large group of over 30% regard naturalistic reasons as being plausible, as is shown empirically by the answers to two of the three statements in the questionnaire regarding “natural” characteristics and the needs of women153. Whilst men predominate amongst these interviewees, 25% of women also agree with the second statement in Table 26. Roughly the same proportion also reject the third statement here.

Table 26: Naturalistic Conceptions of Femininity amongst the “Receptive” (figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements from question 13</th>
<th>“I agree”</th>
<th>“I agree more than disagree”</th>
<th>“I don’t know”</th>
<th>“I disagree more than agree”</th>
<th>“I disagree”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Nature has made only women able to look after children and the family”.</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A woman cannot find happiness through her career alone. Having children and being there for their family is part of it.”</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

152 Items on the perception of social relations are also integrated into the sets of questions.
153 The first two items in Table 25 have already been used in several of our investigations. They are taken from the 1987 manifesto of Germany’s right extremist “Republikaner” party and proved to be a very clear dividing variable.
This popularity of naturalistic conceptions of femininity corresponds to the results of the attitude dimension “a naturalistic way of thinking” on the interculturalism scale. However, within the naturalistic implications of the way the interviewees with “receptive” attitudes think we could not distinguish any views on the inequality of peoples or the inequality of the sexes. Similarly, with a view to the stance towards immigration and interculturality, no insecurities or fears of threats have an effect. Whilst people do express understanding for the fact that “natives feel threatened by the increasing number of foreigners”, they do not appropriate this view and it may possibly be more as a result of a reflection of public discourse that this indirectly formulated item finds at least a small level of support. For on the other hand, they view the identity of their own country as not being negatively influenced at all by immigration.

If we now look at the overall profile of the attitudes of the “receptive” interviewees, then we can see that it is open both towards immigration and interculturality and towards a more non-traditional relationship between the sexes – albeit with the limitations we have already mentioned. At the same time, this profile involves a stance which is critical of society, one which goes along with a vision of a more just society. Even if a certain sense of community is clear in these attitudes, this does not exclude a performance-based way of thinking and a materialistic orientation towards work and career. These attitudes are however not particularly marked.

Nevertheless, it is already clear in the group of interviewees displaying this kind of attitude that openness and a certain degree of “normalism” in the relationship towards immigration and interculturality does not lead to them regarding this as an integral element of society. In concrete terms, this means that interculturalism is a concept that is not made an issue of in connection with social relationships. It is largely separated from these. The only exception is the working world, where social interests relating to work and career are interrelated with attitudes towards the incorporation of colleagues of foreign origin or of members of an “ethnic minority” in the workplace.

This all behaves differently in the attitudes towards gender roles and the issue of the equality of the sexes. These attitudes are not connected with social interests in the world of work. Instead, they are integrated into images of society and on both these points, they differ fundamentally from the conceptions of immigration and interculturality.

One thing which can be seen to be a difference to the other kinds of attitudes is the fact that the open conception of interculturalism is linked to a relatively open conception of the relationship between the sexes.

Nevertheless, whilst the question of immigration, interculturality and incorporation is viewed as a political issue, the question of the relationship between the sexes and men and women’s participation in the sphere of production and of reproduction is a largely non-political, individualised question. It is formulated particularly as a requirement for women to combine having a family and a career. This also runs through the attitudes of the other groups of interviewees as a basic pattern, or rather, as a basic orientation.

---

154 The inter-correlation coefficient between the scales on social conceptions and those on gender role orientations has a value of 0.7 on a significance level of 99%.

155 This is the only group of interviewees where we could establish at least one inter-correlation coefficient of a little over 0.3, on a significance level of 99%, using bivariate correlations.
2.2 Type 2: “The Tolerant Sceptics”

A total of 279 interviewees in our sample surveys can be said to belong to the “tolerant sceptics” attitude type. Most of these come from the interviewees at the Spanish car manufacturer AutoCat; 62% of the sample at this company could be classed within this group. Whilst there are also considerable proportions from the sample surveys at Michel Motors and Textil S.A. within this group, the number of “tolerant sceptics” at Special Motor Plant is too low to be included here. Unlike the group of “receptive” respondents, this group is clearly concentrated in just one of the companies we investigated.

The same is true also for the distribution of age ranges within this group: again, in contrast to the type of attitudes of the “receptive”, the distribution of age ranges is not balanced. Instead, there is an emphasis particularly amongst the interviewees from the age groups 21 up to and including 40, as well as amongst those over 51 years. There are also proportionately more people from the middle status group represented here than from the lowest and from the highest groups. This more or less corresponds to the proportions in the sample at AutoCat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 27: Group Structure of the “Tolerant Sceptics” Attitude Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>(N = 279, figures in % of the part sample)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From the (part) sample...</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... at Michel Motors</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at AutoCat</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at Textil S.A.</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at Special Motor Plant</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of female interviewees</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of male interviewees</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged up to and including 20</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 21 up to and including 30</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 31 up to and including 40</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 41 up to and including 50</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 51 up to and including 60</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 2</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 3</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 4</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of the interviewees without a background of migration</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of the interviewees with a background of migration</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 27 also shows, almost 30% of the men interviewed and almost 32% of the women interviewed belong to this attitude type.

This group’s understanding of interculturalism is not marked by a rejection of immigration and interculturality, although the mean values on the interculturalism scale in Figure 16 would lead us to suspect this, when contrasted with the “receptive”. Both are fully tolerated, but are not accepted – and this is the condition. Prejudices can be discerned, particularly towards immigrants’ incorporation into civil rights. The fact that even here the equality of labour migrants in the workplace is not accepted has much less to do with possible conflicts in the working environment or with resentments towards groups of employees. It is rather much more to do with the lack of the everyday relevance of this attitude dimension at AutoCat (on this point, see again Section 1 of this chapter). This also affects “cultural tolerance”, as these
interviewees have no experience with intercultural neighbourhoods in the areas where they live.

Interestingly, “cultural tolerance” is a central element of the attitude syndrome of “interculturalism”. This means that attitudes towards incorporation in the workplace, ranging from tolerant views right through to sceptical ones, are connected with interculturalism, as are ideas about “natural” differences between people, or the fear especially that “Spanish identity” is threatened by immigration\textsuperscript{156}.

**Figure 16: The Attitude Profile of the “Tolerant Sceptics” (arithmetic mean values) *  

* See Figure 15 for an explanation of the scales.

We can already see that the “tolerant sceptics’” social interests in work and career are more strongly oriented towards material goals. People are expressing not just their interest in a secure job, regular working times or better opportunities for career or salary advancement; factors such as creativity, independent working and such like, are also given a particular standing. The understanding of gender roles is also connected to these interests\textsuperscript{157}, but in a different way than amongst the ‘receptive’. The conception of gender roles here is not supported by naturalistic ideas of femininity – these kind of ideas were firmly rejected – but rather by a more “functional” understanding of the gender specific division of labour, according to which women do the family work and men take on the role of the main provider. In this case, the same is equally true for both sexes within this group of interviewees.

\textsuperscript{156} The inter-correlation coefficients display a value between the attitude dimension of “cultural tolerance” and the other two dimensions of 0.35 and almost 0.40, on a significance level of 99%.

\textsuperscript{157} The scales display an inter-correlation coefficient of almost 0.4 on a significance level of 99%.
Table 28: Naturalistic Conceptions of Femininity amongst the “Tolerant Sceptics” (figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements from question 13</th>
<th>“I agree”</th>
<th>“I agree more than disagree”</th>
<th>“I don’t know”</th>
<th>“I disagree more than agree”</th>
<th>“I disagree”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Nature has made only women able to look after children and the family”.</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A women cannot find happiness through her career alone. Having children and being there for their family is part of it.”</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Women who dedicate themselves to their career and don’t want to have children are not going against nature”.</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between orientations to work and career on the one hand and conceptions of a gender-specific division of labour can also be understood as the expression of pragmatic interests in how people organise their lives. Unlike in the first attitude type, these pragmatic interests are therefore less related to “meaningful” questions, which in this case include naturalistic implications about femininity.

In all, the “tolerant sceptics” regard social differences as being greater than the “receptive” group do, and tend somewhat more frequently to regard a society which does not have these social differences as something worth striving for.

Table 29: Perception of Social Inequality Relationships amongst the “Tolerant Sceptics” (figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 10: “In your opinion, how big are social differences in Germany/ in Spain/ in Britain?”</th>
<th>“very big”</th>
<th>“big”</th>
<th>“not particularly big”</th>
<th>“limited”</th>
<th>“limited”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“we should try and achieve this”</td>
<td>“it would be more worth trying to achieve this than not”</td>
<td>“not particularly”</td>
<td>“it would not be worth trying to achieve this”</td>
<td>“we should not try and achieve this”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 14: “Do you think we should try to achieve a society where there are no social differences between people?”</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite their criticism of social inequality, which is likewise attributed to the socio-economic cleavage, this group’s assessment of social relationships is not quite as unanimous as the “receptive” group’s. Here we find the first voices who put forward the opinion that it is not just immigrants’ social opportunities which depend on their abilities and performance. Going far beyond that, these people also say that social differences are largely acceptable because they are an indication of what people have made of their own personal opportunities. Less than 20% of interviewees supported these views, but their answers meant that the arithmetic mean value which could be measured here had risen slightly over that of the group of “receptive” interviewees (see Figure 16). We therefore cannot say that the “tolerant sceptics” hold anti-
egalitarian views of society; the tendency here is absolutely towards egalitarian conceptions, yet this tendency is not entirely unbroken.

Amongst this attitude type, tolerant and sceptic conceptions of interculturalism are not connected to “pragmatic” gender role orientations; both are separate spheres in people’s minds. As we saw with the “receptive” group, we can also see here that immigration and interculturality is regarded as a political issue. Again, this is not the case with the relationship between the sexes. However, this is regarded as a social issue; yet even within this attitude type, immigration and interculturality are not taken account of in social discourse.

Viewed as a whole, the attitude profile of these 279 interviewees no longer displays the openness which the “receptive” group showed. What is characteristic here is the interplay between tolerance and scepticism. This affects not only the issue of “immigration and asylum”, but also conceptions of society and social interests. The scepticism towards social relations and the criticism of social differences can be interpreted in connection with the more pragmatic social interests. The fact that with regard to earnings and career this group’s social interests lean more towards the tendencies we have described, can be explained in particular by the development of the social situation observed in the sample survey at AutoCat through our comparison of the age groups: a very high risk of unemployment amongst young women and men in a slightly higher age range, and the problems amongst male interviewees of preserving their income status in particular, mean that materialistic orientations towards work and career come into the foreground. With women, the additional factor that whilst they are now on a comparable status level to men, yet do not have adequate access to professional positions and earnings also plays a role. It is not unusual therefore that this kind of social situation should be accompanied by materialistic orientations in work and earnings, and moreover, a massive criticism of social relationships – especially since a belief in the meritocratic triad can be seen right across the interviewees with this attitude type.

As a result, it is hardly surprising that these views tend to be expressed by interviewees from the middle status groups and related age groups.

It is also not surprising that the relationship between the sexes, or to put it more precisely, the traditional definition of roles, finds broad resonance. This is rarely supported using naturalistic arguments, and similarly, it tends to follow on more from “pragmatic” reflections. This can also be seen from the path of the interviewees’ lives in the Spanish sample surveys: this definition of roles is not questioned as it is amongst the “receptive” group, and it remains an everyday experience, one which still seems to be relatively accepted. For this attitude type we must however make it clear that the interviewees possibly did not entirely accept the traditional relationship between the sexes, but they still tolerated it. This means that in comparison with the “receptive” interviewees, and particularly ahead of our discussion of the other two attitude types, people do not feel it necessary to justify traditional gender arrangements on naturalistic grounds. The attitude types of the “intolerant individualists” and the “rigid and intolerant individualists” will demonstrate this relationship even more clearly.

To reiterate, the relationship towards immigration and inculturality is not supported by day to day experience. Interviewees’ attitudes towards these things tend rather to draw on political issues, which for them are more abstract. They tend therefore to be more similar in shape and are characterised by a tolerance, which shows sceptical traits particularly regarding immigrants’ incorporation into civil rights.

---

158 As we noted with the “receptive” group, we could measure a high inter-correlation efficient here of almost 0.7, on a significance level of 99%.
2.3 Type 3: “The Intolerant Individualists”

However, immigration and interculturality are not an abstract subject for the 233 “intolerant individualists”, but are instead part of their experience – in the working world at least. 63.6% of interviewees from the sample survey at Special Motor Plant can be said to belong to this attitude type. In the sample survey at Michel Motors too, almost 34% belong to this group.

The fact that the majority of the British sample can be put into this class of attitude has an impact on the higher than proportionate number found here of respondents from the middle to upper status groups. Furthermore, the fact that almost 36% of the middle age groups of 41 up to and including 50 years can be classed within this group can be put down to the dominance of Special Motor Plant. It is however noticeable that more than 31% of youths can be described as being “intolerant individualists”. These youths are almost exclusively apprentices from Michel Motors.

Table 30: Group Structure of the “Intolerant Individualists” Attitude Type
(N = 233, figures in % of the part sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From the (part) sample...</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... at Michel Motors</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at AutoCat</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at Textil S.A.</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at Special Motor Plant</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of female interviewees</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of male interviewees</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those up to and including 20 years old</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 21 up to and including 30</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 31 up to and including 40</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 41 up to and including 50</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 51 up to and including 60</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 1</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 2</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 3</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 4</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of interviewees without a background of migration</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of interviewees with a background of migration</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the previous attitude type, this attitude type is part of the “potential for tolerant-intolerant attitudes”, though with an emphasis on the “intolerance” in their conception of interculturalism. What allows this attitude type to become intolerant are the attitudes towards all issues concerning people’s more distant sphere, i.e. attitudes towards incorporation into civil rights and immigration and asylum. Political asylum is still viewed positively but further immigration, such as immigration on social and economic grounds, is rejected. Even the idea that the country where the interviewees live is a country of immigration is often rejected. This is true not just for the German youths at Michel Motors, but also for the British interviewees at Special Motor Plant.

The relationship to interculturality in the workplace is very different. On this issue, people support views which are very similar to those supported by the “receptive” group. The field of “cultural tolerance” outside of the working sphere is also entirely characterised by more open attitudes.

As Figure 17 shows, the naturalistic way of thinking even as regards attitudes towards immigration and incorporation, is out of the ordinary.
To some extent, naturalistic concepts are already making a connection here between the opinion that supposedly natural differences between people influence social differences and fears of threats towards the identity of the affected country – particularly Britain – as well as towards “foreigners”. Nevertheless this attitude syndrome (still) does not have the potent force in the conception of interculturalism that would allow it strongly to influence the other dimensions, even those in the more distant spheres. This can first be seen regarding the following type of attitude. At this point we cannot yet see attitudes which fend off anything foreign or attitudes which are hostile towards foreigners with possible racist overtones.

Again, what lets this type of attitude become “individualistic” are the extrinsic career orientations, particularly those orientations which are geared towards professional advancement and good earnings potential. Unlike with the “tolerant sceptics”, but as we saw with the “receptive” group, these are connected with intrinsic work orientations where creativity and independent working practices dominate. Another thing which is likewise supported by individualism is the evaluation of social relationships. Whilst a critical view of unequal social relationships predominates here, as does the desire to live in an egalitarian society – this is desire is however not as pronounced as it is in the first two attitude types – there are also more disappointed expectations concerning a lack of “fair salary” for the work people do.
Table 31: Perception of Relationships Concerning Social Inequality amongst the “Intolerant Individualists” (figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 10: “In your opinion, how big are social differences in Germany/ in Spain/ in Britain?”</th>
<th>“very big”</th>
<th>“big”</th>
<th>“not particularly big”</th>
<th>“limited”</th>
<th>“very limited”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“we should try and achieve this”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“it would be more worth trying to achieve this than not”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“it would not be worth trying to achieve this”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“we should not try and achieve this”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Question 14: “Do you think we should try to achieve a society where there are no social differences between people?” | 29.9 | 27.7 | 28.1 | 6.9 | 6.9 |

In these conceptions, performance oriented conceptions of equal opportunities are more strongly expressed than amongst the groups of interviewees in both previous types of attitudes.

This group’s understanding of the relationship between the sexes, on the other hand, lies somewhere between that of the “receptive” group and that of the “tolerant sceptics”. This means that the roles expected of women and men are “semi-traditional” i.e. neither entirely completely questioned, nor fully accepted or tolerated; the traditional expectations of these roles are “conceivable” in the interviewees’ conceptions of life. In their justification of this definition of gender roles as “meaningful”, this group relies almost as heavily on naturalistic reasoning as the “receptive” group does.

Table 32: Naturalistic Conceptions of Femininity amongst the “Intolerant Individualists” (figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements from question 13</th>
<th>“I agree”</th>
<th>“I agree more than disagree”</th>
<th>“I don’t know”</th>
<th>“I disagree more than agree”</th>
<th>“I disagree”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Nature has made only women able to look after children and the family”.</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A women cannot find happiness through her career alone. Having children and being there for their family is part of it.”</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Women who dedicate themselves to their career and don’t want to have children are not going against nature”.</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To sum up, this attitude type is therefore characterised by a more receptive conception of interculturalism in the day-to-day immediate sphere, and by an intolerant conception of interculturalism in the more distant sphere of immigration and incorporation. As over two thirds of the British sample survey belong to this group, this result can be interpreted against the background of the situation at Special Motor Plant. This means two things: (1) “ethnic minorities”, i.e. groups encountered daily in the workplace and therefore long term resident immigrant groups are largely viewed as incorporated, and are not seen as being part of the phenomenon of immigration in the narrower sense. This is further supported by the fact that (2) the majority of interviewees do not regard Britain as being a country of immigration and reject any de-
development in this direction. This intolerance therefore does not relate to “ethnic minorities” but rather towards more recent groups of immigrants.

Amongst the younger interviewees at Michel Motors the same pattern emerges. Here too, groups of migrants who have been resident in Germany for a long time and who are present in the company are by and large excluded from the respondents’ evaluation of the current immigration situation. This is interesting to the extent that the earlier history of the migration of “ethnic minorities” into Britain and that of the workforce recruited overseas to come to Germany is different and this is also reflected in the legal status of these groups. However, their perception is comparable today and could actually be attributed to a daily experience which has become normality. This seems to be being transferred into the views of the younger generations. This is however only true to an extent, as we will see in our examination of the “rigid and intolerant individualists” attitude type.

Again, amongst the “intolerant individualists”, we can see that the relationship between the sexes is an integral part of social conceptions, whilst immigration and interculturality are excluded.

### 2.4 Type 4: “Rigid and Intolerant Individualists”

The final attitude type which we established applies to 138 interviewees. As with the “receptive” group, we do not find a clear emphasis within any one of the companies we investigated. This is due to the fact that we are dealing with the other pole of extreme attitudes on the continuum between “receptiveness” and “xenophobia”. However – and this should be dealt with at the outset here – not all of the interviewees within this attitude type are xenophobic. What we see instead is a much more fluid boundary between the “intolerant individualists” and those who are more rigidly negative in terms of their intercultural conception, right through to those who are hostile in their orientations.

As we could only measure a potential for xenophobic attitudes in the sample surveys at Michel Motors and Special Motor Plant, it is not surprising that we could classify 18.7% and 12.1% of respondents respectively within the rigid and intolerant attitude type. However, the biggest proportion of 21.5% is presented by the interviewees at Textil S.A., whilst interviewees from the sample at AutoCat are only present here only to a very limited extent (which we can ignore).

It is interesting that in the structural makeup of this group, again almost 30% of the youngest age group could be placed in this attitude type. The numbers from the other age groups are proportionately much lower. The distribution of status groups shows no other particularities, and instead it indicates that this attitude type is supported by similar proportions of each of the status groups.

**Table 33: Group Structure of the Attitude Type “Rigid and Intolerant Individualists”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From the (part) sample...</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... at Michel Motors</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at AutoCat</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at Textil S.A.</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at Special Motor Plant</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of female interviewees</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of male interviewees</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those up to and including 20 years old</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 21 up to and including 30</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 31 up to and including 40</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the (part) sample...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 41 up to and including 50</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of those aged 51 up to and including 60</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 3</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... from status group 4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of interviewees without a background of migration</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... of interviewees with a background of migration</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of these 138 interviewees, 76% have a potentially “tolerant intolerant” attitude and 24% have a potentially xenophobic attitude. This weighting again highlights why this attitude type cannot entirely be labelled as xenophobic. As Figure 18 shows, the conception of interculturalism is however interpreted very rigidly and intolerantly, and no longer excludes the working sphere.

Whilst in this instance we can also discern a graduated difference between the intimate sphere and the more distant sphere in the relationship towards immigration, this is however only gradual when measured against the mean values. The interviewees particularly vehemently reject the incorporation of immigrants into civil rights, are against further immigration and would therefore like to see a tightening of the rules on immigration. Beyond this, large numbers of them question the right to political asylum, something which is met with a broad consensus by all the other interviewees in our sample surveys. A naturalistic manner of thinking is also strong here, although in different form than in the other attitude types: here, it is less the idea that purportedly natural differences between people determine social differences, rather this way of thinking is characterised much more by fears about a possible loss of identity, and fears of “foreigners”. What is determinant here is therefore much less the naturalistic meaning of a conception of interculturalism but rather a feeling of threat. This feeling then also accounts for the close connection with rigid attitudes right through to strongly negative attitudes towards immigration and asylum.\(^\text{159}\)\(^\text{160}\)

All in all, the rejection of immigration and asylum is the major building block within the attitude syndrome “interculturalism”. This is used to reject statements regarding the dimension of “cultural tolerance”, such as for: “Foreigners should be able to practice their cultural traditions in Germany / Spain / Britain”. Equally strongly rejected is the idea that a better relationship between the majority community and immigrants can develop when people live more closely together. In addition, this group of interviewees has no desire to have any further contact with foreigners.\(^\text{160}\)

\(^{159}\) We could measure an inter-correlation coefficient between these attitude dimensions on the interculturalism scale of 0.56, on a significance level of 99%.

\(^{160}\) The inter-correlation efficient with the attitude dimension of “cultural tolerance” which we refer to here, has a value of over 0.5, on a significance level of 99%.
The interviewees within this attitude type also hold a relatively inflexible image of society. On the one hand, a prominent number of them at almost 78% view social differences in society as being large or very large and a majority of them regard a society where these differences no longer exist as something worth striving for – although this is to a lesser extent than support found amongst the “receptive” group and amongst the “tolerant sceptics”. On the other hand, these attitudes are not a consequence of egalitarian views. Criticism of social relationships is instead directed primarily towards the lack of a performance oriented equality of opportunity. These interviewees actually regard the society in which they live as being open in principle, with performance determining social opportunity as opposed to the basic lines of social conflict, the labour market situation or social background.

Against this background, social criticism is relatively noticeable. The motives for this may well lie in individuals’ experience: their orientation towards work and career display a mixed pattern of materialistic and intrinsic interests, although in terms of the latter, the desire for independence at work is dominant. At the same time, the activity which is carried out by the interviewee does not always match up to their desired career. This is most true for the youngest age group, where they are referring mainly to their industrial training. It remains to be seen whether a “frustration” about the state of training is breaking new ground, whether they have been disappointed by their chosen careers which may possibly not meet their original job expectations or whether they had accepted a training position or a job which did not meet their actual career wishes. We can certainly assume here that there is a broad dissatisfaction with both work and career; that is to say, people’s expectations of their careers have been disappointed or they have disappointed in their transition to working life.
### Table 33: Perception of Relationships Concerning Social Inequality amongst the “Rigid and Intolerant Individualists” (figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 10: “In your opinion, how big are social differences in Germany/ in Spain/ in Britain?”</th>
<th>“very big”</th>
<th>“big”</th>
<th>“not particularly big”</th>
<th>“limited”</th>
<th>“very limited”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“we should try and achieve this”</th>
<th>“it would be more worth trying to achieve this than not”</th>
<th>“not particularly”</th>
<th>“it would not be worth trying to achieve this”</th>
<th>“we should not try and achieve this”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Question 14: “Do you think we should try to achieve a society where there are no social differences between people?” | 39.4 | 17.5 | 22.6 | 9.5 | 9.5 |

Attitudes to the relationship between the sexes are closely related to conceptions of society\textsuperscript{161}. These ideas see women as having the same opportunities in their careers as men, and it is up to women to exploit these. The traditional definition of roles does not match their conviction; nevertheless, over 37% of this group of interviewees believe that children and family constitute part of women’s happiness and a little over 28% believe that women who dedicate themselves to their careers and do not want to have children, are going against nature.

### Table 34: Naturalistic Conceptions of Femininity amongst the “Rigid and Intolerant Individualists” (figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements from question 13</th>
<th>“I agree”</th>
<th>“I agree more than disagree”</th>
<th>“I don’t know”</th>
<th>“I disagree more than agree”</th>
<th>“I disagree”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Nature has made only women able to look after children and the family”.</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A women cannot find happiness through her career alone. Having children and being there for their family is part of it.”</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Women who dedicate themselves to their career and don’t want to have children are not going against nature”.</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here we again see the apparent contradiction between the rejection of traditional role definitions and the naturalistically justified role of women as mothers and wives. In terms of these conceptions, the difference between the sexes in the way people answered these questions are interesting: of the women we interviewed, only 24% agreed with the second statement outlined in Table 34. By contrast, 42% of the men we interviewed agreed with it. In answer to the question as to whether women are going against nature in choosing career over motherhood, 38% of women agree, compared to only 25% of men. The priorities are different for the two sexes. For a large group of men, having children and acting as a mother are part of a woman’s happiness. A large group of women, on the other hand, see it as unnatural for a woman to do without these things account of their career. As a consequence, the gender role definition is associated with a justified glorification of femininity.

\textsuperscript{161} The inter-correlation coefficient between both scales has a value of 0.7, on a significance level of 99%.
To summarize, the “rigid and intolerant individualists” attitude type is characterised by a negative to strongly exclusionary or even hostile stance towards immigration, immigrants, incorporation and interculturality. In this case, this stance does not even exclude the immediate sphere of the workplace, or the sphere outside of work, such as was seen with the attitude type of the “intolerant individualists”. The attitude syndrome of “interculturalism” is marked by consistent rigidity and intolerance. The individual attitude dimensions within this syndrome are closely interrelated, and the dimension of “attitudes towards immigration and asylum” is the most important foundation. The answers show a broad inner consistency and can largely be interpreted as a very closed image of interculturality and interculturalism. Whilst we could observe a naturalistic manner of thinking in these interviewees’ orientations towards gender roles with regard to their justification of contradictory expectations form roles, the dimension of naturalistic thinking in the context of immigration and interculturality shows another general trend in people’s attitudes: here, fears of a loss of identity, and fears of “foreigners” are clear. This is surprising in view of the fact that these fears are not related solely to various different types of phenomena and groups in the more distant sphere, but are also related to those in the immediate sphere as well. A possible explanation is the overall low average age in this group of interviewees; for them, daily intercultural experience is therefore not yet something which has been going on for years, even decades. However, this by itself is not a satisfactory explanation. The attitude type of the “intolerant individualists” is a clear example which provokes counter arguments. A further and more plausible explanation is the characteristic performance orientation which has been disappointed, both in the how these respondents evaluate social relationships and their individual interests. In the end, this all culminates in a dissatisfaction with work and career. Age again comes into play: it is possible that people’s disappointed plans for their lives play a role here, and these still have to be dealt with by these young people as they make the transition to working life. As we established in Chapter IV, Section 1, prospects in life for the young age groups in particular are characterised by an imbalance between people’s performance in education and training and their professional position, something which the older age groups have not experienced. The meritocratic triad is therefore being reflected less and less in working life.

But we cannot even draw the conclusion from this explanation alone that the resulting social problems are then simply “externalised” and transferred to and vented on other social groups such as foreigners or “ethnic minorities”. The field of immigration and interculturality may indeed be appropriate for such an externalisation, as this group of interviewees does not regard immigration and interculturality as an integral component of social relationships. However, this pattern can also be found in all other attitude types without this having led to rigid, intolerant and xenophobic attitudes. For this reason we can then follow a further path to which we have given a special value in our investigative conception: opportunities for political participation (see Section 3.2).

2.5 Attitude Potential and Types of Attitude amongst Interviewees with a Background of Migration

The interviewees with a background of migration in the German and Spanish sample surveys are distributed across the four attitude types, although only a very minor portion of this part sample – 5.8% - can be classified within the group of “rigid and intolerant individualists” (see Table 35 in the preceding Section). As this part sample is relatively heterogeneous in terms of people’s various different migratory backgrounds – international immigration and domestic migration – it is useful to re-examine this group’s attitude types separately.

The interviewees with a background of international migration from the sample survey at the German car manufacturer Michel Motors can mainly be grouped as “receptive”. 
Table 35: Attitude Potential and Attitude Types amongst Interviewees with a Background of Migration in the German Sample
(N = 97, figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude potential</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“receptive/tolerant potential”</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“tolerant-intolerant potential”</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“xenophobic potential”</td>
<td>--*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude types</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The receptive”</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The tolerant sceptics”</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The intolerant individualists”</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The rigid and intolerant individualists”</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Number of instances too low.

On closer examination, this result is not surprising. For this group, the attitude dimensions are issues which largely relate to their own individual situation or to that of their families. Therefore they show very receptive attitudes not just in terms of the dimensions in the immediate sphere of the workplace or in the sphere outside of the company, but also in terms of incorporation into civil rights. However, their reactions to further immigration into Germany range from scepticism to full rejection, and a naturalistic way of thinking is as alien to them as it is to the interviewees without a background of migration in the German sample survey. It is therefore primarily due to their situation as immigrants or second or third generation relatives thereof that their attitudes are largely more receptive and more tolerant. Nevertheless, almost 27% can still be classified amongst the “intolerant individualists”.

In the other attitude syndromes on orientations towards work and career, towards gender roles and on the perception of social relationships, we no longer see receptive and tolerant preferences. Nevertheless, these differ from the responses given by interviewees without a background of migration in the fact that German is described as being “more open”. That is to say, the interviewees with a background of migration believe that social opportunities in German society are distributed primarily on the basis of performance and ability. In their criticism of society, they come close to the familiar pattern: they criticize the fact that this equality of opportunity cannot fully develop. On the issue of orientations towards gender roles, people here also rely more heavily on naturalistic reasons than do interviewees without a background of migration. However, these play a similar role as in the pre-study: women are indeed regarded as having natural characteristics which make them more suited to be a mother and the centre of a family. However, interviewees with a background of migration generally tend not to express the view that it is going against nature if a woman does not become a mother on account of her career. On this point they are entirely different in their gender role orientations to both the male and the female interviewees without a background of migration, where this argument can repeatedly be seen (see S. Ottens, 1998).

All in all, the political and social attitudes of the interviewees both with and without a background of migration essentially differ in only one point – in the preferences expressed regarding dimensions of immigration and interculturality, where the situation of the interviewees from migration families is addressed directly. All other attitude syndromes do not display any meaningful differences.

---

162 Regarding the attitude dimensions on immigration and asylum, the mean value is 2.5. For a naturalistic manner of thinking, the mean value is 3.2 (3.4 for interviewees without a background of migration).

163 The arithmetic mean values: for interviewees with a background of migration = 2.5, for interviewees without a background of migration = 2.1.
There are clearly perceptible differences between the interviewees with a background of migration in the Spanish sample surveys at AutoCat and Textil S.A., and indigenous interviewees. Their responses also tend towards more receptive and tolerant views. The differences are however not as important as in the German sample survey, for obvious reasons.

**Table 36: Attitude Potential and Attitude Types amongst Interviewees with a Background of Migration in the Spanish Samples**

(N = 176, figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude potential</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“receptive/tolerant potential”</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“tolerant-intolerant potential”</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“xenophobic potential”</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude types</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The receptive”</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The tolerant sceptics”</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The intolerant individualists”</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The rigid and intolerant individualists”</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority can be classed within the “receptive/tolerant potential” category, although again, the majority of these interviewees can be classed as belonging to the attitude type “the tolerant sceptics”. The biggest difference can be seen between the “rigid intolerant individualists”: 19.2% of indigenous interviewees can be said to belong to this group compared to 9.6% of interviewees with a background of migration. It is noticeable that for all attitude dimensions on the interculturalism scale, those interviewees with experience of domestic migration prove on average to be more tolerant. All mean values, with one exception, are lower than the calculated mean value of 2.5, whilst these figures are above the general mean for the indigenous interviewees. The exception is attitudes towards the incorporation of immigrants into civil rights (mean value: 2.6), which is met more with scepticism, and sometimes even with rejection. In orientations towards work and career, we also find lower levels of materialistic orientations towards work and career; the orientations towards the gender roles on the other hand do not differ from those of the interviewees without a background of migration. But: the interviewees with a background of migration are slightly less likely to regard Spanish society as unevenly structured, and think that individual performance and ability fully characterise social opportunity. Their criticism of society is therefore more moderate than it is amongst the other interviewees, something which is possibly related to their experience of migration. This is also similar to the interviewees with a background of migration from the German sample survey: amongst both groups, labour migration might well be a determining reason for moving, as this would lead to an improvement in their social circumstances in the destination country or region. It can be assumed that the evaluation of social relationships is always carried out in relation to the evaluation of social relationships in the country or region of origin, or at least in terms of their parents’ or grandparents’ country or region of origin.

However, the suggestion that interviewees from families who had migrated within Spain would be more receptive and tolerant towards immigration and interculturality for similar reasons as interviewees whose families have experience of international immigration, is less probable. This would assume that respondents were identifying domestic migrants with foreigners who had immigrated into Spain. In the public perception – such as in the context of the violent clashes against Moroccans in Terrassa, just outside Barcelona in summer 1999 (see Chapter II, Section 3.1) – we see clearly that domestic migrants, particularly from southern Spanish regions, felt resentment towards immigrants. This creates a contradiction to the public perception. This image is not confirmed in the group discussions with Moroccan work-
ers, so we will address this subject again in Section 4. Domestic migrants are possibly victims of a stereotyping, which insinuates that they are resentful towards international immigrants.

3. Conceptions of Interculturalism and Political Participation

We will examine the path towards political participation in two ways: (1) using key data from the quantitative study, where we are interested in the participation in conventional political forms, membership of a trade union and conflict regulation in the workplace. The issue of conflict regulation addresses the extent to which company and trade union interest representation is consulted in such instances. This is an indicator of whether the interviewees are more bound up in collective political and social contexts, or feel themselves to be bound up in these, or whether they are more likely to try to promote their interests on an individual basis. Whilst the level of the company is the reference point for this, the role and status of the unions in political participation and the relationship between these and the interviewees is examined more closely using (2) the group discussions. The issue of “trade unions” is addressed here in connection with the stimulus of the “labour market and unemployment”, that is, by means of a social problem. The assessment of the role of union policy in securing jobs and acting against unemployment was at the centre of the evaluation, and in whether the participants in the discussions feel their interests are being represented by the unions or not. The qualitative results are discussed in Section 4 of this chapter.

Before we move on to the results from the quantitative study on the issue of political participation, in the following text we will again draw a provisional assessment of the attitude types and test these for similarities or for basic patterns, as well as for decisive differences and distinctive features.

3.1 A Comparison of the Conceptions of Interculturalism in the Attitude Types – a Provisional Assessment

When measured against the spectrum of interculturalism-conceptions between receptive and rigidly intolerant/ xenophobic attitudes and the relatively strict boundary between them – a fact which shows up particularly clearly in the comparison of the two extreme poles – differentiating between the attitude types on the basis of their social and structural aspects is, however, difficult. Although we are dealing with very clear social differences and hierarchies amongst the interviewees in the sample surveys, this has no material effects on the political and social attitudes towards immigration, immigrants and interculturality. If we had created a typology on the basis of conceptions of social interests, society and gender, then we would have been able to find social and structural classifications, i.e. the emphasis would have been on social status groups according to gender. Conceptions of interculturalism on the other hand are distributed across the ranges of status and genders. Table 37 again provides a general overview of the structural characteristics of all four attitude types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From the part sample...</th>
<th>“The Receptive” (n = 188)</th>
<th>“The Tolerant Sceptics” (n = 279)</th>
<th>“The Intolerant Individualists” (n = 233)</th>
<th>“The Rigid and Intolerant Individualists” (n = 138)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... at Michel Motors</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... at AutoCat</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The only minor deviations can be seen amongst the “tolerant sceptics”, where proportionately large numbers of interviewees from status group 2 (36%) – mainly the trained specialist workers – are classed. A slightly bigger discrepancy can be seen amongst the “intolerant individualists” through a very high proportion represented from the middle and higher status groups. Both deviations underline the overall result that a lower level of education or profession for instance does not automatically support an intolerant or even xenophobic way of thinking and higher degrees of education and professional positions does protect against this. Both receptive and tolerant as well as intolerant and xenophobic interculturalism conceptions are an issue in every social status group. The same is true with attitudes of women and men: their attitudes differ not in their level of openness or in the extent of their rejection of immigration and interculturality. If both genders do show differences in their attitudes, then is mainly in gender role orientations and partly also in the social interests in work and career. 

Despite the fact that there is no structural delineation of attitude types according to status and gender, two of the sample surveys at least do allow themselves to be categorised clearly. In the sample at the Spanish car manufacturer AutoCat, the “tolerant sceptics” attitude type is largely represented, and in the sample at the British car manufacturer Special Motor Plant, the “intolerant individualists” attitude type is largely represented. A quarter of the interviewees at Textil S.A. displayed no attitude type; the rest are distributed relatively evenly across the attitude types. The only minor group is the small percentage amongst the group of the “receptive”. However: the interviewees who cannot be attributed to any attitude type using the cluster analysis are closest to the “receptive” in their attitudes. The interviewees at the German car manufacturer Michel Motors are equally difficult to classify in one attitude type. We find all
conceptions of interculturalism represented amongst this group, although just over 28% however expressed intolerant positions and almost 34% represent intolerant positions.

The backgrounds for manner of distribution in the companies being investigated amongst the attitude types may possibly lie in a combination of experience of daily life in the company and in the influence of public discourse. A clear pattern can be seen from this combination: where intercultural experience is a characteristic of daily working life, we consistently find receptive attitudes towards interculturality. In places where the public discourse was being negatively focused on the issue of “immigration and asylum” at the time of our investigation, we can similarly find a negative focus in conceptions of interculturalism, particularly regarding questions of immigration and incorporation in the more distant realm of people’s experience. In places where this discourse is carried out without this strong “scandalisation”, it is also lacking in the interculturalism conceptions.

One thing which is worthy of consideration in the structural characteristics of the attitude types is the varying representation of interviewees from the different age groups. This is particularly true for the roughly 30% of youths under 21 in each case whose attitudes are range from either intolerant or rigid intolerant, right up to xenophobic. All in all, over 60% of all interviewees in the youths’ age group are not open to the issue of “immigration and interculturality” and proportionately half of them are not even receptive towards “immigration and interculturality” in the workplace.

Both attitude types which we are addressing here are generally characterised by the fact that they tend to be supported by anti-egalitarian conceptions of society and extrinsic orientations towards work and career. Both these attitude syndromes are accompanied by quite a strongly marked individualistic performance paradigm. Amongst the “rigid and intolerant individuals” in particular we can clearly see that this performance paradigm is not matched in the working world, something that can lead to disappointed expectations of work and career, as well as to a comparatively high level of criticism of society – particularly amongst young people who are in the transition phase to the working world, and where they still need to find out whether their concepts of which life involves can be fulfilled. As these attitudes, expectations and disappointments can be seen particularly amongst the “intolerant and rigid intolerant individualists”, there then seems to be a plausible connection to the conceptions of interculturalism which are represented here. It is here that we find the first indications of threats in the “tolerant-intolerant” attitude potential or as to how xenophobic attitudes are created amongst the interviewees in our sample. However, we still need to find the connection between the attitude profiles affected here, and we continue this in the following Section, 3.2.

Table 38 outlines once again an overview of all the attitude profiles in the quantitative investigation, in comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude syndrome</th>
<th>“The Receptive” (n = 188)</th>
<th>“The Tolerant Sceptics” (n = 279)</th>
<th>“The Intolerant Individualists” (n = 233)</th>
<th>“The Rigid and Intolerant Individualists” (n = 138)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dimension: tolerance in the workplace</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension: cultural tolerance</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension: attitudes towards legal integration</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension: attitudes towards immigration and asylum</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension: naturalistic manner of thinking</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interculturalism scale</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A further pattern runs through the attitude profiles, which cannot initially be seen from the values of the scales shown in Table 38. However, it becomes visible in the connections and interplay between the individual attitude syndromes. What we are referring to is the differing ways in which interculturality and the gender relationship are built into the interviewees’ conception of society as social relationships. The comparison of both social relationships in people’s attitudes then reveals not just the differentiated degree of inclusion, but at the same time the differing constructs (to talk about constructions here would be going too far on the basis of our study) and the different migratory types and gender-typical disadvantages which are hidden behind these. And furthermore: beyond this, we can see how these typical disadvantages are justified.

To put it more pointedly, the social relationship of interculturality, such as we could measure it, has two facets. The first facet describes the direct interaction which takes place in the world of work in our case studies. A decade of continued practice of direct intercultural interaction in at least one area of life leads to it no longer even being regarded as such. This means that work colleagues are perhaps still classed as “ethnicities”, “ethnic minorities” of a particular national origin, but this does not have any effect which is relevant for people’s actions or attitudes. The majority and minorities no longer perceive each other in terms of a clear delineation. The result is that the minorities encountered through daily experience are then no longer connected with the issue of “immigration and asylum”, and to a degree are not even connected with the issue of “incorporation”. Therefore in people’s conceptions, they are bound up in society and in the social environment¹⁶⁴. To put it more precisely, they are partially integrated. For this reason, we will talk here of “partial integration”, because this social relationship does not yet have a stable foundation. When issues of immigration are made into scandals, or ‘scandalised’ in public discourse, where certain minorities from the immediate sphere become the target group, this can for instance lead to these again shifting back into the centre of the disputes regarding immigration, interculturality and incorporation. We could observe this in the German case regarding Turks, in the Spanish case regarding immigrants from Morocco, and in the British case, regarding Asian minorities. In the wake of something being made into a scandal, a kind of ethnicisation takes place, because the classifications of “ethnicity”, “ethnic minorities” or national origin which are generally only important in direct interaction, become politicised and loaded with negative connotations. And yet, the almost constant low scale value regarding the attitude dimension “tolerance in the workplace” generally indicates this partial integration. To this extent this dimension has a particular status within conceptions of interculturalism and can be regarded more as being corrective of the other attitude dimensions¹⁶⁶.

¹⁶⁴ In the group discussions we will however see an interesting variant to this in the Textil S.A. case – a differentiated behaviour towards immigrations, depending on whether they are encountered in the workplace or outside of the company, in neighbouring villages.

¹⁶⁵ This can also be seen statistically through the fact that the scale of “tolerance in the workplace” only ever attains a relatively low value through bivariate correlations with the other scales in the attitude syndrome of “interculturalism”. The only exception can be seen with the “rigid and intolerant individualists” attitude type.
The other facet of the social relationships of interculturalism is one which has nothing to do with direct interaction. We can already see this clearly in the dimension “cultural tolerance”, which is aimed towards the sphere outside of the company. As the interviewees themselves say, they only rarely live directly alongside immigrants or their successor generations. Minorities are more likely to be found in the wider social environment of the interviewees without a background of migration. The interface between the immediate realm and the more distant sphere is found within this dimension. The social relationship in the more distant sphere is regarded as something “external to society”, and is regarded as being vaguely alien, a fact which is expressed in the fears of threats and insecurities. There, the “doing stranger” again comes back into the foreground, as we saw it in the pre-study (see Chapter III, Section 1). This phenomenon is confirmed in the present study. However, it is also differentiated, as we can see from the country comparison. This shows that the issue is not a social psychological phenomenon but rather a social or to put it better, a socio-political phenomenon. This is because both the (still) very moderate discourse about migration and the political treatment of migration in Spain in comparison to Germany and Britain may well affect the attitudes of the people we interviewed. For the employees at AutoCat especially, interculturality is (still) a phenomenon that has little to do with daily life and is encountered principally through the media. If “doing stranger” were primarily a social psychological phenomenon, then it would have to be particularly in evidence here. This careful formulation has to do with the fact that the political debate in Spain too has changed in the meantime, and increasingly, forms of immigration and certain groups of people are being made more of an issue of, particularly as a result of certain ‘scandals’. The debate about increasing modifications in the “Ley de Extranjería” is one example of these (see also Chapter II, Section 3). Two issues are decisive in the public discourse. These are already parts of migration politics in Germany and Britain, and they are now showing signs of picking up in Spain: (1) migratory movements and immigration are treated as an exception and a special case, rather than being treated as “normality” and are thereby particularly noticeable. (2) In the wake of this, certain forms of migration – such as escape for social reasons – are being seen as illegitimate and groups of immigrants have become a central focus either as unwanted or problem groups. On the question of unwanted immigration, the fears of threats which we could discern in people’s attitudes are often made a subject and are activated. But even socially critical discourses about “ethnicity”, “race” or multiculturalism can easily lead to immigration being defined as a special case and a social problem, or as a “new” social line of conflict. On all these points, the “other” and the “foreign” are emphasised as being outside the bounds of the “own”.

The relationship between the sexes on the other hand follows different “rules”. This social relationship is tied into conceptions of society, but has not yet developed a political value in the attitudes we investigated in the pre-study and in this present study. Whilst this social gender relationship has begun to show signs of moving or developing, we cannot yet say that traditional arrangements have in reality broken down as a result. As we could see in people’s career paths and family backgrounds particularly in the German and British sample surveys, the traditional gender arrangement has barely been touched. It is the mothers who interrupt their careers to start and raise a family and it is the fathers who remain employed and become the main breadwinners in the family when children are born. Social and individual demands are however differentiated, as this demands a career and job history which would progress similarly for both genders. For women, this means combining family and career in some way, and this hardly constitutes a politicisable task, but rather an individual one. Generally, however, this cannot be resolved, or the effort of trying to combine a career and a family breaks down in practice, and as a result of the demands of employment. Amongst the men we interviewed, similarly, demands and reality contradict each other, yet this is less likely to become an existential issue. As a consequence, as we can see from our German and British sample surveys,
the traditional role definition is often chosen, in order to avoid this ‘irreconciliability trap’ at least temporarily. As this often breaks down as a result of social and individual demands, particularly for women, that is to say, entering the reproduction sphere requires a particular justification, it can lead to a glorification of the role of women as mothers and the centre of the family, with the help of naturalistic argumentation patterns. However, if the traditional role definition still part of daily experience which is not entirely questioned, then such a justification is less necessary. We could see this amongst the interviewees in the Spanish sample surveys.

In our comparison of both social relationships or how these are depicted in people’s attitudes, two central differences are visible: (1) The social relationship of interculturality, particularly in the more distant realm, is understood as a relationship which exists “beyond society”, that is, as something alien, where a connection is made between fears of threats and insecurities. It seems plausible that this connection is established through public discourse. Whilst the relationship between the sexes is equally subject to a public discourse, for instance through the issue of the equality of women and men in their careers, it is not conceived of as a social relationship; the way that interculturality is. The issue of interculturality is given a political value. However, it is a social relationship that is incorporated into conceptions of society. (2) As a comparison of attitudes towards interculturality in the immediate and the more distant sphere as well as between the sample surveys in the various countries have shown, this social relationship is variable. This means that constructions in this context can gain or lose in importance, resentment can become stronger or weaken, or can disappear altogether. Interculturality is subject to discursive conjunctures and can strengthen to become “normality”, even if this is only fragile. Whilst the relationship between the sexes has begun to change, its basis still remains static. This results especially from the gender-specific division of labour and the gender arrangement. This continues to display static traits. Social demands made of women particularly imagine them taking on a career and this therefore extends the role definition on the one side. This interplay between change and stasis leads to opposing reactions: on the one hand, women try to participate in education and the working world to the same extent that men do, and formulate this as a demand to be able to determine their own lives. This leads them into a contradiction between the traditional and the now broadened imposition of roles and to the structures in employment. This contradiction is then countered on the one side – to put it in simple terms – through a glorification of the mother and housewife role; “withdrawal” into this role is grounded in naturalistic terms and is thereby justified “meaningfully”. The relationship between the sexes is a social relationship which is made a subject of in public and is incorporated within society, but it is not politicised in terms of its problems and contradictions. These are individualised instead. This is at least how it is depicted in the attitudes which we surveyed.

3.2 Interculturalism Conceptions and Political Participation

The issue of political participation and the opportunities to take part in them was not studied as extensively in all of the sample surveys in the present study as it was in the pre-study. A set of questions (see the final statements in set of questions 1, Annex III) dealing with the motives and the interviewees’ relationship with trade unions and union organisation (see Chapter III, Section 2) was only formulated for the German and the British cases, within the part project “Preventing racial discrimination at the workplace”. Nevertheless, statements concerning options for action regarding conflicts in the workplace proved to be adequate and sufficiently relevant. These were measured in all sample surveys. Using these, we could disclose linkages which create a connection to rigid intolerant and xenophobic conceptions of interculturalism. The image is then completed by taking further indicators of political participation and the in-
individuals’ own political assessment into account. This linkage is particularly evident when this is contrasted with that of the “receptive” group of respondents, as below.

In the strategies for conflict regulation in the workplace, options for action are addressed which serve to protect and enforce individual interests in social labour relationships. We were interested in examining whether strategies for conflict management are characterised more by individualised or collective action strategies. We assumed that these strategies would not solely be directed towards collective action, particularly in lower and middle status positions, where dependent employees must protect their interests in a socially hierarchised situation and do not have recourse to powers of enforcement, or only limited ones. Instead, they must also find access to conflict managements in their cultural practices. If this kind of access is lacking – for whatever reason – and the employees are relegated to individual action strategies, therefore, if conflict management is individualised, then this can collide with experience and conceptions in life, in cultural practice. What this means is that social problems are individualised to the same extent, or are regarded as individualised. It would then be necessary to explain how this affects the management of problems and conflicts as well as dealing with other social relationships – here, with that of interculturality and the relationship between the sexes. All in all, it is about the interrelationship between various social relationships, amongst which a further one is the labour relations on the shop floor.

As Table 39 shows, there is a noticeable difference between the “receptive” group and the “rigid and intolerant individualists” in three of the statements on conflict management strategy in the workplace especially: although the “receptive” group more frequently say that as a basic principle, they only try to solve problems collectively, with their superiors, in all, they use collective conflict resolution strategies relatively often or include these as well. This is expressed particularly in the way in which people responded to the statements on options for finding a strategy together with fellow colleagues, or in the case of failed attempts to find a solution, to start using company interest representation, and that this is also considered a concrete partner in conflicts. Nevertheless, over 22% still believe that they would call in the works council or the shop stewards immediately.

![Table 39: Strategies for Conflict Management in the Workplace: A Comparison of the “Receptive” (n = 188) and “Rigid and Intolerant Individualists” (n = 138) (figures in %, only agreement/support)∗](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>“The Receptive” (n = 188)</th>
<th>“The Rigid and Intolerant Individualists” (n = 138)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“As a principle, I only try to solve problems at work, by working together with my superior”.</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Together with my colleagues I think up a collective strategy for negotiations with my superior.”</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I try firstly to solve the problem myself, but if this doesn’t work, I go to the works council/shop stewards.”</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I get the works council/shop stewards involved immediately”.</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I limit work to things that are absolutely necessary.”</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“First of all, I wait and see if the problem solves itself”.</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

∗ These statements were asked using a five-level Likert-scale, where the answers were “yes”, “more yes than no”, “don’t know”, “more no than yes”, “no”. In the table, the categories of “yes”, and “more yes than no” have been collated.
Chapter V: Interculturalism and Social Images

With the “rigid and tolerant individualists”, the relationship to collective forms of conflict management – whether together with colleagues or with the company’s interest representation – is much more reserved. At the same time, in their options for action they are less offensive aggressive than the “receptive” group, and this can be seen in their overall answers. See for example, their answers to the first statement in the Table.

This then continues in the participation in company, trade union and political activities. Those with rigid and intolerant views admit that they are indeed involved in company and union interest representation activities such as company meetings and strikes over wages to a comparable extent as the “receptive”. However, they are far more rarely involved in all other activities which are not directly linked to the representation of individual interests. This is also true for union assemblies. However, the fact must be taken into account that 75.2% of these interviewees are members of a union nonetheless. For the “receptive” group, this figure is however just over 10% higher, i.e. 85% in total.

Table 40: Participation in company and political activities: A comparison of the “receptive” (n = 188) und “rigid and intolerant individualists” (n = 13) (figures in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>“The Receptive” (n = 188)</th>
<th>“The Rigid and Intolerant Individualists” (n = 13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question 19: Which of the following company and political activities have you participated in one or more times?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company assembly meeting</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>89.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade union assembly meeting</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike over wages</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity action with employees from another company</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company occupation (e.g. at a time mass redundancies)</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political events</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petition/Protest demands</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycott of goods</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for donations</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 40 highlights further that the “receptive” group takes part in more diverse activities which lead beyond the spheres of influence within the company or the unions into the political realm. Through both their favoured conflict resolution strategies and in their willingness to participate in socio-political and political activities, the “receptive” group are showing a social and political interest which is oriented more towards a sense of community and which is largely coterminous with their conceptions of society and their criticism of society.

We can find this sympathy echo similarly amongst those with rigid and intolerant views, but with the opposite effect: amongst this group, an individualism dominates in the understanding of social relationships and in their conceptions of life – measured against their orientations towards work and career – and individualistic options for action dominate in the conflict management in the social relationship to working relations. It is an individualism which continues in their political behaviour.

It is hardly surprising then that both groups of interviewees are also located very differently on the left-right political continuum.
Figure 19: Political Self-Positioning on the Left-Right Continuum in Comparison: The “Receptive” (n=188) and the “Rigid and Intolerant Individualists” (n=138) (figures in %)

As Figure 19 shows, a little more than 61% of the “receptive” regard themselves as being left wing or quite left wing, whilst only just over 34% of the “rigid and intolerant individualists” do. Amongst this group instead a bare majority is located in the middle of the political spectrum, and 15% are nevertheless quite right wing or even right wing (9.2%).

All of this now presents an image of the attitudes of two groups of interviewees, which describe two relatively opposing poles in both their social and their political interests, in their access to (socio-) political forms of participation as well as conflict resolution strategies: the sense of community oriented towards collectivity, and the performance oriented individualism, of which an individualised cultural practice is a core element. This also has effects in interaction with other social relationships, such as that of interculturality. Experience in the working world must not be underestimated here. What we mean here is not experience with interculturality in the working world, but rather how this sense of community or the performance oriented individualism is put into practice in the world of work. This is revealed by the relationship between the optimal strategies for conflict management and the interviewees’ conceptions of interculturalism. This relationship can also be measured statistically.\footnote{This statistic relationship was created using bivariate correlations between the items in Table 39 and the attitude dimensions on the interculturalism scale. Here, we could measure an inter-correlation coefficient of somewhere between 0.25 and 0.35 on a significance level of 99%.

Amongst the “receptive” group, the preferences for collective strategies of conflict management on the shop floor are positively related to the acceptance of interculturality in the workplace, the incorporation into civil rights, the support for regarding each of these countries as a country of immigration and to allow immigration as well as being related to a repudiating stance towards a naturalistic way of thinking. This group’s openness towards immigration and interculturality developed from their daily experience of interculturalism. Their conception of interculturalism incorporates these phenomena into collective thinking.

Amongst those with rigid and intolerant views, the restrained and individualistic options for action in working relationships are linked to a repudiation of interculturality in the immediate sphere of the workplace and of immigration and interculturality in the more distant realm of the social context. Here we can perceive a defensive and strongly exclusionary stance towards others, which transforms the social relationship of interculturality into a com-
petitive relationship. It is for this reason in particular that the themes of “tolerance in the workplace” and “incorporation into civil rights”, that is, issues concerning equality, are bound up with issues of conflict management. It is also noticeable that the naturalistic conceptions concerning immigration and interculturality are linked to a lack of access to company interest representation through the works council or shop stewards.

The attitude type of the “rigid and intolerant individualists” is supported by 30% of youths and young adults, who are just making the transition into working life. We wanted to know, if, in our study, this profile of attitudes shows traits characteristic for age or for the phase of life and compared the interculturalism conceptions and the strategies for conflict management across age groups. For both attitude syndromes we can see that intolerant interculturalism conceptions weaken over the years, and become more tolerant. In the strategies for conflict management, collective action options gain in importance. This means that over the course of life, rigidity and individualism in terms of the protection and enforcement of individual social interests weaken as do the rigid and intolerant exclusionary attitudes in the social relationship of interculturality. Both give way successively toward more tolerance and receptiveness to others. However, this does not solve the problem of rigid intolerant and xenophobic ideas, as whether or not these develop or whether they then disappear again depends on a number of factors.

4. Immigration and Interculturality as Reflected in Group Discussions

In this chapter, we will present the results from the in all thirteen group discussions and two individual discussions related to the topics of immigration and interculturality. In the following analysis, the term "multicultural society" is often employed even though - as previously described - we favour the term "interculturality." This conflicting use of terminology stems the prevalence of the term "multicultural" that we encountered in the group discussions, and which we even partially used ourselves, since it is a term currently well-established in everyday life discourses. In the British discussions, we also employ words commonly used in Great Britain and divergent from the local discourse in passages in which "racial" aspects are talked about.

However, we now begin with the question over what ideas circulated in the discussions with regard to future migration and migration policy. That is, whether and if so which regulatory criteria did the participants consider necessary and reasonable.

4.1 Between Liberality and Restriction: Conceptions on the Regulation of Future Migration.

The opinion that immigration should be controlled is widespread among the Spanish participants. Even if they, as described, assume the necessity for further immigration (see Chapter IV, Section 2.2), in general, the autochthons among them pleaded for governmental controls. This should, above all, guarantee that only those migrants receive permission to enter who have a job offer. This resembles Spanish migration to South America and Germany during the post-World War II era.

“Yo instalarse que se instale todo el mundo. Ahora, para instalarse aquí necesita un algo, necesita tener un trabajo o un medio de subsistencia. Entonces ¿derecho de instalarse?
Chapter V: Interculturalism and Social Images

Todo el mundo. Ahora, ¿qué es instalarse? ¿Instalarse aquí es vivir de la sopa boba? Pues no" (E.I)

“Lo ideal sería que el que venga, venga con su permiso de trabajo.” (E.H)

“A los Estados de la UE se les ha venido encima y no saben cómo salirse. Antes, yo me acuerdo, los españoles se iban a Alemania, pero eran personas que se iban ya, poco más o menos, con su contrato.” (E.I)

Some participants did not think that migration control should be aligned with the needs of the labour market, but oriented rather to the capacity of the receiving society to offer social rights and acceptable living conditions to the immigrants. From this point of view, the limit on the number of immigrants is dependent upon how many a society can incorporate.

“But I see the complete opening of borders as crazy, because it would generate the problem that such a large number of people would arrive, that these people here would simply go hungry and live on the street. It should be done rationally, shouldn’t it, to absorb the number of people that the State gradually needed, giving them guarantees of jobs, decent housing, health, education, and a list of things.” (E.D)

The employees of AutoCat are more aware of Spanish immigration and the foreigner policy than the employees of Textil S.A., who hardly commented on this. The foreigner law of April 2000 is regarded more critically by the former group. The trade unionists engage themselves most intensively with it. Their main criticism is that the law insufficiently recognises the rights of irregular migrants and the problems these migrants have to reckon with if they have a job offer and want to regularise their situation.

“In the group of the trade unionists (Group I - semi-skilled workers), a more global perspective on the phenomenon of migration appears. They are not only engaged with the role of the receiving society but also with that of the countries of origin. Reasons given for migration could be a lack of jobs in their home localities. Therefore, some of them argued that immigration control should be curbed by creating policies in the migrant-receiving countries to support development in the migrant-sending countries. Meanwhile, other participants asked why the Moroccan government does not take measures to curb emigration into Spain. For instance, Morocco could make favourable conditions possible to encourage Spanish companies to establish enterprises there and as a result create new jobs.

“Y yo creo que se debería dar recursos, no ayudas, no pelas, no ayudas económicas, recursos, mandar gente y ayudarles (...) Darles unos recursos para que ellos mismos se pudieran sustentar y tener fábricas e ir evolucionando también.” (E.C)
While the topic of immigration regulation was not discussed by the group of the autochthonous employees of Textil S.A., it is interestingly that it was precisely the discussion group of immigrants, that made the strongest demands for closing off the borders and admitting only people who have a job offer. They spoke in favour of a temporary labour migration which should be regulated through bilateral agreements and a residency law and tied to the possession of a labour contract. In the course of this discussion, they did not leave out the fact that many people die while attempting to immigration irregularly.

“Mi opinión es que Marruecos y España han de controlar. Es una lástima porque muere mucha gente. Pero ellos tienen que hacer. En España necesitamos muchos inmigrantes, pero tiene que hacerlo con Marruecos. Por ejemplo: ahora me tienes que mandar cincuenta mil.” (E.P) 174

“Sí, por ejemplo, si España necesita veinte mil o quince mil o treinta mil, tien trabajo, por ejemplo de agricultura o temporal y vienen, por ejemplo, seis meses. Les dan alojamiento, con todo y trabajan y cuando termina la temporada se van” 175

The Moroccan participants lamented that a positively distorted image of Spain may exist in Morocco which encourages many Moroccans to leave their country even if they have a job there since the are often convinced that emigration leads to higher wages within a short period of time.

“Siempre vemos Europa como si fuera el paraíso. Mis paisanos, cuando van a Marruecos, con el coche, con tanta información, Europa, Europa. Algunos ya tienen trabajo en Marruecos, pero se van porque quieren cobrar más.” (E.R) 176

The immigrants regarded Spanish immigration policy to be partly responsible for the increase of immigration: the frequent signing of recruitment agreements - which they actually considered a good method of regulating migration - and the exceptional regularisation campaigns achieves an effect of ”attraction” and misplaced hopes among other Moroccans who are willing to emigrate. Also according to the immigrants, the existence of mafia-like smuggling organisations fosters an emigration founded on illusions. They agreed that the state should take measures against these organisations which are operated people from both the migrant-sending countries as well as the migrant-receiving country.

“Pero yo echo la culpa también a los mafiosos. Dicen que una vez llegues aquí vas a trabajar y esto es mentira. Lo mejor es que el gobierno de España firme un convenio con el país de donde vienen los inmigrantes. Lo que pido es que pongan fin a los mafiosos, que ayudan a traficar y trafican con los humanos. Por culpa de los traficantes hay muchas muertes.” (E.R) 177

Basically, the Moroccan participants still viewed immigration as an inevitable and desirable phenomenon that functions as a motor of change and economic growth for the migrant-receiving country.

173 Loose Translation: “I think that we should give resources, not aid, not cash, not financial help, resources, send people and help them (...) Give them resources so that they can maintain themselves and have factories and progress, too.” (E.C)
174 Loose Translation: “My opinion is that Morocco and Spain have to control. It’s a shame because many people die. But they have to do it. In Spain we need many immigrants, but it must be done with Morocco. For example: send me fifty-thousand.” (E.P)
175 Loose Translation: “Yes, for example, if Spain needs twenty thousand fifteen thousand or thirty thousand, there is temporary work, for example in agriculture and they come, for instance, six months. They give them accommodation, with everything and they work, and when the season is over they go.” (E.Q.)
176 Loose Translation: “We always see Europe as if it was paradise. My fellow countrymen, when they go to Morocco, with the car, with so much information, Europe, Europe. Some already have a job in Morocco, but they leave because they want to earn more.” (E.R).
177 Loose Translation: “I also blame the mafias. They say that once you arrive there you’re going to work, and it’s a lie. The best solution is that the Spanish government signs an agreement with the countries where the immigrants are from. What I ask for is that they put an end to the mafias, who help to traffic and traffic in people. It’s their fault that there are many deaths.” (E.R)
“Para mí, gracias a los inmigrantes los países mejoran, se progresa. Como Alemania – mira cuántos inmigrantes hay, millones y millones, y se ha puesto el primer país de Europa.” (E.R)\(^{178}\)

In the discussion groups conducted at the German automobile manufacturer Michel Motors, almost all of the participants - just as in Spain - assumed that there should be some sort of regularisation of immigration. The reasons ranged from the argument that the capacities for incorporation might be depleted (D.O: "Wenn das Glas voll ist, fließt das Wasser nach dem letzten Wassertropfen über")\(^{179}\) to the line of reasoning that it is important to be able to offer good living conditions to those people who immigrate (D.D).

The attitudes of the discussants in the most of the groups were marked by ambivalence, that is, by some liberal and some restrictive tendencies or vagueness. Even the more unambiguous stances could not to be assigned to any set of specific characteristics of the participants, such as gender, nationality, or social status. Thus, for example, rather liberal conceptions dominated in two of the discussion groups composed of male German workers, while participants in the other two German male groups had rather restrictive ones. Further the Turkish man interviewed individually had much more restrictive ideas than the three foreign, male discussants in Group III and with regard to the different aspects under discussion, they again showed different tendencies toward each. Ambiguities could also be found among the group of women (Group V) as well as among the two salaried employees (Group IV).

With regard to the question over which criteria are favoured for regulating immigration, there was a consensus that individuals who were "real" victims of political persecution should always be granted asylum. However, some of the participants also alleged that some also abuse this right by simply staging such persecution. Interestingly, with the exception of the German trainee, most of all the two Turkish participants dealt with this aspect. They specifically referred to Kurds who in large numbers and often unjustly received asylum (D.G, D.T).

The distinction was indeed made between people who migrate for political reasons and those who seek to improve their economic situation, however, economic motives were by no means uniformly considered to be illegitimate. In this way, both of the three German participants as well as one Turkish participant maintained that there can be no objections to people wanting to improve their lives through migration. Generally, the Turkish worker, D.E, called for "social values" to be used as criteria for admitting immigrants. And the Austrian salaried employee, D.I, argued that in no case should "racist matters" be allowed to play a role in regulation. Further, according to him, immigration should be viewed with less anxiety. D.I pointed out that in the post-war period, the expellees (Vertriebenen) were incorporated without question, even though today’s society is materially far better off than at that time. On the other hand, the trainee, D.S, sees the German state and society more as having been pressed into the role of the victim. Immigration should be regulated according to state interests. However, according to his perception, Germany cannot do anything against the migration "coming from all sides," since it still has to pay off its debts because of the "Third Reich" and since this time, Germany has had the USA “breathing down its neck.”

"...weil Deutschland ja wirklich sehr von allen Seiten bedrängt wird... Sie dürfen nichts sagen, sie dürfen nichts machen. Amerika sitzt dann immer hinten im Nacken.” (D.S)\(^{180}\)

Connections to the period of National Socialism and its putative consequences also surfaces among the male German participants in Group VI (see below).

For most of the discussants, the question over whether and how integration functions, seemed more important than the criterion of the motive for migration. This is not only rele-

\(^{178}\) Loose Translation: "For me, thanks to immigrants, countries get better, they progress. Like Germany, look how many immigrants there are, millions and millions, and it's become the number one country in Europe." (E.R)

\(^{179}\) Loose translation: "If the glass is full, with the last drop of water, the water spills out." (D.O.)

\(^{180}\) Loose Translation: "...because Germany really is under pressure from all sides... They are not allowed to say or to do anything at all. America is right there “breathing down its neck.”(D.S)
vant for looking at attitudes toward a multicultural society which will be addressed in the fol-
lowing section, but it also arises in the questions over criteria for allowing immigration and
for the deportation of immigrants. This is most noticeable in the arguments put forward by the
German workers, D.R (Group VI) and D.B (Group I), as well as in a modified form by the
German trainee, D.S, and the German salaried employee, D.H.

D.S demands a general halt of immigration for a certain period of time ("time-out"), not
only to relieve the labour market, but also to enable those foreigners, who have immigrated up
to this time, to first integrate themselves. (However, he later contradicts himself by he saying
that those who have immigrated up to now are already integrated.)

D.R sympathises with the proposal to expel immigrants who are especially poorly inte-
grated. Additionally, D.B wants to arrive at a selection of "suitable" immigrants. He not only
demands that non-German individuals who are guilty of a crime and persons who have been
refused asylum should be deported, but also those individuals for whom it is foreseeable "dass
es nicht klapt" ("that won’t work") should not be allowed to enter the country in the first
place. He would prefer a standardised procedure in which all at first receive a visa for only
one year, and thereafter it will be determined if "it" will work- meaning integration, and a
rule, proper behaviour.

His discussion partner, D.A, is sceptical about such a proposal, and he questions the overall
legitimacy of any sort of criteria for selecting migrants.

„Also, ich wüsste es jetzt selber nicht so, ob man sagt, wir gehen jetzt nach IQ, also nach Intelligenz, oder
was sie an Bereicherung bringen können für uns so kulturell oder auch im technischen Sinne, oder so.
Schwierig, die festzumachen, zu sagen, wir machen das jetzt so: Man muss mindestens drei Sprachen
sprechen und besonders gläubig sein aber auch tolerant, damit man hier die deutsche Kultur akzeptiert –
finde ich übertrieben. Also das so extrem zu sehen.“ (D.A)

He also objects to the one-year trial period regulation suggested by D.B:

„Wie sollte man denen gegenüber treten, wenn man denen sagt: Bitte, für ein Jahr. So, Visa ist abgelaufen. Ihr
habt euch nicht so bewährt, wie wir das gerne gesehen hätten und ‘Auf Wiedersehen’?“ (D.A)

The model of a rotating labour migration with temporary residency status as intended in the
recruitment period know as the “Guestworker system” ("Gastarbeiter system") and which is
currently projected for in the so-called "green-card provision" for example, was only a mar-
ginal topic of discussion. The Spaniard D.F when referring to the former guestworker pro-
gramme considers it to be a sensible principle. The German trainee, D.S, on the other hand,
with reference to the green card proposal has objections to sending the people away after sev-
eral years of settling down and establishing a home in a place. As for the rest, with regard to
the green card system, there was no criticism of the foreign workers, but rather on the failed
national policies on job training (D.A and D.B). According to the Turkish worker, D.T, there
is no alternative to the green card at the moment; it is necessary.

Unambiguous, consensual answers to the question on the criteria was not reached in any of
the groups. A German worker puts this general attitude to the point, when he says:

„Irgendwo muss aber auch Schluss sein, man weiß nur nicht, wo.“ (D.D)

However, he also notes that it the number of immigrants would sink, he consider this topic to
be a less “pressing problem.”

181 Loose Translation: "Well, I wouldn't know myself, if one said that we should use the IQ, that is, according
to the intelligence level, or if it were said that they bring us cultural enrichment or even in a technological way, or
so. It is difficult to lay down such a set of standard, so to say, from now on we will do it like this: One must
speak at least three languages and be exceptionally devout, but yet tolerant enough for one to be able to accept
the German culture - I find this too exaggerated. That is, I consider it to be too extreme." (D.A)

182 Loose Translation: "How can one approach them, if one tells them: There you are, for one year. So, your
VISA is expired. You did not prove as effective as we would have liked to seen and so 'good bye'?" (D.A)

183 Loose Translation: “Somewhere there must also be an end, but one doesn’t know where it is.” (D.D)
Also the rigidity of the deportation practices in cases of a criminal offence were not uniformly evaluated by all participants. Whereas the Austrian salaried employee, for example, argues for more indulgence especially for adolescents regardless of their nationality, the German salaried employee, D.H, demanded a clear-cut compliance with the norms:

„Das hängt, weiß nicht, vielleicht ist das jetzt eine radikale Einstellung, aber wer sich irgendwie strafbar macht und nicht mit unseren Regeln zurechtkommt, der hat auch nicht das Recht, hier zu sein.“ (D.H)\textsuperscript{184}

With this statement she refers to an example on drug dealing, just as did the German worker D.B (D.B: “the black drug dealers”), as absolute grounds for deportation. D.B objects to the alleged preferential treatment of these dealers by the courts which take into account that individual’s own difficulties and fears over being able to bring his Dominican wife into the country and securing a residency status. He sees himself and/or his wife as disadvantaged:

„Wir (haben) hier die ganzen Probleme und andere Leute leben hier auf meine Kosten.“ (D.B)\textsuperscript{185}

Also the Turkish worker, D.T, brought the question of the costs into play: Only those who are able to financially support themselves should be allowed to immigrate. He criticised that some people immigrate and then live at the state’s and/or the taxpayer’s expense for years. This illustrates the clearest agreement with the ideas on immigration criteria dominant in the Spanish discussion groups.

In the group of the employees at Michel Motors, the discussants - similar to the group of semi-skilled workers as well as active trade unionists at Michel Motors - also concentrated on migration incentives prevalent in the countries of origin. In these countries, greater employment opportunities should be created. In order to prevent a "brain drain" in the migrant-sending countries, according to the salaried employee D.H, foreign students should be sent back after completing their studies in Germany.

Whereas the issue of asylum almost played no role at all in the Spanish discussion groups, when discussing immigration in the German groups, a balance in the thematisation of asylum and labour migration could be observed. Meanwhile, the research team in Great Britain chose the question of asylum as first important topic for discussion.\textsuperscript{186} This is consistent with current public debate on immigration in Great Britain, which at the time of the research project extraordinarily concentrated on the immigration asylum-seekers. This is perhaps comparable with the medial attention given to this topic in Germany at the beginning of the 1990s before the right to Asylum drastically restricted there.

Similar to the German discussion groups, there was a consensus among the British groups that asylum must be granted in "genuine cases." Among the discussants at Michel Motors, there was such a clear understanding that "genuine cases" exclusively pertains to those asylum-seekers who have actually experienced political persecution. However, among the British groups, the classification of "genuine asylum-seekers" differentiated. Alone within Group II, the view that a number of people do not come into the country out of a fear of political persecution, but rather are motivated by economic opportunities led to a clear distinction between "genuine" asylum-seekers (and their families) and "fake" ("bogus") asylum-seekers who really come for economic reasons. While it was thought that the former should be provided for, this should not be extended to the latter – a notion that carries obvious implications for immigration laws and the police. Although no reference was made to the real number of asylum-seekers in Great Britain (that is, on the dimension of the problem), it was often indicated that an acceptable limit or maximum number of asylum applicants exists.

\textsuperscript{184} Loose Translation: "That depends, I don’t know, maybe it is just a radical position now, but someone who somehow commits a criminal offence and cannot handle our rules, has no right to be here." (D.H)

\textsuperscript{185} Loose Translation: "We (have) all these problems here and other people here are living on my expense." (D.B)

\textsuperscript{186} In the British Group II, they merely spoke of labour migration: It was argued in this group that economically motivated immigration should only be permitted if specific qualifications are on hand.
This distinction between political and economic migrants is made far less clearly by the other British discussion groups. In Group I, it was strongly argued that the current political and economic system of global capitalism produces both political persecution and economic deprivation. Therefore, it is understandable and acceptable under these circumstances that economically-motivated migrants endeavour to improve their standard of living, and in cases of hunger and starvation, to save their lives. According to this group, it is ridiculous to argue that human beings pay great sums of money and undertake dangerous trips to Great Britain simply to live from state welfare in the form of vouchers. This approach was accompanied by the demand, that more must be done against the causes of migration at the international level - an argument that also surfaced in various German and Spanish discussion groups (see above). Furthermore, when referring to the numbers mentioned in a newspaper article that was introduced as a discussion stimulus, this group stressed how insignificant the asylum problem is numerically and in relation to the total population.

This attitude was shared by Group III, although it was not as persuasive. Here there are two main aspects. First, in terms of the magnitude of asylum, it was stated - contrary to the strong thematisation of asylum in the British media - that very few people have had any sort of experience with asylum-seekers in their locality. Instead, they referred to begging (alleged) asylum-seekers in London. Second, the group found it difficult, to differentiate between genuine and "false" asylum applicants. People, who seek refuge for political and economic reasons (in cases of dire poverty), are entitled to apply for asylum. More specifically, both motives are considered to be an issue of genuine need.

This divergence between the groups also becomes apparent in other aspects. Concerning the public perception of asylum-seekers in Britain, Group I was remarkably critical toward the role of the media, which blows problem all out of proportion and brings racism to a boil.

“You’ve got to bury this issue (asylum), because it isn’t an issue.” (UK.B)

“Given the right facts (most people) would be quite happy to have these people here.” (UK.C)

The role of the media is seen as that they leading the government into a difficult situation, in which the Minister of the Interior Blunkett must now calm the reactionaries, in particular by accelerating the asylum procedures. Group III clearly differentiated - as previously mentioned - between media coverage and the current impact of asylum on their own everyday life experiences. However, they did not discuss this as critique of the media. In contrast, Group II did not question the role of the media at all. Rather, they developed a line of argumentation that, on the one hand, presents Great Britain as tolerant, and on the other, renders asylum as a problem, - similar to how this issue is advanced by media coverage.

A common topic surfacing in all three groups and one which reflects media coverage is the perception, that compared with other European countries, Great Britain allows too many asylum-seekers to enter. The conception exists that asylum-seekers purposefully and directly come to the United Kingdom (Group II), since the European Integration has lowered the barriers for asylum-seekers, thus they perceive of Great Britain as a small island, a small country (Group III), and therefore the other European countries "aren't doing their bit" – even as they accept that Germany has taken on a considerable number. There is, however, explicit substantiated reference made to the current asylum laws or to the proposed changes, even though they are central issues in the newspaper article offered for these discussions.

The discussants were also concerned with the economic dimensions of the asylum issue, in fact quite intensely, although again with distinctly different emphases. Group I stressed the costs of asylum less strongly. Vouchers were seen as degrading and as a secondary topic even though (UK.C) expressed the opinion that they must to be spent on the "right things." Similarly, there was a general consensus that asylum applicants benefiting the economy - most of them just want to work and would make net contributions to revenue taxes and social security.

“They were not looking for a handout from the Government.” (UK.D)
This is set in a positive relation to the current lack of skilled labour and the low rate of unemployment. The only concern expressed by the group refers to the financial burden on public funds by asylum-seekers. This could harbour the potential for feelings of resentment up to attacks on asylum-seekers - as transpired in Glasgow. Once more, it is UK.C who expressed rather different concerns by mentioning that he would complain if his taxes had to be raised.

Group III focussed on the abuse of vouchers, in particular, if they are spent on something other than food. However, some participants noted that they knew little about the system and consequently the debate shifted to the aspects of stigmatisation through vouchers (UK.M). Nonetheless, concerns were expressed on the costs of the voucher system and that if is to be expanded immediately, it was remarked that "we" would support the asylum-seekers in addition to carrying a higher tax burden. As the conversation came around to the needs of asylum applicants for education, housing, health, and schooling, the discussion centred once more on a costs-benefit assessment. The net costs of supporting every asylum-seeker was juxtaposed against with the inability of them to pay social contributions since the individuals concerned are incapable of immediately working, for example, because of language barriers. This is expressed with rather crude words:

"I am going to work; I am paying taxes; I am doing this; I am doing that. And yet they are coming in and taking all the benefits." (UK.K)

The same was evident in Group II:

"We are working and paying taxes; we are paying for these people." (UK.G)

"You have to make sure that we are not tipping the balance in favour of people that are getting more than we do, you know as tax paying people." (UK.E)

Although – even if reluctantly admitted that asylum-seekers are willing to work, the debate concentrated on aspects of social welfare. In this case, examples were given of social welfare services that are extended to asylum-seekers but not to British citizens. There were complaints as well that asylum applicants know how to most effectively exhaust the social welfare system. In the same way, when addressing the issue of housing, the discussants explicitly stressed that asylum-seekers must not profit from "our" costs, and that they should receive the housing that British citizens do not want to live in: If it has a roof and is dry, then its a home.

The generous social system – compared to other EU-states - was seen as a magnet. Nonetheless, it was stated that refugee smuggling organisations arouse the inflated expectations of "false" asylum-seekers. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that in this group parallels between asylum and earlier immigration to Great Britain are drawn as well as to the appearance of additional problems with the expansion of communities of "ethnic minorities."

The research team selected asylum as the first topic of discussion most of all to see if the discussants of their own accord connected aspects of asylum with problems of racism experienced in the established immigrant communities. In other words, to what extent do the participants dissociate asylum-seekers from British citizens, including "ethnic minorities"?

In Group I, no significant connection was made between the two aspects. It was mentioned that the extreme political right uses asylum as part of their larger racist campaign in order to kindle anger. Some parallels were also made with earlier immigration and to efforts to recruit workers areas lacking skilled labourer (yet not necessarily asylum-seekers). Group II discussed the latter point as well, but related it very strongly to the necessity of restraining the number of immigrants in order - as they said - not to recreate the same problems of the past. Meanwhile, Group III digressed relatively quickly away from a discussion on asylum to aspects dealing with well-established "ethnic minorities." Here, they assumed a lack of willingness to integrate, especially on behalf of the Muslim communities. This led to discussions about denominational schools, issues of racism, comments on a multicultural society, the setting of quotas, etc. (see Section 4.2). There is no apparent explanation why in the discussing asylum, the debate in Group III strikingly digressed away from this topic. Perhaps anti-
Islamic sentiments play a role here since examples were given of asylum-seekers from Kosovo and Bosnia as well as from the Pakistani community in Birmingham. Also fears over the number of asylum-seekers, which this group perceived as high, and/or general problems of integration may have also played a role. However, it is possible that the discussants simply prefer to talk about more familiar issues if we consider that they admitted to having little or no experiences with asylum-seekers. Nevertheless, it also suggests an identification of asylum-seekers with specific "ethnic minorities," and by definition, both groups are "foreigners/strangers."

4.2 The "Multicultural Society:" A Functioning Reality or a Failed Model?

In the following section, we will summarise the experiences and ideas the participants expressed in the group discussions regarding an intercultural or "multicultural" society.

In Spain, strong differences emerge according to the companies. In the discussions conducted at AutoCat, the dominant positions are characterised by sincere tolerance and complete rejection of xenophobic attitudes. Multiculturalism is perceived as desirable and socially enriching. Societies with a long tradition of immigration such as the Netherlands and Great Britain and where cultural pluralism is the norm, it referred to positively.

"Y tú te vas a Londres y, bueno, a veces dudas de dónde estás. No sabes dónde estás. Y te vas a Holanda y hay más turbantes... Y para ellos no es un problema. Pero yo no creo que sea un problema. Lo están convirtiendo en un problema pero no es un problema. En Holanda y en Inglaterra no hay problema. ¿Por qué aquí si?" (E.F)

In the numerous contributions, the discussants spoke respectfully about "cultural differences." Integration is obviously understood to be two-way process of mutual adaptation and not a one-sided assimilation of a single group forced to give up their own culture.

"Lo que pasa es que cada uno nos hemos de cambiar el chip y coger el chip de que no son ellos los que se tienen que integrar, sino que somos nosotros los que tenemos a integrarles, o sea, absorberlos, ¿no? Y que todos participemos los unos de los otros." (E.D)

"Pero bueno es un tema que la religión es fundamental, quiero decir. Fundamental por el tema que ellos tienen sus cosas y sus especificidades y, claro, cada uno es como es. Y hay que respetar lo bueno y lo otro ¿no?" (E.C)

One participant also states his personal family background of internal migration as an example of successful integration from which speaks a certain identification and advertising of optimism.

"Mira, yo lo veo de una manera positiva. Y creo que nos va a enriquecer ¿Vale? Porque mira un ejemplo. Yo siempre me remito al pasado en estos temas. Mi familia es toda andaluza y seguro que tenían las costumbres diferentes cuando llegaron aquí, a Cataluña, que los catalanes. Ahora nosotros formamos parte de una familia que es catalana y andaluza." (E.D)

Loose Translation: “And you go to London and, well, sometimes you doubt where you are. You don’t know where you are. And you go to Holland and there are more turbans ... And for them it isn’t a problem. But I don’t think that it’s a problem. They’re turning it into one, but I don’t think it’s a problem. In Holland and England there’s no problem. Why is it here?” (E.F)

Loose Translation: “What happens is that each one of us has to change his attitude and think that it’s not them who should integrate themselves, but rather it’s us who should integrate them, I mean, absorb them, isn’t it. And that we should all participate in the process.” (E.D)

Loose Translation: “Nun das ist ein Thema, bei dem Religion fundamental ist, meine ich. Fundamental, weil sie ihre Sachen haben und ihre Unterschiede und, sicher, jeder ist so. Und wir müssen das respektieren, was gut und verschieden ist, nicht wahr.” (E.C)

Loose Translation: “Look, I see it in a positive way. I think that it will enrich us, OK? Because look at an example. I always use examples from the past in these cases. All my family is Andalusian and sure they had different customs to the Catalans when they arrived here in Catalonia. Now we form part of a family that is Catalan and Andalusian.” (E.D)
The broad-minded opinions can be explained by the circumstances that the employees at AutoCat in general do not have direct contact with immigrants either at work or at home. Therefore, they represent "abstract" positions. However, even in the case of a participant who lives in the same housing district as many immigrants, this experience is evaluated positively:

"En Sant Feliu, donde vivo, en el mismo bloque hay cuatro matrimonios: uno es italiano, uno alemán, el otro son de Marruecos y el otro me parece que es peruano (...) Llevo 18 años viviendo en ese bloque y jamás hemos tenido ningún problema con ellos. Al revés, que se ofrecen a todo." (E.E)

Nonetheless, the participants are aware that their progressive attitudes are not representative, neither for the general society nor for the entire staff of AutoCat. Rather, the dominant discourse is one that rejects other cultures. This contradicts Spain's long tradition as exporter of migrants. One participant also accuses the state of supporting this rejection of immigrants and of using the issue nebulously in order to distract people from other problems.

"Aquí somos mentalidades progresistas ¿no? Y se tiene que aceptar, que asumir, y se entiende. Pero la mayoría de la gente pues... como diría, son de centro y de centro tirando al no progresismo. Y esas cosas no las entiende la mayoría de la gente, que las mujeres vayan tapadas con un velo, que tengan que rezar a la Meca a las doce en punto, no sé qué historias. (...) Y hay que respetarlas absolutamente." (E.C)

The autochthonous participants at Textil S.A. represent a radically different position from those at AutoCat. Their discourse is not abstracted, but aimed directly at the Moroccan population and criticises its putative refusal to integrate into the host society. Some workers openly reject the Moroccans because they supposedly ghettoise themselves. The fact that these people want to maintain their cultural practices is seen as offensive and negative. To the autochthonous discussants at Textil S.A., integration is undoubtedly understood to be synonymous with assimilation.

"Yo lo que no entiendo es por qué ellos no se adaptan a nuestra cultura." (E.K)

"¿Qué se encuentran esta gente?. Esta gente tiene una cultura diferente a la nuestra. La religión es diferente a la nuestra. O sea, que les costará. Esta gente, costará muchas generaciones. No cambia tan fácilmente. " (E.L)
“Nosotros no haríamos lo que hacen ellos aquí, eso seguro. Nosotros tendríamos que adaptarnos a ellos.”
(E.K)

“Han montado su propio mundo dentro del nuestro, su rutina, su cosa y han hecho un mundo aparte. Sus propias tiendas, montan su propia cultura, su religión. Quiero decir que se han hecho un mundo paralelo, una ciudad paralela propia. Tú vas allá y pides hacer lo que ellos hacen aquí y te mandan a la Chín.”(E.O)

A further topic, they are very concerned with in connection with to this - unlike the autochthonous employees at AutoCat - is that of public resources and their distribution between locals and immigrants. They sense a clear competition for resources provided by the welfare state, especially at the local level. They complained that the immigrants are supplied with all kinds of aid - a perception that sustains strong resentment toward immigrants.

“Tienen demasiadas ayudas (…) Tienen faena, pues que paguen impuestos como nosotros. Que tienen un crío en el colegio, que paguen lo mismo que lo estamos pagando nosotros.”(E.M)

“Lo que a ti te sabe mal es que dices: ey, tú eres de aquí de Cataluña y que venga un inmigrante y veas que le dan un cheque para ir a la compra, le pagan los estudios (…) y en cambio tú con mucha dignidad para poder sacarlos adelante sola y nadie…” (E.M)

“Bueno, muy bien que estén, pero si nosotros tenemos que pensar como unos negros para mantenernos, que tengan que pensar igual, no que Benestar Social, un vale para comer, gratis, esto gratis, un piso, un coche… Tú has pensado como un negro. Coño, ¿esto es ley? Esto es: vinieron a tu casa y te echaron.” (E.O)

The Moroccan discussants at Textil S.A. stated that they do not feel openly rejected by the dominant society, but that they plainly observe that the autochthonous population distances themselves in certain ways, for instance, they avoid all contact with them.

“No sientes el racismo aquí, solamente la gente de aquí se aleja un poco de nosotros.” (E.Q)

“Te miran un poco como gente intocable.” (E.R)

“Yo vivo en Vic y en mi opinión nunca vamos a llegar a convivir con gente de aquí. Ellos no nos quieren a nosotros.” (E.R)

“Por ejemplo, hay bares (regentados por marroquíes) donde no entra un español. Ni uno, ni uno. Entra u no si tiene un vicio. Para algo bueno, nada.” (E.R)

196 Loose Translation: "What do these people find here? These people have a different culture to ours. Their religion is different to ours. That means that it will be difficult for them. It will take many generations. It won't be that easy for them to change.” (E.L)

197 Loose Translation: "We wouldn't do what they do here, that's for sure. We would have to adapt ourselves to them.” (E.K)

198 Loose Translation: "They've set up their own world within ours, their routine, their things and they've set up a world apart. Their own shops, they set up their own culture, their own religion. I mean that they've made a parallel world, their own parallel city. You go there and ask to do what they're doing here and they send you to China.” (E.O)

199 Loose Translation: “They're given too much help (...) They've got jobs, well they should pay taxes like the rest of us. They've got kids at school, then they should pay the same as we do.” (E.M)

200 Loose Translation: “What makes you feel bad is that you say: hey, you’re from here, from Catalonia, and that an immigrant comes along and you see that they give him food vouchers, they get their studies paid for (...) and you, on the other hand, with a lot of dignity in order to get by alone and no-one...” (E.M)

201 Loose Translation: “Well, fine that they’re here, but if we have to work like slaves to survive, they should have to work the same, and the Social Security shouldn’t give them food vouchers, free, this free, a flat, a car...You’ve worked like a slave. Fuck. Is this the law? This is like: they came to your house and they threw you out.” (E.O)

202 Loose Translation: "You don't feel racism here, it's just that the people from here keep away from us a bit.” (E.Q)

203 Loose Translation: "They look at you like untouchables.” (E.R)

204 Loose Translation: "I live in Vic and in my opinion we are never going to be able to live together with people from here. They don’t want us”. (E.R)

205 Loose Translation: "For example, there are bars (run by Moroccans) where no Spaniard goes in to. Not one, not one. One'll go in if he really needs to. But not for anything good.” (E.R)
They renounced the claims made by the autochthonous population that uses their customs and cultural habits - clothing for example - as a pretext for accusing them of not wanting to integrate.

"Si vamos a Vic, la mayoría nos dicen, ¿por qué vuestras mujeres van tapadas?. Ya tienen una excusa de por qué no queremos integrarnos. Antes todas las españolas iban con el pañuelo, hasta hace poco. No tiene nada que ver, es la persona la que tienes que mirar" (E.P)\(^{206}\)

In Section 4.3, we will look more closely at how this is specifically reflected in community life.

In the discussion groups at the German research company, opinions on a multicultural society were quite different. Most of the participants looked upon it as being generally positive or simply recognised it as a normal reality. Along these lines, a German worker reported:


Additionally the male salaried employee regards the debate around "Überfremdung" (foreign permeation/infiltration) as "stupidity/foolishness." He thinks that neighbourhood districts with high numbers of migrants are exciting and generally enrich the multicultural society. Problems with it are blown out of proportion in the media (D.I). In the group of the foreign workers (Group III), D.F points out that the multicultural society is a functioning reality. In the soccer club composed of 85% foreign children in which he is a trainer, he is especially familiar with the well-functioning intercultural coexistence of children and adolescents. According to his observations, it is that the adults who tend to have problems with it. He guesses that the media and politicians disseminate distorted representations since they perhaps do not want the multicultural society to function well. The German workers in Group II described the situation as "normal" in which many of the former "Guestworkers" remained in Germany and established families. For the migrant-receiving society this means that,

"wenn man was will, muss man was geben." (D.D)\(^{208}\)

The salaried employee D.I points out that adolescents with migration family background must be offered opportunities.

"Das überfordert uns keineswegs." (D.I)\(^{209}\)

On the cultural influences brought by the immigrants, such as the mosques, the Doener or similar things, "one has already gotten used to" (D.D). The multicultural society is a reality - "one has to learn to deal with it" (D.C). They see the multicultural society as a process in which both locals and immigrants have to perform the necessary work of acculturation (D.A, D.C, D.D, D.F).

"Man versucht, sich denen auch anzupassen. Die sollen sich natürlich auch anpassen, aber man sagt auch: o.k., wir kommen ihnen entgegen. Ist auch völlig in Ordnung." (D.A)\(^{210}\)

The Turkish worker D.G, who fared badly in the host country as he became a victim of a fire assault motivated by xenophobia, described that he is still trying to adapt to German society.

\(^{206}\) Loose Translation: "If we go to Vic, the majority say to us, why are your women covered up? Then they have the excuse for us not wanting to integrate ourselves. Before, all Spanish women wore a head-scarf, until recently. It's not important, it's the person that you have to look at." (E.P)

\(^{207}\) Loose Translation: "I recently heard someone from the CDU say that the multicultural society does not work out, and that there is not a single example in the world where it does work. And on this point, I can simply disagree with him. This is stupidity. What kind of stupid stuff is that! One must only do it the right way; in my opinion." (D.B)

\(^{208}\) Loose Translation: "If you want something, you have to give something." (D.D)

\(^{209}\) Loose Translation: "This is not too much for us to cope with." (D.I)

\(^{210}\) Loose Translation: "One tries to adapt to them as well. Of course, they must also adapt, but one also says: o.k, we’ll meet them halfway. This is totally okay." (D.A)
Nevertheless, this is very difficult, and according to him, even more difficult the older one is at the time of immigration.

Regarding the conditions for settling down in a new society, the discussants also made distinctions between the different groups of immigrants. On the one hand, the German workers in Groups II maintained that the Turkish migrants - as the largest group - have been the most successful in integrating themselves, and likewise their culture is best accepted in German everyday life. On the other hand, they speculated that it is much more difficult for green card immigrants from India to integrate since there are so few Indian people living in Germany. Here it becomes clear that from the perspective of the immigrants integration is seen as a difficult process that is more successful the more fellow compatriots that are already there. Therefore, integration is not associated with expectations from the Germans for the immigrants to adapt, but rather with the question of how immigrants may feel.

Group VI composed of four male German workers most explicitly disapproved of a multicultural society, as well as the female German salaried employee D.H., though to a lesser degree. A participant in Group VI even referred to it as “a failed attempt” (gescheitert) (D.O). The reason given was the lack willingness on behalf of the foreigners to integrate. Paradoxically, several participants in Group VI emphasised that they personally get along very well with "all of them" (D.O). Or with foreigners they know better, such as Turks, Indians, or "even" (sogar) (!) Blacks as colleagues and a Persian as a brother-in-law, as D.R stated. Most Germans feel similarly, and some people interpret too much into "racism" (D.R). These are only a few "black sheep" (D.Q).

"die anderen (Deutschen) müssen das dann ausbaden." (D.Q)\textsuperscript{211}

This suggests that these German participants see themselves as victims of a “critical discourses on racism” (see below).

As soon as the discussion group takes a more general position, it no longer corresponds with the personal experiences they described. Rather, they emphasise that the German culture is the \textit{Leitkultur} (principal culture) and that those who live in Germany just have to accept it (D.R). There is a broader tendency to understand nationality in \textit{nationalist biological} terms. For instance, immigrants remain foreigners regardless if they naturalised or not (D.R). It even seems that Naturalisation is seen rather as disturbing. In this way, to D.R it appears as if two-thirds of the trainees in his company are "nothing but foreigners," despite the high number of "Germans." He explained this by saying that most of those he perceives as foreign colleagues, do have a German pass.

This mode of interpretation is based on naturalisation, but also on a perception in which people feel exposed to a threat "deception" by "converts" over who are the "real" members. Indeed this model is strongly suggestive of the historical antis-Semitic stereotype often encounter by Jews who had been baptised: They were still attached to their previous religious affiliation and it was assumed that they wanted to disguise this.

The salaried employee D.H is generally in favour of the freedom of religion, but vehemently opposed to the introduction of prayer times during work time. On this issue, she for once agreed with her discussion partner D.I. Whereas he, however, argued from an overall atheist position and wants Catholic holidays, for example, to be abolished as well, D.H fears the discrimination of Germans:

"Aber letztendlich denke ich mir, die sind von XXX [Untersuchungsbetrieb] eingestellt. Und die werden bezahlt für, um eine Zahl zu sagen, 8 Stunden Arbeit. Dann sollen sie auch 8 Stunden arbeiten. ... Sonst werden die Deutschen diskriminiert." (D.H)\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{211} Loose Translation: “Then the others (Germans) have to take the rap for it.” (D.Q.)

\textsuperscript{212} Loose Translation: “But in the end, I think that they are employed by XXX (company studied). And they are paid for, to mention a number, eight hours of work. Then they should also work eight hours. ... Otherwise, the Germans will be discriminated against.” (D.H)
The perception of Germans as victims, which she shares with the participants of Group VI and the German trainee, can also be found in other statements she made.

Inconsistent attitudes towards a multicultural society also become evident in the statements made by the trainee D.S. Generally he thinks that people who are born here or live here for a long time and speak the language well should be allowed to remain in the country. With the term ‘culture,’ he associates ‘Turk’ and ‘Islam.’ In the following, the same gap between personal experiences and general assumptions as in the case for the participants of Group VI is evident. D.S generally considers Islam to be incompatible with the Christian culture and also a threat to it since it wants to annihilate the Christian Occident. According to him, especially the fanatics who know the Koran by heart firmly believe in this goal. D.S clearly evaluates Christianity as having a higher value. He would prefer it if everyone would become atheists, but alternatively he wishes that would be or become Christians. On the other hand, the trainee reported that he himself has friends who know the Koran by heart, but nevertheless do not support a holy war. He also sees the praying of faithful Muslims at the workplace, women wearing scarves on their heads, and special arrangements being made for Muslim holidays as unproblematic. All in all, he has had no bad experiences with foreigners, and on the contrary, is pleased that there are many migrants in his surroundings, among whom some are also his closer friends. This means that the abstract idea of a multicultural society seems to frighten D.S, while he actually has had good experiences with it.

Similar to the other topics, it is only the group of the women (Group V), who more precisely discussed the gender specific aspects of a “multicultural society” – namely, in connection with the wearing of the head scarf. The German participants unanimously considered this to be a symbol of another culture that is backwards in terms of gender issues and as a symbol of the lack of women’s freedom. Despite longer contemplation, they could not understand the motives for women who wear a head scarf. On the one hand, they emphasised that it is very important to them that they under no circumstances want to give up the achievements of the feminist movement. However, they also self-critically reflected, that it is not right to simply “press” others into their standards, especially since one also must question if one’s own position really makes one makes "happier" (D.M). Despite their lack of understanding, they also appealed for tolerance. This was also shown for the question on intercultural coexistence, above all by D.M: The model is a peaceful side by side, in which one can not morally "offend" (vor den Kopf stossen) each other. However, whereas wearing a head scarf is no violation moral boundaries, the slaughtering of animals is perceived so. Otherwise, another belief must be accepted. Taking the example of fasting on Ramadan, one should not feel disturbed by it.

„und wenn er seinen Ramadan feiert, soll er doch!” (D.M)

Here the participant called for special sensitivity to be taken, and therefore to not directly eat in front of a person who is fasting. The same applies to people who are only on a diet. Through this comparison, the theme which was at first introduced as a cultural-religious subject, was then given a very everyday life, ‘culturally unspecific’ connotation.

The attractiveness of standards that can be generalised measures becomes evident through the argumentation that women should see to it that they follow the given social norms abroad, for instance, not lay naked on the beach. Since they themselves keep to such standards elsewhere, they draw from this that they can also expect the same from immigrants living in Germany: that they “adapt a little” (ein wenig anpassen) (D.L, D.M). Among other things, this also stipulates that they should not import the conflicts existing in their country of origin.

The segregation between immigrants and Germans is seen as a normal process which is initiated by the migrants, who can, as a result, maintain their national pride and uphold their traditions and thereby make it easier to live in a foreign country. This they evaluated quite

213 Loose Translation: “and if he wants to celebrate his Ramadan, let him do it!” (D.M)
positively since it also supposedly helps the migrants maintain their "independence" (D.M, D.N, D.K).

These women (Group V) as well as the German workers in Group I positively commented on the issue over whether dual citizenship should be an accepted possibility. However, the German trainee D.S once again commented against it. In each case, the question was evaluated in terms if it would make integration easier. While the women, as well as D.A and D.B, assessed the so-called Doppelpass (double pass) as a relief, D.S thought that a more consequent declaration to the German state, thus through the annulment of one’s former citizenship, would contribute more to the integration of the immigrants.

The Turkish worker D.T took a perspective that sets him apart from all the other discussants. For him, the multicultural society has not succeeded insofar as the Germans have learned too little about hospitality and neighbourliness. Furthermore, the immigrants have endured too much unfriendliness from the Germans. Additionally, he made the critique that the Germans are afraid of Islam, which he correlated with an example on the anxiety surrounding the wearing of a head scarf, which, in his eyes, is nothing more than a religious symbol. He presumed that the Germans are afraid that Germans might convert into Muslims.

In Great Britain, the subject of a "multicultural society" was introduced to the discussion groups in reference to the established "ethnic minorities." However, the participants in Group III had already commented on questions of integration while discussing the topic of asylum. This ranges from aspects of language to the assimilation to and the acceptance of British culture. UK.J gives an example of a failure to integration with regard to a group of Bosnians, who according to him have made no effort to integrate even after living for ten years in Great Britain. A specific concern of this discussion group, mostly among the women, is the insistence that the asylum-seekers – in addition to the "ethnic minorities" - respect ‘British,’ meaning ‘western,’ values, especially in dealing with and in showing respect towards women. Here there is a noticeable parallel with the woman in the group at the German research company.

To introduce the topic of "race relations," the title page of the newspaper Guardian showing a picture of burning cars and headlined, "Racial tension blamed for riot," was shown to each group. This article referred to the violent clashes between the police and adolescents mostly of Asian origin that shortly prior to this discussion had caused quite a sensation in the locales of Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford. Each group was then explicitly asked by the interviewer to comment on the riots and indicate the reasons behind them. Therefore, much more than in the other countries these discussions were related to a current event, which nevertheless, enables us insight into the fundamental attitudes on intercultural relationships.

A common topic raised by all the groups here was the role of the extreme right-wing parties in these cities prior to the "riots," about which the media also reported extensively. Groups I and III clearly made these connections. They particularly mentioned the marches of the BNP\textsuperscript{214} and the NF\textsuperscript{215} right through Asian districts. Indirectly, this was also a topic of discussion in Group II in which a participant described:

"There’s a small minority who’ll get together and organise trouble. And they are jumping on the catalyst, making it worse.” (UK.F)

With regard to the overt causes behind of the riots, the discussants reflected on the role of a local newspaper in Bradford that manipulated the situation and the activities of the extreme right groups, which together lead to a reaction from the Asian community.

"If those (Asian) communities think they are going to be attacked they will probably defend themselves.” (UK.D)

The incidence of an attack on an elderly white pensioner - supposedly through Asiatic adolescents - immediately preceded was used:

\textsuperscript{214} British National Party
\textsuperscript{215} National Front
“That old guy was murdered and it was reckoned that two Asian youths did it, and the white lads latch on to any excuse…” (UK.M)

However, this raises the question over whether the extreme right “created” “racial” tensions or only manipulated existing tensions. The general consensus in Groups I and II was that the extreme right is only able to use or intensify underlying tensions that already exist. The black (Indian) worker in Group I noted:

“You don’t get this level of rioting without tapping into something.” (UK.D)

In contrast, Group III for the most part offered explanations for the riots which did not directly refer to "race relations." However, this division between the groups is a simplification since all in all there was no clear consensus within or between the groups on the primary reasons for the riots. Efforts to give an explanation can be roughly grouped under four keywords: First, ‘racial conflict between communities based on the economic situation.’ The riots are connected to perceptions of different white and Asian communities in these cities, and the tension between them is based on problems resulting from segregated neighbourhoods. The formation of "enclaves" is seen as a main source of “racial” tensions (UK.B, UK.E) and is primarily analysed economically.

“Coloured people want [need] cheaper houses, because they’ve just moved in and they’re just getting started. They move in, the white people moved out... so you end up with all Indians.” (UK.H, similar to UK.D)

Interestingly, they contrasted the isolation of the communities with possibilities for integration at the workplace (UK.G), even though they took the distinct view that the majority of the Asians live and work stable communities.

In Group I, strong contrasts are shown between the (perceived) degree of integration into Birmingham and the (perceived) lack of integration in Bradford and that the potential for “racial” conflicts are based on ignorance. The perception that these riots were "regional," that is, they only occurred in specific northern cities where integration is inadequate, was again reinforced by an economic dimension that identifies these cities as being economically disadvantaged. In Bradford,

“I would assume a lot of unemployment, a lot of deprivation, a lot of people living on the poverty line.” (UK.A, similar to UK.F)

Second, they referred to ‘the endeavours of the Asians of the second generation,’ which is also predominantly an economic explanation. The "riots" reflect, in part, the alienation and dissatisfaction of the young (male) Asians owing to their limited opportunities and the racism they experience. They are attempting to make it better than their parents did and are infuriated over the lack of opportunities to do so:

“Older generations were happy to accept the possible low paid jobs in Bradford but their children want better and are not prepared to tolerate their conditions and have not received the opportunities.” (UK.K)

The economic endeavours between the generations also include a cultural dimension that affects the young Asians:

“It’s when you get all these people (Asians) low paid, living in slums in some areas, dissatisfied with their bit, all their racial tensions within families because of the rules they have. They’ve got a lot of mixed-up kids...” (UK.H)

Finally, the riots also reflect this group’s attempts to attain the same or a better lifestyle as/than white people have:

“They feel they are entitled to the same rights and privileges that they think we’ve got.” (UK.G)

Third, ‘cultural, religious, and linguistic differences' were given. “Cultural differences” between the established communities of (Asian) "ethnic minorities" and the white communities are a point of reference that extends through the interviews simultaneously with the economic arguments. The discussants indicated that the (dominant) Muslim/Pakistani communities in
Oldham, Bradford, and Burnley currently seek to create an isolated community in order to form and preserve strong cultural ties. UK.D, the Indian worker, explained this as follows:

“What they (the Pakistanis) are worried about is the dilution of culture. So they tend to ‘put the walls up.’” (UK.D)

Indeed it is perceived that Muslims may try to ensure segregation in certain areas, such as in educating and bringing up their children:

“…it’s probably not the kids fault… [its] the parents who are trying not to integrate them. They’re making every effort not to have them integrated into the rest of the community … because they don’t want them to have outside influences. Western influences.” (UK.J)

The "cultural" differences between the Asian and the white communities - however, also the black, afro-Caribbean communities - are reinforced by the fact that English is not their mother tongue (UK.B) and that they are not Christian (UK.J). It is also important that the participants in Group I emphasised that the perception of cultural difference, including religion and language, effectively operates through the "race or colour" of these communities:

“Colour is a label (difference) which provides a reason to have a go.” (UK.A)

Ironically, in spite of the emphasis placed on the differences between cultures and the necessity of these communities to adapt to "British culture," it was admitted that it is almost impossible to describe what "British culture" is:

“Because for me you have a British culture and they’ve got to adopt a British culture … Whatever it is.” (UK.D)

“You want to have it that everyone should have their cultural identity. I think it’s one of the reasons find it so difficult to accept other peoples’ cultural identity. Because the English don’t have one.” (UK.J)

In general, the outlook was pessimistic. We noticed that was a prevailing expectation that the Asian communities are not going to change, but should:

“Their shops, their clothes, they have no intention of blending in.” (UK.F)

“People [are] coming into the area with their own culture and very set in their ways.” (UK.I)

Only one participant took into account that the current situation could change with time.

“Do you think in twenty years time, right, all this, their own culture will have disappeared, and that each generation will adapt to the English way?” (UK.I)

Only Group II made it a topic of discussion that the native British should adapt or develop a greater acceptance of others.

“(We have to) try and respect the way they think and they feel… We’ve got to encourage people to stretch themselves. You know, you’ve got to go out of your way.” (UK.B)

Fourthly, the participants referred to ‘other factors’ - a series of other explanations not specifically related to ‘race’: The summer riots were an expression of tensions which often explode during hot weather.

“It was bloody hot, there are always riots when it’s hot – loads of people out on the street.” (UK.J)

The “riots” illustrate the growing violence among young men.

“The other social indication is age – 15-25 year old males are mainly involved in (any) attacks.” (UK.A)

In this case, parallels are drawn to soccer hooligans and to the role of alcohol. Finally, there is the perception that a "riot" could have led to another one, therefore, it is a question of imitating behaviour.

Altogether it becomes clear that in the first instance there is a distinct economic dimension in the discussants - relatively fragmented - analysis of the riots when they associated them with the relative deprivation found in each of the cities, with housing segregation, or with labour market related and social attempts made by young, Asian men. Second, the discussants strongly insisted on cultural differences between the communities in the cities (and general) as a reason; we will refer to this below. Third, although they have little concrete knowledge...
Chapter V: Interculturalism and Social Images

on current events and on examples for the lack of integration, the discussants stated that the riots necessitated a combination of factors before they could arise in these places and in this manner: such as the weather, age, and gender of the participants; the role of the extreme right and the local media; and prior tensions, etc. Obviously many of the sources for “racial” conflicts already existed before the riots if one follows the CRE report published previously on the situation in Bradford.

4.3 Inside the company: About "good colleagues", "glass ceilings", and the difficulty of making complaints

How do people in intercultural situations treat each other inside and outside the world of the workplace? Are they aware of discrimination and/or intercultural conflicts, or not? What do they think about anti-discrimination policies, for instance, from the works council? And how does it look "after work": How do the interviewees assess the situation of discrimination by society as a whole, what causes do they see for it, and who do they think is responsible in each case?

Let us first look on the company level. In Spain, as we often already noted, the situation in each of the two research companies appears to be very different on this point as well. Seldom do people from poorer countries work for AutoCat. Thus according to the discussants, on no occasion did "ethnic" conflicts emerge. They knew of particular cases in which immigrants worked for a sub-contractor and explained that they had adapted without difficulty. Conflicts between the longer established Catalonian employees and domestic migrants did not become topic of discussion. With the German workers at the company, who hold management positions or positions as technicians at the middle level, there were generally no conflicts aside from occasional misunderstandings on work questions. These good relationships are apparently based on the autochthonous workers’ perception that the German workers share the same interests within this multinational company. However, they often face the bitter realisation that the German employees appear to receive more support than they do, but they hold the company responsible for this rather than their German colleagues.

“Y quizás la discusión no es contra los alemanes, sino contra XXX [research company] (...). Entonces aquí, en líneas generales, siempre hay casos de todos los colores, ha habido buena relación. Porque el conflicto no lo tenemos con un país, sino con una fábrica. Yo es que he llegado a oír en alguna ocasión, por parte de un alemán, es que estos alemanes son la hostia. Porque de alguna manera ha pasado a vivir la problemática nuestra. Y está, digamos, en nuestro equipo, como si esto fuera un equipo de futbol. Y no pienso que haya grandes problemas.” (E.H)

“Normalmente, con lo que yo he visto y he hecho, se les ha ayudado. Cortapisas no se les ha puesto. Que después has visto que, joder, ¡te han jodido!. Pues bueno. Yo pienso que se les ha ayudado.” (E.F)

Nonetheless, the participants fear that with the arrival of a greater number of immigrants in the future, in particular Moroccans, that some conflicts may arise within the company. From this discourse, we can deduce that they see a “tolerance limit,” which if exceeded could lead to "ethnic" conflict. Such a boundary line does not appear to exist with regard to the Germans from the company headquarters. They are not seen as an "ethnic group." The concentration of large numbers of foreign workers belonging to an "ethnic" community, for instance of Mo-

216 Loose translation: "Maybe the argument isn't against the Germans, but rather against XXX [research company] (...) So here, in general terms, there are always all kinds of cases, there's been a good relation. Because our conflict isn't with the country, but with the factory. I've heard sometimes, from a German, these Germans are bloody great. Because somehow they've come to share our problems. And that's it, let's say, in our team, as if this was a football team. I don't think that there are big problems." (E.H)

217 Loose translation: "Normally, going on what I've seen and done, they've been helped. They've not had to face any obstacles. Then after, you've seen that, fuck, they've fucked you! Well, I think that they've been helped.” (E.F)
roccan origin, is estimated to be potentially explosive, since, according to their opinion, isolation and a lack of integration are to be expected.

"Supongo que sería diferente si, de golpe, mañana contrataran a trescientos marroquíes y los pusieran a trabajar aquí abajo. Si vienen así, como colectivo, generaría que ellos se cierren en sí mismos." (E.H)\(^{218}\)

"Un conflicto llamémosle racista, se daría cuando la empresa planteara el ingreso de trescientos inmigrantes aquí." (E.G)\(^{219}\)

"Porque han venido (los alemanes) de la empresa madre. Pero si, en cambio, vinieran aquí mil marroquíes, eso no tenemos experiencia de lo que pasaría." (E.G)\(^{220}\)

Since "racist" attitudes are quite common among the rest of the employees, they foresee that if there is a distinct increase in the number of immigrants, they will not be included well within the company. According to the discussants, the paradox emerges within the unions inasmuch as the active trade unionists with a long tradition of struggling for workers’ rights open engage in a xenophobic discourse on the issue of immigration.

"Un tío que se ha estado abriendo la cabeza por derechos laborales, en Zona Franca, y que luego te diga barbaridades referente a los inmigrantes, de, joder, que nos van a invadir, que no sé qué, que no sé cuántos. Te choca." (E.D)\(^{221}\)

In the light of such predictions, the participants who are active in the unions commented that the unions would implement various preventative measures in order to facilitate integration. One example was the action to employ a black worker in order to heighten awareness over this community among the rest of the staff. Considering this - so they assume - AutoCat is going to have a greater number of workers with a migration background, they emphasise the need for the unions to undertake such measures.

"Hay que apostar más por todo eso. Hay que darle más caña. Para que deje de ser un departamento y pase a ser una política concreta en el sindicato." (E.D)\(^{222}\)

Since for a long time now there has been numerically large group of Moroccan employees in the staff at Textil S.A., this discourse here is not hypothetical, but rather a daily interaction. Thus the native employees speak with reservations directly about "ethnic" conflicts. From their discourse, we can derive a rather rigid separation and a lack of contact between local and immigrant workers, a situation especially manifested outside the company (see below).

Accordingly, the autochthonous employees do not think that the company discriminates against workers on the basis of their "ethnic" origin. However, during the discussion the question arose over whether there had been cases of discrimination in one of the factories in the course of a recent reorganisation of the staff. In particular it seems that many young Moroccan workers were dismissed. While a participant related this to their "ethnic" origin, the other participants denied that there was such discrimination and instead associated these measures to the period of employment as the decisive factor.

"Yo creo que sí están un poco discriminados, por en XXX, como estuvimos estos días mal, se despedia gente para aquí y para abajo. En cambio a la hora de despedir a la gente les hicieron daño, porque los pobrecillos fueron los primeros en salir a la calle. Uno detrás de otro hasta que los despidieron." (E.L)\(^{223}\)

\(^{218}\) Loose translation: "I suppose that it would be different if, suddenly, tomorrow three hundred Moroccans were taken on and were put to work down here. If they arrived like that, as a group, it would lead to them closing themselves off." (E.H)

\(^{219}\) Loose translation: "A conflict, let's call it racist, would come about if the firm proposed the entry of three hundred immigrants here." (E.G)

\(^{220}\) Loose translation: "Because they've come (the Germans) from the parent company. But if, on the other hand, a thousand Moroccans were to come, there's no telling what might happen." (E.G)

\(^{221}\) Loose translation: "A guy who's been killing himself over labour rights, in the Zona Franca, and who then talks a lot of rubbish to you about immigrants, that, fuck, they're going to invade us, and this that and the other. It surprises you." (E.D)

\(^{222}\) Loose translation: "More must be put into this question. More must be done. So that it stops being a department and becomes a specific policy within the union." (E.D)
The migrant workers themselves were full of praise regarding their treatment by their superiors. They felt a deep gratitude for the attitudes towards them expressed by company boss because he, they say, not only supplied them with places of work and housing, but he also respects their religious beliefs. However, certain criticisms did emerge towards some foremen and forewomen, yet these apparently cannot be generalised.

The Moroccan workers at Textil S.A. explicitly ruled out the existence of "ethnic" discrimination with regard to wages and work relationships. All of them agree that it is only the service and productivity of the workers that is evaluated and that "ethnic" origin is unimportant.

They traced this back to the company management’s policy which, according to them, punishes every obvious discriminatory act committed against the immigrants. The migrant workers feel protected by the management. They are fully aware that the discriminatory situations
against Moroccan immigrants are a daily occurrence in other companies, especially in the smaller ones, and therefore, they feel privileged.

“Si un encargado trata mal a un inmigrante y la dirección se entera, el personal de recursos humanos le da un aviso y le dice que tiene que vigilar y tratar bien a la gente.” (E.Q)

“Es muy distinto a lo que ocurre en otras empresas. Yo he trabajado en una empresa pequeña y trabajas con el dueño y siempre, si fumas, cuidado con la ceniza, cuidado con... Esto aquí no pasa.” (E.P)

However, the Moroccan workers complained about the existence of a "glass ceiling" for immigrants at Textil S.A., inasmuch as promotions to another category is exclusively reserved for local workers irrespective of their period of employment and their skill level. The participants ascribed this discriminatory practice to the foremen and forewomen since they are responsible for proposing candidates for a promotion to management, who consequently is free of all responsibility. They maintained that the actions of the foremen and forewomen were motivated by "what-would-the-others-say," if the promotion of a Moroccan worker was not approved by the rest of the native employees.

“Esto es lo que pasa. Aquí hay un límite de categorías y ya hemos llegado todos a este límite. De aquí no pasamos. Los de la dirección no lo saben.” (E.Q)

“A lo mejor llevas aquí veinte años con buena experiencia y te quedas siempre y otro con menos experiencia, con cinco años, y ya como encargado. Dan más confianza a la gente de aquí.” (E.Q)

“La empresa se fía de lo que les dice el encargado. Si aquel encargado ve que vamos a poner a este hombre, la empresa simplemente dice sí. En fin, la culpa no la tiene la empresa.” (E.T)

“A lo mejor es también por la vista de los demás. Porque a lo mejor si me ponen a mí, claro, dirán, mira a ese extranjero que lo ha puesto en un sitio alto y yo soy de aquí.” (E.T)

Despite this plain limitation of opportunities for internal promotion, the Moroccan workers did not consider themselves to be discriminated against. Additionally, hardly any of the other autochthonous employees deny that there is discrimination on the basis of "ethnic" origin. The immigrants, even more so than the autochthonous employees, described the intercultural working climate as good and unproblematic.

In the discussion groups at the German company under examination, Michel Motors, a different picture emerges in terms of appraisals over the intercultural situation inside the company. There is quite a divergence in the assessments: The structural discrimination of foreigners in the company is noticed by the German workers, D.A and D.B (Group I), by the Turkish worker, D.N, and by the foreign workers, D.E, D.F, and D.T. The other participants denied any sort of structural discrimination (Group VI and the German women in Group V) or did not make it topic of discussion (Group II, Group IV, and D.G in Group III). The German trainee, D.S, once again made a contradictory statement.

We already presented the assessments of the foreign participants concerning questions of discrimination in Chapter IV, Section 2.2. Therefore, we will concentrate on the opinions of the other discussants in this section.

233 Loose translation: "If a foreman treats an immigrant badly and the management finds out, the people at personnel warn him, and say that he should watch out and treat people well.” (E.Q)

234 Loose translation: "It's very different to what happens in other firms. I've worked in small firm, and you work with the owner, and always, if you smoke, careful with the ash, careful with... That doesn't happen here.” (E.P)

235 Loose translation: "That's what happens. Here there's a limit on categories and we've reached that limit. We go no further. The management doesn't know.” (E.Q)

236 Loose translation: "Maybe you've been here for twenty years with a lot of experience and you stay the same, and another with less experience, with five years, is already a foreman. They trust people from here more.” (E.Q)

237 Loose translation: "The firm trusts what a foreman tells them. If the foreman says that we're going to promote someone, the firm simply says yes. In the end, the firm's not to blame.” (E.T)

238 Loose translation: "Maybe it's because of how the others might see it. Because maybe if they promoted me, sure, they'd say, look at that foreigner who they've promoted, and I'm from here.” (E.T)
D.A and D.B say that discrimination does not occur openly, but rather subtly and unofficially. To be sure, the German women see that foreign employees are concentrated in areas that entail harder, more dangerous, and dirtier work. However, they explained these circumstances by maintaining that the foreigners chose it themselves, that they are more indifferent to the conditions of work than the Germans, and that their main interest is to make "a quick German mark." On the other hand, the German trainee D.S admits that even though discrimination exists, nonetheless, he finds the complaints on the subject are mostly exaggerated. Also jokes referring to nationality are usually not meant to be taken seriously.

Similar to Group VI which is composed of German workers, D.S is of another opinion that it is not the foreigners who are discriminated against, but rather the Germans. Thus for awhile the foreigners used more dirty language against the Germans than the other way round. The participants of Group VI perceived that foreigners were formerly usually given more priority in their requests for taking their eight weeks of earned vacation at one time in the summer. In contrast, the Germans were told that they were only allowed four weeks at one time and not during the peak season. The quarrel around this matter ended with the result that at present nobody can receive more than three weeks of vacation at one time. They also attributed other problems with the behaviour of the foreign colleagues: First the German colleagues had to enforce that German is spoken during the group meetings. According to them, it is simply normal that tensions arise if the foreigners working in the company do not speak German. They welcomed the measure taken by the factory management to employ only students who speak German for the summer positions (D.Q). D.R said that he could not imagine having a foreign supervisor because of the concealed "clan"-like dependencies, which he particularly suspects among his Turkish colleagues. D.Q pointed out that the problems with foreign colleagues were not so massive in earlier times. D.R noted that there is increasing xenophobia amongst both himself and his colleagues.

The issue of different languages and foreign colleagues speaking to each other in their respective language is also considered to be a problem by D.S, while the German workers D.C and D.D did not see it as a problem at all. Although they indeed observe a divisions among their colleagues according to different nationalities during break times, they considered this to be simply normal and explained it by arguing that it makes communication much easier and perhaps that different topics are discussed.

D.A and D.B observed discriminatory treatment most of all in the form of graffiti written in the lavatories, in jokes and in derogatory remarks made about foreigners.

"Ja, meiner Meinung nach ist das hier... Gut, Beziehungen spielen hier auch eine Rolle aber auch, wie gesagt, mehr oder weniger aus Erfahrung und Gerüchten hört man ja auch, der Türke der kann gar nichts, der kann nichts werden, der ist nichts, der braucht nichts, der... ist halt so. Arbeitet am Band und das reicht für ihn." (D.A)

With regard to internal company conflicts, several participants argued against the assessment that it was a question of systematic xenophobia. Along these lines, D.B said that "the temperraments clash against another" between Turks and Germans.

"Also, in dem Bereich wo ich früher war, (...) wo also auch viele Türken drinne sind, da gab es schon oft Streitigkeiten... Prallen gewisse Temperamente aufeinander“ (D.B)

D.C and D.D know Germans who advocate xenophobic attitudes, such as "Türken raus" (Turks go home) or "Ausländer raus" (foreigners go home), but also foreigners who say "alle Deutschen sind Scheiße" (all Germans are shit). However, these are isolated cases and these

---

239 Loose translation: “Yes, in my opinion, ...Okay, relationships do play a role here too, but also, as I said, more or less through experience and the rumours one hears, the Turk cannot do anything, he cannot become anything, he is nothing, he doesn’t need anything, he ...is just this way. He works on the assembly line and it’s enough for him.” (D.A)

240 Loose translation: “Well, in the area where I was before, (...) where there are also many Turks, quarrels were quite common...Certain temperaments clashed against each other.” (D.B)
comments are rarely defended in public because of the fear of sanctions. The latter corre-
sponds to the perception of the Turk, D.N, who said that everybody is friendly, but people still
talk negatively about foreigners behind their backs. She thinks that feelings toward foreigners
are becoming more and more hostile in the company. This, according to her, results from
Germans who accuse foreigners for their children’s unemployment. D.C and D.D did not
share her opinion. In general, they did not see "ethnic" belonging as important in the cases of
controversy. Nonetheless, they said that there are also and most of all conflicts between dif-
f erent groups of migrants:

"Es ist aber nicht so, wie es immer dargestellt wird, also zwischen Deutschen und Ausländern, sondern unter
den einzelnen Kulturen selbst" (D.C)\(^\text{241}\)

One thing is linguistically remarkable here: Migrants from a variety of countries of origin are
perceived as "cultures." Turks and Greeks, who do not even want to work together according
to D.C's statement, are selected as a significant example of such conflicts.

The Turkish worker T describes another area of conflict: There is competition between the
Aussiedler and foreign workers. Aussiedler receive preferential treatment, for example by be-
ing classified into higher wage brackets by the foreman.

The anti-discrimination discourse practised by the official side, that is by the works council
as well as by management, as mentioned above is manifested in part through the implementa-
tion of a commensurate company agreement that was mentioned by the discussants in four of
out of eight groups. Among these were the group of the women as well as three discussion
groups composed of male German workers.

The participants in Group I welcomed the anti-discrimination measures, but could not
imagine how they should look. It was a topic of discussion that it has had no positive effects
for individuals in the company if foreign representatives from the same nationality are active
in the works council. Further, D.A and D.B asked themselves if the works council can actu-
ally do much against discrimination and xenophobia, especially since at least D.B assumes
that some people are already racist as a result of their family background, something that can
hardly be changed.

Meanwhile in the other conversations, the participants complained about one outcome of
the anti-discrimination discourse and policy that they assessed as counterproductive: The
German colleagues no longer dare to openly formulate criticism toward foreigners. The
trainee D.S and the group of the women articulated this in such a way as that they have the
impression that there has been such a development not among themselves but with their col-
leagues. They also noted that anti-discrimination policies are not yet sufficient enough (D.S)
and that, according to their appraisal, approximately 20% of their colleagues at the company
tend toward xenophobic attitudes. One of the female participants estimated the share at even
30% in her department (D.K).

Conversely, the participants in Group VI clearly spoke of themselves in the course of de-
scribing the counterproductive effect mentioned above: The anti-discrimination discourse is
jointly responsible for the bad atmosphere within the company. "Racism" is then used as an
gridlock argument. One must be cautious over what one says to the works council. The anti-
discrimination policy of the works council thus leads to a situation in which one cannot
openly speak about problems they are having with foreigners because then one will get
“chewed out” (reprimanded) and because foreigners are requested to report cases of mobbing
immediately (D.Q). This policy does not help the foreign colleagues, since it makes normal
relations between German and foreign employees impossible (D.Q). "Racism" can be grounds
for refusal by the factory management.

“und dann auf einmal dieses ‘oh hast du was gegen Ausländer?’ Da werde ich verrückt. Und diese Schiene
fahren einige.” (D.R)\(^\text{242}\)

\(^{241}\) Loose translation: “It is not as it is usually presented, that is between Germans and foreigners, but rather be-
tween the separate cultures themselves.” (D.C)
Chapter V: Interculturalism and Social Images

The accusation of racism is irritating to D.R and to him seems to be a restriction of his freedom of speech. The works council was also criticised that it has "forced through" the measure enabling the foreign colleagues to take their vacation time. In this way, it has "destroyed a lot" (D.R) insofar as the Germans feel disadvantaged.

It remains unclear whether this is the opinion of a small self-centred and resentful minority or if there really is an increasing potential for conflict that needs to be taken seriously.

In summary, it is worth mentioning that with regard to the assessments of discrimination in the German research company, the group composed of (mostly German) women (Group V), who tended to deny discrimination on the basis of nationality or "ethnic" origin, rather emphasised discrimination on the basis of gender. Women, according to their consensus, have to try harder than men and are given less chances. Women in traditionally male professions are accused of only being the “quota woman” and not adequately qualified. Nevertheless, it was positively noted that Michel Motors even accepts women at all for trainee positions in automobile mechanics. In addition, they observed that policies to promote women in the company have increased women’s chances.

In Great Britain, all three discussion groups spoke about the possible discrimination at Special Motor Plant, in part also making references to other companies or fundamental patterns of behaviour. In this case, discrimination could be subdivided into three main areas: employment procedures, job promotion, and discrimination at the workplace. We should begin by mentioning that only one member of an "ethnic minority" was present, who did not speak about personal experiences at all. Thus we are dealing primarily with perceptions of white British people on this subject. It is different when dealing with sexual discrimination. This was included in the discussions by the participating women who related their personal experiences.

Now we will concentrate on employment procedures which are a very important issue since the research company is a new site with an expanding staff. The staff manager emphasised that all of the cases of external staff employment as well as the transitions from Vagabond are based on evaluations of their qualifications and the job interviews. In an interview with another employee in the personnel department, it was stressed that the employment procedure is rigorous and both gender and "race" neutral. More specifically, no alterations are made in favour of or against specific groups. It followed from the group discussions that in comparison to other factories in the region, there are not many workers from "ethnic minority" groups at the site. Further, the participant UK.F noted that relatively few persons belonging to "ethnic minority" groups were invited for a job interview.

“When I see them all gathered prior to the interviewing, you don’t see many Indians, sorry Asians, or Afro-Caribbeans. You don’t see many of them.” (UK.F)

The participant UK.J (Group III) noted the following even though she had not noticed the “ethnic mix” at the site until now:

“But I’ve had people come from Germany and say, ‘Where are all the Asian people?’ They’re sitting here and they’ve spotted it and I hadn’t really thought about it until that point. I mean we’ve got a few Asian people, but I don’t think we’ve got a representative number here. And I certainly think the West Indian, black (representation) is worse.” (UK.J)

Indeed the reason for this problem seems to more to lie in manner in which the jobs are initially advertised and in the selection methods rather than in the actual employment procedures that involve testing and interviews. Nonetheless, the groups debated over the procedures. The main assessment of Group II is that it is simply a question of merit:

“I was under the impression that people who came here for a job went through an extensive interview system…. [and] that these people were taken on [based] on their own merits, regardless of colour or creed.

242 Loose translation: “and then suddenly there is this ‘Oh, you have something against foreigners?’ This makes me crazy. And quite a few follow this track.” (D.R)
We interview and I don’t believe anybody interviews seeing there being problems against (with) any particular race or creed.” (UK.F)

“There’s a hell of a lot of people applied and a very small proportion of those people that applied actually got to the interview stage. And then there is a lot of people we did (interview). So that should have been purely on merit. And that’s the way I believe it was done. And therefore the question of racism shouldn’t actually exist. In this respect …” (UK.G)

In contrast, it was argued by Group III composed mostly of female participants that subjective elements always slip into the employment process which can lead to indirect and passive forms of discrimination. The participant UK.J defended the objectivity of the procedure, but noted that a subjective decision can be made, if two interviewees rank similarly. In this situation, the following mechanism can take place:

“Maybe you will always pick the one that is like you.” (UK.J)

This issue becomes a specific focus of the group discussion. While they argued that an subconscious decision reinforces those attributes that the interviewer relates most to him/herself.

“You recruit in your own image. It’s subconscious. So if you are a white male you are much more likely to recruit another white male, than you are a woman, or somebody from an ethnic minority.” (UK.J)

Furthermore, the participant UK.I presumed that there are differences in the manner in which he would conduct interviews with white and black people; he feels closer to the former. This has an subconscious influence on the decision.

A further dimension was raised by the participant UK.M (Group III). She noted that there actually had been complaints on discrimination in interviews with job applicants belonging to an “ethnic minority” insofar as no individual from an ethnic minority group was included in the testing procedure from the side of the decision-makers. With regard to discrimination, the participant UK.K similarly observed:

“I wouldn’t say they (women) didn’t get in because it was men interviewing them. But because I know some of the attitudes of the men downstairs [on the shopfloor], that could easily have happened.” (UK.K)

Interestingly, the participants of all groups noted that more women had been employed recently. This was evaluated as part of the responsible policies of a personnel staff member. While this was generally welcomed by Group III, the participant UK.F (Group II) pointed to the ambiguity this kind of positive discrimination has in the testing procedure.

“I interviewed a lady Saturday before last. And she was absolutely perfect, not only in qualifications, experience, her attitudes…And it was a job on the assembly line that she should have been fitted into. And I spoke to someone and he said… ‘She is just what we need.’ Not her brain, it was the fact that she was a lady and she could have filled a role in that environment, she would have just balanced it up quite nicely.” (UK.F)

The discussants also drew comparisons with other sites belonging to Vagabond on the issue of the employment of women and "ethnic minorities." Here, the ‘black Indian’ UK.D noted that the production lines in two other factories were formerly 'completely white,' which now is no longer the case. There was also a reasonable attempt to increase the share of female production workers - according to his information - up to forty percent in one of the sites.

The internal promotion procedures at the Special Motor Plant were discussed as the next area of possible discrimination. In this case, every group concentrated on different topics. Group I strongly stressed the absence of opportunities for promotion since all the higher positions are taken by German or Austrian employees who come from the company headquarters in Germany. The participant UK.D summarised the situation as follows:

“There does appear to be like a glass ceiling if you can’t speak good German and you are not from Austria or Germany.” (UK.D)

The debate centred around the question over whether this is a discriminatory practice in the way in which positions are not open for competition but rather for political reasons filled with Germans, or if this simply reflects the rights of the company owner. For the participants UK.A and UK.B, it is a problem of discrimination; Participant UK.C contradicted this.
“I pick him not because he is the best person, but because he is German.” (UK.A)

“You have to remember it’s a German company…. You [research company] want to have some overall control and pick the people you have confidence in.” (UK.C)

But Group I opened up this discussion to other aspects as well:

“But there is a glass ceiling. … Both for people of different racial backgrounds. I mean, non-Germanic in this one, but even in Vagabond, you know certain types, and females.” (UK.B)

This had the following consequences for the Special Motor Plant:

“I’m saying they create a situation where they have people that are very....that think the way as they do, below them - creating an organisation where at the top of the tree senior and middle management is 100% white (male).” (UK.B)

Similar to the woman’s discussion group at Michel Motors in Germany, in Group III, the debate over discrimination concentrated on gender issues in connection with job promotions, however, they rarely drew parallels with “racial” discrimination. UK.J mentioned an example from Vagabond in which she and other female trainees who had graduated were not taken into consideration, while newer male employees were entrusted with key tasks and were promoted. She added:

“I couldn’t believe I’d hit the glass ceiling at C grade. I thought, you know, that’s why I came into the company, and I hit the glass ceiling at this (level).” (UK.J)

According to the participants’ evaluations, the problem with promotions to higher levels exists because there are no women in the upper management, and until very recently when someone came from Germany, there were no women on the management level below.

Group II observed that internal promotion is also problematic. However, here the accent was not on the gender or "racial” dimension of the problem, but rather on personal favouritism in the promotion process.

“I don’t think it’s based on race or anything else, it’s on personal relationships often. There is a perception that connections [it’s who you know] are more important, even if formal procedures are followed.” (UK.E)

Typically none of these groups discussed the promotion procedures in great detail. While the participants who participated in the application procedure were very attentive toward the employment and selection practices, no one was able to give a detailed description of the promotion procedure. In itself, this situation reflects the call for greater transparency (made, for example, by participant UK.G in Group II).

With regard to discrimination at the workplace, that is, specifically in the staff offices and on the shop floor, the main statement made by both male groups was that there is no discrimination, at least not directly.

“I don’t know of any problems here.” (UK.C)

“I do not believe there is any direct discrimination within the organisation, it’s quite a good organisation. In my view it’s all indirect.” (UK.B)

In spite of a number of court cases founded on "racial” discrimination in companies of the Vagabond group and the statement made by the local "Commission for Racial Equality” that there were numerous cases of "racial" discrimination, the participant UK.F defended the following opinion in the group discussion:

“I don’t think you come across racial problems at all in the industry. (...) I don’t think there was much that could be put down to racial discrimination…it was very very minimum.” (UK.F)

Contrary to the two other groups, the participants in Group III mentioned a considerable number of indications of sexist discrimination both in the factory as well as otherwise. Such could be found both in the production halls and in the staff offices. The participant UK.K who works in the production especially emphasised how intimidated she is made to feel by her "line manager."
“Why am I treated differently or being told I’m, you know, stupid? (...) Why do you have to prove yourself more than anybody else because you are a woman.” (UK.K)

Similarly, the participant UK.L related how she and her co-worker friend were treated badly by an older employee in their office. He repeatedly asked them to run errands even though they are employed to professional technical work.

Interestingly enough, especially the participants in Groups I and III expressed aversion to using the term 'discrimination.' Participant UK.B (Group I) speaks of 'buddyism' in the industry and at the site, as something he describes as the aforementioned dominance of white and male persons employed at the highest levels. Similarly, the participants in Group III considered the higher management to be "a little boys' club." They emphasised the male management culture, which, for example, also includes playing golf as avenue to promotion and acceptance.

“If you don’t play golf…you go nowhere. Oh he’s gone to play golf. And it’s 3pm. He’s disappeared and that won’t be holiday.” (UK.I)

It becomes implicitly clear that a ‘male culture’ indirectly dominates which is partly sexist and could be potentially ‘racist’.

“In Special Motor Plant it is very much a case of ‘if your face fits’.” (UK.I),

These viewpoints, in turn, are in opposition to those of Group II. For this group, which exclusively consists of white men, not only was "racial" discrimination not a topic of discussion, but furthermore, they thought that "ethnic minorities" are able to use related complaints in order to move up in the company. In the case of wage differentials based on the quality of work, for example, they assumed that "ethnic minorities" tried to gain increases in their income, not through hard work, but rather by filing a complaint over discrimination.

Company internal equalisation policies were an additional subject matter of the British group discussions. Special Motor Plant took over the anti-discrimination guidelines (the "Red Book") adopted by the Vagabond group. We asked the discussants as to what extent they are familiar with it, whether measures such monitoring and quotas should be used to counter inequalities, and whether they considered the equalisation policies to be effective.

Generally speaking, there was little or no knowledge about the respective policies and procedures. The answer was either that there is none or, if there was one, they have not been informed about it.

“I would suspect that there is an equal opportunities policy, knowing where we’ve come from, and knowing the business. But I have never seen it, so it’s not been publicised very well.” (UK.B)

There was a general refusal of a quota system by the groups. They are considered such to be artificial and a hindrance with regard to the need to place the best people in the positions, particularly in an environment strongly oriented toward competition. Beneath this lied the assumption that the respective quota system would raise the economic costs.

“I have a real problem with government legislation that insists on quotas…In this competitive market place you should be employed on the basis that you can do the job.” (UK.E)

“Quotas mean sometimes you could end up recruiting people who aren’t competent to do the job.” (UK.J)

The participant UK.M also really thinks that she was chosen for the works council on the basis of 'statistical' reasons.

“They decided they needed someone on the plant council. And to be fair they only chose me because I’m a C grade, and I think I’m semi-intelligent…and I’m a woman. I was a token gesture.” (UK.M)

Monitoring did not encounter much opposition and was actively supported by Group I, particularly by UK.B. In this manner, he contrasted the "gender and ethnic mix" in the entire corporation with each of the management degrees (PG3 and above) and then pointed out that this illustrates the existence of a glass ceiling, more specifically, that there are problems within the organisation.
“Without monitoring how DO you know that equal opportunity policies are being managed?” (UK.B)

Objections over the consequences of monitoring were also mentioned: Which policies will result from it?

“Do you lower your standards to get them [to address inequalities highlighted by monitoring], or do you just go on merit?” (UK.C)

“It could be an interesting statistic. But I don’t think it’s a statistic that should necessarily be acted on, because you get into a game then that is beyond …our comprehension.” (UK.E)

Objections were expressed in another manner by Group III. Something to the effect that the management indeed reacted to the monitoring, however, not effectively since the persons concerned once again do not sit there. All in all, little confidence in the management was shown by other comments.

“They will go into massive overdrive, and again it will be a bunch of men in a room panicking about something they know nothing about” (UK.J)

“The company is very bad at doing anything. The cultural role is out. What a flop. If they put together a code, a policy…they would probably do it wrong.” (UK.I)

In Group I, they first alleged that the monitoring statistics are manipulated.

“In organisations like this there’s so much double speak, you don’t know where you stand.” (UK.A)

Altogether, in this group we can find the clearest approval of formally established equalisation policies.

“I think there should be a clear [equal opportunities] policy” (UK.A)

“And our policy should be written to try and break that (discrimination) down. It’s not going to happen overnight…” (UK.B)

“I’ve asked my safety rep…Can we have a policy on bullying at work, because this takes all forms of discrimination. They [policies] protect the company and protect the individual.” (UK.A)

Yet there is much debate over the effectiveness of such policies, in which UK.C argued that equality cannot simply be prescribed.

“You cannot legislate and make people feel that until you create the right atmosphere and the right culture, whereby people feel that they can feel comfortable and they are treated fairly.” (UK.C)

In the other two groups, the necessity of additional formal politics was questioned more fundamentally. Accordingly, Group II referred to the role of the existing legislation, for example, the Race Relations Act and the Sex Discrimination Acts.

“I thought the policy would be that laid down in the legislation, for us to operate within. How can you improve on that?” (UK.F)

Instead Group III discussed informal opportunities.

“…team contracts built upon a discussion of issues such as jokes at other people’s expense.” (UK.I)

However on the insistence of the other participants, UK.I accepted that this could be applicable to some office teams, but not universally. Therefore it does not represent a comprehensive solution.

A further dimension of this subject was the question over how the discussants assessed the real use of the possibilities to file complaints and their consequences. This topic was mainly dealt with at length in Groups I and III.

While the participants of both groups assumed that cases do exist in which an official complaint is necessary, nevertheless, they considered this more as an exception.

“It has to be something really disgraceful.” (UK.B)

The consequences of a such conduct was seen as negative. The main view was that one causes irritation and harvests a reputation as a troublemaker which then could lead to harming one’s career.
“Even if in the end I was vindicated in my complaint, what has it done to my career. Because I have created this unholy mess that has splattered (affected) everyone.” (UK.B)

The ‘black Indian’ worker, who had expressed that there are cases in which an official complaint must be filed, was asked by the other group members if it is worth the trouble. To this he replied that it is more a question of principle than of a fair outcome. This not very optimistic assessment was also expressed in Group III:

“...the perception is that you make life more difficult for you(selves).” (UK.J)

A specific case is given: The participant UK.K, an assembly line worker, emphasised the problems encountered when pushing through a complaint on her treatment by her supervisor. It was impossible to deal with the issue - sexual harassment - with the foreman, and she was not able to report it to the works council because the foreman serves as a representative in the council. She believes that the whole process did not lead to any satisfactory outcome, but rather that it has been disadvantageous for her position in the factory and that it became a general topic of discussion on the shop floor, therefore, it was not handled confidentially.

“There was something I wasn’t very happy about. The way I was being treated because I was a woman. And that wasn’t looked upon seriously at all. And so I thought, I won’t take this any further then, I’ll deal with this in my own way.” (UK.K)

Consequently, there was neither the option for her to complain to the union via the works council nor did she feel support from her colleagues.

“A hell of a lot more people on my area knew what was going on and didn’t like it. But then not one of them actually went and backed me up. They don’t want to be labelled as troublemakers.” (UK.K)

In contrast in Group II, it was doubted that there are reasons for complaints at all. One participant emphasised when referring to the factory in which he formerly worked that he does not think "ethnic minorities" are disadvantaged.

“We’ve got one or two minority on in machinery. I’ve not come across a problem. Even back at XXX where there were loads of Indians...if there was a problem, I couldn’t have imagined them not highlighting it, being afraid to highlight it for fear of recrimination. I just can’t see it.” (UK.F)

Despite his position, the picture that develops out of the discussions in the other groups is one of a 'company culture,' in which employees believe that their complaints are not effectively processed, and in which they themselves are then actually accused of the problems they name. This can be connected to a lack of transparency on the procedures, to the relatively low degree of union organisation - at least in certain departments, and to the way of collectively dealing with problems or inadequate structures of representation by the union. At least this strongly contradicts the assessment made by the participants on the situation in other factories, as mentioned by the participant UK.F and clarified by participant UK.A using the example of another incident. As follows, in another factory, a black worker "used" his status, that is, he played the "race card." After he was not promoted, he complained that he was not considered for the position since he is black. According to UK.A, there was the following reaction:

“to turn the place upside down... They went through all the records. It was a tremendous problem.” (UK.A)

However, from the perspective of the participants, the black worker did not – other than can be expected in their own company - have to suffer from it:

“The complaint was not held against him.” (UK.A)
4.4 Outside the Company: About “Good Friends”, “Cultural Differences”, and Reciprocal “Isolation”

After examining the discussants’ assessments on potential discrimination and potential intercultural conflicts inside the each of these research companies respectively, we now want to accompany them into the world outside the factory gates. How does it look there?

The overall assessment of the discussants at AutoCat can be summarised to the extent that they think that people like themselves - whom they consider to be open-minded and who make an effort to create a community of reciprocated acceptance between the native British and immigrants - are a minority in Spanish society. This means that the explanations they offered for the issues and problems discussed were attributed to the narrow-mindedness of the majority of the society. Meanwhile, the autochthonous discussants at Textil S.A. in Spain stressed the cultural differences between themselves and the immigrants and claimed that immigrants isolate themselves within their own community.

“Es que, claro, la gente de aquí no queremos relacionarnos con ellos. Como piensan diferente y son otras culturas, a lo mejor por eso. Quiero decir, no lo discriminare y lo veré como a otra persona, quiero decir, si alguna vez tiene un problema y lo puedo ayudar lo ayudaré. Pero de cara..., no sé, a lo mejor no. Somos diferentes.” (E.K)

Loose translation: "It's that, of course, people from here don't want to mix with them. Since they think different and they're from other cultures, maybe its because of this. I mean, I won't discriminate, and I'll look on them as just another person, I mean, if ever they have a problem and I can help, I will. But in theory..., I don't know, maybe not. We're different." (E.K)

Loose translation: "When there were few of them, they had dealings with the people from here, because there were eight or ten of them in the town. There was more contact. But now, there's not eight or ten, there's a lot more of them.” (E.N)

“Cuando eran pocos se trataban mucho con la gente de aquí, porque se encontraban que había 8, 10 en este pueblo. Se trataban mucho más. Pero ahora no, son 8 ó 10, son muchos más” (E.N)

Loose translation: "When there were few of them, they had dealings with the people from here, because there were eight or ten of them in the town. There was more contact. But now, there's not eight or ten, there's a lot more of them.” (E.N)

The Moroccan participants in the discussions, as we could see, agreed that the work atmosphere can be positively assessed inasmuch as they emphasised the absence of "ethnic" conflicts and the friendly relations between both groups. However, they complained that those colleagues, with whom they usually speak, pretended not know them outside the company in the local context. They interpreted this schizophrenic situation as follows: The autochthonous are ashamed if others can see that they have interactions with Moroccan people and so they try to hide it.

“Aquí somos buenos compañeros. Uno ayuda al otro, uno saluda al otro. Pero fuera, ni palabra, la mayoría.” (E.R)

Loose translation: "Here we are good workmates. We help each other, we say hello to each other. But outside, the majority, not a word.” (E.R)

“Aquí hay mucha gente que te saluda dentro de la empresa y cuando sale de la empresa no te saluda.” (E.Q)

“Pero trabajas con esos compañeros, sales a la calle y vas a saludarle y ni...” (E.T)

“Tienen miedo que lo vean, tienen miedo de la sociedad. Tienen miedo que un compañero los vea y diga: mira, un español, anda con un morito, con un Mohamed. Tienen miedo.” (E.R)

Loose translation: "When they work with these workmates, you go out into the street and go to say hello and nothing..." (E.T)

Loose translation: "They're afraid to be seen, afraid of society. They're afraid that a friend might see them and say: look, a Spaniard, with a Moor, with a Mohammed. They're afraid.” (E.R)

In the town, the separation between these two communities is the norm and this might be because of the attitudes of the native British. They, the immigrants, are discriminated in a vari-
ety of situations, for example, local festivities are organised in such a way as to avoid immigrants participation in them. They are also refused admission to a certain bar and to discos.

“Bueno, dos o tres fiestas lo celebran. Hacen baile y esto. Hacen todo posible para que ningún inmigrante no pueda entrar. No dejan que el inmigrante pueda también disfrutar de las fiestas. Han hecho todas las puertas cerradas para que no podamos entrar.” (E.R)

“Por aquí en el pueblo hay un bar. Si entras, supongo, si entran y te ve que eres un inmigrante y no te va a servir, no te va a acercar ni para pedir lo que quieres tomar.” (E.R)

“Y en los bares, hay un bar aquí que va mal, el del bar está enfermo de la cabeza. Cuando le va uno de fuera ya le da la espalda, está nervioso.” (E.R)

“Aquí si vas a una discoteca y eres moreno no te dejan entrar.” (E.R)

The Moroccan discussants stated that among the autochthonous, they are most rejected by the domestic migrants, in particular those from Andalusia. It is true that this assessment does not correspond with the results of our standardised interviews, nor did the domestic migrants formulate these kinds of reservations within the scope of the group discussions. Nonetheless, this seems to be a widespread perception that is mostly ascribed to the migrants from Andalusia.

“Por ejemplo, los empresarios han dado pisos para los inmigrantes. Ahora viven en un mismo bloque con los de aquí. Bueno, no son de aquí. Vinieron de fuera, son de Andalucía. Entonces allí había una envidia. No quieren, por ejemplo, que un inmigrante viva con ellos.” (E.R)

“Los más cerrados son los que han venido de abajo, de Andalucía. Tienen menos cultura.” (E.Q)

The Moroccans also report that it is quite different in the case of children and adolescents, while playing and at school, as well as in clubs of the city. The separation disappears gradually, here.

“Eso sí, los pequeños están ajuntados, juegan juntos.” (E.T)

“Y en la escuela no hay diferencias. Allí lo llevan bien.” (E.R)

“El tema de deportes, por ejemplo, aquí había equipos de fútbol. También habían cogido algunos de nuestro país para jugar con ellos. En este tema no hay problema.” (E.Q)

In the discussion groups at the German company, with regard to issues related to the assessment of discrimination outside the workplace, we can determine three groupings of different attitudes: Those who noticed discrimination against foreigners by the overall society, those who did not deal with this topic, and those who quite the reverse felt discriminated as Germans. Once again, we will not address the opinions of the foreign participants here since they were already examined in Chapter IV, Section 2.2.

In Group I, the German workers D.A and D.B mentioned several forms of discrimination to which, according to them, non-Germans are exposed: the lack of opportunities for promo-
tion for foreigners; the scapegoat function (D.A); the work prohibition for asylum-seekers (D.B); and the fear of expulsion or deportation. Concerning the latter point, D.B argued:

"Früher war`s ja auch so. Ich weiß von vielen Türken, dass die auch jedes Jahr Angst hatten, dass die nicht doch wieder nach Hause müssen. Das ist natürlich auch ein Scheißleben, wenn man nicht mehr weiß... Jetzt bist du bei XXX [Untersuchungsbetrieb] schon zehn Jahre, sag ich mal, und weißt nicht, ob du nächstes Jahr noch hier bist, überhaupt noch in diesem Land lebst oder so. Das ist schon ganz schön heftig." (D.B)  

The Austrian employee D.I finds the German authorities treatment of foreigners especially discriminatory. He himself had similar "disgusting" experiences in the Sixties. Moreover, he criticised that the integration of immigrants is not promoted, neither in the schools nor in the everyday social environment. Ghetto structures are accepted which makes integration of children even more difficult. On top of that, social exclusion leads foreign adolescents to adopt a behaviour that is socially unacceptable.

The German workers of Group II, the German trainee D.S, and the women in Group V hardly gave any evaluation over discrimination in the overall society. All that the women mentioned was that in everyday life there are not only conflicts with and reservations against foreigners on the side of the Germans, but also the other way round and - even more often - between different groups of migrants, for example, between “Russians and Poles” or between “Turks and Greeks.”

The position that inside as well outside of the company it is not the immigrants, but rather the Germans who are discriminated against, was held by the German workers of Group VI and the German employee D.H. They also felt that the ‘anti-racist discourse’ is oppressive outside the factory gates as well. According to them, one is not allowed to say anything against foreigners as German. Particularly within the group of the German men, the participants complained that because of their positions, they are pushed into the "right-wing corner." The debate around a "Leitkultur" (dominant culture) carried out in the public sphere in politics and in the media, for example, was very important. However, one is not at all able to speak openly. Whenever one wants to discuss fundamental issues, one is presented as a "Nazi" (D.R). The reason for this is the German past. Even if one admits that one is proud to be German, one is “immediately” accused of being a "Nazi" (D.P). D.O fears that in Germany there has even been a "loss of identity" since even expressing joyfulness over a gold medal places one into the "right-wing corner.” The employee D.H stated that as an east Friesian, she can also claim to be discriminated against.

An interesting difference between the discussion groups is quite clearly represented when they were asked to provide the causes for inter-cultural conflicts and xenophobia with regard to the role of the immigrants. In the purely German groups, they were always (additionally) mentioned, in the conversations conducted purely among foreigners, they were never mentioned. The nationally heterogeneous groups composed of the women and the salaried employees completely refrained from taking a position on this explanatory assignment.

Among the German workers, there were some, for example, who said that the "black drug dealers" provoke xenophobia as well as foreigners who insult Germans such as, "ungläubige, unbeschnittene Ferkelfresser" (“nonbelievers, uncircumcised, filthy swine-eaters”) (DB). Another point of criticism was immigrants’ lack of German language knowledge (D.S, D.B). The sanctions towards non-Germans who exhibit abnormal behaviour are too lax - if somebody is given a chance here, then he should behave appropriately.

258 Loose translation: "Formerly, it was the same. I know from many Turks that every year they were also afraid, that they would have to go home after all. Certainly, this is a shitty life, if you no longer know...Now, you have been at XXX [researched company] for ten years already, for example, and don't know if you will still here next year, or even live in this country at all and so forth. This is really quite brutal." (D.B)
The failure of the multicultural society was perceived to be a result of the foreigners lack of willingness to integrate themselves. They simply do not show their appreciation for the opportunities and favours they receive. Only in the rarest cases are they useful to the state; they do not contribute their capacity to labour and do not want to learn German. They do not show enough tolerance towards the Germans and do not sufficiently assimilate themselves (Group VI). In almost of all discussions in the group of male German workers, the discussants criticised the formation of ghettoised structures and placed blame for it on both the immigrants and the state which should not approve of it (Group VI) and should guarantee better living conditions (Group II).

The discussants claimed the courts are too lax on foreigners guilty of a crime (Group I and Group VI), but also with members of the radical right who gain impetus through this (Group VI). Meanwhile, they criticised the state for creating residence regulations that are too rigid and consequently induce the foreigners’ frustrations:


Especially interesting in this context is the causal formation and self-perception of the participants of Group VI concerning “the rightward drift” as they repeatedly mentioned through their discussions. On the one hand, they saw it as a problem that radical right politics are very much in demand and that the German society as a whole (including themselves) has right-wing tendencies. On the other hand, in some ways they also seemed to flirt with this development and more or less use it as a potential threat. By presenting themselves and the Germans as a whole as victims of an "anti-racist" and "anti-nationalist" discourse, they (as well as the other Germans – “I know of many who feel the same,” says D.R) have, so to speak, no other chance, but to become right-wing.

“Unterschwellig, da kann mir einer erzählen, was er will, überall brodelt es. Ich sage, was im Osten gewesen ist, wenn die da, die Otto Normalverbraucher daneben stehen und klatschen, wenn ein Asylantenheim angebrannt wird. Das sind Sachen, ich sage mal so, wir bewegen uns da immer weiter hin. Das ist sowas, was hier auch passieren kann.” (D.R)

Especially people who work in jobs that have something to do with foreigners are thinking more and more on the right, such as people who work at the employment office or at the welfare department, or such as D.R’s father, who works at the police department. However, they did not consider this tendency to be a (joint) cause of the ‘failure of the multicultural society.’ On the contrary, they regarded this tendency to result from the behaviour of the immigrants and from experiencing preferential treatment being given to foreigners. D.R, for example, said that he was even formerly a member of an “anti-fascist group and the Greenpeace” and ever

---

259 Loose translation: "... so that one then has to say, 'my dear friend, we want to have our peace and quiet here, we don’t need you here. We want to have order in our own country.'" (D.R)

260 Loose translation: "Well, I couldn't live like that, if I no longer knew whether I would still have my job or my country, or my apartment where I live. I just could not live in peace and freedom, and so on. Then I would also say, you damn (shitty) Germans. Then I would see it exactly the same." (D.B)

261 Loose translation: "Subliminally - you can say what you will - it’s simmering everywhere. I’ll tell you, what’s going on in the East, when they, the Otto Normalverbraucher (the average person) stands by and claps when they burn down a residency hostel for asylum-seekers. These are the things, in my opinion, that we are moving toward more and more. This is something that can happen here as well." (D.R)
since experiencing the preferential treatment of foreigners, he has "drifted" further to the right.

Seldom did the participants address in their discussions the issue of supporting the demand for formal equality or whether special rights and specific demands can be considered useful for reducing discrimination. The group with the German workers D.A and D.B appealed for special rights specifically addressing the collective life among native Germans and immigrants; for instance, the arrangement of prayer times and rooms for Muslims. However, on the issue of the administration of justice, D.B demands absolute equality:

"Also entweder wir sind hier alle gleich, oder wir sind’s nicht. Das ist so." (D.B)

In the group of the foreign workers, they controversially discussed quota systems and equal opportunities. D.F and D.G are opposed to a quota system since it would cement differences and everybody should have to prove himself or herself. D.E, on the other hand, thinks that a set of reliable and neutral criteria for assessing performance does not exist; thus a well-planned promotion system is necessary. Foreigners are already at a disadvantage since very often they are not taken on by the company after completing their training and they have additional problems that can be explained by the size of their families, which does not allow them enough time for their children. The state is supposed to promote integration and support the localities in this capacity.

In Great Britain, the participants in the three discussion groups selectively dealt with the issue of intercultural relations in everyday life. Accordingly, Group I gave a detailed discussion on perceptions of ‘difference’ and ‘race.’ Participant UK.C, who is married to a Swiss woman, pointed out that people of the same “colour” do not necessarily think the same and people of a different “colour” do not necessarily think differently. Rather

"if people are a different colour, then you notice their culture as different.” (UK.C)

Despite the idea that cultural differences should be seen positively - as an opportunity to enrich one’s experiences (UK.B) - it was considered to be a fact that one tends to interact with people of a similar background:

“But everybody always chooses to have a drink with somebody who is in a similar mind, mindset.” (UK.B)

Along these lines, it was considered logical that ethnic minorities, for the most part, do things the same as other people do:

“feel comfortable with people of the same…” (UK.B)

People of other “ethnic minorities” are perceived as ‘other,’ but UK.C added:

“I’m not saying it is a bad thing, but they are different.” (UK.C)

In contrast, Group II evaluated ‘cultural differences’ to be decisively negative and elaborated broadly on the specific negative associations with them. In connection with Birmingham, which was seen positively by the other discussants as being multicultural and integrated, they spoke of “immigrant niches” having distinctly separate cultures and complained that they feel “foreign” in their “own” country.

“In certain areas of Birmingham it is like driving through another country.” (UK.F)

“You’re a stranger in your own country.” (UK.G)

For Group II, it was not, as for Group I, simply a question of associating with similar people, but it apparently led further in the direction of protecting one’s own ‘culture’ or ‘race,’ an aspect that becomes clear in a contribution made by participant UK.F:

“We’re tribal: we like to be with and we look after our own.” (UK.F)

These differentiations were reinforced through misunderstandings and ignorance.

“Isn’t this based on this thing that we don’t know what’s going on in their minds?” (UK.F)

262 Loose translation: “Well, either we are all equal here or we’re not. That’s the way it is.” (D.B)
Nonetheless, it was thought that this distanced attitude of the white community is probably
generational. Among younger people, the greater mixing of whites and "ethnic minorities" in-
dicate less anxiety.

“They haven’t got the same fear.” (UK.H)

Next the 57 year-old participant UK.HJ, for example, also explained:

“If my daughter came out with a coloured person I wouldn’t be happy. Not that I am particularly anti-black,
or whatever. It’s just that I believe that if my daughter was marrying a coloured person then it would make it
more difficult for her and her children” (UK.H)

He then admitted:

“Now, if I would say that to her, she’d go mad at me.” (UK.H)

In Group III at the Special Motor Plant, we found a line of discussion that showed similarities
with the mode of argumentation of some the German participants at Michel Motors. Similar-
ly, it revolved around the idea of a ‘reverse discrimination.’ Thus the British discussant
UK.I maintained that ‘racist’ or ‘cultural differences’ are permanently being forced upon the
native British, but are substantiated by taboos that produce resentment.

“If the differences are so pushed in your face all the time from, from when you were young. You are not
allowed to do this, you’re told you are not allowed to do this, and you basically, you’re just highlighting the
differences.... it’s also breeding resentment...” (UK.I)

Further comments referred to whites being more disadvantaged in comparison to “ethnic minorities.”
Accordingly, the participant UK.K incidentally noted:

“People consider that the council will do more for ethnic minorities than for white people.” (UK.K)

This can be interpreted as an echo of the campaign motto of the extreme right, "rights for
whites," which was just recently started.

4.5 Who and how are "the others" ?

The construction of groups, attributes, and lines of difference

In this section, we will specifically look at which groups were named, produced, and con-
structed by the discussants – through their reflections on how they either perceive and/or
speak about societal conditions. Each of the ascribed putative distinct characteristics of such
groups can be understood as the participants’ observations and interpretations or also as a
necessary constitutive part in this process of constructing groups even in cases in which the
designated group is not actually named ‘as a group.’ In addition, we also encountered the ex-
plicit criticism of such group constructions as well as endeavours to deconstruct them.

Again we will first address the Spanish situation taking the discussants at AutoCat. All of
the participants emphasised that it is not immigration per se which is a problem for the rest of
society, but rather the immigration of poor people. They criticised distinctions made between
first class and second class immigrants according to the economic situation in the migrants’
countries of origin.

“En Mallorca a los alemanes no les tratan como a los moros. (...) Es pasta y como es pasta... Estos vienen
como si nada. En Mallorca viven los alemanes y a nadie le parece mal.” (E.B)

“El problema no es la inmigración, el problema para mí es la inmigración de gente pobre. Porque Rivaldo es
un inmigrante, pero seguro que nadie lo considera un problema.” (E.H)

“Para mí que estamos entrando a absorber la mentalidad americana, la mentalidad individualista, del éxito
americano, del ascender, no mirar atrás y cincuenta mil historias. Entonces llega gente, gente magrebí, gente

---

263 Loose translation: “In Mallorca the Germans are not treated like Moors (...) It’s money and as its
money ....They come as if nothing. The Germans live in Mallorca and no-one thinks anything of it.” (E.B)

264 Loose translation: “The problem isn’t immigration, the problem for me is the immigration of poor people.
Because Rivaldo is an immigrant, but I’m sure that no-one considers it a problem.” (E.H)
Above all the participants disagreed with the complaint that immigration implies a rise in criminality or in the sense of insecurity. All the same, they recognised that when an immigrant commits a crime, it attracts more attention in the media which likewise fosters an association between crime and immigrants.

“Y desde luego que ser ecuatoriano, o ser, yo qué sé, de un país africano, no implica ser delincuente tampoco. Yo no creo que sea un problema de inseguridad (...) Que nosotros somos, quizás, los que los estamos jodiendo.” (E.D)

They also formulated the idea that the situation of the irregularity of immigrants, which the state itself reinforces, contributes to an increase of delinquent immigrants since they are not given any other means to ensure their survival.

“In these contributions made by the participants, they attempted to deconstruct the seemingly common construction of the "criminal immigrant."

Nevertheless, we encountered group constructions which the participants did not question. For example, two of the skilled workers considered "South Americans" as a group easiest to integrate; for example, it is easier for them than it is for the "Orientals" or the "Arabs." They traced this back to their assumptions over specific degrees of cultural differences and similarities respectively, above all pertaining to language and religion.

“Si estos inmigrantes hubieran sido más o menos atendidos y regularizada su situación, muchos de ellos habrían encontrado un trabajo y el número de delitos que se les achaca sería menor.” (E.G)

In these contributions made by the participants, they attempted to deconstruct the seemingly common construction of the "criminal immigrant."

Moroccans as a group were hardly named by the discussants at AutoCat; this could owing to their non-presence in the company.

The native Spanish workers at Textil S.A., who live in the same neighbourhoods and work with immigrants from Morocco, equated the figure of the immigrant to be identical with the Moroccan and constructed this image on the basis of negative attributes. Some participants spoke of their arrival by using the terms "invasion" or "Reconquista." They also put emphasis on the immigrants as being "abnormal" – more precisely as having noisy habits, a frighten-
ingly high birth rate, a lack of willingness to integrate, and a lack of respect for the culture and religion of the host society. In the discussions, they referred to them with the apparently commonly used pejorative term of “Moros” (“Moors”).

“Dentro de 20 años esto será Marruecos, al paso que vamos. Están reconquistando ellos España. Aquí tenemos uno o dos hijos, ellos cuatro, cinco o seis.” (E.O)271

“Si tú tienes tu horario de trabajo, pues las mujeres (marroquíes) están en casa. Unas hacen ruido hasta las dos o las tres de la mañana. Yo sé de gente de aquí que les hacen ruido y han tenido que subir arriba y tocarles a la puerta y si no paran, pues mira, llamar a los mozos de escuadra. No me parecen normales.” (E.N)272

“De Ghana, Nigeria, o estos sitios ellos se adaptarán a nosotros, porque ellos se adaptarán. En cambio, si viene uno de Marruecos no se adaptará. Quieren mezquitas, que su mujer encerrada...” (E.N)273

“Cuando hicieron el encierro invadieron el terreno sagrado de los cristianos, en una Iglesia ¿Y por qué no lo hicieron en la mezquita? ¿Qué pasa? ¿La mezquita es sagrada y lo nuestro es una porquería? ¿Eso es respetar lo nuestro? ¿La Iglesia para qué es, para que hagas la fe cristiana o para que un grupo de moros se metan dentro de la Iglesia para protestar? Eso es como si se meten en mi casa y no me dejan entrar en mi casa.” (E.O)274

Meanwhile, one autochthonous participant at Textil S.A., who lives in the same block as many immigrants, referred to their generosity and good neighbourliness.

“Yo estoy viviendo en un bloque de pisos que hay 40 pisos y allí hay un negro, hay marroquíes y (...) son unos buenos vecinos. Yo los tengo por bellísimas personas. Te ayudan o lo que sea.” (E.L)275

The Moroccan workers denounced the negative images that host society has of them. They mainly explained this as resulting from a lack of information and the local native population’s low educational level.

“No podemos hacer esta convivencia porque ellos piensan que somos de otro planeta.” (E.R)276

“Mira, en el 2001, a nosotros nos preguntan si tenemos coche en vuestro país. ¿Dónde vamos a llegar con eso?” (E.S)277

“La mayoría en España no sabe dónde está Marruecos en el mapa. No saben dónde están las localidades” (E.Q)278

The Moroccan participants distinguished between two groups of native Spaniards. They used the term "catalanes” (Catalonians) for those born in Catalonia and the term "castellanos” (Castilians) for the internal migrants from the rest of Spain.

“Los inmigrantes, los catalanes y los castellanos, todos ganan casi igual, no hay diferencia (...)” (E.Q)279

---

271 Loose translation: “Within twenty years, at the rate we’re going, this will be Morocco. They’re reconquering Spain. Here we have one or two children, and they have four, five or six.” (E.O)
272 Loose translation: “If you have your working day, the women (Moroccan) are at home. Some make noise until two or three in the morning. I know of people from here who’ve been bothered by the noise and have had to go upstairs and knock on their door, and if they don’t stop, well, they call the police. They’re not normal.” (E.N)
273 Loose translation: “If they’re from Ghana, Nigeria or places like that, they’ll adapt to us, because they’ll adapt. However, if they’re from Morocco, they won’t. They want mosques, their wives locked in...” (E.N)
274 Loose translation: “When they organised the lock-in, they invaded the holy ground of the Christians, in a church. Why didn’t they do it in a mosque? What’s up? The mosque is sacred and ours is a dirty hole? This is respect for the other? What’s the church for, to practice the Christian faith or for a bunch of Moors to go in to protest? It’s like they go into my home and don’t let me in”. (E.O)
275 Loose translation: “I live in a block of forty flats, and there’s a black man, Moroccans and (...) they’re good neighbours. I think they’re lovely people. They help you and all that.” (E.L)
276 Loose translation: “We can’t live together because they think we’re from another planet.” (E.R)
277 Loose translation: “Look, in the year 2001, they ask us if we have cars in our country. Where’s this going to lead us?” (E.S)
278 Loose translation: “The majority in Spain don’t know where Morocco is on the map. They don’t know where the cities are.” (E.Q)
279 Loose translation: The immigrants, the Catalans, and the Castilians, all earn almost the same (...).” (E.Q)
A lack willingness to interact with each of the other groups is a characteristic that both the native Spaniards and the immigrants at Textil S.A. ascribed to the other.

In all of the discussions in Germany, it more or less came to a distinct construction of groups that they, in part, even self-critically questioned. In addition to the categories "Ausländer" (foreigners) and "Deutsche" (Germans), They usually referred to “Turks” and "Muslims."

The construction of groups was least pronounced among the German workers D.A (in Group I), D.C and D.D (in Group II) and the foreign workers D.E and D.F (in Group III).

Although it was stated in Group II that foreigners tend to form separate groups among themselves or not to learn the German language well, D.C and D.D emphasised that nationality was not a criteria for determining whether they like someone or not. They did not accentuate differences between Germans and foreigners.

“Wenn ich mit den Menschen klar komme, dann interessiert mich ihre Nationalität nicht.” (D.C)

D.C and D.D were very empathetic concerning the living conditions of the immigrants. Several times, they put themselves into the migrants’ position. Accordingly, D.D could understand it, for example, if people come to Germany for economic reasons.

“Wenn es mir irgendwo dreckiger gehen würde, würde ich auch versuchen, irgendwo hin zu gehen, wo es mir besser geht.” (D.D)

Both assumed that it is more pleasant for immigrants to have people from the same nationality around them and that living in the countryside is rather problematic for them, (D.D), in part, because there is not infrastructure to meet their needs there.

The German worker D.A said that there are "black sheep" everywhere, both among the foreigners and the Germans. The Turkish worker D.E was of the opinion that it is not a matter of nationality, but rather a question of the protection of civil rights and liberties.

Several participants expressed criticism on making of generalisations in the process of ascribing certain characteristics to specific groups. The German employee D.H and the Spanish worker D.F criticised that negative examples of individuals are generalised onto entire groups. The employees D.H and D.I, moreover, stated that it is not easy to answer the question over who is "richtig deutsch" (a real German) and who is "fremd" (strange/foreign). Consequently, such divisions into groups are difficult to maintain.

Occasionally the Austrian employee D.I, the Turkish worker D.T, and the German worker D.B criticised such group constructions produced by the press (D.I), by locals (D.T) or by oneself (D.B). At other times, however, all the three of them made strong group associations.

In this way, despite his criticism of stereotypical medial reporting, D.I associated "Ausländer" (foreigners) with "Ausländerkriminalität" (foreigner crimes). In so doing, he spoke of groups of adolescents, whose activities come very close to "organised crime" and to groups of foreigners who, according to the press, control the red light district, for example, the "Russian Mafia." At the same time, he referred to the "Russlanddeutschen" (Russian Germans) as a group with which there are no cultural problems.

D.T, who is of Turkish origin, sets up the group “the Turks,” to which he exclusively presents with positive characteristics. To a large extent, they are frank and peaceful. According to him, the Turks say what they think and remain calm if people irritate them. The people in Turkey arefriendlier and more sociable than those in Germany. D.T also said that it is "in the blood" of the Turks to irritate "the others," by which he apparently means that many people, especially Germans, feel provoked by Turks. D.T referred to the Aussiedler as "the worst ones."

---

280 Loose translation: “If I don’t get along with people, I am not interested in their nationality.” (D.C)

281 Loose translation: “If I were in a worse situation elsewhere, I would also try to go somewhere, where I would be better off.” (D.D)
The group “the Kurds” as constructed by D.T, in his opinion sell drugs, "up to 90% within Europe." He also generally accused the Kurds of abusing the asylum laws, especially by the PKK. The construction of the Kurds as unauthorised asylum applicants also arose in statements made by the Turk D.G (in Group III).

However, D.T also critically analyses constructions made by locals. Accordingly, he maintained that foreigners are usually considered to be only the Turks and all Muslims are also perceived as Turks regardless of where they come from. In comparison, Yugoslavians, Italians, and Greeks are not perceived of as foreigners. The head scarf serves to construct the Other, and therefore, women are easily to identified as being the Other and are considered to be dirty. Muslims are identified as the Other. This assessment is partially confirmed in other discussions as well (see below).

To start with, D.B objected to the homogeneous construction of "Ausländern" (foreigners):

"Man kann ja jetzt auch nicht alle Ausländer über einen Kamm scheren. (...) Ich denke, ganz wichtig ist die Familie, die Herkunft der Menschen und halt der Glaube, die Religion, die sie ausüben.” (D.B)\(^{282}\)

However, he then constructed groups that he considers to be problematic: "the Muslims," "the Asians," "the Jews," "the Turks," "Blacks," "black Africans," "People from the Third World without schooling," and so forth. In this case, the categories under which he formed these groups are inconsistent; together they comprise religion, skin colour, nationality, continents of origin, and even residency status. However in the process of the discussion, D.B formulated the claim that he no longer wants to make groups. Moreover, he strongly empathises with the older so-called Guestworkers, even though he tended to assign negative characteristics to them. He said that he best understands them, especially with regard to their uncertain residence status.

In constructing groups, the German women in Group V and the German trainee D.S focused on Islam (D.S) or women who wear a head scarf which represents their belonging to a "fundamentalist culture" (Group V).

D.S distinguished between cultures that are hostile toward each other, such as Christianity and Islam, and cultures that are not "antagonistic," such as that of the Russian immigrants and the Germans. The basis of hostility between Islam and Christianity lies in Islam which seeks to annihilate the Christian Occident.

"Ich bin ja selbst sogar christlich und ich kann das auch nicht tolerieren insofern die da dauernd ihren heiligen Krieg ausrufen: Tötet das christliche Abendland, also praktisch Europa.” (D.S)\(^{283}\)

He describes the "arabische Morgenland und das Osmanenreich" (Arabic Orient and the Ottoman Empire) as opponents of the Christians.

The German women discussed the Muslim practice of wearing a head scarf, not so much under the aspect of the "clash of civilisations," but rather as a symbol of progression or regression in women’s liberation. To the head scarf they associated a lack of emancipation.

"Die Mädels mit den Kopftüchern sind noch nicht so emanzipiert in ihrer Kultur.” (D.J)\(^{284}\)

For the German women in this round of discussion, women with head scarves and a "fundamentalist culture" in general seem to be synonyms for foreign women (D.K). The German women assumed that such women are generally "kurz gehalten" (kept on a tight rein) by their husbands. Their lack of independence was also explained by claiming that they are not allowed to go shopping without their husbands’ accompaniment since they do not speak German even after living in Germany for ten years. (D.K). The Turkish participant D.N attempted to dissolve this construction of groups by stating that Turks are especially associated with the

\(^{282}\) Loose translation: "You cannot lump all foreigners together. (...) I think that the family is very important, where people come from, and simply belief, the religion that they exercise.” (D.B)

\(^{283}\) Loose translation: "I am even Christian myself and I can not tolerate it that they permanently proclaim their Holy War: Kill the Christian Occident, meaning quasi Europe.”(D.S)

\(^{284}\) Loose translation: "The girls with the head scarves are not so emancipated in their culture.” (D.J)
"Kopftuch" (head scarf), which does not fit with the reality since women from Iran, Iraq, or from Arab states also wear head scarves.

One German participant characterised Germans as being patient and warm-hearted people who are not so narrow-minded, whereas “the others,” meaning foreigners, in comparison, often make a lot of trouble.

"Turks" and "Jews" are labelled as groups that do slaughtering (schächtten) according to Islamic and Jewish rites respectively (D.M). Among other things, this type of slaughtering is a Muslim practice. Therefore, the Turks are identified across the board with religious Muslims who only eat meat that is halal. However, D.M noted elsewhere that not all of those who have a fanatic belief, are Turks (D.M) and with this statement she dismantled her own construction.

Likewise, D.M put "asylum applicants" and "Asylanten" (asylum-seekers) into a group which presents a danger, especially for children, since they deal drugs. To protect the children, accommodations for asylum applicants near schools need to be more clearly demarcated.

Among the German workers in Group VI, we found the most constant use of negative attributes in the construction non-German groups. In the course of this conversation, foreigners were generally seen as "Störer" (interrupters) of the peace in Germany. Here they referred to personal experiences, the opinions of acquaintances - D.R's father, who is a policeman, seemed to play a special role here, or the newspaper. On the one hand, they distinguished between "Ausländer" (foreigners) and "Germans," on the other, between different groups of foreigners according to different nationalities or - with regard to the Turks – to different religions. The most powerful construction was that of the “violent foreigner” as someone threatening and inscrutable. Statements such as, "Ausländer wissen immer, woher Geld kommt" (“foreigners always know where money comes from”), "die meisten Ausländer sprechen kein Deutsch" (“most foreigners do not speak a word of German”), "die meisten Ausländer können sich nicht anpassen und unterordnen" (most foreigners cannot adapt and subordinate themselves) or "es gibt viele Probleme mit Ausländern" (there are many problems with foreigners). In dividing people into categories according to different nationalities, most prejudices are made against "Turks." They do things in Germany for which they would be punished in Turkey; Turkish children always go about together in groups; young Turks find themselves in positions of dependency under older Turks; "die Türken stecken alle unter einer Decke" (all Turks are in cahoots with each other); and finally their are hierarchically organised in clans. The Turks are presented as violent and intolerant, while the Germans, in contrast, are considered very tolerant.

The Russians and Poles are also constructed as groups that live in ghettos - similar to the Turks – and as only feeling powerful when in big groups that smash each other's heads.

With respect to the issue of integration, which is another 'field of construction' for the discussants in Group VI, migrants are divided into categories according to different cultural belonging (randomly corresponding to national or religious affiliation), and according to whether they integrate either well or poorly. The Vietnamese are identified as a culture that integrates easily, while Muslims are considered a bad example of integration. Islam is constructed per se as a “culture” that is impossible to integrate. Indeed, Islam is even "antagonistic" to integration. The Turks - who are possibly most identified with Islam - do nothing toward their integration.

Xenophobia was described as being an anthropological constant:

"Was fremd ist, macht Angst." (D.R)

Many different nationalities can not get along with each other.

At Special Motor Plant, in nearly all of the discussions, the participants concentrated exclusively on the Asian “ethnic minorities” in Great Britain. The participants discussed very

285 Loose translation: “What is strange (or unknown), causes fear.” (D.R)
little, if at all, over Afro-Caribbean "ethnic minorities." These were not directly observed as being problematic, in part through remarks on their common religious and linguistic bonds with the of the white majority community. A further explanation may be, though it was not addressed by the participants, a result of the history of immigration to Great Britain in which the Afro-Caribbean population is the oldest and best established group of immigrants. It is interesting that no direct connections are made between the current riots and the 1980s rioting of the Afro-Caribbean communities in Brixton (London), St Pauls (Bristol), and Toxteth (Liverpool). Likewise, despite widespread media reports over the last years, the participants did not at all mention the murder of the (black) Stephen Lawrence and the subsequent McPherson report that denounced institutional racism within the British police.

This means that in the construction of “the others,” the interview groups rather clearly focused on the Asians as a perceived "ethnic minority" than on other "ethnic minority" groups, such as the Afro-Caribbeans and the Chinese. Thus participant UK.I only spoke of an "influx of Asians into the UK". This focus could have been partially provoked by the topic introduced at the beginning of the discussions on the recent rioting in principally "Asian" communities. However, it became implicitly clear that the participants assumed that problems with the black communities have been largely dissolved.

“Why don’t we have the same problem now with the black (Afro-Caribbean) community, when 20 years ago we did? And maybe that’s where we are with the Asian community now? But I don’t think it is – I think we are going in the opposite direction.” (UK.I)

Furthermore, the term "Asian" was employed quite often, even in Group I in which an Indian worker participated. “Asian” is primarily used in Great Britain within the context of "ethnic minorities" to refer to the immigrants from the Indian sub-continent, mainly from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and their currently established communities in Britain. Certainly, these migrant have very different cultural, linguistic, and religious 'identities,' nonetheless, during the interviews, this all-'inclusive' term was used to describe the situation in predominantly Pakistani communities:

“There is a big Asian population in Oldham.” (UK.B)

This raises the question over whether the general characteristics of the Asian community - English not as their mother tongue and different cultural practices - present a situation of conflicts that follow out of a construction of ‘race’ or rather other diffuse attributes, as for example, the criteria of religion, especially Islam.

Within particular Asian communities, the members are perceived as being strongly tied to each other, for example the Muslim Pakistani in Bradford. According to the discussants, these communities are eager to protect elements of their culture, that is religious affiliation and so forth., but also seek to integrate into British life – especially as a means of opening up more opportunities to their children.

“To know about the Koran, and to be, you know, religious, yet, you know, speak beautiful English and become lawyers and doctors, you know. They want both, you know. And you just got to try and strike that balance.” (UK.B)

Ironically, it was noted that just as the parents seek to retain these cultures, they are consequently modified:

“Asian communities attempt to retain culture and end up retaining the culture they had when they arrived in the UK – but culture is dynamic and changes.” (UK.A)

The Indian participant UK.D confirmed this impression:

“When I went back home it was actually more relaxed in India than it is over here.” (UK.D)

Finally in Group I, there was a longer discussion over how perceptions influence behaviour. UK.C stressed the difference between direct relationships with "ethnic minorities" and the usual generalised perception of "ethnic minorities":
“I have coloured friends and I don’t think of them as being anything different. But when I read a report in the paper and they say a black person, that’s a difference.” (UK.C)

This was complemented by a discussion on subgroups of “ethnic minorities.” It began with a comment from UK.A on his son:

“If he was walking down the road and saw a group of Asian guys he’d probably do a detour – because he wouldn’t know what kind of reception he’d get.” (UK.A)

The Indian participant, at first surprised by this statement, admitted the following:

“If there is a group of black lads in front of me, then I would have second thoughts.” (UK.D)

Meanwhile another discussant added:

“But it could be the same for them if there would be a group of white people.” (UK.C)

The discussants agreed that this had more to do with the perception of groups of young man than with ‘race.’

“And we’ve obviously got an Asian group on the shop floor and West Indian people on the floor. So, if Sophie says to me, can you tell me who so and so is, right. And they are Asian or the West Indian, I really have to think about describing them by saying, because it would be easy to say oh he is up there on that section, but that’s not actually saying who that person is.” (UK.K)

However, this behaviour was not seen in a positive manner - as to how the members of “ethnic minorities” would want to be identified, - but rather as relating to “an oppressive” need to be politically correct:

“It’s going politically correct to the extreme and getting stupid. You do not know what to say anymore.” (UK.K)

The perception that problems are specifically related to (Muslim) “Asians” was discussed in detail in reference to education in Birmingham. UK.K advocated that such problems have increased in comparison to earlier times.

“I went to schools where there were lots of West Indian children and lots of Asian children… And there was never, never racism. And as my children have gone through school it didn’t seem too much. But now there seems to be even more.” (UK.K)

This aspect reflects in particular the increasing school segregation between whites and “Asians.” Typically schools would become completely Asian, with English as a second language. This triggered resentment within the local community: if white pupils could no longer go there and would have to drive to a school farther away, or - if they continued to go there - the standards declined since the main interest would be to teach English to non-native speakers. UK.K suggested that this could be related to Muslim communities. She said that ‘Asian’ parents want to transform schools to being exclusively Asian schools; something which the local council tries to defend against. This can be linked with the efforts of Muslim parents to convert several schools into "religious schools."

Comments made by UK.I illustrates the expectations over the behaviour of “ethnic minorities” and the diffuse image of ‘Britishness’ to which they should adapt:

“There’s two kind of Asian people. There are, and you can see this even within XXX [research company]. You’ve got the, the basically Englishman with a brown skin. That is very much an Englishman. Right. They are great, you know, you know, like a guy who worked in my department. He was great. He was a good laugh, he was, you know, you could talk to him, you could, and you didn’t feel as if he’d jump down your throat (spelling should be throat) if you, if you, you know, you took the Mickey a bit or something, and he was a nice. But then you got other people that, you know, you would never sort of feel very relaxed talking to in some way. And you, you know, you feel as if you’ve got to always watch something, if there, if there’s a two-way connotation, you know, they might jump down your throat (spelling should be throat).” (UK.I)

Although no further information was given over the kind of "Mickey taking" or over what would be said that would cause people to "jump at each other's throat,” it is interesting that none of the participants addressed or rejected this position.
Finally, the group composed primarily of women - as before when discussing asylum applicants - only referred to the 'Asians' with respect to the aspects of sexual molestation and disrespect for women. UK.J reported on experiences she had had in Bradford where she lives:

“I got kerb-crawled by Asian youths and some were disrespectful and made sexual comments – which used to piss me off!” (UK.J)

Even this topic was connected to the issue of political correctness that the participants felt to be unfair. For instance, while from UK.J’s perception these Asian adolescents go unpunished in cases of sexual molestation,

“I wouldn’t be allowed to say these things [to them] … yet they could say them to me and this reflected cultural disrespect for women.” (UK.J)

The theme of inequality between the British natives and immigrants in the discussions was not the only dimension that the participants assigned an unequal distribution of social opportunities, it also becomes repeatedly apparent in their perceptions of the gender question. In the course of these conversations, further lines of thought were identified along which social group constructions and constellations could be shown.

Thus some of the British discussants stressed the formation of a white male 'upper class' from which not only women and “ethnic minorities” can feel excluded, but also native British men of ‘lower social status.’

In Spain, on the other hand, several participants - both autochthonous and immigrants - dealt with age as a decisive category. In the group of the semi-skilled workers at AutoCat, this point of view took two opposite directions: 1. the "elderly" would hinder the "youth" from access to employment. The former work a lot of overtime which reduces the opportunities for employment for the younger ones. 2. The "older" workers, over age forty-five 45, as well as women have difficulties finding "decent" work since they have to compete with "the youth," who are willing to accept low wages and worse working conditions for the same job. At Textil S.A., the Moroccans dealt with the age question: They described rivalry between themselves and younger people, regardless of nationality. The younger people represented an adaptable workforce favoured by the entrepreneurs. This competition fosters insecurities among them.

“Por ejemplo, no se fían de nosotros, no sé, siempre le cae a un inmigrante como en lo bajo de todo, no sé, de poder. Siempre buscan jóvenes, buscan jóvenes, pero no se fían de nosotros que somos más aptos para trabajar. Sí, jóvenes para que los exploten más.” (E.P)

In the German research company, as mentioned above, the group of women addressed structures of inequality, primarily regarding gender questions. In the other groups, it was more or less a sharp criticism of the enterprises’ pursuit of profits at the expense of the workers and the environment. At the same time, however, a clear distinction is recognisable between participants’ implicit or even explicit alternative ideas. While the majority considered a consistent orientation to the principles of performance to be a “fairer” alternative to "cronyism,” the discrimination of foreigners, and the North-South divide, a few countered this with a substantial notion of equality that went far beyond the criteria of performance. However, the latter was clearly a marginal position that was most strongly defended by the group of foreign workers.

286 Loose translation: “For example, they don’t trust us, I don’t know, the immigrant’s always the last in the queue. They’re always looking for youngsters, but they don’t trust us, even though we’re more suitable for the job. Yes, youngsters so that they can exploit them more.” (E.P)
4.6 *Under the Magnifying Glass:*
*Group Dynamics, Sensitive Issues, and Specific Aspects*

In conclusion, we will now offer some comments regarding the internal group dynamics in the course of the discussions. Further, we will draw attention to issues that the participants intensely dealt with.

The most striking aspect of the group dynamics was the ‘tendency to homogenisation,’ something evident in nearly all of the groups.

In view of that, repeatedly in discussions at the German research company, the participants attempted to reach a consensus in their discussions. They were not always successful in their efforts to do so, however, if they were, it was by using different mechanisms. In Group I, the participants remained calm despite their differences and were able to reach a consensus on topics discussed towards the end. In Group II, the discussants agreed with each other most of the time, and if they did not reach an agreement on one occasion, someone then adapted as far as the content is concerned to the others. The further group comprised of German workers were in such close agreement with each other that they tended to get each other ‘all worked up.’ In particular, one participant radicalised the positions again and again. It is interesting that another discussant afterwards stated that it would have been better if their foreign colleagues had participated in the group. It is possible that he did not feel comfortable with the dynamics of the discussion. The chief topic of this group was their perception of being the victims of discrimination because they are Germans. We also recognised this to be a central theme for the trainee D.S. In each case, they drew a connection with the period of National Socialism. Apparently, their thinking here was dominated by the desire for a ‘final closure’ with the National Socialist past. Also in Group I this topic emerged in passing. It becomes clear that in this connection, latent meanings and unconscious subtexts play a role in, for example, the following dialogue: D.A noted that in the case of xenophobia, people always immediately refer to the "Historie Deutschlands" (Germany's history). After this comment, D.B abruptly explained in detail the experiences of an acquaintance in France whose neighbours are Jews. He immediately associates the "Historie Deutschlands" with "Jews." In the story he related, the Jews that appear in it are, to be sure, not the victims of "Mord und Totschlag" (first-degree murder and manslaughter), but rather the actors in it. Ultimately we can interpret this 'anecdote' as a way to facilitate a "psychological" release. In the course of these group discussions, the "Nazi-Vorwurf" (Nazi accusation) never once emerges, however, the participants repeatedly fight against it by employing a defence mechanism that fashions themselves as victims of a moralising discourse. In anti-Semitism research, a similar mechanism is termed "sekundärer Antisemitismus" (secondary anti-Semitism). These conversational passages suggest that the interpretation we are dealing with here is closely intertwined with such a (subconscious) secondary anti-Semitism and – what perhaps we can call - a "sekundären Rassismus" (secondary racism) and a "sekundären Ausländerfeindlichkeit" (secondary xenophobia).

In the other four discussions, it was most conspicuous that the migrant participants spoke from a position "as such." In the case of the group of women composed of one Turkish and four German workers, because of their different perspectives, they could not reach a consensus on many aspects despite their concerted efforts to do so. Nonetheless, they were able to reach a consensus on the topic of juvenile delinquency, which they all considered to be a problem. It seemed that their concerns from the common perspective as mothers led to a consensus. In the group of salaried employees, the dynamic between the potentially more restrictive and undifferentiated arguments by the German D.H and the more open-minded and eloquent Austrian D.I was such that the frequent controversies over subject matter tended to follow a certain conversational pattern: D.H asserted a brief restrictive statement, then D.I con-
tradicted her with more detailed explanations, whereupon D.H followed with a more moderate statement. In this manner, D.I seemed to convince D.H several times, or perhaps she only "talked her around" to it. The consensual passages in the conversations of the foreign workers over the issue of discrimination were based on their noticeable self-involvement as affected individuals. Here D.G was on the whole distinctly more silent on this subject than D.E and D.F. D.E and D.F were also the ones who disputed most intensely with each other on several points. For example, this was the case over the issue of the death penalty, which D.F insisted on for putative "racist" murderers, while D.E rejected it on the basis of general human rights. A further controversy developed around the question of whether or not the media should report on racist acts of violence. D.E regarded it as correct in order to bring in into the open, whereas D.F was opposed to it since he feared that it will lead others to emulate it. From the perspective of being personally affected, the Turkish worker D.T also very actively and nearly exclusively spoke on the topics immigration, interculturality, and discrimination.

Empathy was shown during various parts of the discussions at Michel Motors and regularly led to more differentiated evaluations.

We could also observe the 'tendency to harmonisation' among the British discussion groups at Special Motor Plant. In all, there were only a few controversies. Once a path was taken, there were few deviations from this 'group norm.' Accordingly, UK.E in Group II, for example, hardly ever countered the opinions of the older participants, especially those of UK.G and UK.H, even though he did not accept many of their arguments. In Group I, we could also observe a 'harmonisation:' The presence of UK.D as the only 'Black' seemed have the effect that the participants tended to discuss more 'conciliatory' than in the other groups. Moreover, the discussion was dominated by UK.A, a former shop steward, who 'guided' the group with a relatively intellectual argumentation rooted in political economy.

Particularly concerning the issue of asylum, it is worthwhile to consider the composition of the discussion groups. While Group I on the whole offered stringently open-minded arguments - and presumambly not only owing to the presence of a black Asian, but rather structured the overall framework of their manner of argumentation, - we can presume that Groups II and III would not have expressed their negative commentaries in this manner if Blacks had been represented among them. We can assume the same for the group composed of four German men at Michel Motors, who advocated especially rigid and negative positions and seemed to get each other 'all worked up' (see above).

On the topic of the 'riots' in the British discussion groups, we first noticed how few of the participants knew about the situation in the three cities despite extensive media reports over these incidents. In particular, there was noticeable confusion over the chronology of the events as well as various attempts to completely evade this issue either by talking about a completely different topic (terminology and "political correctness" in Group III) or by talking very generally about "immigrant niches/enclaves" without relating them to the riots at all. This lack of knowledge and/or insecurity was reflected in the various responses to the question of causes for the rioting at which point the groups then, nevertheless, finally tried to offer them.

Concerning the topic of discrimination, it was striking that there was only a slight 'permeability' in terms of changing one's perspective. While the participants in Group I best managed to abstract from their own situation, in Groups II and III the participants' own standpoint dominated. Thus Group II tended put forward a predominantly 'white-British-male' shaped perception that inclined toward minimising different kinds of disadvantages which could not be explained at the individual level. Group III, which was mainly composed of women, mainly had eyes for forms of sexist discrimination, but far less for 'racist' discrimination. In contrast, they articulated a discourse here that can be interpreted as an "Ethnisierung von Sexismus" (ethnisation of sexism). (cf. M.Jäger, 1996) Since their main criticism of immigrant groups, be it asylum-seekers or (Asian) "ethnic minorities," was connected with a "disrespect
for women." However, this pattern was broken by their similar criticism of the sexism of men in the mainstream society. Therefore, we can assume it to be more a mode of thinking in both primary and secondary contradictions. The women seemed to regard and thematise 'gender' as a primary contradiction. For the male dominated discussion groups, this appears rather as secondary contradiction compared with 'race and class' (Group I) and individual achievement and connections (Group II).

In Spain, the discussion groups – with a few exceptions - also appeared relatively uniform in forming their opinions. To be sure, opposing opinions were formulated at times - for example as one of the autochthonous participants at Textil S.A. underscored that she experienced her Moroccan neighbours as sympathetic and co-operative. However, this seemed to have little influence on the further development of the discussion.

Nonetheless, it is striking in the discussions conducted in Spain that the participants shifted the focus to various topics, which not only shows their interactions with the set of questions, but also represents their independent combination of interests or concerns. At the same time, they demonstrated the similarities and differences between the ‘political cultures’ of the two companies researched. Therefore, we will briefly summarise them in the following.

(1) ‘Resources and welfare state’: The discussants at AutoCat are very aware of the crisis of the welfare state. They analysed it as resulting from a combination of political and economic strategies. Strategies that can only be approached in any great detail by union activities. The structural powers that influence the entire society and particularly the labour market are politically constructed and therefore also can be changed by political means. Finally, they aimed at taking political action to change the current situation. The autochthonous workers at Textil S.A., on the other hand, saw immigrants as a group who monopolise public resources. For example, immigrants are said to have too many children because the state provides them with assistance. In contrast, state social services available to autochthonous workers are regarded as meagre. Thus in their eyes, an excessively high level of social protection exists for immigrants, while they themselves feel cheated. They expressed the desire that the distribution of certain social resources should only be made available according to distinctions based on the criteria of nationality. In consequence, this implies a legitimisation of inequality and discrimination along the lines of nationality.

(2) ‘Company paternalism’: At AutoCat a certain kind of paternalism exists via the unions in the sense that they are perceived of "taking care" of the workers, ensuring better work conditions, and guaranteeing wages and safety at the workplace. At Textil S.A., it is the entrepreneur who seems to take responsibility for the well-being of the workforce by making "fair" decisions, for instance over who will be dismissed and who will not, as well as providing certain social services, such as apartments for the employees most in need. In both cases, workplace safety depends less on individual achievement, rather much more on the co-operation between the employer and the employees at Textil S.A. and on pressure put on by the union at AutoCat.

(3) ‘Crises in the models of maintaining the local standard of living’: In both companies the models for work and living conditions overlap. AutoCat represents a continuation of the Fordist model with regard to employment conditions, wages, and indeed life. To leave AutoCat implies a drastic reduction in earnings, a deterioration of working conditions and thereby the end of a certain lifestyle which can be described as belonging to the 'industrial elite' or the 'workers’ aristocracy.' In the case of Textil S.A., the existence of the company and its survival determines the regional development of both the city and the district and its chances for survival. The company has a quasi control-monopoly over specific – namely industrial - places of work in the area. At both AutoCat and Textil S.A., therefore, problems created by management in the process of changing certain aspects of the organisation of production substantially challenge both the continued existence of the models of work and local living standards together with models for organising production and living conditions within the organisation.
of work. All this emerges in the context of far-reaching modifications for the rest of industry and the region. Therefore, the workers are very conscious that the transformations at the workplace are not restricted to the working world, but rather affect their everyday life and environment as well. Over the last decades, they themselves were less affected by such modifications. Instead they were experienced outside the confines of their own companies.

(4) ‘What are the workers willing to accept?’ The discussants articulated this question under the aspects of age and family responsibility. Thus if there are children to be fed, the worker’s willingness to take employment under worse conditions increases. In contrast, the younger discussants see themselves as being protected by family welfare; on which they can depend until they find acceptable employment. However, this did not keep the younger participants from emphasising that obligations such as loan debts increases their willingness to accept any job. Further, the younger participants felt generally unsure of themselves if they accepted an occupation below the level of that of their parents. The main differences in accepting employment revolved around the question of how to confront the increasing job insecurity on the labour market. While influence seems to take place by means of collective action through the unions and the company’s own representation of interests at AutoCat, the increasing insecurity at Textil S.A. tends rather to be coped with - and only slightly influenced - more through externally oriented both individual and collection action.

5. Conclusions: Interculturality - the "Other" Social Relationship

The main conclusion of our empirical study is that the 923 participants surveyed here understood interculturality to represent a social relationship with a special position. This is at least valid compared to other social relationships, such as between the sexes and in work relationships on the shop floor. Throughout the companies and countries investigated here it was generally understood as a social relationship which is not incorporated into the society; rather it is perceived as an relationship “outside the society.” In this intercultural relationship, cultural differences - "mentalities" - and cultural distances were just as much topic of discussion as were the putative natural differences between people and "nations/peoples." The emphasis of which in total does not necessarily lead to an assessment of immigrants and minorities as unequal, nevertheless, the boundary line here is extremely narrow. A striking aspect of this intercultural relationship is that it is variable and constantly in motion. More specifically, this means that in one’s perception, migration groups as well as entire generations of migrants can be disengaged from this intercultural relationship and reassigned to other social relationships, as for example, the relationship between colleagues at the workplace. At this point, they will no longer be connected with the phenomenon of immigration and interculturality. Unless, that is, specific groups are consigned to the centre of public attention and debates or of conflicts, such as the at times violent conflicts that could be observed at the turn of the last century, particularly in Spain and Great Britain. In such situations, a distancing from those groups of migrants or minorities then occurs even if everyday contacts with members of these groups already exists. Therefore, incorporation is not process that can entirely be brought to a close, rather it continues to have a relatively unstable character.

Another important and shared outcome of this study is that interculturality proved to be especially laden with conflict in everyday experiences with immigration. This does not mean, however, that we also found a specially high degree of intolerance, dislike, or xenophobia against immigrants and their families; quite the opposite tends to be the case. Rather two lines of development came together here: (1) the intercultural, everyday experience at the workplace in which the main features for reaching a normality have already been set, but not yet completed; and (2) the special emphasis placed on immigration and interculturality as a societal exception and special case in both public and political discourse as well as even within the working world and the unions, that is, also in the local discourses. Consequently, problems
and conflicts among each other are not simply seen as problems and conflicts between employees - between colleagues, - but they can also be made into a special case, namely an intercultural special case. Even so, since these conflicts and problems can be explicitly identified, therefore they cannot be anticipated, abstracted, or constructed.

Altogether this constitutes quite a broad spectrum in the conceptualisation of interculturalism in accordance with the attitudes and argumentation patterns expressed by the discussants, who were relatively evenly distributed among various groups corresponding to social status and gender. This spectrum extended from those individuals possessing a more "open-minded" attitude, whose understanding of interculturalism was essentially receptive to immigration and interculturality, over to those individuals manifesting a more "rigid and intolerant individualistic" attitude. Those having this latter attitude correspondingly demonstrated a rigidly intolerant understanding of immigration and interculturality together with xenophobia.

The background for such rigidly intolerant and xenophobic attitudes can be located in a combination of orientations and preferences from which specific conceptualisations of life are derived. These conceptualisations of life are likewise characterised by a rigid interpretation of individualism based on achievement. This achievement-oriented individualism also issues forth consequences for the choices and opportunities available for political and sozio-political participation, which prove to be limited. The hinge between these conceptualisations of life and resentment toward immigrants and minorities can be identified as preferences in certain strategies for regulating conflicts at the workplace. These are the interceding variables between conceptualisations of interculturalism and the preservation as well as realisation of individual social interests. Put in most drastic terms, this means that conceptualisations of life that follow the paradigm of personal achievement which underlies the meritocratic triad of education, profession, and income then conveys meaning onto options for social action which, in turn, renders itself to a large extent as individualistic. As a result, the modes of dealing with conflicts as well as for asserting one's interests in work relationships are individualised.

If such a conceptualisation of life leads to disappointment, for instance by young adults as they make the transition over to engaging in gainful employment and then find that there are no other options in the area of (socio-)political participation outside of individual action, then these persons are left to their own devices and have no alternatives with which to counter their disillusionment over their conceptualisation of life. Likewise, alternatives for interpreting one's own situation are also absent, especially if their entire "world view" in the terms of their concept of society is then called into question as a result of this disillusionment. Precisely those with a rigidly intolerant outlook, using their conceptualisations of life, assess social relationships based on the paradigm of individual achievement. This pertains to gender relations as well as to interculturality. In order to bring a sense of "order" back to one's concept of society which at this time appear to be "disordered" as a result the experience of disillusionment over one's conceptualisation of life, people often enlist naturalistic arguments. By looking at gender relations as a social relationship that has been incorporated into notions of society, attention is called to the putative natural qualities and needs - of women for instance – as a means of establishing naturalistic explanations for the unequal relationships between the sexes. Thus the societal conceptualisation of interculturality as a non-incorporated social relationship leads to a legitimation of exclusion and rejection. This may have been amplified since to the participants interculturality is not an abstract subject, but rather an everyday life experience. For both sets of social relationships, it always boils down to the issue of defining "the self" and "the other," however, with different lines of impact. In gender relations, women and men are not described as being unequal, but as being "naturally" different. Consequently, this legitimates a tradition of dividing up gender roles and an one-sided expansion of the gender role expectations for women so that despite a strongly developed career orientation, the area of reproduction remains a female domain. Likewise, interculturality is also considered to
be a relationship based on "natural" differences, however in this case, it is defined as unequal. Accordingly, social inequalities distinctive to migration continue to exist even though the "social opportunities for foreigners also depend on individual achievement and their abilities." This conceptualisation of the natural differences between people, prevents foreigners from being able to develop a level of achievement and ability that would help them reach a parity of treatment.

The absence of alternative conceptualisations of life and the manner in which one interprets his or her life experiences can be seen as an important approach for explaining the formation of these kinds of rigidly intolerant and hostile attitudes toward immigration and interculturality. The German political scientist Winkler reaches a similar conclusion in a secondary analytical interpretation of a representative study conducted in West and East Germany. His point of departure was to examine the influence of individual states of social imbalance and belief systems on attitudes toward foreigners. According to his findings, the variable of education\(^{287}\) was especially crucial for exploring whether individuals are in a position to be able to develop alternatives to their conceptualisation of life. Such can aid one in coping with social inequality over the course of one's life and to be able to deal more flexibly with their own social situation. Winkler summarised as follows:


In terms of social structure, we could not, in truth, find any striking features for the types of individual attitudes. This, however, first of all may result from the case study character of this investigation. With regard to social structures in the societies studied here, we only took samples from one section. When compared with each other, there were structural differentiations among the participants, however, if compared to their societies, they first and foremost represented production workers who did not have any professional qualifications. Since they only reflect a segment their societies, their educational level can be determined quite easily since we make comparisons with data from EUROSTAT. In view of this, they possess an average level of education - if we measure it with the highest secondary school qualification, the participants here, in part, fell well below the average level of education in Germany, Spain, and Great Britain (cf. Appendix V.B). This means that we can assume a social discrepancy between those surveyed in relation to the rest of their societies. Therefore, it is possible in this study to determine whether belief systems – to use Winkler’s term - are decisive.

These belief systems are the really the surprising aspect of our study since up to over 90% of the discussants cannot be described as being xenophobic and up to nearly 84% cannot even be referred to as being rigidly intolerant. Nevertheless, an individualistic achievement-oriented mode of thinking is evident, which can manifest itself as a potentially danger when combined with the absence of dispositions toward (socio)political participation. In our case, this was already demonstrated in an exaggerated variant among the "rigid and intolerant individualists," who indeed can be distinguished by a structural feature: a relatively high propor-

\(^{287}\) He isolated the variable of education by using a regression analysis.

\(^{288}\) Translation: "The analysis supports the pre-eminence of the theories of structural dispositions for explaining xenophobia at the individual level. Theories of imbalance are especially suitable for explaining changes in attitudes towards foreigners. In addition to structural dispositions and individual states of imbalance, education exercises a strong influence on the formation of attitudes toward foreigners. The hypothesis has been proven that cognitively flexible individuals under the same conditions are inclined to develop a positive attitude towards foreigners".
tion belong to the age group of up to twenty-one years, therefore, they are young adults who for the most part are still going through professional training.

The group discussions further substantiated these results. Additionally, they also showed that those participants, in particular, who based their an orientations around individual achievement, manifested a stronger negative responses toward immigration and interculturality. Here it is striking that in their argumentation, they assigned the immigrants and minorities as those responsible for their own discrimination, and analogously, the autochthonous participants understood themselves to be the ones who are actually oppressed. Two reasons were given for this: On the other hand, because foreigners are brought to the fore in the discourse, and on the other, in their opinion, they are not allowed to openly express their opinions. Thus the consequences are namely that they are then accused of xenophobia and racism.

The consequences are namely that they are then accused of xenophobia and racism.

The discussion groups also offered insight on five other central aspects:

1. On the constructions that underlie interculturality as a social relationship: As soon as resentment comes into play, constructions are articulate by using of diffuse ascriptions. In the German case, it was the dichotomy of "the foreigners" and "the Germans" or allocations on the basis of religion, such as the "Muslims" by which the Turks were usually meant. If they were referred to in a positive manner, then they were classified according to their nationality of origin. Altogether, within the diffuse ascriptions surfaced fears of threats just as those which are central to attitudes aligned with "naturalistic thinking." In the British case, negative connotations were evident in the sweeping statements made on "Asians," who were usually identified with Muslim Pakistanis. The relationship with "African-Caribbeans" was not a topic of discussion here - at least not at the time our investigation and not one that was assessed negatively. Rather, "African-Caribbeans" were granted as possessing a greater capacity to integrate because of their English language competency and their affiliation with the Christian religion. In the end, it was not clear if this will continue to be a lasting assessment. In the Spanish case, it was not as easy to locate similar primary constructions as a leitmotif throughout the discussions. Only the participants at Textil S.A. problematised the question of cultural differences and attributed them to Moroccans. This, however, was not necessarily charged with resentment. Immigrants from South America - similar to the "African-Caribbeans" in the British case - were assumed to be more capable of integrating because they share a common language and religion. In contrast, the capacity of "Orientals" and "Arabs" to integrate was called into question. Here again, the participants employed diffuse ascriptions. In all of these constructions, culturalistic elements were evident, which largely rested on religion.

2. On the effects of public discourses: Each of these diffuse ascriptions directly related to public debates on immigration and incorporation, as we had previously presumed in the quantitative data raised on attitudes. Here, an unstable social relationship to interculturality in the localities can be shown. If these groups are to be found in the centre of public debates, then not only does the distance again increase, but - as described in the first point above - it also alters the construction. In Great Britain at the time of the empirical stage of this study, an exaggerated and scandalising debate took place over the issue of flight and asylum together with a tightening of the rights to asylum. This was subsequently reflected in the discussions of the British participants, who, while discussing the topic of immigration, concentrated on this debate. It is interesting, however, that they did not simply reproduce the scandalising character of the public debate, but also argued in a thoroughly differentiated manner.

3. On the attitudes of the participants with a migration background: This partial sample essentially took on greater meaning mainly with the Moroccan workers in the group discussions in Spain, and therefore, does not reflect the perspective of domestic migrants to Catalonia. These participants, as well as those with a migration background in the German sampling, similar to the autochthonous participants were sceptical over further immigra-
tion to Spain and Germany respectively. However, their apprehensions were tied more to fears that their own social opportunities would suffer as a result of increased immigration and that they would be threatened with added competition on the labour market.

4. On the relationship of the participants having a migration background to the autochthonous participants: During the discussions at the German car manufacturer, the participants from migrant families, in part, repudiated having experienced discrimination themselves, meanwhile, in some cases they strongly emphasised discriminatory actions. According to them, they usually perceived discrimination and hostility in rather subtle and indirect ways. For example, they referred here to sayings and graffiti on lavatory walls (cf., Chapter III, Section 3.1), rather than being directly accosted themselves. Moreover, they saw their relationship to younger Germans as more open as compared with the older generations. The Moroccan workers differentiated between "Catalanos," those being the autochthonous, and the "Castellanos," those being the domestic migrants. Above all, they accused the "Catalonos" of being intolerant and prejudiced.

5. On the deficient incorporation of the social relationship of interculturality: In the small village where the Textil S.A. factory is located and the factory employees live as well, outside of the working hours, there is a separation between the Spanish inhabitants and the immigrants. In this regard, the Moroccan workers spoke of two co-existing worlds: the intercultural world at the workplace in which a collegial climate prevails; and the world of village life in which the neighbourhoods are separated from another along the lines of nationality and associations are largely avoided. This is an example of the failure to incorporate the social relationship of interculturality and of the partitioning off of the sphere of work and other areas of life activities. In everyday life in the village, a "normal" form of contact evidently does not (yet) belong to the accepted norm.
Chapter VI: The Long Way to an Open Society –
a Summary of the Most Important Results

Western Europe started to become a region of immigration in the 1970s, entering a stony path whose end is not yet in sight. This development became first evident in a structural change in migration and migration systems in the traditional immigration countries and in their purely nationally oriented migration politics. At that time a process leading to more similarity in structure and politics became evident in these countries. This meant that, on the political level, migration politics were formulated in an increasingly restrictive way. Recruitment stops and limitations on moving into the country as well as tighter stipulations regarding naturalisation of post-colonial immigrants were intended to put a general stop to migration. The so-called return help and the re-entry ban were supposed to encourage those migrants to re-migrate permanently to their countries of origin, which was for most Turkey. Family reunion and asylum became the remaining “gates of entry”. There were attempts to tighten them as well, despite their being protected by international law. This all led to a decrease in immigration to Western Europe and to a forced emigration, but these tendencies were balanced out for the most part, mostly due to family reunification. Others wanting to immigrate who were not part of a migration network or who were unable to use the benefits of family reunification regulations were dependent on the right to asylum as a way to gain entrance. This led to an increased number of those seeking asylum in the 1980s. There was a simultaneous drop in those who were granted asylum.

Co-operation and antagonism between countries marked this phase of European migration politics. Due to the tightening of family reunification and asylum laws in some countries, other countries saw themselves forced to synchronise their laws in order to avoid becoming a collecting basin for refugees. Further, what started out as a bilateral political instrument became increasingly more important: treaties were signed with neighbouring countries in which they were obliged to stop migrants without papers from travelling on or to receive migrants back who had managed to cross the border. This led to the neighbouring countries – usually in Eastern Europe – signing treaties with their other neighbours. These measures were complemented by a visa politics that eventually resulted in citizens of almost all countries outside of the OECD having to carry a visa. A large part of the national migration control and steering was thus transferred to the consulates and embassies in foreign countries.

This all can be referred to as a kind of “domino effect” in migration politics. The result has been that the belt around the Western European immigration countries has become increasingly broad. The image of a “fortress Europe” defending itself against migrants became more clear.

The Western European immigration countries mutually influenced each other’s restrictive and often competing politics so that the spiral became increasingly tight and high. The outcome has been wide-reaching and primarily negative consequences for other goals and fields of politics as well as for public sentiment regarding immigration and interculturality. The two most important results are as follows.

First: The process of synchronisation and mutual negative intensification in migration politics crystallised into a strong blockade of finally realising the goal of a European common market contained in the 1957 EEC treaty. The global economic development to recognise economically rising states in Asia as new competitors and the increasing intertwining of the economy in Western Europe and beyond increased pressure on the EC to realise the common European market. In addition to the free movement of goods, services and capital, freedom for EU citizens to travel and establish themselves in other EU countries was one of the necessary prerequisites. That required the opening of internal borders and the abolition of border controls. It became evident that migration regulations were needed not only for EC
citizens, but also for so-called third country nationals. Some of the issues to clear up and co-ordinate were the question of which common path regarding visa politics should be taken and who should be responsible for asylum politics, which needed to be unified at the same time. Further, they were to agree on freedom of travel within the EC for third country nations with valid residence papers. Particularly this last issue was opposed by Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark. The efforts of Ministers of the Interior and Ministers of Justices of the EC-countries to establish a group, ad-hoc workgroups, forums, etc. in order to develop solutions on the level of intergovernmental co-operation led to rather chaotic and confusing discussion structures. The first successful effort to establish a new border regime and migration regulations was negotiated by the so-called Schengen Group, founded in 1985 and made up of the three Benelux countries, France and Germany. The resulting treaty came into effect only in 1992. The activities of the Schengen Group, however, began a process that has led to more strongly co-ordinated activities in migration politics, at least among the participating countries. These politics were, at first, on a restrictive course regarding immigration from outside the EC, leading to restrictions in the asylum laws and to regulations about “safe third countries” and “safe countries of origin” for asylum seekers. This group successfully put pressure on the other EC-countries (later EU countries) so that by now 13 states have signed the Schengen Agreement. Only Great Britain and Ireland have refused their signature thus far. The Agreement has been transferred into the sphere of the EU with the Treaty of Amsterdam so that migration politics, including asylum politics, has become an area of action for the EU and thus part of common policy. The common politics vis-à-vis migration and asylum must be worked out by 2004 at the latest.

The front that wanted a solely restrictive migration politics weakened in the 1990s. The immigration countries – including the new immigration countries in southern Europe like Spain and Italy – were in need of foreign workers to strengthen their domestic economies. The demand for labour was concentrated in general in the areas of unqualified and poorly paid jobs in the service sector, like in the tourism industry, in the agricultural sector or in the highly qualified work segment of the IT-industry. Both the realisation of the European common market and the newly arisen need for labour migration demanded a directional change in migration politics toward somewhat more openness to immigration. Immigration was quite allowed and desired in the 1980s and 1990s, even if it was on a low legal level for those wanting to immigrate and mostly outside of public legitimisation and discourse. This political path became impossible to maintain, which leads us to the second negative consequence of the past restrictive migration politics.

Second: public and political discourse on immigration has generally been accompanied by a scandalization of migration and anti-foreign resentment since the 1970s. Xenophobia and violence accompany the history of migration, especially in the traditional immigration countries. Spain, as an example of a new immigration country, at least has a public discourse that is not full of these resentments and scandal-loaded tone. This too, however, has been changing since the turn of the millennium.

Even in the time of acceptance of labour migration through recruitment of foreign workers or through post-colonial migration movements, immigration has always been considered to be a temporary phenomenon as well as a special situation and exception. Post-colonial immigration was often seen as an exception in that it was not classified as immigration, but rather – still under the influence of colonial thinking – was seen as a migratory movement within a “colonial empire”. This is particularly evident in Great Britain after World War II until the early 1960s. Thus the paradox can be explained that well in the 1990s, and in some cases even until the turn of the millennium, even large post-colonial immigration countries did not consider themselves to be immigration countries. This is one way in which they hardly differ from the countries that recruited foreign labour. The largest destination country for labour mi-
grants and flight in Western Europe, Germany, took until 1999 to declared itself to be an immi-
gration country.

In light of this situation it is difficult to make the change to a more open migration politics
and to communicate and legitimise it to the public. This difficulty is present not only regard-
ing the external openness to migration, but also regarding the willingness to move toward
more internal openness like the incorporation of immigrants into society.

These two negative consequences of past migration politics and their public legitimisation
present a dilemma. This dilemma is the topic of this study and is also the central result of the
analysis. Our main idea follows the German sociologist Seifert, that the external and internal
openness of society can be determined depending on the societal and political dealings with
migration. The question is not whether we can find a measure for saying at what point a soci-
ety can be called externally and internally open or closed. Rather, more important is to think
about the societal and political approach to a phenomenon that has been described by the
German historian and migration researcher Bade as always having accompanied human his-
tory, thus in no way being an extra-ordinary or exceptional situation. Another question that
must be approached is whether the explanation for the understanding of migration in Western
European countries as exceptional and non-normal can be found in the fact that the “old con-
tinent” was, especially in early modern times until well into the 20th century, a region of emi-
gration. Immigration is more of a new historical phenomenon here. Or is it a result of the
paradigms that the Western European countries used to create a “national people” and that
“ethnicities” came to be an important construct in this context? This study starts with the
relics of history and their consequences.

Great Britain, Germany and Spain served as fields of investigation for us, for they repre-
sent the three types of immigration countries in Western Europe, or, more specifically: In the
EU (1) Great Britain stands for a post-colonial immigration country, (2) Germany as a coun-
try that recruited foreign workers in the 1950s to 1970s and (3) Spain as a county with a
strong internal migration in the 1950s to 1970s and as a new Southern European migration
country. Each of these countries has its own particularities regarding structure, the develop-
ment of democracy and the political system, and in regard to the history of migration, but the
above named indicators are particularly clear. The differences in the migration systems of the
three countries were of particular interest. Thus we were able to determine whether the above
mentioned dilemma, and especially the phenomenon that migration is considered to be an ex-
ception and extra-ordinary situation, can be equally observed in all three immigration coun-
tries. This is what links the three countries to one another.

Conclusions in regard to the process of synchronisation can thus be made as can be seen
above. This can be done regarding the external openness or closedness of society to migra-
tion. The question of the internal openness was also confirmed: the understanding of migra-
tion as a particular, exceptional situation is the main factor for missing openness. This can be
found clearly both on the societal level, for example by looking at the understanding of citi-
zenship, and on the individual level, as in the examination of the interviews of employees of
the four manufacturing plants (of which three had an intercultural workforce). The attitudes
we analysed here showed which concept of citizenship and which understanding of intercul-
turality as a social condition prevail on this level.

At first glance at the level of society it seems that the understanding of citizenship has gone
in two opposite directions in the last six decades: on the one hand, as has been often stated in
social science research – there has been a continuing split of citizenship into separate legal,
political and social dimensions, in which non-citizens also have access to the labour market,
the social welfare system and some arenas of political participation. On the other hand, a so-

572 Whether the cause for this understanding in comparison to, for example, the North American immigration
countries may also be due to the fact that the European countries did not constitute themselves through immigra-
tion as nations and societies was not a topic of this study.
cial and political construction has moved back into the centre of the migration societies: the “ethnic community” of the nation-state. The understanding of belonging according to ancestry (“ius sanguinus principle”) has become more important even where the “ius soli principle” prevailed in the past. This tendency cannot be overlooked in the case of Great Britain. Spain and Germany, however, exhibit a slight softening of the principle of descent, due to the fact there is a backlog demand in both countries: they both need to modify their citizenship laws in order to correspond to the situation of immigration. The “ius sanguinus principle” remains the guiding principle despite the slight modifications.

The split in citizenship is quite clearly a step towards adaptation for the migration societies. It does not, however, lead to the legal dimension, i.e. citizenship/nationality, becoming less important. Quite the contrary is true: in the process of this split, the “ethnic membership” to the “community” of the majority society as expressed through citizenship/nationality has become the “core construction” in the three migration societies. This “core construct” has become the focus of politics and thereby has become the central structural category in regard to access to the political space of the three nation-states. Other categories like “EU-citizen”, “citizen of a country outside of the EU”573, “recognised asylum seeker”, “refugee in a recognition process”, “Convent refugee” or “de-facto refugee” as well as “sin papeles” are all derived from this central category. Great Britain includes the post-colonial immigrants at least formally, but this is not the case for later immigrants from the Commonwealth.

One should not overestimate the politically quite strictly defined “ethnic community” that is dominant in Germany and Spain. It has not lead to a social practice of hermetically sealing the society off to immigration and resisting incorporation of immigrants. That is not true even for the political practice. It is possible to identify a pattern of order in this construction, which developed historically and which plays a particularly strong role in the building of nation-states in Western Europe, but the categories within it are permeable. This can be seen in the split of citizenship into the legal, political and social dimensions. As can be seen in the three countries, this permeability is possible without the “core construction” of the “ethnic community” with all its exclusivity challenged. This permeability is flexible under the primacy of the “ethnic community” and allows for the incorporation of immigrants and their families.

Despite the flexibility of citizenship with an “ethnically” defined structural category, there is still a drop of bitterness. Such a concept of belonging leads to a chasm in the migration societies and their political arena due to the fission in rights and chances afforded those in society. And this seems to be the desired effect, for all of this can be understood as a political tool to steer and control migration via access/non-access to the political arena. This replaces or supplements the control at the borders of the national territory and is the reason that the concept of citizenship based on the principle of ancestry is experiencing a revival in Western European immigration countries, a revival that was first initiated due to the above mentioned division.

The question is thus difficult to answer whether Great Britain, Germany and Spain are becoming societies with more internal openness, even more difficult than the question of external openness. A tendency toward more external openness is reflected in the move away from a relatively strict resistance to migration in favour of a limited politics of admission and in the change in perspectives that is perceptible in this context. We have shown that this is not necessarily accompanied by a political and social incorporation of immigrants. Especially the immigrants that have entered since the 1980s under more difficult legal conditions are subject to the division within the migration countries. The societies are open to them only to a limited extent and, despite the process of European integration, the economic and monetary union and the open internal borders, the “borders” to the nation-states in the EU remain standing.

573 All three countries differentiate between those who immigrate from other western countries outside of the EU and OECD countries and those who immigrate from all other countries. It is also of importance in Germany whether immigrants and their families come from countries from which Germany formerly recruited labour.
These are no longer as obvious as territorial borders, but rather as (virtual) borders regarding access to the political arena through citizenship/nationality. This way not only migration of third country nationals, but also of those from EU countries, are more closely controlled. EU-citizens enjoy on the one hand the unrestricted freedom to travel and settle down, but on the other hand they are accorded only limited access to the national political arena. Although citizens of EU countries are often no longer considered to be “foreigners” – as one result of the survey of 923 employees shows – the “ethnic community” is still the core construction according to the empirical study. This is the starting point from which immigrants and their descendants are grouped and subject to other constructions. These constructions change according to the social context and discourse. Everyday and interculturally structured contexts – like at work – are spoken of, ascriptions to other “ethnic communities” or national origin dominate next to those self-ascribed constructs. When more abstract, social and political contexts are meant, and when discourses with a negative reference to migration and interculturality play a role – i.e. when negative connotations are on the table – then more diffuse constructions and ascriptions are virulent. These can take the form of dualisms like “foreigner” vs. “British”, “German” or “Spanish” or according to religion. Dualisms are here, too, the rule, as in “Islam” vs. “Christianity”, regardless of which Christian religion is more dominant, whether Catholicism or Protestantism are equally represented, whether the state is formally secular or whether a state church exists and regardless of how strongly or weakly marked the connection to the institution of the church is.

We were able to find rejecting attitudes regarding migration as well as anti-foreigner resentment in connection with constructions with negative connotations among those who participated in the survey. All the same, xenophobic positions in the strict sense were only present among those surveyed in a minor – and in comparison to each society in case in general – in a proportionally small extent. Further, we were only able to find a potential for xenophobia in the German and British samples and not at all in the Spanish samples. It is possible to say of the sample in general that immigration and interculturality are, despite the mentioned constructions and ascriptions, approached with a relatively open and tolerant attitude. This is particularly true for close range areas like the workplace and less the case with more abstract or distant areas like the societal and political level.

One more result is of central importance in regard to our main question: the integration or non-integration of interculturality as a social condition in the perceptions and images of society. We were able to find a broad spectrum of interculturality concepts both in the quantitative as well as qualitative analysis which run from the attitude-type “open” to the type “rigid and intolerant individualist”. All of the understandings of interculturality had in common in that interculturality is perceived as a social condition not incorporated into society. In this way it differs from the understanding of other kinds of social conditions that we examined in comparison, gender relations and the work relationships on the shop floor. It is interesting to see that this lack of integration is expressed in ways that ranged from scepticism to rejection of the incorporation of immigrants into civil rights, i.e. in a rejection of foreigners’ access to rights that are exclusively held by citizens of that nation-state. Looking at these phenomena together the position of migration and interculturality not only in political but also in cultural practice becomes clear. It is a position of “a phenomenon outside of society”, a special case and exception. Further, we were able to ascertain on the level of attitudes that the construction of the “Self” as an “ethnic community” is the central construction from which the different and variable constructions of the “Other” are derived.

The lack of integration of interculturality as a social condition in the attitudes about society and social conditions of inequality could thus be the reason that the theme “labour market and unemployment”, a problem that the interviewees regarded as a relevant social problem, was not brought into connection to immigration in the group discussions. This means that the participants – other than is often the case in political discussions – did not regard an increase in
immigration as responsible for the situation on the labour market. This has to do with the open and tolerant attitudes on the one hand and, on the other, with the lack of integration of interculturality in society.

Altogether it is possible to say of the results of this study in the four industrial firms in three different immigration countries that the intercultural every day practice – as we found on the shop floor of three of the plants – is just as important as the possibility for socio-political participation for the open and tolerant interculturality concepts. Both – and this is the paradox of these results – can be turned into negative attitudes in belief systems. The dangerous potential for xenophobic attitudes are not connected to the existence of inculturality in a causal manner, but rather with a rigid, individualistic orientation towards achievement. This translates into a relative distance to collective interest representation and leads in consequence to an individualisation of social problems and an individualisation in regard to the struggle for or defence of individual social interests like those in work relationships. When this individualistic orientation towards achievement, in which the meritocracy triangle of education, profession and income is reflected, does not find an equivalent in a person’s work life, then problems arise in regard to life concepts and life prospects. The problem arises because the disappointed expectations are not compensated through alternative life concepts or in belief systems or because the actors do not see other explanations than the individualistic ones and do not develop other courses of action regarding socio-political participation. This provides the foundation for attitudes ranging from intolerant to anti-foreign especially in young adults, mostly apprentices. The results of an age comparison further showed that these intolerant and anti-foreign feelings regarding disappointed expectations in their life concepts decreased with age. Whether these feelings remain limited to a single phase of life – like the transition from the educational system to working life in young adults – cannot be definitively said based only on the data of case studies. There are no representative studies in the countries at hand that take focus not only young adults and their attitudes, but also make a comparative age analysis.

The study we carried out does at least show that such life concepts provide the starting point for intolerance and xenophobia. This direction determines both the public discourse about and the manner in which society deals with migration as an exception and special case. This confirms the perception of interculturality as a social condition that is not incorporated into society. Thus interculturality is up for grabs as a kind of “game field” in which social problems are acted out. Further, not being able to develop alternatives in life concepts and belief systems is an expression of a social problem or, more precisely, of social inequality. This too is an outcome of the study. From the social structure perspective, our samples are taken from only one segment of society, the unskilled, unqualified workers in industrial production. Looking at the highest degree attained, we can see that the interviewees had, on average, sometimes even far below the average educational level in Great Britain, Germany and Spain. Access to education, as was argued in Chapter II, is subject to social selection. This doesn’t happen to quite the extent in Spain and Great Britain as in Germany, but is none the less present in all three countries. As education is not just a question of training for the labour market, but also a question of what chances people have to reflect on social conditions, life plans and belief systems, it is also quite relevant for the chance to develop life concepts and options for acting.

We can thus assume that the interviewees experience restrictive conditions for life prospects that are marked by the limited access to resources of social, cultural and political capital. None the less, xenophobia remains a peripheral phenomenon in the German and especially in the British sample. It cannot even be detected in the Spanish sample, only an intolerant attitude as the extreme in the conception of interculturalism was found for that country. Both the

574 We did find a group of older skilled workers in the pre-study who also expressed disappointed expectations in their life concepts and in the labour union and who had similar constellations in their attitudes (see Chapter III, Part 1).
intercultural every day practice and the chance to participate in labour union politics and politics in general – and in Spain the public discourse – are all likely to have a central affect on these results.

We can note at the close of this study that the path to an open society is likely to remain long, more so in regard to internal openness than external openness. Even open and tolerant conceptions of interculturalism – whether on the societal level, in public and political discourse or in individual attitudes – cannot compensate a fundamental understanding with a long history: migration as an exception and special situation and interculturality as a social condition not incorporated into society. Despite first attempts to allow more external openness to immigration and to invest more in the incorporation of immigrants and their descendants we find another, opposite trend as well: a closing off of the political space of nation-states toward non-citizens. This delimitation activates the core construction of the “ethnic community” when negotiating citizenship rights and understanding of belonging. It is relevant not only for members of third countries, but also for citizens of EU member states, though with fewer consequences regarding the chances for participation. This could, however, be a reaction to the process of European integration.
Annex

Download in German language: www.ursula-birsl.de/Publikationen.


Arbeitsgruppe Bildungsbericht am MPI für Bildungsforschung, 1994: Das Bildungswesen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Strukturen und Entwicklungen im Überblick, vollständig überarbeitete Neuauflage, Reinbek bei Hamburg (Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag).


BBC online, 1999c: UK – Action demanded over workplace racism, in: http://news2.thls.bbc.co.uk (11.10.).


Birsl, Ursula, 2003: Migration und Migrationspolitik im europäischen Integrationsprozeß. Großbritannien, Deutschland und Spanien im Vergleich, Opladen (Leske+Budrich).


Casey, John, 1998: Las políticas de inmigración. La regulación de ad misión y la acción integradora, en: Las políticas públicas en España. Contenidos, redes de actores y niveles de gobierno, editado por Ricard Gomà, Joan Subirats, Barcelona (Ariel), cap. 16.


Bibliography


El País v. 08.03.2001: Los inmigrantes abandonan las iglesias de Barcelona tras 47 días de encierro.
El País v. 07.04.2001: Mi amigo Smart.
El País v. 17.04.2001: La oposición exige al gobierno que suavice el reglamento de extranjería.
El País v. 08.05.2001: 700 ecuatorianos tienen ahora problemas para regresar en breve a España.
El País v. 19.06.2001: Aumenta el 10% la entrada ilegal de extranjeros con la nueva ley.
El País v. 04.03.2002.
El País v. 06.03.2002.
El País v. 07.03.2002.


European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 1999: Racist incidents lead to new equality initiative at Ford, in: http://www.eiro/eurofound.ie (18.11.).


Frankfurter Rundschau v. 31.08.2001: Fremde Kontrolleure.


Göttinger Tageblatt v. 22.07.1999: „Maurische Huren söhne, raus mit euch“. Spanien: In katalanischer Stadt Terrassa bricht sich Fremdenfeindlichkeit die Bahn.


Han, Petrus, 2000: Soziologie der Migration, Stuttgart (UTB, Lucius&Lucius).


Mittelbayerische Zeitung v. 8.10.1999: Spanien wird zum Einwanderungsland.

Bibliography


Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, 1999: Indicadores de la inmigración y el asilo en España, núm. 5.


Rex, John, 1986: Race and Ethnicity, Buckingham.
Solé, Carlota, 1995: Discriminación racial en el mercado de trabajo, Madrid (CES).
Solé, Carlota, 2001: El impacto de la inmigración en la economía y en la sociedad receptora, Barcelona (Anthropos).

Solé, Carlota, 2002: Ciudadanía y racismo, in: Estructura y Cambio Social, editado por María Angeles Durán, Carlota Solé, José Félix Tezanos, Madrid (Imserso).

Solé, Carlota et al., 2000: Inserción de los inmigrantes en la economía e impacto en las sociedades del sur de Europa, Madrid (Imserso).


taz (die tageszeitung) v. 10.3.2000: Jagdszenen aus Südspanien.


taz v. 17.08.2001: Prekäres Leben auf dem Asphalt.

taz v. 21.08.2001: Reiseziel Spanien.

taz v. 13.11.2001: Notstand in Großbritannien.


The Guardian v. 06.06.2001: Cars and shops set on fire and missiles thrown after arrest row.


The Guardian v. 18.09.2001: Police says victim was taunted over US atrocity.


Toharia, Luis, 1997: Labour Market Studies: Spain, Luxembourg (Office for Official Publication of the European Communities).


